Davy v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] QDC 241

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Davy v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] QDC 241 PARTIES: RONALD DEAN DAVY (appellant) v COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (respondent) FILE NO/S: No 4818 of 2016 DIVISION: PROCEEDING: Appeal ORIGINATING COURT: Magistrates Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 29 September 2017 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 12 May 2017 JUDGE: Durward SC DCJ ORDER: 1. Application for extension of time for filing Notice of Appeal refused. 2. Appeal dismissed. 3. The convictions and sentences imposed in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane on 30 August 2016 is confirmed. CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – PRACTICE & PROCEDURE - APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL – where delay attributed to not having transcript and personal issues – whether adequacy of explanation and/or interests of justice justify granting application CRIMINAL LAW – PRACTICE & PROCEDURE - APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION – where appellant convicted of bankruptcy offences – where he was self- represented – where he claimed disadvantage and unfairness – where appellant was serving a gaol sentence for previous fraud convictions – whether any merit in grounds of appeal – where proceedings below were regular and appellant provided the usual procedural judicial assistance – where proceedings show appellant was able to look after his own -- 1 of 12 -- 2 interests in the hearing – where appeal must fail. CRIMINAL LAW – PRACTICE & PROCEDURE - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – where sentence of 8 months imprisonment to serve 4 months to commence after parole eligibility date of current sentence imposed – whether manifestly excessive. LEGISLATION: Justices Act 1886 sections 222, 223, 224 and 225. CASES: R v Tait (1999) 2 Qd R 667; R v Phillips [2017] QCA 41; R v GV [2006] QCA 394; Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Hughes v Hopwood (1950) QWN 21; R v Morse (1979) 23 SASR 98; R v Lemass (1981) 5 A Crim R 230; R v McIntosh [1923] St R Qd 278; Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606; R v Lawley [2007] QCA 243. COUNSEL: Appellant was not legally represented Ms DA Holliday of counsel for the respondent SOLICITORS: Appellant was not legally represented Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent [1] The applicant has sought an extension of time for filing the Notice of Appeal [s 224 (1) (a) of the Justices Act 1886 (“JA”)], in an appeal against conviction and sentence (s 222 JA). Background [2] The appellant was convicted in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane on 30 August 2016 of two charges of dishonesty made pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (“the Act”). [3] The appellant became bankrupt by virtue of a Creditors Petition and Sequestration Order on 18 January 2012. The first charge arose 5 days after he became bankrupt when he removed part of his property to the value of $20 or more (he withdrew $54,000.00 in cash from his bank account) contrary to s 265 (4)(a) of the Act; the second charge relates to his filing a Statement of Affairs on 09 February 2012 which contained false information in two respects: that he had no cash in the bank (writing ‘0’ in answer to Question 22); and failing to declare ownership of certain property (at Question 28) contrary to s 267 (2) of the Act. [4] He was sentenced to 8 months imprisonment, to be released after serving four months upon entering into a 3 year good behaviour recognisance. When the appellant was convicted he was serving a 6 year sentence for fraud offences (committed on dates in 2008 to 2010), imposed on 22 June 2016 in the District Court at Brisbane. The sentence the subject of this appeal was ordered by the magistrate to commence after 29 May 2018, his parole eligibility date for the fraud offences. -- 2 of 12 -- 3 Preliminary matters [5] I heard the merits appeal by way of rehearing on the basis that I would determine the application for extension of time for filing the Notice of Appeal in this judgment. [6] The prosecution went to some lengths to provide the appellant with the relevant materials to prepare for and present his appeal as a legally unrepresented litigant. An affidavit of Kristy Anne McLeod was filed on 24 March 2017 outlining the provision of the documents to the appellant. I gave leave pursuant to s 223 JA for the respondent to adduce as additional evidence, the information in the affidavit. The grounds of appeal [7] The appellant’s application for extension of the time for filing the Notice of Appeal refers to delay caused by his waiting for receipt of transcripts (of the subject hearing and an earlier Mention of the matter in the Magistrates Court). [8] His appeal against convictions refers to his self-representation, waiting for transcripts, insufficient time to prepare, being on medication and having an inability to cope, wanting to do a plea bargain, being unprepared for the hearing and unable to ask prosecution witnesses questions and being