Development and Finance Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2016] QCAT 538

CITATION: Development and Finance Pty Ltd v The Commissioner of State Revenue [2016] QCAT 538 PARTIES: Development and Finance Pty Ltd (Applicant) v The Commissioner of State Revenue (Respondent) APPLICATION NUMBER: GAR168-15 MATTER TYPE: General administrative review matters HEARING DATE: 20 October 2016 HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Member Traves DELIVERED ON: 18 November 2016 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane ORDERS MADE: The decision made by The Commissioner of State Revenue to disallow the applicant’s objection in respect of the reassessment of land tax for the 2014-2015 financial year is confirmed. CATCHWORDS: GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW – LAND TAX – who is the statutory owner of taxable land – whether an agreement for the sale of land had been entered into at the relevant time – the test for “buyer in possession” within the meaning of s 11 of the Land Tax Act 2010 – effect of a tenancy agreement with an option to purchase Land Tax Act 2010 (Qld), s 7, s 8, s 9, s 10, s 11 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 9 Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld), s 71, s 73, s 129, s 132 Cam & Sons Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax (1965) 112 CLR 139 -- 1 of 13 -- 2 Commissioner of Land Tax (NSW) v Manors of Mosman Pty Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 94 David Deane & Associates Pty Ltd v Bonnyview Pty Ltd [2005] QCA 270 E Long & Co Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax [1968] 2 NSWR 143 HC Sleigh Ltd v Commissioner for Land Tax [1961] NSWR 1132 Highlands Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxes (SA) (1931) 47 CLR 191 Kameel Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2016] VSCA 83 Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57 Mark Bain Constructions Pty Ltd v Barling [2006] QSC 48 Ross Nielson Properties Pty Ltd v Orchard Capital Investments Ltd [2011] QCA 49 Vale 1 Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Vale 1 Trust v Delorain Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Delorain Trust [2010] QCA 259 Yule v Commissioner of Taxes (1918) NZLR 890 APPEARANCES: APPLICANT: Mr Clarence Gibbons RESPONDENT: Mrs Gail Hartridge of Counsel instructed by Mr Ben Tyler-Whiteman (Office of State Revenue) REASONS FOR DECISION [1] This matter concerns the review of a decision made by the Commissioner of State Revenue to disallow an objection against an assessment issued to the applicant on 10 September 2014 in relation to its land tax liability for the 2014-2015 financial year. The applicant’s liability for land tax arises on all taxable land owned by it as at 30 June 2014.1 [2] The notice of assessment is evidence that the amount and all particulars of the assessment are correct.2 On review, the applicant has the onus of proving its case.3 Here that would require the applicant to present evidence of sufficient weight to establish facts which, despite the assessment, would render the tax not payable as a matter of law. 1 Land Tax Act 2010 (Qld), s 7. 2 Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld), s 132, s 129. 3 Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld), s 73. -- 2 of 13 -- 3 [3] Pursuant to s 71 of the Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld) the tribunal must hear and decide the review by way of a reconsideration of the evidence before the Commissioner when the decision was made unless it considers it necessary in the interests of justice to allow new evidence. “New evidence” is defined to mean evidence that was not before the commissioner when the decision on the objection was made.4 [4] The evidence which was before the Commissioner in considering the applicant’s objections was before the tribunal. In addition, the applicant had filed submissions which annexed 10 items of correspondence numbered App 1 – App 10.5 [5] The respondent objected to the admissibility of documents numbered App 1-7 and App 10 on the basis, in relation to App 1- 3 it was new evidence, and in relation to App 4-7 and 10 that the material was not relevant to the applicant’s case. [6] I am not satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to allow the new evidence. In relation to the other evidence, although I find it to be of limited relevance, I am prepared to admit it. Background [7] The applicant was issued with a Land Tax Assessment for the 2014-2015 financial year which included 6 properties of a combined taxable value of $431,000.00.6 The applicant’s land tax liability based on that taxable value was $2, 827.00. [8] The applicant objects to the assessment principally on the basis it is not, for the purposes of the Act, the owner of four out of the six properties. The applicant however has only produced evidence in relation to two properties. [9] This review is therefore confined to the two properties in respect of which the applicant provided evidence. These properties are: a) Property 3 – Old Tara Road; and b) Property 5 – Crosbies Road. [10] Each property was subject to an agreement. The agreement relating to Property 3 – Old Tara Road [11] The relevant agreement is a Form 18a “General Tenancy Agreement” between Development & Finance Pty Ltd as Lessor and Benjamin Aaron 4 Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld), s 71(5). 