Andrews v Body Corporate for Skyline Apartments CTS 37631 [2019] QCATA 18
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION: Andrews v Body Corporate for Skyline Apartments CTS
37631 [2019] QCATA 18
PARTIES: ANTHONY ANDREWS
(appellant)
v
BODY CORPORATE FOR SKYLINE
APARTMENTS CTS 37631
(respondent)
APPLICATION NO/S: APL164-18
ORIGINATING
APPLICATION NO/S:
MCDO 55505 of 2017 (Brisbane)
MATTER TYPE: Appeals
DELIVERED ON: 8 February 2019
HEARING DATE: On the papers
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Member Howe
ORDERS: 1. Application by the appellant for leave to adduce
fresh evidence refused.
2. Application for leave to appeal refused.
CATCHWORDS: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL
PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL
LIES – where body corporate unitholder claimed a
neighbouring unitholder caused damage to a balcony –
where statement of evidence in the form of a statutory
declaration the primary evidence of the claimant – where
Justices of the Peace preferred the evidence of the claimant
over the oral testimony of the appellant – where that
conclusion was available in the circumstances – where the
appellant claimed he was surprised at the hearing by late
presentation of evidence – where the transcript of
proceedings showed the appellant had the material before
hearing – where the appellant claimed he was prevented
from leading evidence of a witness at hearing – where the
transcript showed otherwise – whether parties should be
responsible for the reasonable conduct of their own cases
– where application for leave to adduce fresh evidence
refused on the basis the evidence was reasonably available
to be led at hearing
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Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009
(Qld) s 28, s 142(3)(a)(i)
House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499
Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513
Pickering v McArthur [2005] QCA 294
The Pot Man Pty Ltd v Reaoch [2011] QCATA 318
REPRESENTATION:
Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent: Self-represented, assisted by Gary Weedon and Adam
Chadwick
APPEARANCES:
This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] Mr Andrews lives at unit 293 in Skyline Apartments in Brisbane. Above him is unit
303.
[2] On 3 October 2016 the occupants of unit 303 claimed Mr Andrews, their neighbour
below, struck the glass balustrading on the balcony outside their unit with a broom.
They said that broke the glass. They complained to the body corporate. The body
corporate claimed the cost of repair of the glass from Mr Andrews. Mr Andrews
refused to pay. The body corporate sued for the cost of replacement of the glass in the
Tribunal.
[3] The matter was heard before Justices of the Peace on 4 July 2018. The Justices of the
Peace allowed the body corporate claim, ordering Mr Andrews to pay $1023 for costs
of repair and the filing fee of $116.40.
[4] Mr Andrews now seeks leave to appeal that decision.
[1] Given this is an appeal from a decision made in the Tribunal’s Minor Civil Dispute
jurisdiction, leave to appeal must first be obtained before any appeal proceeds.1
[2] Leave to appeal will usually only be granted where an appeal is necessary to correct
a substantial injustice to the appellant and where there is a reasonable argument that
there is an error to be corrected.2
[3] Mr Andrews complains that the Tribunal relied entirely on one statutory declaration
presented as the evidence of the body corporate. He maintains the statutory declaration
(he refers to it as an affidavit) was only presented to him at the hearing and it was
written nearly 10 months after the incident the subject of the claim occurred.
1 QCAT Act, s 142(3)(a)(i).
2 Pickering v McArthur [2005] QCA 294, [3].
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[4] The statutory declaration was made by one of the occupants of unit 303 and it said:
On 3.10.2016 afternoon at around 5:30 PM it was rainy day, as the design of
the balcony (sic) water was pouring down the edge of the balcony. The male
neighbour downstairs all of a sudden started yelling and cursing out of (sic) the
balcony. Minutes later I started hearing some banging noises. As I turned to my
balcony I saw a blue broom sticking out from the floor below and started
banging against the glass wall/façade with yelling in curses (sic) still going on.
After a few bangs he must have hit a weird spot on the glass. The far right piece
of my glass just smashed. I instantly reported the incident to the reception
downstairs and notified them the damage of the building property.
[5] The statutory declaration was sworn in front of a Justice of the Peace and dated 11
July 2017.
