Commissioner of Police Service v Parole Board of Queensland & Anor [2019] QSC 315 (2019) 3 QR 251
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Commissioner of Police Service v Parole Board of
Queensland & Anor [2019] QSC 315
PARTIES: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE SERVICE
(applicant)
v
PAROLE BOARD OF QUEENSLAND
(first respondent)
CLIVE ANTHONY NICHOLSON
(second respondent)
FILE NO/S: BS No 6865 of 2019
DIVISION: Trial Division
PROCEEDING: Originating application
ORIGINATING
COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 19 December 2019
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 18 September 2019
JUDGE: Douglas J
ORDER: 1. The application be dismissed.
2. The parties be heard as to costs.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – POST-CUSTODIAL
ORDERS – PAROLE – BOARDS, TRIBUNALS ETC:
POWERS, DUTIES AND CONSTITUTION – where the
second respondent was serving a life sentence of imprisonment
for murder – where the body or remains of the victim of that
offence have not been located – where the offence of murder
is a homicide offence within the meaning of s 193A(8)(a)(iii)
of the Corrective Services Act 2006 – where the Parole Board
must refuse to grant an application for parole unless it is
satisfied that the applicant has cooperated satisfactorily in the
investigation of the offence to identify the victim’s location –
where in considering the applicant’s cooperation the Parole
Board must have regard to a report given by the Commissioner
of Police relating to the applicant’s cooperation – where the
Parole Board “may have regard to any other information the
Board considers relevant” – where the Commissioner’s report
was supplied by an Acting Inspector – where the first
respondent made a determination that in determining the
second respondent’s application for parole, the Acting
Inspector be subjected to cross-examination by the second
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respondent’s counsel – where the first respondent made a
further determination that the Parole Board could take
evidence from the Acting Inspector as the Commissioner’s
delegate on oath or otherwise – where the applicant challenges
those two determinations – whether the Parole Board is entitled
under the Corrective Services Act to hear evidence on oath or
otherwise and to permit cross-examination of those giving
evidence in respect of parole applications
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 27
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), ss 3(2), 189(1), 193A(5),
193A(6), 193A(7), 193A(8)(a)(iii), 218, 219, 230
Hird v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Sports Anti-
Doping Authority (2015) 227 FCR 95 referred
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 referred
Lincoln v Parole Board of Queensland [2019] QSC 156
referred
Maclean v Workers’ Union [1929] 1 Ch 602 referred
Rose v Bridges (1977) 79 FCR 378 distinguished
COUNSEL: S McLeod QC with M Nicholson for the applicant
J M Horton QC with E Longbottom QC for the first respondent
L Reece for the second respondent
SOLICITORS: Commissioner of Police Service for the applicant
Parole Board Queensland for the first respondent
Wallace O’Hagan Lawyers for the second respondent
[1] The applicant, the Commissioner of the Police Service of Queensland, challenges a
decision of the first respondent, the Parole Board, by which it was decided that an Acting
Inspector Knight be subjected to cross-examination by the second respondent’s legal
representative as part of the second respondent’s application for parole. The Board also
decided that it could take evidence on oath or otherwise to enable it to hear and determine
the second respondent’s application for parole.
Factual background
[2] The second respondent, Clive Anthony Nicholson, is serving a sentence of life
imprisonment for murder. The body or remains of the victim of that offence have not
been located. As the offence of murder is a homicide offence within the meaning of
s 193A(8)(a)(iii) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), the Board must refuse to grant
the application for parole unless it is satisfied that the applicant has cooperated
satisfactorily in the investigation of the offence to identify the victim’s location.
[3] Section 193A(7) says that, in deciding whether the Board is satisfied about the prisoner’s
cooperation, the Board must have regard to a report given by the Commissioner of Police
under s 193A(6) dealing with whether the prisoner has given any cooperation and, if so,
an evaluation of the nature, extent and timeliness of the cooperation, the truthfulness,
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completeness and reliability of any information or evidence provided in relation to the
victim’s location and the significance and usefulness of the cooperation.
