Conias Hotels Pty Ltd v Ross Neilson Properties Pty Ltd [2017] QPEC 65 (2018) QPELR 217
PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Conias Hotels Pty Ltd & Anor v Ross Neilson Properties Pty
Ltd & Ors [2017] QPEC 65
PARTIES: CONIAS HOTELS PTY LTD
(First Applicant)
AND
CITY COMMERCIAL HOLDINGS PTY LTD
(Second Applicant)
AND
BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
(First Respondent)
AND
CHIEF EXECUTIVE ADMINISTERING THE
SUSTAINABLE PLANNING ACT 2009
(Second Respondent)
AND
ROSS NEILSON PROPERTIES PTY LTD
(Third Respondent)
FILE NO/S: 884 of 2016
DIVISION: Planning and Environment Court
PROCEEDING: Application for costs
ORIGINATING
COURT: Planning and Environment Court, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 6 November 2017
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: Application on the papers
JUDGE: R Jones DCJ
ORDER: 1. Ross Neilson Properties Pty Ltd is to pay Conias
Hotels Pty Ltd and City Commercial Holdings Pty
Ltd costs of the proceeding from and including 19
May 2016 to 25 October 2016.
CATCHWORDS: COSTS – where first and second applicants bought court
proceedings challenging the validity of a development
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application lodged by the third respondent – where
proceedings commenced on 3 March 2016 – where
proceedings listed to commence 19 May 2016 – where
hearing date adjourned to 28 November 2016 – where third
respondent withdrew its development application – where as
a consequence on 25 October 2016 the court gave leave for
the appellants to discontinue their proceedings on the limited
grounds that the development application had been
withdrawn – whether first and second applicants entitled to
favourable costs orders as a consequence
COUNSEL: Mr C Hughes QC with Mr A Skoien for the first and second
applicants
Mr J Lyons for the respondent
Mr D Gore QC with Mr M Williamson for the third
respondent
SOLICITORS: Thomson Geer for the first and second applicants
Brisbane City Legal Practice for the respondent Council
Connor O’Meara for the third respondent
[1] This proceeding is concerned with an application for costs by the first applicant,
Conias Hotels Pty Ltd (“Conias”) and the second applicant, City Commercial
Holdings Pty Ltd (“City Commercial”) against the third respondent, Ross Neilson
Properties Pty Ltd (“RNP”). For the reasons set out below, the orders of the court
are:
1. Ross Neilson Properties Pty Ltd is to pay Conias Hotels Pty Ltd and City
Commercial Holdings Pty Ltd costs of the proceeding from and including 19
May 2016 to 25 October 2016.
Background
[2] In or about May 2015, a development application (“DA”) was made to the Brisbane
City Council on behalf of RNP for the redevelopment of land located at 500 George
Street, Brisbane. The proposed development involved the retention of an existing
building and the construction of a mixed use high rise development comprising
residential apartments, short term accommodation units and limited miscellaneous
commercial uses. In total some 56 storeys were proposed involving a total of 248
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residential dwelling units, 144 serviced apartments, 334 m2 of commercial floor space
and 133 car parks.
[3] Due to the physical characteristics of the site and, in particular, its frontage to George
Street near the intersection with Roma Street, the sole means of vehicle access was to
be via a laneway encumbered by existing easements which would have provided
ingress and egress to Herschel Street. These easements benefitted not only the subject
site and another site (Lot 1), but also land accommodating commercial developments
owned by Conias and City Commercial. The former is a hotel of traditional character
and the latter currently incorporates various uses including backpacker
accommodation and bar facilities.
[4] The DA as originally made did not seek the consent of or otherwise include Conias
or City Commercial. Both of those land owners were, unsurprisingly, concerned
about the impact of the proposed use of the laneway. In particular they were
concerned that the traffic generated by the proposed development would cause
unworkable congestion and be likely to limit the right to develop over the easement
at some time in the future.