prepared to accept a finding of guilt if there was no conviction. [9] His appeal against sentence appears to rely on the same grounds as for his conviction, with the additional matters of remorse, shock at the sentence imposed and allegedly having previously been told by a lawyer that he would receive a fine. Summary of relevant evidence in the Magistrates Court hearing [10] Ms To was an employee of a legal firm which was dealing with debt collection from the appellant and the evidence relating to the bankruptcy proceedings was tendered through her. Those documents speak for themselves. The appellant attempted to elicit evidence relating to events leading up to his bankruptcy but was informed that the relevant matters were what occurred after he became a bankrupt. He appeared to have asked those questions in cross-examination because of references made in the prosecution material to pre-bankruptcy matters. Those matters appear to me to have been led to give some context to the involvement of the lawyers and the bankruptcy, rather than to canvas matters in the context of them being factually relevant. That is the inference I draw from that evidence having been led in the prosecution case. [11] Ms Lamb and Ms Modrzejewska, investigators for the Australian National Security Authority, were called to tender the bulk of the documentary exhibits relied upon in the prosecution, including the Statement of Affairs which is relevant to the second charge. [12] The appellant in cross-examination said that insofar as the non-disclosure of certain property that he owned was concerned, “…the property was transferred from my company to me in ’09 because of the Supreme Court matter and I forgot about it” [T1-33]; and referred to his “…distressed state at the time that I… was under pressure to complete this Statement of Affairs within 14 days…” [T1-35]. -- 3 of 12 -- 4 [13] Mr Miller, a partner of the firm which took over the bankruptcy proceedings from the firm in which Ms To was employed, gave evidence, but there is nothing relevant to refer to in this summary. [14] The cross-examination of those four witnesses, not surprisingly, was largely irrelevant because their role was simply to provide the relevant documents upon which the prosecution case substantially relied. [15] The fifth witness was a Mr Goggin, an Associate with the legal firm. He had prepared a list of creditors. The document was tendered in the proceeding: the bankrupt estate owed a total of $607,365.82 to known (secured, unsecured and priority) creditors. The appellant’s cross-examination of Mr Goggin was in many respects irrelevant but he attempted to put his own case to that witness in the context that he had a defence and he couldn’t understand how he could be charged as a consequence of the matters that had occurred and questioned how people who might be bankrupt are informed as to what their duties and responsibilities were. However, he also referred to an offer to creditors. Mr Goggin said he had become aware - as had the trustees - that there would have been potential for such a proposal. Of course, that is a matter that pre-dated the bankruptcy. The appellant told the magistrate that if he was not allowed to cross-examine about the previous (pre-bankruptcy) events, then “I can’t explain how my mind was in turmoil and eventually I made an attempt on my life” [T1-56]. [16] The appellant gave evidence in the hearing after being informed by the magistrate as to his rights. It is apparent from the transcript that the appellant was being a little difficult, to say the least, in focusing on the matters which were relevant to the charges. [17] In evidence-in-chief he said that after 19 January 2012 he didn’t have thoughts together and that was the only excuse he could offer with regard to the non- disclosure of the property asset. He claimed the non-disclosure was an honest mistake arising out of the stress that he was under. In respect of the bank accounts he said they had balances in them (and he had been told there was a total of $917.85). He had intended to close the accounts but did not do so and that is why he put ‘$0’ balances in the Statement of Affairs. He then said that he took the money out of an account on the basis of an intent to make a proposal to creditors. He claimed to be receiving advice from others about such a proposal. Other monies were expended for services rendered by lawyers, a bank or other advisors. Things were complicated and he believed the trustee would have been paid out of the sale of assets, but nothing was sold. [18] In cross-examination he agreed that he had signed the Statement of Affairs on the last page of the document. He agreed that he had four bank accounts at that time and owned the property (that he had said he had forgotten about). He agreed that this was the third time he had become bankrupt. He agreed that there was a duty of disclosure in full as a bankrupt. He said he wasn’t trying to defraud anyone by signing the Statement of Affairs and claimed he didn’t know that the document was false when he signed it. He said that he was aware that he had been made bankrupt as at 19 January 2012. He denied having told the officer from the Authority