[4] Section 193A(7) also provides that the Board must have regard to any information the
Board has about the prisoner’s capacity to give the cooperation, the transcript of any
proceeding against the prisoner for the offence, including any relevant remarks made by
the sentencing court. Notably, also, s 193A(7)(b) says the Board “may have regard to
any other information the Board considers relevant”.
[5] The Commissioner’s report was supplied by Acting Inspector Knight.
[6] Counsel was instructed by Legal Aid Queensland on behalf of Mr Nicholson to appear
before the Board at the hearing of Mr Nicholson’s application on 7 June 2019. The Board,
at counsel’s request, issued an attendance notice to Acting Inspector Knight to attend the
hearing.
[7] On the afternoon of 6 June 2019, the Commissioner wrote to the Board objecting to any
intention by the Board to allow another party to the parole application to put questions to
the officer requiring him to give information.
[8] The Commissioner’s submission was that, if a party to the parole application wished to
clarify matters provided in the officer’s report, it would be appropriate for the party to
provide the issues or questions to the Board which could then ask the officer for the
relevant information. The Commissioner’s view was that the Act did not provide for a
Board meeting to take evidence on oath or otherwise. Nor did it provide for a party to
examine or cross-examine or ask questions of a person whether or not their attendance
had been required by way of an attendance notice.
[9] The Board rejected that submission and its premise, concluding that it was entitled to hear
evidence on oath or otherwise and to permit cross-examination of those giving evidence.
[10] This is an application, therefore, seeking to review those decisions made on 19 June 2019
which determined that Acting Inspector Knight be subjected to cross-examination by
Mr Nicholson’s counsel and the further determination that the Board could take evidence
from Acting Inspector Knight as the Commissioner’s delegate on oath or otherwise.
The statutory context
[11] Other relevant sections of the Corrective Services Act apart from those to which I have
already referred included ss 218, 219 and 230. Section 218 provided:
“Powers Generally
The parole board has the power to do anything necessary or convenient to
be done in performing its functions under this or another Act.”
[12] Section 219 is a power to require attendance. Pursuant to it, the Board may require a
person to attend a meeting of the Board at a stated time and stated place:
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“(a) to give the board relevant information; or
(b) to produce a stated document containing relevant information.”
[13] Section 230 provides that, subject to Division 4 of which it forms a part, the Board may
conduct its business, including its meetings, in the way it considers appropriate.
[14] It is also relevant to refer to s 27 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) which provides
as follows:
“Power to hear and determine includes power to administer oath
A person or body authorised by law, or by consent of parties, to conduct a
hearing for the purpose of the determination (by that or another person or
body) of any matter has authority—
(a) to receive evidence; and
(b) to examine witnesses, and to administer oaths to witnesses, who have
been lawfully called before the person or body.”
[15] The Commissioner’s submission was that s 219 should not be read so as to allow
Mr Nicholson’s counsel to ask questions of the officer. Rather, it was submitted, the
Board should have required Mr Nicholson to respond to the reports and then could have
sought further clarification from Acting Inspector Knight in respect to aspects of his
reports with that response then being made available to Mr Nicholson. Apparently such
a procedure was adopted by the Board in Lincoln v Parole Board of Queensland.1 The
Commissioner argued that the approach advanced accorded with the demands of
procedural fairness.2
[16] The Commissioner submitted, therefore, that the powers provided to the Board under the
Corrective Services Act should be circumscribed by reference to the procedures
particularly prescribed, for example, in s 219 to give the Board relevant information or to
produce a stated document containing relevant information.
[17] Reliance was placed on a decision of Finn J in Rose v Bridges.3 There his Honour decided
that a right to cross-examine witnesses cannot be asserted to be a possible requirement of
procedural fairness, where the inquiry or tribunal in question does not possess the power
to require the giving of oral evidence. His Honour went on to say, however, that, in the
absence of power to require cross-examination, there was a variety of expedients open to
the inquiry officer ranging from cross-examination through agreement with the witness
concerned to providing both for comment on adverse evidence and for submitting
evidence in rebuttal to having questions put to witnesses through the inquiry officer.