[5] Changes to the DA were made in March 2016. Those changes included making the
laneway part of the DA, but still did not include the consent of Conias or City
Commercial. They commenced proceedings in this court by way of Originating
Application on 3 March 2016. At the heart of the dispute was the validity of the DA
and, in particular, whether Conias and City Commercial were landowners who should
always have been a part of the application process and who had been unlawfully
excluded from that process.
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[6] The proceeding was listed for hearing to commence on 19 May 2016 but was
adjourned because RNP sought to raise a jurisdictional issue and expand the relief it
sought pursuant to s 440 of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (SPA). The matter
was relisted for hearing to commence on 28 November 2016 but, on 25 October 2016
leave was granted to discontinue the proceedings on the limited grounds that the DA
had been withdrawn by RNP.
Relief now sought by Conias and City Commercial
[7] Conias Hotels and City Commercial seek orders that:
(i) RNP pay their costs of and incidental to the proceedings or, in
the alternative;
(ii) RNP pay their costs of and incidental to the proceedings from
and including 20 May 2016 or, in the further alternative;
(iii) pay their costs thrown away by the adjournment of the hearing
on 19 May 2016.1
[8] It is not in dispute that the discretion to award costs in such proceedings is that
provided for pursuant to s 457 of the SPA. That section relevantly provides:
“(1) Costs of a proceeding or part of a proceeding… are in the
discretion of the court.
(2) In the making of an order for costs, the Court may have regard
to the following matters...”
Thereafter a number of matters including the relative success of the parties in the
litigation, the overall conduct of the parties and public interest considerations etc. are
set out.
[9] RNP resist any adverse costs orders on various grounds which will be discussed in
more detail below but which could be broadly summarized as follows:2
“Against the background of the above it is submitted that:
(a) the Applicants have overstated the extent to which their case
enjoyed good prospects of success – their case had to face up
to a number of difficult points, including technical evidence
(traffic) which was before the Council, and to be relied upon
by the Third Respondent, that did not support its case;
1 See court document 28 and Applicants’ written submissions at para 1.5.
2 Written submissions of RNP at paras 56 to 58.
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(b) the Applicants, in turn, down play the force of the Third
Respondent’s case – a case which was fair and reasonable and
supported by expert opinion; and
(c) it is wrong to suggest that the Third Respondent was
unreasonable in its defence of the proceeding – it had genuine
and forceful points to agitate in its favour which cannot be
said to be unarguable.
Moreover, the prospects of success for each party were not that
different. In an objective sense, the matter was fairly balanced. This
is a compelling reason as to why each party ought bear their own
costs of the proceeding.
The early ending of the proceeding was simply no reflection on the
relative merits of its party’s case.”
[10] It was also contended that at all material time RNP acted reasonably and by way of
conclusion:3
“The application for the cost of the proceeding is one based upon
submissions which overstate the Applicants’ position. The
submissions fail to come to grips with the obvious – the Applicants’
case faced a number of points against it that were of significant force,
supported by authority and expert evidence. It was saved the need to
have to litigate its case by an event which was not connected with the
subject proceeding. The Applicants have therefore enjoyed, by
default, success but not for any reason connected with the merits of its
proceeding.”
Mr Green’s reasons for not continuing the litigation
[11] The relief originally sought by Conias and City Commercial was for declaratory and
other relief. In particular, a declaration pursuant to s 456 of the SPA that the DA:
(i) did not include all of the land that is the subject of the
development application; and
(ii) does not include the consent to making of the development
application of all the owners of land the subject of that
application;
(iii) a further declaration that the development application had not
been properly made under the SPA;
(iv) an order pursuant to s 456(7) of the SPA that the Brisbane City
Council and the Chief Executive cease all steps to process,
assess and/or decide the development application;
(v) an order that the development application be returned to the
application stage as an application that had not been properly
made;
3 Ibid, para 71.
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(vi) an order that the Brisbane City Council and/or the Chief
Executive pay the costs of the application.