that he knew the relevant procedure (in bankruptcy with respect to non-disclosure) despite the fact that this was the effect of a contemporaneous note of the relevant conversation that the officer had made). He appeared to agree, in a rather -- 4 of 12 -- 5 convoluted way, that he informed Mr Goggin that he spent $21,000.00 of the sum of $54,000.00 that was withdrawn from his bank account, on living expenses. He denied knowingly omitting reference to bank accounts or the property asset in the Statement of Affairs. A. Extension of time within which to appeal Submissions: application for leave to extend time within which to appeal Appellant [19] The reason for the delay in filing the Notice of Appeal was because he was unable to obtain the transcripts from the hearing in the Magistrates Court. Respondent [20] The respondent accepted that the delay was relatively short and that it would not oppose leave on the ground of delay alone. However, the application should be refused because the appeal had no merit and it was not in the interests of justice to grant the application. Discussion [21] In order to satisfy the requirements of section 224 (1) (a) JA, the principles to be applied are as set out in R v Tait (1999) 2 Qd R 667 at [668]: “… the Court will examine whether there is any good reason shown to account for the delay and consider overall whether it is in the interests of justice to grant the extension. That may involve some assessment of whether the appeal seems to be a viable one. It is not to be expected that in all such cases the Court will be able to assess whether the prospective appeal is viable or not, but when it is feasible to do so, the Court will often find it appropriate to make some provisional assessment of the strength of the applicant’s appeal, and take that into account in deciding whether it is a fit case for granting the extension.” [22] In R v Phillips [2017] QCA 41 (as cited in R v GV [2006] QCA 394 at [3]), the court expanded the scope of the grounds for an extension of time application where there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay: “Even if no satisfactory explanation for delay is given, an application to extend time may be granted if the applicant can demonstrate that to refuse it would result in a miscarriage of justice. In order to decide whether or not there is an adequate explanation and whether or not to refuse leave to extend time would result in a miscarriage of justice, it is necessary to look at the circumstances of the case.” [23] There is a two stage process: an application for an extension of time requires the appellant to demonstrate that there is a good reason for the delay. If the appellant is -- 5 of 12 -- 6 unable to demonstrate a good reason for the delay, the question then is whether it would it be in the interests of justice to grant the extension. [24] I will resolve the application after discussing the merits of the appeal. Appeal is by way of rehearing [25] This appeal is conducted as a hearing de novo, on the evidence that was before the magistrate: s 222 Justices Act 1886. It is not necessary that I identify errors in the decision of the magistrate. [26] I am required to review the evidence and draw my own inferences and conclusions and thereby determine the relevant facts in issue from the evidence, giving proper deference to the magistrate’s view: Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 at 551; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [25]; and see also Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132. [27] Pursuant to s 225(1) JA the court has the power to “confirm, set aside or vary the appealed order or make any other order in the matter the judge considers just.” B Appeal against convictions Submissions Appellant [28] The appellant submitted that he did not receive a fair trial. He had been at a disadvantage as a self-represented litigant and the Magistrate had previous dealings with the appellant, a matter he said was acknowledged during the hearing below. [29] He was unfit to conduct the proceedings because he was unable to properly formulate and articulate a defence having regard to his personal circumstances at the time of trial - his incarceration and issues with his mental health; the files were stored in his gaol cell; he had no proper facility or time to work or research; he was emotionally very fragile; his cell was not air-conditioned; and he was taking medication. If granted a retrial he would plead guilty and “receive ‘no conviction recorded’”. Respondent [30] There is no merit in the appeal against conviction because the appellant received a fair trial. The appellant was fit to conduct the proceeding. The court process with respect to cross-examination and calling evidence was explained to the appellant prior to the prosecution calling evidence. The appellant demonstrated an understanding of the issues involved and understood the process of cross- examination. He demonstrated knowledge of the defences available to him when he gave evidence that he had “no intention to defraud any creditors” and did not know the responses in the statement of Affairs were false. The appellant had previously terminated legal representation