Attorney-General v Legal Services Commissioner & Anor [2018] QCA 267 [2018] 43 QLR
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Attorney-General of the State of Queensland v Legal Services
Commissioner & Anor [2018] QCA 267
PARTIES: ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
QUEENSLAND
(appellant/applicant)
v
LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER
(first respondent)
HAROLD WARNER SHAND
(second respondent)
FILE NO/S: Appeal No 5758 of 2017
QCAT No 163 of 2013
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: General Civil Appeal – Further Orders
ORIGINATING
COURT:
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal – [2017]
QCAT 159
DELIVERED ON: 12 October 2018
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: Heard on the papers
JUDGES: Morrison and McMurdo JJA and Brown J
ORDERS: 1. The second respondent pay to the appellant the costs of
the appeal, not including the costs of the Attorney-
General in seeking leave to apply for that order.
2. There should be no order for the costs of that
application for leave.
CATCHWORDS: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE –
QUEENSLAND – POWERS OF COURT – COSTS – where
the Court allowed the appellant’s appeal – where the appellant
sought no order for costs in her notice of appeal or outline of
submissions – where the appellant sought leave to make an
application for the costs of the appeal when the judgment was
delivered – where paragraph 52 of Practice Direction 3 of 2013
provides that parties wishing to make submissions on costs
must do so in their written outlines of argument and/or orally
at the hearing – where the appellant was granted leave to apply
for costs – where the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) provides
a distinct role for the appellant Attorney-General to challenge
a decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative
Tribunal in the public interest – whether the appellant should
be granted an order for costs in her favour
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2
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 468
Attorney-General of the State of Queensland v Legal Services
Commissioner & Anor; Legal Services Commissioner v
Shand [2018] QCA 66, related
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Legal
Services Commissioner & Anor [2018] QCA 198, related
Grocon Constructors (Qld) Pty Ltd v Juniper Developer No 2
Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 333, cited
COUNSEL: P Dunning QC SG, with F Nagorcka, for the appellant
T P Pincus for the second respondent
SOLICITORS: Crown Law for the appellant
Motteram Lawyers for the second respondent
[1] MORRISON JA: I agree with the reasons of McMurdo JA and the orders his
Honour proposes.
[2] McMURDO JA: This appeal was heard and decided with an appeal by the Legal
Services Commissioner against a decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative
Tribunal in relation to Mr Shand, who was then a solicitor. The Tribunal had declined
to recommend that Mr Shand’s name be removed from the Roll of Legal Practitioners.
The outcome in each appeal was that the appeal was allowed, the decision of the
Tribunal was set aside and the respondent’s name was removed from the Roll.1
[3] In compliance with this Court’s Practice Direction,2 the Legal Services Commissioner
sought his costs of the appeal. By an oversight, the same order was not sought within
the submissions for the Attorney-General. Consequently, when the judgment was
delivered, there was an order for costs in favour of the Commissioner but no order for
the costs of the Attorney-General’s appeal.
[4] An application has now been made by the Attorney-General for those costs. It is
submitted that the costs should follow the event and that there are previous cases
where two sets of costs have been awarded where both the Attorney-General and the
Legal Services Commissioner exercised their rights to appeal.
[5] For the respondent, it is argued that the usual rule is that, where parties with parallel
interests are separately represented, and are successful, the unsuccessful party will
not be ordered to pay two sets of costs without good reason. The submission cites
Grocon Constructors (Qld) Pty Ltd v Juniper Developer No 2 Pty Ltd3 and Dal Pont
Law of Costs at 11.52, where it is said:
“If separate representation is chosen, the litigants cannot assume that,
should they be successful, the court will direct the unsuccessful
party(ies) to indemnify each of them for their costs. The policy is that
a desire to be represented separately by a lawyer of one’s own choice
cannot be indulged in at another’s expense without good reason.
Therefore, the court will not normally allow more than one set of costs
1 Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Legal Services Commissioner & Anor; Legal Services
Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66.
2 Practice Direction Number 3 of 2013, para 52.
3 [2015] QSC 333 at [64].
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3
to successful litigants where there was no possible conflict of interest
between them in the presentation of their cases”.4
(Citations omitted.)
[6] That general proposition may be accepted, but it is necessary to have regard to the
statutory context. By s 468 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) an appeal may be
made to this Court from the Tribunal’s decision by a party dissatisfied with the
decision and by the Minister. Although the Legal Services Commissioner performs
a public duty in proceedings of this kind, the statute provides for a distinct role for
the Attorney-General to challenge a decision of the Tribunal in the public interest.
Whilst there was no evident tension between the respective arguments for the
appellants, the distinct role of the Attorney-General takes the case out of the more
usual kind referred to in the passage set out above.
[7] In my view the general rule, that costs follow the event, should apply. I would order that:
1. The second respondent pay to the appellant the costs of the appeal, not including the
costs of the Attorney-General in seeking leave to apply for that order.
2. There should be no order for the costs of that application for leave.
[8] BROWN J: I agree with the reasons given by McMurdo JA, and the orders proposed
by his Honour.
4 G E Dal Pont, Law of Costs (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2018) 11.52.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCA/2018/267