[12] At the time of filing the Originating Application seeking the above relief, RNP was
not a party. Pursuant to an order made by Judge Rackemann on 18 March 2016, RNP
was served with the relevant material. Following RNP becoming a party to the
proceeding, the application was relevantly amended to require the costs of the
proceeding to be paid by the Brisbane City Council and/or RNP.
[13] On 8 June 2016 RNP’s solicitors wrote to the solicitors acting for Conias and City
Commercial setting out a number of matters in the form of a “defence”. In that
document a number of allegations or assertions were made including: 4
1. This court did not have the power to grant the relief sought.
2. There was, as a matter of fact and/or law, no non-compliance with the relevant
provisions of the SPA. Or, alternatively, in the event that the court was to find
that the development application was not properly made on the basis of there
being non-compliance that could be remedied and excused pursuant to s 440
of the SPA.
[14] An affidavit was sworn by a Mr Peter Green who was the general
manager/development of RNP. In his affidavit it was stated: 5
“On or about 3 October 2016, Mr Ross Neilson, a director of the Third
Respondent and Northbridge MJN Pty Ltd advised me that
notwithstanding the advice that the Third Respondent had received
that its prospects in the proceedings were good:
(a) given that the overtures to the First and Second applicants to
resolve the matter had been rejected;
(b) the financial environment (which had changed substantially
since the earlier part of the year) was such that Mr Neilson
considered that it may not be possible for Northbridge MJN
Pty Ltd to obtain finance to acquire Lot 1 and carry out the
development on terms suitable to Mr Neilson;
(c) the market for multiple dwellings had substantially softened
since earlier in the year;
(d) satisfactory commercial terms could not be agreed with the
Feros parties for a further option extension
and Mr Neilson had made the decision that it would not be prudent or
appropriate to proceed with the development application.
4 Court document 28.
5 At paras 12-14.
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Thereafter given that Northbridge MJN Pty Ltd no longer had control
of Lot 1, Mr Neilson instructed me to take the necessary steps to
withdraw the development application forthwith.
It was not until Wednesday, 5 October 2016 that I was able to
communicate that instruction to Connor O’Mara, given that Michael
Connor was absent from the office on a short period of annual
leave…” (Emphasis added).
[15] The reference to Lot 1 is relevant in this context. It was owned by the so called “Feros
parties” who were not parties to the proceeding but whose land was required to
facilitate the construction of the proposed development as intended. The first
emphasised part of Mr Green’s assertions suggests that no meaningful enquiries had
been made to ascertain the true or likely situation concerning financing the purchase
of Lot 1.
Discussion and conclusions
[16] Neither the Brisbane City Council nor the Chief Executive are involved in any
proceedings concerning costs.
[17] As was recognised by Rackemann DCJ in Queensland Nickel Sales Pty Ltd v Chief
Executive of Environment and Heritage Protection & Ors6 and somewhat
begrudgingly, by RNP, both Conias and City Commercial have been in a very real
sense successful litigants.7
[18] Of course being a successful litigant does not mean that costs must necessarily follow
the event. The discretion to award costs under s 457 of the SPA is an open one and
is not to be approached either on the basis that there is a presumption that costs follow
the event or on the basis that there is some form of underlying presumption that each
party should bear its own costs.
6 [2017] QPEC 55.
7 Respondent’s written submissions at para 71.
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[19] Another important consideration in deciding whether or not to make costs orders is
that, generally speaking, costs are not awarded to punish, but to compensate. In
Oshlack v Richmond River Council8 McHugh J relevantly said:
“… costs are not awarded to punish an unsuccessful party. The
primary purpose of an award of costs is to indemnify the successful
party. If the litigation had not been brought, or defended, by the
unsuccessful party, the successful party would not have incurred the
expense which it did. As between the parties, fairness dictates that the
unsuccessful party typically bears the liability for the costs of the
unsuccessful litigation.”