[18] The argument for the Board, whose submissions were adopted for Mr Nicholson, pointed
to the adverse evaluations contained in Acting Inspector Knight’s report which suggested
that Mr Nicholson’s cooperation was not satisfactory.
1 [2019] QSC 156.
2 See a discussion of procedural fairness in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 583-584.
3 (1977) 79 FCR 378, 387-388.
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[19] They drew attention to the Board’s emphasis on the seriousness of the decision to be
made, including the gravity of its consequences for Mr Nicholson and its conclusion that
it had power to take evidence and examine witnesses.
[20] They argued that the statutory framework to which I have already referred, including the
power under s 27 of the Acts Interpretation Act where a body authorised by law to conduct
a hearing has authority to receive evidence and to examine witnesses, when coupled with
s 193A(5), which requires the Board to state the day it proposes to hear the application,
was said to justify the conclusion that it was conducting a hearing.
[21] In arguing against the Commissioner’s submissions, counsel for the Board said that the
statutory scheme did not support the negative implication for which the Commissioner
contended. The argument was that, although the Corrective Services Act made specific
provision for giving the Board relevant information, including by the production of a
stated document, the breadth of its other powers in ss 218 and 230 did not preclude it
from adopting another mechanism to assist it in making its determination, namely by the
calling of evidence with cross-examination.
[22] In that context, they relied upon a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Hird
v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority.4 There the Full
Court rejected a submission that there existed a negative implication said to limit the class
of persons who could assist in a doping investigation by the Australian Sports Anti-
Doping Authority to preclude it from acting with the Australian Football League in
conducting its investigation.
[23] The Full Court said:5
“Plainly enough, the scope of a grant of power of this kind should be
interpreted in light of the functions of the parliament as conferred on the
body in question … Where, as here, the legislature confers a function in
general terms, a grant of power in the terms of [the relevant section] will,
generally speaking, have a commensurably wide scope …”
[24] Accordingly, the Board submitted that it may require a person to attend and give “relevant
information”, but has a discretion to adopt another mechanism should that be appropriate
in the circumstances. They relied particularly on the width of the language in s 218 and
on the expression in s 3(2) of the Corrective Services Act which recognises that every
member of a society has certain basic human entitlements, including an offender. They
submitted that those entitlements should not be interfered with lightly.
[25] The second submission made for the Board was that it was authorised to “conduct a
hearing” within the meaning of s 27 of the Acts Interpretation Act, referring to the
language used in s 189(1) of the Corrective Services Act specifying that a prisoner’s
application for a parole order may be “heard and decided by the board”. Accordingly,
counsel for the Board submitted that, while there can be no right to cross-examination
4 (2015) 227 FCR 95.
5 At [210].
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unless the decision-maker has the power to require a witness to attend and give evidence,6
the power of the Board to receive evidence and examine witnesses under s 27 of the Acts
Interpretation Act supported the conclusion that it had jurisdiction to direct cross-
examination by another party.
Conclusion
[26] I agree with the submissions made for the Board and with the decision it made in reliance
on those sections of the relevant legislation.
[27] The Board itself pointed out that, even though some of the language referred to it
conducting its business by meetings, that did not preclude any meeting conducted by it
from also being a hearing for the purposes of s 27 of the Acts Interpretation Act. They
were, after all, hearing and deciding an application for a parole order at their meeting:
see the heading to Chapter 5 Division 2 of the Corrective Services Act which is “Hearing
and deciding application for parole order”.
Order
[28] In those circumstances, it is my view that the application should be dismissed. I shall
hear the parties as to costs.
6 See Maclean v Workers’ Union [1929] 1 Ch 602, 620-621 discussed in Rose v Bridges (1977) 79 FCR 378,
387-388 per Finn J.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2019/315