[6] There are two parts to the appellant’s complaint concerning the statutory declaration.
First, simply that the Tribunal should not have relied on it to reach its decision and
second that he was not provided with a copy of it prior to hearing.
[7] Per s 28 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘the
Act’), in conducting proceedings, the Tribunal must observe the rules of natural
justice and is not bound by the rules of evidence or any practice or procedure applying
to courts of record other than to the extent the Tribunal adopts the rules, practices or
procedures and may inform itself in any way it considers appropriate. Additionally
the Tribunal is required to act with as little formality and technicality and with as
much speed as the requirements of the Act, enabling Act or the Rules permits,
alongside a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal.
[8] Presenting evidence by way of statutory declaration is not unusual in minor civil
dispute proceedings in which parties are not legally represented. It was within the
discretion of the Tribunal as constituted (the Justices of the Peace appointed to hear
the matter) to accept or not accept the evidence presented in that form.
[9] Overall there was very limited material placed before the Justices of the Peace in the
matter. At hearing the representatives for the body corporate referred to documents
being attached to their application, however a perusal of the Tribunal file shows
nothing was attached to the application. Given the claim was filed electronically as a
minor civil dispute – minor debt application, by commercial agents acting for the body
corporate, that was not unusual. It may be the case that the body corporate provided
the agents with additional material but that additional material was not filed either
with the initiating process or subsequently at hearing.
[10] An email from ‘Reception Mantra Quay’ was tendered, which, according to the email,
is a reception located inside Skyline Apartments. The email notes that at 5:57 PM on
3 October 2016 the tenants from unit 303 reported that Mr Andrews from unit 293
had used a broom and smashed 303’s balcony glass whilst screaming at them. The
email refers to an attached photograph but there was no photograph attached to the
email tendered at hearing.
[11] Additionally, there was a tax invoice from G James Glass and Aluminium dated 21
December 2016 for $1023 which was for the cost of replacement of one panel of
balustrade glass for Skyline Apartments.
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[12] According to the transcript of the proceedings before the Justices of the Peace, Mr
Andrews’ evidence was that he knew nothing about broken balustrade glass at unit
303:
McMahon JP:… So Mr Andrews, you know, this is still a bit of a mystery to us.
One day it was not broken and the next it was, and then there is somebody say
(sic) that you got the broom to it…
Mr Andrews: Well if you heard the parties that were going on upstairs all the
time and the noise and banging. That hailstorm that he mentioned smashed our
glass in that very corridor – right, full height, full width glass on our – and how
do you know that the hailstorm didn’t weaken the glass there and all the parties
with all the girls and everything else – whatever was going on – they didn’t
break it. Why don’t they just blame someone else? [Indistinct] it’s too easy to
do something like that.
…
McMahon JP: Very well. Now, Mr Andrews, let’s bring you back to the point
– the breaking of the glass. That’s the point that we really need to talk about,
not harassment, not having minutes. Can you give us any more details about…
Mr Andrews: No idea.
…
McMahon JP: … What date you think it was broken?
Mr Andrews: I have no idea.
McMahon JP: Month?
Mr Andrews: Who would know? I can’t see up above. There is a balcony that
sticks out and the glass sits back here. How do I see from below what happens
above me? No idea.
McMahon JP: Very well. Well, tell us about the incident with the broom then.
Mr Andrews: What broom?
McMahon JP: The alleged incident with the broom that’s reported in this stat
dec.
Mr Andrews: It doesn’t say anything. He said must have. There is no actual
allegation and there of anything. In the affidavit, if you read it word for word.
McMahon JP: So you’re denying taking a broom to it at any time.
