Bowyer v de Jersey [2017] QSC 340
1
[2017] QSC 340
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CIVIL JURISDICTION
A. LYONS SJA
No 9899 of 2017
ROBERT ANTHONY BOWYER Plaintiff
and
HIS EXCELLENCY THE HONOURABLE PAUL DE JERSEY
and ANOTHER Defendants
BRISBANE
4.15 PM, WEDNESDAY, 15 NOVEMBER 2017
JUDGMENT
Any Rulings that may be included in this transcript may be extracted and subject to revision by the Presiding Judge.
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2 JUDGMENT
HER HONOUR: Pursuant to an application filed on the 25 th of September 2017, the
applicant, Mr Bowyer, has filed an application under the Judicial Review Act 1991
(Qld) for a statutory order of review, pursuant to section 20(g) on the grounds that a
fraud will take place upon the people of Queensland when the Queensland
Government makes the application to the Governor to have the writs for the election 5
approved and signed. This application was made prior to the actual calling of the
election.
Mr Bowyer’s application contended that the basis of his application was that the
Legislative Council was abolished unlawfully because the 1921 State Parliament did 10
not have the powers to bypass triple-entrenched provisions to amend the Constitution
Act 1867 (Qld) that made changes to the composition of the legislature. The
argument is that, should it be found that the entrenched provisions have not been
followed, then the application for the writs for an election that only make provision
for the legislative assembly as sole composition of the legislature would be 15
fraudulent. The statutory order for review therefore sought orders that the Governor
of Queensland cannot sign writs to hold an election until the State Government
provides for the lawful composition of the legislature as described in section 1 of the
Constitution Act 1867 (Qld).
20
In his application, the applicant sought that the following questions be forwarded for
review: (1) did the State Parliament have the power to amend the entrenched
provisions enacted by the British Parliament without first following their directions
and in accordance with the UK Privy Council findings; (2) was the Constitution Act
Amendment Act 1922 (Qld) unlawfully presented to the Governor when neither the 25
entrenched provisions for two-thirds’ majority or the majority of the members was
achieved in the chamber’s division; and (3) did the 28 Labor-appointed Legislative
Council members, while holding pledges to destroy the Legislative Council, in taking
their oath of office, act in treason to the democratic will of Queenslanders as
demonstrated by the 1917 referendum results. 30
In his oral submissions today and in his earlier written submissions, the applicant
indicates that the application to seek a judicial review has highlighted the un-
lawfulness of the decisions not to have the writs include the provisions to elect
members of the Legislative Council. It highlights the fact that the two-thirds’ 35
majority provision was always to be used when amendments to the Legislative
Council were undertaken; the two-thirds provisions have not been undertaken; and
the 1917 referendum bill was not placed on the statute books. The applicant argues
that it is the duty of the executive, to ascertain the law; but it is especially the duty of
the Attorney-General as chief law officer to do so. The applicant argues it is 40
appropriate that a judicial review be undertaken as the Supreme Court holds
jurisdiction over the statutes and there is no other process that can remedy the
mischief.
Essentially, it is submitted that a judicial declaration of opinion is sought, on whether 45
the Legislative Council was lawfully abolished and following, by logic, the
conformity of the executive to the fundamental laws of the Constitution.
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3 JUDGMENT
I have read Mr Bowyer’s outline of submissions and note his arguments, particularly
in relation to the factual basis of some of the decisions that have been relied upon by
counsel for the respondents, in particular his arguments as to the factual bases of
Taylor v Attorney-General (Qld) [1917] 23 CLR 457, Taylor v Attorney-General
(Qld) [1918] St R Qd 194 (Privy Council) and also McCawley v The King [1920] AC 5
691; 28 CLR 106 (Privy Council). I make it clear, however, that those decisions
speak for themselves and I am bound by those decisions.
Pursuant to an application filed by the respondents on the 31st of October 2017, the
respondents seek the summary dismissal of the application for judicial review. 10
Basically, the respondents submit that, pursuant to section 48(1)(b) of the Judicial
Review Act 1991 (Qld), the application should be dismissed because it has no
reasonable basis. Whilst the application seeks to review the Governor’s issuing of
the writs in the forthcoming election, I agree that, in substance, it challenges the
validity of the abolition of the Legislative Council in 1922. That is the essence of this 15
application for judicial review. The basis of that challenge is that the former section
9 of the Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) contained a manner and form provision that the
Legislative Council’s constitution could be amended only by a special majority. The
argument is that the 1908 repeal of the proviso by a simple majority was invalid and,
therefore, the passage of the 1922 bill by simple majority did not comply and was 20
therefore invalid. When the application was originally filed, it was only a potential
issue, but on 29 October 2017, after this application was filed, the Governor issued
the writs for the election.