5 Submissions of the applicant dated 15 October 2015. 6 2014-2015 Land Tax Summary, Section 21 documents filed by the Applicant, p 45. -- 3 of 13 -- 4 Maher and Tamara Ann McShannon as Tenants signed by the tenants on 12 February 2014 and the lessor on 20 February 2014. [12] The premises are identified under “location” as Lot 2 on RP 199328, 404 Old Tara Road, Wieambilla, Queensland. [13] The term of the agreement is 2 years and 11 months. It starts on 28 January 2014 and ends on 27 December 2016. The rent is $1, 211.95 a month. [14] The agreement also nominates a repairer for any electrical, plumbing or other repairs required by the “tenant”. [15] The Special Terms to the General Tenancy Agreement include clause 6 (which should be numbered clause 9). It provides: Rent to buy. The parties acknowledge that this is a ‘rent to buy’ arrangement, and the tenant is hereby given the right to buy the property at any time upon the following terms and conditions: During the first two years and eleven months of the agreement a. The purchase price shall be $275 000.00 (Two hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars); b. The deposit shall be 10% of the total amount of rent which has been paid up to the date of completion of the contract of sale. The landlord will accept 10% of the rent previously paid as the deposit, PROVIDED that this deposit shall not be refundable in the event that the contract does not proceed to completion for any reason including the landlord’s default. c. The contract may be subject to finance approval if the buyers require it, provided that finance approval is obtained within 21 days of the date of contract. d. The completion date will be 45 days from the date of contract. e. The contract will not be conditional upon satisfactory inspections. f. The terms and conditions will otherwise be as set out in the then current REIQ contract. g. The tenants must prepare, execute and forward to the landlords two signed contracts together with any mandatory warning statements or other documents which may then be required by legislation, duly executed, in the terms set out above, and the landlord is required to sign and date the contracts and return one copy to the tenants within seven business days of receipt. [16] The clause goes on to provide that if the tenant decides to buy the property during any subsequent period, the purchase price “shall be negotiated between the parties”. The relevant sub-clauses mirror those in clause 6, (b)-(g) however clause (o) provides: -- 4 of 13 -- 5 The landlord may not otherwise sell or transfer the property to any third party without first offering of the tenant the opportunity to purchase the property on the same terms and conditions as those offered to any third party. In this event, the tenant shall be given five business days within which to make an offer on the same terms and conditions as those proposed by any third party. [17] It contains a “call option”. There is no obligation on the tenant to buy. The agreement contemplates that, where the right to buy is exercised by the tenant, that two duly executed and signed contracts are made. The agreement relating to Property 5 – Crosbies Road. [18] The relevant agreement is titled “Rental/Purchase Agreement”. It is between Development and Finance Pty Ltd as Landlord/Vendors and Rose Family Trust as Renter/Purchasers. The details of the property to rent/purchase is described as Lot 1 on Tara Goranba Lane, Tara and Lot 3 on Crosbies Road, Tara. [19] Clause I provides that “The property is freehold or leasehold.” [20] The monthly rent is $1, 743.55. Under conditions of rental it is provided, relevantly, that: 3. The landlord will pay Rates, Insurance on the building and any general maintenance costs but not damage caused by the tenants or his associates, family or friends. The tenants will pay such outgoings as power, phone etc. The Rent will be subject to a review each six months. No dogs are allowed in the dwelling house. The tenant will mow and maintain the house yard. The tenant must insure his own property and possessions. The tenant cannot sublet the property. 4. The Renter is allowed to undertake improvements to the property and receive any profits gained from the property. The tenant is given first option to purchase the property. A contract for the sale of the property will be drawn up by the landlord at the time the tenant decides to purchase the property. 