and had chosen to continue the proceedings self- -- 6 of 12 -- 7 represented. With respect to the magistrate and the suggestion of partiality or bias, there was no evidence upon which the magistrate should have recused himself. Discussion 1 Extension of time [31] Whilst the appellant relied on delay in receipts of transcripts and other personal matters, the respondent’s position was to oppose the application because there was no merit in the appeal. [32] If it was merely a matter of delay arising perhaps from the non-receipt or late receipt of relevant transcripts, or proven illness, or some proven form of temporary incapacity on the part of the appellant, then it could have been in the interests of justice to extend the time for filing of the Notice of Appeal. However, when one considers whether the appeal per se has any merit the position is quite different. It is not possible in my view for the appellant to overcome the almost inevitable conclusion in this case that this appeal has no merit at all. I will say something further about that when dealing with the appeal itself but it seems to me that to refuse the application would not give rise to a miscarriage of justice, would not invoke any reasonable assertion of interests of justice and that the reasons advanced for the application other than delay per se are of no substance, are unreasonable and unsatisfactory. 2 The appeal against convictions [33] I have read the transcript of the evidence in the hearing in the Magistrates Court, the exhibits and the submissions made by the appellant. I have as required on a rehearing, independently considered the evidence and come to my own views upon the merits of the appeal. Whilst it is necessary to acknowledge the advantage the magistrate had in hearing and seeing the witnesses, that is not a significant factor in this case. The prosecution witnesses primarily were engaged in the tender of documents (which speak for themselves) and some conversations with the appellant, who gave evidence in his own behalf. [34] The appellant complained that he had to represent himself and had no lawyer. The truth of the matter is that he did have lawyers acting for him at a time prior to the hearing, but he terminated their retainer and, it seems to me chose to represent himself. He apparently had a view that they were not properly representing him nor properly conducting the case according to the way that he saw things in the factual sense and he decided to dispense with their services. Not surprisingly, Legal Aid Queensland, upon his having attempted to obtain further legal representation, refused his further application. The fact that he was representing himself was a matter of free choice by him. [35] When one examines the transcript of the hearing and how he conducted the proceedings, it seems to me that he was aware of what was required of him insofar as dealing with the factual allegations and the legal concepts involved (although at times he claimed not to be so aware). This is simply able to be discerned from the nature of questions and responses that he made in the course of the proceeding. He had indicated a plea of not guilty on an earlier mention of the matter and when formally charged in the hearing he pleaded not guilty. He elected to plead not guilty -- 7 of 12 -- 8 and to contest the charges. There is no merit in the contention that he was unfit to conduct his defence or ask questions of witnesses. [36] The appellant has a made a somewhat obscure complaint about the magistrate having previous knowledge of him. The discussions about that matter appear at [T1- 89 to 91]. It is not necessary for me to set out what was said at that part of the transcript, but having read it there does not seem to me to have been any reason why the magistrate should have recused himself. There does not seem to be anything that might have led the magistrate to take a view of the defendant, his evidence or his submissions in an adverse way which related to any understanding of prior events concerning the appellant. He was aware that the appellant had been made bankrupt twice previously and this is of course is relevant to issues of the appellant’s understanding about his duties and responsibilities as a bankrupt, particularly in relation to full disclosure of financial property and other relevant matters. [37] The appellant had claimed that he had been unwell at the time but when one looks at this evidence in a holistic way and at the way in which he approached cross- examination of the prosecution witnesses, it does not seem to me that he had any lack of appreciation of his conduct with respect to the bankruptcy, even though he may have been suffering the effects of his incarceration arising out of the sentence previously imposed on him in June 2016. [38] The passage of time from the acts of non-disclosure in respect of the bankruptcy until the date of the hearing were largely due to delays that seemed to have been caused by him as much as by the natural progress of the matter in the court below or any other factor. It is clear from the affidavit material that the appellant had to be supplied with at least one if not more sets of relevant documents of the