Section 48 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) provides that the Court may stay or 25
dismiss an application under section 20, 21, 22 or 43 or a claim for relief in such an
application if the Court considers (a) that it would be inappropriate for the
proceedings in relation to the application or claim to be continued or (b) that no
reasonable basis for the application is disclosed. Pursuant to section 48(2) the power
of the Court must be exercised by order and may be exercised at any time in the 30
relevant proceeding, but in relation to the power to dismiss an application, the Court
must try to ensure that any exercise of the power happens at the earliest appropriate
time. It is on that basis that I have proceeded to determine the application.
Under the Court’s power in section 48, the Court can dismiss an application if it is 35
satisfied of one of the matters in the paragraphs. Clearly, the respondents rely
primarily on the basis that there is no reasonable basis for the application for judicial
review. I accept that the test in section 48(1)(b), that is no reasonable basis for the
application is disclosed, is similar to the test under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules
1999 (Qld) rule 293(2)(a), which is a test that the plaintiff has no real prospect of 40
succeeding on the claim. Having read the decision of Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v
Nicholls by Applegarth J, [2013] QSC 68, I am satisfied that the test in relation to
section 48(1)(b) is, in fact, a test which is similar in effect to rule 293(2)(a).
In terms then of whether it is inappropriate, the respondents argue that this 45
originating application discloses no reasonable basis and therefore should be
dismissed. It is also argued in the alternative that the Governor’s actions are not
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4 JUDGMENT
justiciable and therefore it would be inappropriate for the proceeding to be continued
or to grant the application. It is also argued that, given that the writs have now
issued, it would be inappropriate either for the proceedings to continue or the
application to be granted.
5
Turning then to the issue of justiciability and standing, the object of the Constitution
of Queensland 2001 (Qld) is to declare, consolidate and modernise the Constitution.
It is an Act of the Queensland Parliament. It can be amended and repealed by the
Queensland Parliament subject only to the Commonwealth Constitution. Section 29
provides there must be a Governor appointed by the sovereign, with power to do all 10
things that belong to the Governor’s office under law. One of those roles is to
dissolve the Legislative Assembly and to provide for the election of a new one.
Since the 1981 High Court of Australia decision in R v Toohey; ex parte Northern
Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170, the mere fact that an action is taken by a
representative of the Crown will not itself immunise the action from judicial review, 15
but that the non-justiciability will depend on the nature of the decision rather than
simply the identity of the decision-maker. The Governor’s powers to dissolve the
Legislative Assembly and issue the writs are not prerogative. They are statutory.
In the decision of The King v Governor of the State of South Australia [1907] 4 CLR 20
1497, the question was whether mandamus may lie against a State Governor to
perform an asserted duty under section 12. There, the High Court unanimously held
that mandamus will not lie against an officer of the Crown to compel him to do an
act which he ought to do as agent of the Crown unless he owes a separate duty to the
individual seeking the remedy. It was held by the Court that they did not consider 25
that the Governor of a State, in issuing a writ for the election of senators, is acting as
an agent for the sovereign in this sense, since the duty imposed by the Constitution is
imposed by statute law and not by delegation from the sovereign himself. It was
held it is a duty cast upon him as Head of State.
30
That case remains good law in Australia, and whilst there are some authorities which
have referred to the possibility that remedies other than mandamus or prerogative
writs rely against a Governor, none of those cases concern the dissolution of
legislatures or the issuing of electoral writs. Accordingly, the authority of The King
v Governor of the State of South Australia prevails. I accept that in the United 35
Kingdom, matters are different in that the powers of the Crown in relation to the
dissolution of Parliament are prerogative and not statutory, and therefore they are in
a different category. I agree with the submission of counsel for the respondents that
the power of the Governor under section 15(2) of the Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) is
to prorogue or dissolve the Legislative Assembly by proclamation or otherwise, and I 40
accept the submission that it is difficult to see what legal constraint there could be
upon the exercise of the power or by what legal standard a decision by the Governor
to dissolve the Legislative Assembly could be reviewed, particularly given the
convention is its exercise on the advice of the Ministers.