5. The details for the contract are to be agreed to by both Tenant and Landlord. For the sale to proceed both parties must agree on the contract terms. Development and Finance Pty Ltd will provide the finance if the Tenant proceeds to purchase the property. 6. If the Tenant decides not to purchase the property then there is no refund of any monies paid. … 11. The Landlord has the right to inspect the property each month to make sure the property is being kept clean and the agreement conditions adhered to. The Tenant shall be responsible for any clean up costs to bring the property into the condition it was in at the time of the agreement date. The Tenant shall be responsible for costs incurred enforcing agreement conditions. -- 5 of 13 -- 6 [21] Clause 5 contemplates a further agreement if the “renter” decides to purchase the property. The tribunal’s review jurisdiction [22] The tribunal has jurisdiction if it has been conferred by an enabling Act.7 Under s 69 of the Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld) (Taxation Administration Act), if a taxpayer is dissatisfied with the commissioner’s decision on the taxpayer’s objection and the taxpayer has paid the tax under the assessment to which the decision relates, the taxpayer has a right to apply for review to QCAT. [23] The taxpayer must apply within 60 days after notice is given to the taxpayer of the commissioner’s decision.8 [24] The tribunal has power on review to confirm or amend the decision, set aside the decision and substitute its own decision or set aside the decision and return the matter for reconsideration to the decision-make for the decision, with the directions the tribunal considers appropriate.9 Basic statutory concepts [25] Section 6(4) of the Taxation Administration Act provides that the Land Tax Act 2010 (Qld) (Land Tax Act) is a revenue law. The Taxation Administration Act and each revenue law is to be read together as if they formed one statute.10 The Commissioner of State Revenue is responsible for the administration and enforcement of Queensland’s revenue laws.11 [26] The Land Tax Act imposes land tax, for each financial year, on all taxable land.12 Land tax is imposed on the taxable value of taxable land.13 Taxable land is land in Queensland that is held as an estate in fee simple and not exempt land.14 [27] Section 10 of the Land Tax Act defines the term “owner” as follows: 10 Meaning of owner (1) The owner of land includes the following— (a) a person jointly or severally entitled to a freehold estate in the land who is in possession; (b) a person jointly or severally entitled to receive rents and profits from the land; 7 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 9. 8 Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld), s 69(2). 9 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 24. 10 Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld), s 3(3). 11 Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld), s 8; Schedule 2 definition of “tax law”. 12 Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld), s 6(1). 13 Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld), s 6(2). 14 Taxation Administration Act 2001 (Qld), s 9. -- 6 of 13 -- 7 (c) a person taken to be the owner of the land under this Act. (2) The fact that a person is the owner of land under a provision of this Act does not prevent another person also being the owner of the land. (3) This section is subject to sections 12 to 14, 22 and 23. [28] An important provision for the purposes of this review is s 11 of the Land Tax Act. Section 11 provides: 11 Sellers and buyers of land (1) For this Act, if an agreement has been made for the sale of land— (a) the seller is taken to be the owner of the land until the buyer is in possession of it; and (b) the buyer is taken to be the owner of the land as soon as the buyer is in possession of it. (2) This section applies whether or not the agreement has been completed. [29] All land owned by a taxpayer must be aggregated and assessed on the total taxable value of all taxable land owned by the taxpayer when the liability arises.15 The rate of land tax for a company is $1, 450 plus 1.7c for each dollar more than $350, 000.16 The grounds of objection [30] The grounds on which the application for review is made are limited to the grounds of the relevant objection, unless the tribunal orders otherwise.17 [31] The applicant’s position, is that, property 3 and property 5 are not taxable land owned by it. In support of this position, the applicant relies principally on two arguments: a) it was not the owner within the meaning of s 10 of the Land Tax Act; and b) it had entered into an agreement for the sale of land and the buyer had taken possession within the meaning of s 11. Who is an owner for the purposes of the Land Tax Act? [32] Before considering the two contracts I will deal with the relevant principles. [33] The owner of land is liable for land tax, under s 8 of the Land Tax Act. “Owner” is defined inclusively in s 10 of the Land Tax Act. The common law 15 Land Tax Act, s 19. 