prosecution materials whilst he was in jail. There also seems to have been a consistent effort by those who had relevant contact with the appellant and by the respondent to deal fairly with him in the prehearing process. That was certainly the case in the hearing itself. [39] The appellant’s complaint of unfairness has no substance. He was not “unable to ask prosecution witnesses questions” and he appeared to understand what the proceedings were all about although he prevaricated a good deal in his exchanges with the prosecutor and with the magistrate in the course of the hearing. [40] Curiously, he not only said to me in the appeal but also was made clear in his Notice of Appeal that he was prepared to accept a finding of guilt subject to there being ‘no conviction’. I presume he means no “conviction recorded” and perhaps he had the erroneous view that if that were the case he would not have been sentenced to imprisonment. However, that matter was largely left alone in the course of the appeal and my view about the lack of merit in the appeal does not rely on that statement by him at all. Finally, there was unequivocal and evidence in support of the prosecution case, I make the following findings on this rehearing:  I reject the appellant’s contentions that he did not know that his answers were in the Statement of Affairs false.  I find that he knew he was made bankrupt on 18 January 2012. -- 8 of 12 -- 9  I find that his previous experience of bankruptcy made him well aware of the duties and responsibilities he had as a bankrupt person including the requirement that he make full disclosure of property assets and financial resources to the trustee.  I find that he knowingly failed to disclose the bank account in the Statement of Affairs. He may have done this because he knew that to have done so would have revealed his withdrawal of the sum of $54,000.00 only a matter of days after he was made a bankrupt, although it is not necessary for me to make a specific finding about that. In any event, I find that part of the sum of $54,000.00 was used by the appellant for personal living expenses.  I find that he knew he owned the property asset and his protestation that he had forgotten about it is rejected.  I am satisfied that the elements of both offences have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant some 5 days after being aware that he was made bankrupt removed part of his property valued at $20 or more; and that some 3 weeks after he was aware he was made bankrupt made a Statement of Affairs the contained false information in two respects.  I find upon a consideration of the whole of the evidence adduced before the magistrate, that the statutory defences (no intent to defraud in the first charge and reasonable excuse in the second charge) were raised - albeit it barely so. However, they have not been proven on the evidence (the appellant has not discharged his onus of proof). I reject the evidential facts and circumstances relied on by the appellant in his defence. The appellant referred to but did not develop in evidence any basis for consideration of a defence of mistake of fact. [41] There was no unfairness to the appellant in the hearing in the Magistrates Court. I am satisfied that the elements of the offences have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The convictions made in the court below were in all the respects regular. The convictions should be confirmed. C. The appeal against sentence [42] The material principle to be applied in an appeal against sentence is that some error in the exercise of the sentencing discretion must be identified: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499. [43] Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ, at 505, wrote: “The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be -- 9 of 12 -- 10 reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so.” [44] See also the observations of Keane JA (as his Honour then was) in R v Lawley [2007] QCA 243, at [8]. Antecedents of appellant [45] The defendant is aged 73 years (date of birth 24 February 1944). In his evidence he described in a rather complicated way his experience in business over many years. He has a criminal history which is largely of no specific relevance in this matter save for his conviction on 22 June 2016 in the District Court at Brisbane for fraud (s 408 C (1) (A) (I) of the Criminal Code (Qld). It is on that matter that he was sentenced to imprisonment for six years with a declaration of 390 days of pre- sentence custody as time served and the fixing of a parole eligibility date as at 29 May 2018, although the criminal history sheet does not contain the latter fact. Submissions Appellant [46] The sentence was manifestly excessive. He was “shocked by the sentence”. He had been told by a legal aid solicitor to “expect a fine” although he was not represented in the court below by a legal practitioner. Respondent [47] The respondent submitted that the sentence was within range and no error was demonstrated by the Magistrate. He had not provided any grounds as to why the sentence is manifestly excessive. Discussion: appeal against sentence [48] The principles governing appeals against