Mr Andrews: I had – on the other end, where the other end of the balcony where
he was, which is a breach of by-law 10.3, washed water over the side because
my wife was sitting there on a bench and got water all over a silk blouse which
was damaged beyond repair.3
[13] The learned Justices of the Peace gave Mr Andrews every opportunity to say clearly
yes or no whether he had handled a broom at the time of the alleged incident which is
3 Transcript Page (‘T’) 1-7 Line (L) 46 to T1-9 L23.
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the allegation made in the statutory declaration. Rather than answering yes or no Mr
Andrews prevaricated and avoided appropriate response. A conclusion both logical
and commonly drawn where someone is evasive in answering simple questions is that
a simple answer is not in their interests as they see it. The Justices of the Peace said
in their reasons for decision they preferred the evidence of the body corporate ‘as
opposed to the respondent’s’. Their preference in accepting the claim of the
unitholders in 303, as articulated in the statutory declaration, over the oblique
responses and prevarications of Mr Andrews, was not unreasonable in the
circumstances.
[14] The Justices of the Peace enjoyed the advantage of hearing from Mr Andrews. Whilst
they did not hear from the deponent of the statutory declaration, they also had before
them the complaint by the unitholders on unit 303 recorded in the email from the
apartment reception staff. That email was made approximately contemporaneously
with the incident which adds weight to the veracity of the statutory declaration
evidence regardless that the declaration was not itself made until months later.
[15] The decision of the Justices of the Peace to prefer the evidence of the unitholder of
unit 303 given by way of statutory declaration only, in circumstances where the
deponent did not attend and make himself available for cross-examination, was a
matter for them. The Tribunal is authorised to inform itself in any way it considers
appropriate.4 According it more weight than Mr Andrews’ oral evidence at hearing to
the effect that he knew nothing about damage to the balustrade whilst, fairly
obviously, avoiding answering the specific question whether he wielded a broom at
the time or not fell to the Justices of the Peace. It was not such an outrageous decision
that it can now be said that no reasonable decision-maker could have come to the same
conclusion on the evidence available.5 It was within the range of decisions reasonably
possible.
[16] There is therefore no error disclosed on the part of the Justices of the Peace in respect
of this aspect of complaint by Mr Andrews.
[17] Mr Andrews also complained that he repeatedly asked the applicants and the Tribunal
what evidence would be presented and who would be attending to represent the body
corporate at hearing. He says he made an application to the Tribunal about that, but it
was dismissed.
[18] Mr Andrews filed an application for miscellaneous matters prior to hearing which,
amongst other things, sought an order requiring Mr W Payne of PO Box 626, Spring
Hill to produce documents and provide ‘evidence of claim and authority to act on
behalf of the body corporate’.
[19] Mr Andrews failed to make clear in his application before hearing who Mr Payne was
and the application was otherwise so vague as to be embarrassing. Any challenge to
the standing of the applicant to bring the claim was appropriately a matter of evidence
and determination at hearing. Mr Andrews knew at least within 3 months after the
incident that the body corporate was claiming against him for the cost of repair of the
4 QCAT Act, s 28(3)(c)
5 House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505; Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513, 518-519.
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balustrade glass to the other unit. He said that in his evidence to the Justices of the
Peace.6
[20] The Tribunal does not obtain from one party and provide to the other the evidence to
be presented at a hearing. That is a matter between parties. Mr Andrew’s complaints
about not being supplied with evidence are ill-founded.
[21] Mr Andrews also suggests in supplementary submissions associated with an
application for leave to adduce fresh evidence on appeal, that the statutory declaration
tendered at the hearing by the body corporate was only presented to him for the first
time at hearing. He further suggests he was thereby taken by surprise. A perusal of the
transcript of the proceedings below reveals the following statement made by Mr
Andrews to the Justices of the Peace:
Mr Andrews:… They’ve never ever – here is a list – date, email, date, email –
all letters I’ve written to these people to say let’s talk about this like civil people
so we don’t have to be here today. So that you can tell me exactly what your
issue is, because I have no idea. And nowhere in that affidavit – which I got
through the BCCM – not from the body corporate because they are unfriendly
and unhelpful. They would never give me that. It’s only because the BCCM got
it, that I ended up with it. So if I had not gotten that, the first time I’d seen that
would have been 10 minutes ago.7
[22] It seems clear that Mr Andrews is talking about the statutory declaration which he
refers to as an affidavit throughout the proceedings, and also that Mr Andrews was
not surprised by its late production at the hearing. He had it before he walked into the
hearing room. There is nothing to his complaint about this.