45
Pursuant to section 82(1)(a) of the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld), the Governor is to issue
a writ for a general election, and he must issue a writ no later than four days after the
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5 JUDGMENT
day on which the legislature is dissolved or expires. It is a necessary adjunct to the
power to dissolve parliament, and it does not involve any discretion; it merely
ensures the short period of time between the dissolution of parliament and the issue
of the writs. I accept the force of the submission based on the decision of Re Ditfort;
ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 FCR 347 that if there is no 5
matter which can be the subject of judicial review, it follows that the applicant does
not have standing to bring the application. The dissolution of the Legislative
Assembly and the issuing of the writs are not justiciable decisions.
In any event, the substance of the present application would also seem to be futile. 10
In substance, it is not an application challenging a decision of the Governor, but it is
a challenge to the passing of legislation in 1908 and 1922 which amended the
Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) and abolished the Legislative Council. If that is the
nature of the application, then it is out of time. Section 46 of the Judicial Review Act
1991 (Qld) provides that an application for review under part 5 must be made within 15
three months of the day on which the grounds for the application arose. It is more
than three months since 1908 and since 1922. Whilst the Court has power to extend
time, there is no basis for the Court to do so here. Particularly when one considers
the merits of the application; on the basis of the decisions which I have been taken to
and after analysis of the constitutional provisions which I have been referred to by 20
counsel for the respondents, the Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) was an enactment of the
Queensland Parliament and, like all provisions, it is susceptible to amendment or
repeal by ordinary majority unless subject to manner and form requirements.
The general principle of parliamentary supremacy is that parliament can make, 25
amend or repeal any law within its powers and, generally, an earlier parliament
cannot bind a later one. An important exception in the Constitution of the Australian
States arises under the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp) and the Australia Act
1986 (Cth). The ‘exception’ is that a colonial or state law respecting the constitution
powers and procedures of the colonial or state parliament is of no force or effect 30
unless it is made in the manner and form required by law of that parliament.
However, importantly, such a manner and form requirement may be amended or
appealed in the ordinary way and it not binding on a later parliament. However, if
that requirement itself is subject to a manner and form requirement then later
parliaments will be bound by both requirements. As Professor Carney states: 35
For a manner and form provision to be effectively binding on a legislature it
must be doubly entrenched.
When enacted, the Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) contained provisions requiring 40
special majorities for amendments of the composition of the Legislative Assembly
and the Legislative Council. Section 9 originally provided a power to alter the
composition of the Legislative Council subject to two provisions. First, it was
unlawful to present a bill for such change to the governor unless it had been passed
with the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of both the Legislative Assembly 45
and the Legislative Council. Second, such a bill was to be reserved for signing by
her Majesty and it was required to be laid before the Imperial Parliament before such
signing. However, it is significant that those provisos were not doubly entrenched.
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6 JUDGMENT
Section 10 of the Constitution placed similar special majority requirements and
provisos on the passing of a measure to alter the system of representation for the
Legislative Assembly. Similarly, those restrictive provisions were not doubly
entrenched.
5
Clearly, then, it was the intention of the Imperial Parliament that the colonial
legislature should have the capacity to remove the restrictions placed upon the power
to alter the composition of the two houses of parliament. In 1920 Lord Birkenhead
in the Privy Council in his speech set out that in very clear terms. He stated:
10
It would, indeed, be difficult to concede how the legislature could more plainly
have indicated an intention to assert on behalf of the colonial legislatures the
right for the future to establish courts of judicature and to abolish and
reconstitute them than in the language under consideration, nor were the
framers of this Act content with making provision for the future. Adhering to 15
their fundamental purpose which was to remove doubts as to the validity of
colonial laws, they affirmed in terms that every colonial legislature should be
deemed, at all times, to have had full powers in the matters in question.
Now, I note Mr Bowyer’s arguments in this regard with respect to the decision of 20
Chief Justice Griffiths in the decision of Cooper, and I note that in the speech of
Lord Birkenhead this was, in particular, specifically referred to. In this respect, Lord
Birkenhead held that:
The contention of the respondents is that the Constitution Act of 1867 enacted 25
certain fundamental organic provisions of such a nature as thereafter to render
the Constitution stereotyped or controlled.