16 Land Tax Act, s 32(1)(b); Schedule 2. 17 Taxation Administration Act 2010 (Qld), s 71(2). -- 7 of 13 -- 8 definition has not been excluded. For land to be taxable it must be held as an estate in fee simple. The holder of the fee simple is generally the registered owner of the land on the freehold land register.18 The registered owner is the person with indefeasible title to the lot.19 [34] Section 10 provides: (1) The owner of land includes the following – (a) a person jointly or severally entitled to a freehold estate in the land who is in possession; (b) a person jointly or severally entitled to receive rents and profits from the land; (c) a person taken to be the owner of the land under this Act. [35] Owners of land therefore includes those deemed to be owners under the Land Tax Act.20 There may be multiple owners. [36] Section 11 defines who shall be the owner of the land in circumstances where “an agreement has been made for the sale of the land”. The effect of sections 10 and 11 is, relevantly, that the applicant is the owner of the land unless section 11(1)(b) applies such as to deem “the buyer” of the land to be the owner. Therefore, where an agreement for the sale of land has been entered into, the buyer will be deemed to be the owner from the time the buyer takes possession of the property, the subject of that agreement. [37] Unpaid land tax can be recovered as a debt from the owner of taxable land on which the land tax was imposed.21 However, this is not the case if the land was the subject of a sale and the unpaid land tax was imposed before the owner purchased the land.22 [38] Two questions therefore arise for consideration under the relevant provisions: a) whether there is an agreement for the sale of land within the meaning of section 11(1); and b) if there is an agreement for the sale of land, whether the buyer is “in possession” of it within the meaning of subsections 11(1)(a) and 11(1)(b). [39] The expression “contract for the sale of” does not have a fixed, technical meaning. Its meaning has been held to be “capable of being influenced by 18 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), Schedule 2. 19 Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 38. 20 Land Tax Act 2010 (Qld), s 10(1)(c). 21 Land Tax Act 2010 (Qld), s 59(1). 22 Land Tax Act 2010 (Qld), s 59(2)(a). -- 8 of 13 -- 9 the context in which it appears”.23 Of course, as is the case here, the obligation or prospect of an obligation of sale may exist within a broader contractual context including, for example, a tenancy. [40] In broad terms, the question is whether an option to purchase land, within an agreement which might otherwise be characterised as a tenancy agreement, is “an agreement for the sale of land” within the meaning of the Land Tax Act. [41] There is conflicting authority on the meaning of the phrase and the cases have turned on the context and the construction of the agreements in question. [42] In some cases it has been possible to argue that a contract of sale formed on the exercise of an option is assimilated with the option agreement from which it originated so that the option agreement itself, though not a contract “of” sale, might be regarded as a contract “for” sale.24 This was held to be the case where a purchaser was bound to exercise the option if it failed to find an alternative purchaser25 but not in the case of a development agreement containing a put and call option which would become exercisable only upon fulfilment of a series of contingencies.26 [43] It is possible for the character of a contract to change. In David Deane & Associates Pty Ltd v Bonnyview Pty Ltd27 Keane JA observed that “an option or contract relating to the sale of property may, by mutual resolution of the contingencies to which it was previously subject, become properly characterised as a contract of sale.” There it was held that a put option which obliged a prospective purchaser to acquire such lots as the owner might elect to put to it for purchase was a contract of sale, notwithstanding that the obligation to purchase was conditional on the exercise of the put option.28 On the other hand, in Beca Developments Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 92) Pty Ltd29 Young J found that a conditional contract was created, not on the giving of the option, but on the giving of its notice of exercise. [44] There is a sensible argument that the words “agreement for the sale of land” are broader than the words “agreement of sale of land”. It is arguable, therefore, that the words “agreement for the sale of land” include an agreement, of the nature of a tenancy agreement, which include an option to purchase yet to be exercised. 