the exercise of discretion on sentence are well established. In Hughes v Hopwood (1950) QWN 21, at 31, Macrossan CJ stated that an appeal court is not entitled to interfere unless it “… can find that the sentence is manifestly excessive or that there are some circumstances which show that the magistrate acted under a misapprehension of fact or on some wrong principle in awarding a sentence”. [49] For a sentence to be “excessive”, it must be “beyond the acceptable scope of judicial discretion” or “so outside the appropriate range as to demonstrate inconsistency and unfairness”: R v Morse (1979) 23 SASR 98; R v Lemass (1981) 5 A Crim R 230; R v McIntosh [1923] St R Qd 278; Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606. [50] The magistrate considered that terms of imprisonment were the only sentence that reasonably could be imposed. Whilst the comparative sentences schedule reflects a broad range of sentencing, from non-custodial orders to terms of imprisonment (some with immediate release or short periods of custody), covers matters that went to trial and also matters involving pleas of guilty and a broad range of antecedent considerations, an assessment of them demonstrate that insofar as there may be a range of sentencing options the sentences imposed here were within that range when -- 10 of 12 -- 11 one takes into account the appellant’s antecedents and the circumstances of his offending. [51] The exercise of the sentencing discretion is impacted by five principal factors: firstly, the recent criminal history of the appellant; secondly, the two previous bankruptcies of the appellant; thirdly, the dishonest conduct having occurred within a very short time after the date of the bankruptcy; fourthly, there was no plausible expression of remorse about the offending per se (the only ‘remorse’ is about the situation the appellant now finds himself in); and fifthly, the restriction arising from the term of imprisonment imposed in June 2016 and the parole eligibility date fixed with the consequence that any further period of imprisonment imposed would commence after the parole eligibility date. Hence considerations of totality of sentence were paramount. The totality principle was recognised by the sentence being at the lower end of that whish might otherwise have been imposed. [52] The sentence imposed was regular and within range. It was open to the magistrate to impose the sentence. The sentence is not excessive in all the circumstances. Resolution: sentence [53] I do not consider that there was any error in the exercise of the sentencing discretion by the magistrate. The sentence should be confirmed. Disposition A. Application to extend time [54] In the circumstances, leave to extend the time for filing the Notice of Appeal should be refused. The reasons for the failure to file the Notice of Appeal within time are unsatisfactory and unconvincing. The grounds of appeal have no merit. The delay here was not dissimilar to the delay in having the hearing in the Magistrates Court commenced. The reasons then were referred to at the hearing below and appeared to be equally unsatisfactory and unconvincing. It is not in the interests of justice to grant leave. There are no identifiable circumstances that might give rise to any miscarriage of justice. B. The appeal against convictions [55] There are no merits in the grounds of appeal. The appellant raised a number of potential matters of apparent concern to him before the magistrate and was given an opportunity to discuss them in evidence and in submissions. However, he did not come up to proof and he largely agreed with the critical points of the prosecution case with respect to the proof of the elements of the offences. [56] The appellant raised similar issues on the appeal and to the extent that it is possible to divine any credible evidence or relevant evidence or issue of law with respect to the grounds of appeal, such as they may be understood, there is no merit in the grounds. [57] The conviction was regular and the appeal against conviction should be dismissed and the conviction confirmed. C. The appeal against sentence -- 11 of 12 -- 12 [58] I have reviewed the comparative sentences provided by the respondent. The appellant faces the inevitability, in his circumstances, of a custodial sentence. He has previous convictions for significant dishonesty and is already serving a substantial sentence of imprisonment for a serious fraud conviction. The sentence imposed below reveals no error on the part of the magistrate. Issues of totality were taken into account by the length of the sentence, which could have been longer but for the fact that the appellant is serving a sentence of imprisonment. The sentence imposed was within the range of sentences appropriate to the offence and its circumstances, giving proper consideration to the antecedents of the appellant. [59] I have found no reason to interfere with the sentence imposed. The sentence should be confirmed. Orders 1. Application for extension of time for filing Notice of Appeal refused. 2. Appeal dismissed. 3. The conviction and sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane on 30 August 2016 is confirmed. -- 12 of 12 --