[23] Then Mr Andrews complains that he was overwhelmed with the body corporate
having three representatives rather than one. Mr Payne, one of those gentlemen, said
at outset that he was not a body corporate committee member and therefore would not
represent the body corporate and he said nothing throughout the proceeding until he
was actually asked to comment about something by the Justices of the Peace towards
the end of hearing. The other two gentlemen, Mr Weedon the chairman of the body
corporate, and Mr Chadwick, the secretary, did both speak but principally it was Mr
Chadwick.
[24] There is no suggestion from a perusal of the transcript that Mr Andrews was
overwhelmed in any way by the presence of more than one person representing the
applicant. Indeed it was Mr Andrews that was asked at one stage not to interrupt Mr
Weedon whose turn it was to speak.8
[25] From the transcript there is no suggestion that Mr Andrews was not accorded natural
justice and not given reasonable opportunity to speak and present his case, nor that he
did not do so. This complaint is also groundless.
[26] Finally Mr Andrews says he should be allowed to adduce fresh evidence in the appeal.
He says he had a witness present at the hearing below, but the witness was not allowed
6 T1-8 L31.
7 T1-8 L33-39.
8 T1-12 L21.
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to speak because at the beginning of the proceedings she was identified as his support
person only.
[27] The transcript shows the Justices of the Peace identified the various people appearing
before them and after being advised the names of the three representatives for the
applicant the following exchange occurred with Mr Andrews:
Mr Andrews: Anthony Andrews, A – n – d – r – e – w – s. I’m the respondent.
Schmidt JP: and the lady is there for support.
Unidentified speaker: I am there for support.
[28] Presumably the person identified as the unidentified speaker in the transcript is the
witness Mr Andrews says was available, but not permitted to talk at the hearing. That
proposition is not reasonably made out from the brief exchange noted above.
[29] The person concerned is identified as Ms Catherine Prowse in the appeal
documentation. There was nothing to prevent Mr Andrews advising the Tribunal at
the hearing that Ms Prowse would also be giving evidence. That would have been the
reasonable thing to do at the time. There was nothing preventing him from doing that.
Certainly there was no constraint placed on him by the Justices of the Peace. He
simply chose not to say anything about Ms Prowse giving evidence.
[30] Parties have an obligation to accept some responsibility for the conduct of their own
affairs. A failure to take reasonable care to do that in hearings cannot subsequently be
relied on as a reasonable ground of appeal. As stated by Wilson J in The Pot Man Pty
Ltd v Reaoch,9 also an appeal from a minor civil dispute hearing:
The applicant knew of the hearing date and, although its officers or staff have
advanced several explanations for their failure to attend, it is inescapable that
they knew of the hearing date and took no appropriate steps in their own
interests, including any attempt to seek an adjournment of the hearing.…
It is common knowledge that the jurisdiction is a busy and demanding one, in
which parties are expected to present their own cases, and act in their own
interests. QCAT’s resources for the resolution of disputes serve, as the High
Court has recently observed, the public as a whole and not merely the parties to
proceedings. The QCAT statutory regime itself places obligations upon parties
to take care in their dealings with Tribunal matters and to act in their own best
interests.10
[31] Now, at the appeal stage, Mr Andrews wants Ms Prowse’s evidence considered. He
also wants to lead evidence about other things such as the weather on the day of the
incident. But there is no reasonable explanation offered as to why Ms Prowse’s
evidence and the other evidence was not available for the hearing below. It is too late
now to lead it in the guise of fresh evidence. Leave to adduce same is refused.
[32] In any case, Ms Prowse’s evidence would be of little comfort to Mr Andrews. In her
proposed statement of evidence she says Mr Andrews was waving a broom around to
attract attention at the time of the incident, something Mr Andrews avoided saying at
hearing and Ms Prowse’s evidence in fact offers some support to the claim by the
9 [2011] QCATA 318.
10 Ibid, [7], [9].
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body corporate that the damage to the glass balustrade was caused by Mr Andrews
hitting it with a broom.
[33] There are no reasonable prospects of a successful appeal. Leave to appeal is refused.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCATA/2019/018