23 Ross Nielson Properties Pty Ltd v Orchard Capital Investments Ltd [2011] QCA 49, [34]. 24 Ibid, [38]. 25 Vale 1 Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Vale 1 Trust v Delorain Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Delorain Trust [2010] QCA 259; Mark Bain Constructions Pty Ltd v Barling [2006] QSC 48. 26 Ross Nielson Properties Pty Ltd v Orchard Capital Investments Ltd [2011] QCA 49. 27 [2005] QCA 270, [23]. 28 Adopting the approach of Gibbs J in Laybutt v Amoco Australia Pty Ltd (1974) 132 CLR 57. 29 (1989) 4 BPR 9575. -- 9 of 13 -- 10 [45] The better view, in my opinion, is however that in order for there to be an agreement for the sale of land under section 11 there must be, in effect, a contract of sale of the land. In the context of an option to purchase, until an option to purchase land has been exercised, there is no obligation on the buyer to buy, and no obligation on the seller to sell. There is, at that point, no contract for the sale of the land. Such an interpretation is consistent with the authorities, referred to below, which require for the buyer to be in possession of the land that the buyer be in “possession as purchaser obtained in intended execution of the agreement of sale”.30 [46] As to the meaning of the phrase “the buyer is in possession”, the High Court in Cam & Sons Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax31 adopted the view of Sugerman J in the decision below that possession had been obtained in the statutory sense when the vendor, himself retaining no vestige of possession, has done all that is necessary for him to do to enable the purchaser to assume actual occupation of the land or receipt of its rents and profits, and when, there being no obstacle in the way such as adverse possession by a third party, it rests solely with the purchaser to decide whether and when he will do so. When and whether he chooses to enjoy its profitable use or its returns are matters entirely for him. He has ‘obtained possession’, and the vendor has ‘delivered possession’ to him, in the intended senses of those expressions. [47] The High Court had earlier considered the Land Tax Assessment Act 1910- 1926 in the leading case of Highlands Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxes (SA).32 There the Act deemed a buyer to be the owner of the land “so soon as he has obtained possession of the land”. Dixon J (as he then was), with reference to the relevant statutory provision, said: The material portion of sec 37 requires that, where an agreement has been made for the sale of land, the buyer shall be deemed to be the owner of the land so soon as he has obtained possession of the land. This appears to me to mean possession as purchaser obtained in intended execution of the agreement of sale, performance of which may, of course, be affected by agreed variations of its terms and by waiver, including the acceptance of substituted times and modes of performance.33 [48] In H C Sleigh Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax (NSW)34 Collins J found that possession as purchaser differed in kind from the possession obtained merely as lessee and found that possession solely as lessee did not fall within the statutory provision. 30 Highlands Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxes (SA) (1931) 47 CLR 191 per Dixon J, 201. 31 (1965) 112 CLR 139, 144-5. 32 (1931) 47 CLR 191. 33 Ibid, 201. 34 [1961] NSWR 1132 -- 10 of 13 -- 11 [49] The relevant provision in the Land Tax Act 2005 (Vic) was considered in Kameel Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue.35 The decision contains a useful summary of the authorities. There the Victorian Court of Appeal held that there had been a conversion from occupation as a licensee to possession as a purchaser under a contract of sale upon registration of a plan of subdivision. It was not until the relevant party ceased to be a licensee and took possession as a purchaser in intended execution of the contract of sale upon a registration of a plan of subdivision, that the elements of “possession” within the meaning of the equivalent provision in the Victorian Land Tax legislation were held to be satisfied.36 [50] Similarly, in Commissioner of Land Tax (NSW) v Manors of Mosman Pty Ltd37 the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that once the vendor had given the relevant notice, the licence agreement entered into and the purchaser had gone into occupation, the purchaser had obtained possession as purchaser. The giving of the vendor’s notice bound the purchaser to pay the balance of the purchase price to the vendor and required that the deposit be contemporaneously accounted for to the vendor. [51] A person in possession as a purchaser has been held to include a lessee in possession under a lease containing a compulsory purchase clause.38 This has not been extended to include a tenancy with a mere option to purchase. [52] The critical date to determine possession under s 11 is the date of assessment.39 [53] The meaning of possession in s 11 must therefore, in my view, be construed to mean possession in the capacity as purchaser under the relevant agreement for sale and not in some other capacity, for example, as occupier, tenant or licensee.40 [54] The alternative view, that possession need not be referable to an agreement for the contract of sale, would mean accepting that s 11 merely requires that there be actual possession by a person nominated as a 35 [2016] VSCA 83. 