CISC Pty Ltd t/as The Construction Training Centre [2017] QCAT 301
CITATION: CISC Pty Ltd t/as The Construction Training
Centre [2017] QCAT 301
PARTIES: CISC Pty Ltd t/as The Construction Training
Centre (Applicant)
APPLICATION NUMBER: ADL084-16
MATTER TYPE: Anti-discrimination matters
HEARING DATE: 1 September 2017
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Member Gordon
DELIVERED ON: 1 September 2017
DELIVERED AT: On the papers
ORDERS MADE: 1. It is declared that:-
(a) The proposal by CISC Pty Ltd t/as The
Construction Training Centre to pay
an additional 1% in superannuation
contributions for its female
employees would if not rendered
lawful by a statutory provision, be
direct discrimination in the
superannuation area of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld).
(b) The proposal is rendered lawful by the
operation of section 59 of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) because
the proposal is permitted under the
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).
2. Therefore an exemption from the
operation of the Anti-Discrimination Act
1991 (Qld) is not required and the
application is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: HUMAN RIGHTS – DISCRIMINATION –
DIRECT DISCRIMINATION – where there is an
application for exemption from the operation of
the direct discrimination provisions in the area of
superannuation – where the applicant wishes to
pay an additional 1% in superannuation
contributions for its female employees – whether
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already exempt by the provisions of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld)
Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 10, s 55,
s 59, s 113
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), s 7D
Jacomb v Australian Municipal Administrative
Administrative Clerical & Services Union [2004]
FCA 1250
Walker v Cormack & Anor [2010] FMCA 9
APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):
This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act).
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] The Applicant, CISC Pty Ltd t/as The Construction Training Centre (CTC),
wishes to pay its female employees (but not its male employees) an
additional 1% over the mandated employer contributions.1
[2] The proposal appears to be direct discrimination under s 10 of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (the Act) because it would be treating male
employees less favourably than female employees where their
circumstances are (apart from their gender) the same or not materially
different.
[3] Such discrimination is not a contravention of the Act unless it comes within
one of the “areas” protected by the Act. Which area applies to this proposal
is important for the resolution of this application. CTC suggest that it comes
within the work area. However, it appears that it may come within the
superannuation area.
Which area (if any) applies to the proposal?
[4] The superannuation area includes this provision:-
55 Discrimination in superannuation area (work)
A person must not discriminate against another person who works for the
person—
(a) in any variation of the terms of the work that relate to superannuation;
or
(b) in denying or limiting the other person’s access to any benefit to a
worker that relates to superannuation; or
1 The mandated employer contributions are the superannuation guarantee contributions
(which are a statutory minimum) and any superannuation contributions required by an
award.
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(c) by treating the other person unfavourably in any way in connection with
superannuation.
[5] It seems to me that an employer who proposes to increase superannuation
contributions for female employees above that for male employees, is
proposing to treat the male employees unfavourably in connection with
superannuation.
[6] By s 13(2) of the Act, if the superannuation area applies, then the work area
cannot apply. Hence the only area in the Act which could make this
particular proposal unlawful is the superannuation area.
The Tribunal’s role
[7] The Tribunal is able to grant an exemption from the relevant provisions of
the Act under s 113 of the Act.
[8] The Act requires an application for exemption to be given to the Anti-
Discrimination Commissioner, who can make submissions and suggest
(amongst other things) whether there should be public consultation.
[9] Here the Commissioner did not suggest that any particular consultation
should take place, but did consider the purpose of the proposed exemption
to be “certainly meritorious”. The Commissioner did suggest however, that
an exemption was not required because it was likely that the general
exemptions in s 104 (welfare measures) or s 105 (equal opportunity
measures) of the Act applied to the proposal. To decide whether these
sections applied to the proposal would require some discussion of their
correct interpretation in the light of the stated aims and purposes of the Act.
The Commonwealth exemption in the superannuation area
[10] To my mind, since it appears that the proposal comes within the
superannuation area, there is another exemption in the Act which more
obviously applies. This is s 59 of the Act which renders lawful those things
which are permitted under the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984
(Cth) (the SDA) but which would otherwise be a contravention in the
superannuation area. There is a similar exemption in the insurance area.2
[11] S 59 is as follows:
59 Commonwealth exemption (sex or relationship status)
It is not unlawful to discriminate on the basis of sex or relationship status
with respect to a matter that is otherwise prohibited under subdivision 1 if
the discrimination is permitted under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984
(Cwlth).
2 Provided in s 73.
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[12] The reference to subdivision 1 is to the subdivision which contains s 55
which would otherwise render the proposal unlawful in the superannuation
area.
[13] It is necessary therefore to look at the SDA. There is a general exemption
from sex discrimination in s 7D of the SDA. This reads as follows:
7D Special measures intended to achieve equality
(1) A person may take special measures for the purpose of achieving
substantive equality between:
(a) men and women; or
(aa) people who have different sexual orientations; or
(ab) people who have different gender identities; or
(ac) people who are of intersex status and people who are not; or
(b) people who have different marital or relationship statuses; or
(c) women who are pregnant and people who are not pregnant; or
(d) women who are potentially pregnant and people who are not
potentially pregnant; or
(e) women who are breastfeeding and people who are not
breastfeeding; or
(f) people with family responsibilities and people without family
responsibilities.
(2) A person does not discriminate against another person under
section 5, 5A, 5B, 5C, 6, 7, 7AA or 7A by taking special measures
authorised by subsection (1).
(3) A measure is to be treated as being taken for a purpose referred to in
subsection (1) if it is taken:
(a) solely for that purpose; or
(b) for that purpose as well as other purposes, whether or not that
purpose is the dominant or substantial one.
(4) This section does not authorise the taking, or further taking, of special
measures for a purpose referred to in subsection (1) that is achieved.