[20] It was said on the part of RNP that this was not a case, as it was in Queensland Nickel
Sales Pty Ltd, of it discontinuing any proceeding. In my view, nothing really turns
on the distinction between a party that discontinues its proceedings (be it by way of
discontinuing an application or a defence) and the withdrawal of a DA which was the
substantive and underlying cause of the proceedings. In every practical sense, the
end result was the same for the applicants.
[21] As was identified above, it was contended on behalf of RNP that;
“… (the applicants were) saved the need to have to litigate its case by
an event which was not connected with the subject proceeding. The
applicants have therefore enjoyed, by default, success but not for any
reason connected with the merits of its proceeding.”9
[22] I cannot accept the thrust of that submission. The so-called “event” that led to RNP
withdrawing its DA are those evidenced in the affidavit of Mr Green. Leaving aside
any valid objections to his affidavit and taking it at face value, it still provides RNP
with no reasonable defence. Even accepting the hearsay evidence, on any view of it,
while it is not necessary to finally determine the matter, it would be to overstate things
to say that RNP had “good” prospects. Relying on the evidence provided by Mr
Green, it was also submitted on behalf of RNP that:10
8 [1998] HCA 11 at [67].
9 Written submissions at para 71.
10 Written submissions at paras 35 and 36.
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“To say the Applicants have enjoyed success in this proceeding needs
to be approached with caution. It is submitted that the so-called
success falls well short of justifying an order as to costs.
The Applicants’ case was never tested and did not have the support of
the assessment manager, Brisbane City Council. This proceeding was
discontinued because the development application the focus of the
issues in dispute was withdrawn. Mr Green of Ross Neilson Properties
explains this in clear terms in his affidavit sworn 10 November 2016.
The simple point is that the third Respondent no longer controls
part of the land that was the subject of the development
application. This is why the application was withdrawn. The
withdrawal of the application had nothing to do with the merits or
otherwise of the Applicants’ case. The decision to withdraw the
development application was based on considerations unrelated to
the merits of the Applicants’ proceeding.” (Emphasis added).
[23] To put it somewhat crudely, the evidence establishes that RNP made a commercial
decision not to continue with the proposed development.
[24] The fact that RNP no longer “controls part of the land that was the subject of the
development application”, that is Lot 1, was but another consequence of RNP’s
decision not to proceed with the development. I can see no good reason to deny the
applicants favourable cost orders because the proceedings came to an end based on a
self-interested commercial decision made on the part of RNP. In this context, as was
the case concerning the potential to finance the Feros purchase, without further
explanation and there was none, I found the evidence of Mr Green concerning the
substantial softening of the market “since earlier in the year” less than persuasive.
That evidence does not sit comfortably with RNP still maintaining a robust opposition
to the relief sought by Conias and City Commercial as late as 8 June 2016.11
[25] The affidavit of Mr Green refers to an offer being made by RNP to Conias and
Commercial Hotels to “settle the proceedings”.12 Usually an offer to settle would be
a material consideration in determining whether or not to make cost orders. However,
11 Refer to para 13 herein.
12 At para 11.
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I was not taken to any material identifying the terms of any offer and, of particular
significance, no reliance was placed on such an offer in RNP’s written submissions
concerning costs.13 Accordingly, in my view, it is not necessary to consider this
matter further.
[26] I am prepared to approach this proceeding on the basis that RNP had at least an
arguable case concerning the construction of the easement and the traffic congestion
issues. However, RNP’s actions not only required the adjournment on 19 May 2016,
but also introduced new issues of some complexity which then had to be addressed
by the applicants.
[27] There is no evidence that either Conias or City Commercial have behaved
unreasonably in the proceeding, a matter acknowledged by RNP (save for asking for
their costs). On balance, I can see no good reason to deny either Conias or City
Commercial favourable cost orders. Accordingly, the orders of the court are:
1. Ross Neilson Properties Pty Ltd is to pay Conias Hotels Pty Ltd and City
Commercial Holdings Pty Ltd costs of the proceeding from and including 19
May 2016 to 25 October 2016.
13 This matter was to be decided on the papers.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QPEC/2017/065