36 Section 15 of the Land Tax 2005 (Vic) provides: (1) For the purposes of this Act, a purchaser under a contract of sale of land is deemed to be the owner of the land (but not to the exclusion of any other person) if the purchaser has taken possession of the land. (2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the contract of sale has been completed by the transfer of the land. 37 (1994) 34 NSWLR 94. 38 Yule v Commissioner of Taxes (1918) NZLR 890 at 894. 39 Kameel Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2016] VSCA 83 at [87] citing Highlands Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxes (SA) (1931) 47 CLR 191. 40 Highlands Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxes (SA) (1931) 47 CLR 191, 197; See also E Long & Co Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax [1968] 2 NSWR 143; HC Sleigh Ltd v Commissioner for Land Tax [1961] NSWR 1132; Yule v Commissioner of Taxes (1918) NZLR 890. -- 11 of 13 -- 12 potential purchaser in an “agreement for the sale of land”, and the contract remains on foot. This is not a rigorous threshold for a status that in effect transfers a liability for land tax.41 Reasoning in respect of Property 3 – Old Tara Road [55] The agreement is titled “General tenancy agreement” and provides for a term and a rent. [56] However, it also: provides for the tenant a right to buy at any time; identifies a purchase price of $275,000; provides for a deposit, although curiously by way of rent already paid, which shall be non-refundable; includes a subject to finance clause; provides for a completion date; and otherwise includes the standard REIQ terms. [57] The question is whether the General Tenancy Agreement, having been made, is an “an agreement for the sale of land” within the meaning of section 11. [58] Although the tenant has an enforceable right to buy the property under clause 6, there is no obligation on the tenant to do so. A tenant who has not exercised the option to buy the property cannot, in these circumstances, in my view, be regarded as a “buyer” within the meaning of s 11 of the Land Tax Act. [59] The case is distinguishable from Cam & Sons Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax (NSW) where the purchaser had agreed to buy the property and “rent” went towards satisfaction of interest and the balance in satisfaction of the purchase price. Here the tenant remains a tenant paying rent until he elects to buy the property. If the tenant elects to buy the property, of the rent already paid up until that time, only 10% is allocated to a deposit. [60] Further, until the purchaser makes a decision to buy the property and exercises the option to do so, the character of his possession is as a tenant and not as a purchaser. This is consistent with the provisions in the contract as to payment of rent: the money paid by the tenant is rent and the character of this does not change until the option to buy is exercised. [61] The tenant is not, in those circumstances, a “buyer in possession” of the land within the meaning of section 11. That is so even if, contrary to my view, the agreement is an agreement for the sale of land within the meaning of the section. Reasoning in respect of the agreement relating to Property 5 – Crosbies Road. [62] Under this contract, the tenant is given first option to purchase the property but on terms to be agreed. Thus, the tenant is not in a position by the exercise of an option to create a binding contract of sale and purchase. The 41 Kameel Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) [2016] VSCA 83, [92]. -- 12 of 13 -- 13 option, such as it is, if exercised, gives rise only to an agreement to agree. Such an agreement is unenforceable.42 [63] In those circumstances, the agreement in respect of property 5 is not an agreement for the sale of land and nor is the tenant a buyer in possession. Conclusion [64] In my opinion, there was no agreement for the sale of land within the meaning of s 11 in respect of either property. [65] The tenant in each case was not a “buyer in possession” within the meaning of s 11. [66] The tenant is not therefore the deemed owner. The applicant is accordingly liable to pay the land tax for 2014-2015 financial year as assessed. 42 Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353, 361. -- 13 of 13 --