[14] The exclusion of “special measures” from discrimination is in accordance
with Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women which is reproduced in the Schedule to the
SDA. Article 4 says that special measures aimed at
accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be
considered to be discrimination. The Article emphasises however that the
measures should be temporary and should be removed after their purpose
has been achieved. This requirement is enacted in s 7D(4) of the SDA.
[15] S 3 of the SDA says that one of the purposes of the SDA is to give effect to
certain provisions of the Convention. It is noteworthy that the preamble to
Queensland’s Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) also refers to the
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Convention as being one of the international human rights instruments
which have “recognised the need to protect and preserve the principles of
dignity and equality for everyone”.
Is the proposal exempted by s 7D?
[16] As was pointed out by the Federal Court in Jacomb v Australian Municipal
Administrative Clerical & Services Union [2004] FCA 1250, s 7D requires
proof that the subjective intention of the person relying on the section is to
achieve substantial equality between men and women. But it was accepted
in that case that there is also an element of objectivity in the test – so that
it would be reasonable to regard the otherwise discriminatory act as
capable of achieving that goal.
[17] This must be right because otherwise entirely genuine but quite
misconceived attempts to achieve equality which would otherwise be
discriminatory would come within the section. A purposive construction
requires that the objectively reasonable test must also be satisfied.
[18] The same approach was taken in Walker v Cormack & Anor [2010] FMCA
9, a decision upheld on appeal.3
[19] CTC explains that it wishes to implement the proposal in order to try to
redress, at least partly, an imbalance in the superannuation benefits
generally accumulated by women by the time of retirement. The evidence
is submitted by CTC’s Chief Executive Officer and Company Secretary.4
This evidence shows that the decision to bring the application was taken at
board level and discussed and agreed at team meetings.
[20] The evidence also demonstrates that the imbalance in superannuation
benefits exists. A table in the paper “Women’s Economic Security in
Retirement” from the Workplace Gender Equality Agency (a government
agency) 2015 showed that in the year 2009-10, the average balance in
superannuation benefit at retirement for women was $112,600, whereas for
men it was $198,000. The figures for 2011-12 were $105,000 and $197,000
respectively.5 Whilst no more up to date figures were provided, there is
nothing to indicate that the gap has been substantially closed since then
and on the balance of probabilities the considerable imbalance remains.
[21] CTC provided a number of additional papers in its evidence. They were
Workplace Gender Equality Agency “Gender Pay Gap Statistics” August
2016, ANZ Women’s Report – “Barriers to Achieving Financial Gender
Equity” 2015, ANZ “Submission to the Senate Inquiry into Economic
Security for Women in Retirement” February 2016 and Rice Warner
Actuaries “Valuing Females and Rewarding them in Retirement” November
2012.
3 Walker v Cormack [2011] FCA 861.
4 Submitted by statutory declaration made on 6 February 2017.
5 These figures were provided by the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia.
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[22] These papers show that women spend about half the number of years in
paid employment as men and their lifetime earnings are about half that of
men.6 The papers seek to explain the social and employment-related
reasons why this is so, and why women’s superannuation benefits at the
time of retirement are therefore much lower than men. In this application, it
is unnecessary for me to make any findings as to the reason for these
imbalances. Multiple causes were offered, and many of these have multiple
sub-causes. They ranged from generalised difference in pay between men
and women, women being more likely to have gaps in their employment,
interruption in their careers, and difficulty in returning to work particularly
when older, to women being more likely to be in jobs which do not pay
superannuation, and more likely to be in part-time work.
[23] It was said that the effect of the disparity in superannuation benefits is
compounded because women have a greater life expectancy than men and
therefore they have a greater need for those superannuation benefits after
retirement.
[24] There is actuarial evidence showing that as at November 2012, if an
employer were to contribute an extra 1.5% superannuation contribution for
its female employees, this would equalise the likely income stream for the
employees at the time of their retirement, based on their average life
expectancy.7
[25] I am satisfied therefore that the subjective intention of CTC’s officers in
making the proposal is to achieve substantial equality between men and
women. I also accept that the increase of 1% in superannuation
contributions for women in its employment will further that aim.
[26] I am satisfied therefore that the proposal comes within s 7D. That means
that the proposal would not be discrimination under the SDA, and in turn
the Commonwealth Exemption in the Act applies so that the proposal is
also lawful under Queensland law.
[27] In passing it can be noted that since July 2015, ANZ bank has paid an
additional $500 pa in superannuation contributions for its female staff. In its
Submission to the Senate Inquiry into Economic Security for Women in
Retirement, ANZ said that this was “deemed to be a ‘special measure’ and
not unlawful” in jurisdictions other than New South Wales. The submission
says that in New South Wales the special measure provisions are not
repeated into local anti-discrimination law. For that reason, ANZ obtained
an exemption for the proposal from the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW
(this was granted for 10 years to 10 June 2025).
[28] For its Queensland operations, ANZ did not apply to the Tribunal for
exemption for its proposal. It appears likely that this was because it was
advised that the Commonwealth Exemption applied to its proposals in
6 In particular, pages 2 and 3 of Workplace Gender Equality Agency “Economic Security
for Women in Retirement” 2015.
7 Page 17 Rice Warner Actuaries “Valuing Females and Rewarding then in Retirement”.
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Queensland by s 59 of the Act and therefore no exemption was necessary,
as I have found in this application which is a similar proposal.
Conclusion
[29] I conclude that since the proposal is already exempt from the provisions of
the Act by the operation of s 59 of the Act and s 7D of the SDA, there is no
need for an exemption to be granted under s 113.
[30] In the circumstances, the correct approach is for me to make a declaration
to the above effect under s 60 of the QCAT Act and to dismiss the
application for exemption.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCAT/2017/301