That submission was rejected by Lord Birkenhead where he held it would be almost
impossible to use wider or less restrictive language. He considered that the terms 30
made it clear that the colony may make laws for the peace, welfare and good
government of the colony in all cases whatsoever. It was clear, therefore, that he
firmly rejected the submission that the Constitution was controlled and held it was a
flexible Constitution. There was also a reference to the historical context in the
decision of Western Australia v Wilsmore (1982) 149 CLR 79, where Chief Justice 35
Gibbs referred to the Constitution Act 1889 (WA) which was based on the earlier
New South Wales and Victorian Constitutions which contained a provision requiring
a special majority to effect changes to the Legislative Council and the Legislative
Assembly. The Chief Justice said at page 85:
40
The history of these provisions shows that section 73 of the Constitution Act of
1889 could not have been intended to be a great constitutional safeguard. By
that time, the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 had been passed but it remained
true to say that although, while the first proviso of section 73 remained in
force, it was not competent to repeal or alter the provisions of the Constitution 45
Act of 1889 in a way that would affect any change in the constitution of the
Legislative Council or of the Legislative Assembly except by the majority to
which the proviso referred, it was, nevertheless, possible to repeal the proviso
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7 JUDGMENT
by a simple majority since no manner or form was required for a law affecting
such a repeal.
By the Constitution Act Amendment Act 1871 (Qld), the proviso to section 10 of the
Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) was removed. Consequently, the composition of the 5
Legislative Assembly could therefore by amended by ordinary Act passed by simple
majority. Far from being unlawful or repugnant to imperial law, the repeal was
consistent with the provisions of the Constitution Act 1867 (Qld), and its ultimate
source which was the New South Wales Constitution Act 1855 (Imp). Now, I accept
the submission that there is no evidence of any legal challenge to the repeal at the 10
time or since. The purpose of the repeal was to remove the restriction so as to enable
that the Legislative Assembly to keep pace with demographic changes.
By the Constitution Act Amendment Act 1908 (Qld), the first and second provisos to
section 9 were repealed. Consequently, the composition of the Legislative Council 15
could thereafter be amended by ordinary Act passed by simple majority. It is
significant that the question of the validity of that Act and the Parliamentary Bills
Referendum Act 1908 (Qld) were considered by the High Court in Taylor v Attorney-
General (Qld) [1917] 23 CLR 457. The first question in the case stated for the
opinion of the High Court was: is the Constitution Act Amendment Act 1908 (Qld) a 20
valid and effective Act of the Parliament? That was answered by five High Court
judges in the affirmative, and, indeed, Justice Isaacs stated:
The argument never seriously put the validity of this Act in contest. The
plaintiffs, rather, threw the burden on the defendants of proving (1) that it had 25
been passed by two-thirds majority, and (2) that the royal assent has been
validly given.
He concluded that both provisions appear, in fact, to have been observed. With
respect to Mr Bowyer’s argument that Justice Isaacs was wrong in his conclusions, it 30
does not matter whether Justice Isaacs was correct. In any event a special majority
was not required, a simple majority was sufficient. I am bound by the decision of
Taylor v Attorney-General (Qld), and an Act which amends a manner and form
provision which is not itself subject to a manner and form requirement may be
amended by an ordinary Act passed by a simple majority. 35
In relation to the abolition of the Legislative Council on 23 March 1922 royal assent
was given to the Constitution Act Amendment Act 1922 (Qld). The Act was able to
be passed by simple majority of the Legislative Assembly because the requirement
for a special majority had been removed by the Constitution Act Amendment Act 40
1908 (Qld). Mr Bowyer’s argument that a majority of the Legislative Council could
only have been achieved by a vigorous process of appointing members who
supported the abolition of the council is irrelevant in this regard.
In relation to the arguments by the respondents in relation to the political and legal 45
reality, having made my conclusions clear in relation to the other aspects of the
application, I do not consider it necessary to turn to this aspect of the argument.
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8 JUDGMENT
In my view, the respondents have established that the originating application should
be dismissed. They have established that pursuant to section 48 of the Judicial
Review Act 1991 (Qld), the application should be dismissed because it would be
inappropriate for the proceedings to be continued because there is no reasonable
basis for the application. I am satisfied, therefore, that there should be orders that the 5
originating application is dismissed.
...
10
HER HONOUR: It was quite clear on the basis of the submissions and the affidavit
that were provided to Mr Bowyer that he was aware of the arguments by counsel for
the respondents, and that his application not be further pursued, but he did pursue his
application, and in the circumstances, given the success of the respondents, the 15
applicant should pay the respondents’ costs as sought on the indemnity basis. Thank
you. We will adjourn.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2017/340