Bell v Mount Isa Mines Limited; Bell v Chelden Pty Ltd [2016] ICQ 22

INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Stewart Lynn Bell v Mount Isa Mines Limited; Stewart Lynn Bell v Chelden Pty Ltd [2016] ICQ 022 PARTIES: Stewart Lynn Bell, Commissioner under the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Appellant) v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (Respondent) CASE NO: CASE NO: C/2015/52 Stewart Lynn Bell, Commissioner under the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 v Chelden Pty Ltd (Respondent) C/2015/54 PROCEEDING: Appeal against a decision of the Industrial Magistrate DELIVERED ON: 8 September 2016 HEARING DATE: 3 May 2016 MEMBER: Deputy President O'Connor ORDERS : 1. The appeals are allowed; 2. The decision of the Industrial Magistrate is set aside; and 3. The matter is remitted to the Industrial Magistrates Court to proceed according to law. CATCHWORDS: APPEALS - PROCEDURE - INDUSTRIAL MAGISTRATE - APPLICATION FOR JOINT TRIAL - Power of an Industrial Magistrate to make an order for joint trial - Whether joinder is a rule of -- 1 of 13 -- 2 law or a rule of practice and procedure - Whether implied power under the Justices Act 1886. CASES: Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 s 234 Industrial Relations Act 1999 ss 677, 683 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 42, 43, 83A Justices Act 1902 (NSW) s 57 Munday v Gill (1930) 44 CLR 38 R v Davidson [1985] 1 Qd R 332 Chief Constable of Norfolk v Clayton [1983] 2 AC 473. APPEARANCES: Talbot v Lane (1994) 14 WAR 120 Power v Heyward [2007] 2 Qd R 69 Higgins v Comans Acting Magistrate and DPP (Qld) [2005] QCA 234 Thiess Pty Ltd v Industrial Magistrate Elizabeth Hall & Ors [2013] QSC 130 Attorney-General v Walker (1849) 3 Ex 242 Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (1999) 198 CLR 435 JR Hunter QC and RM O'Gorman, Counsel instructed by Gilshenan & Luton for the appellant. PJ Davis QC and JR Jones, Counsel instructed by Minter Ellison for the first respondent. No appearance for the second respondent. [1] On 25 September 2015, the prosecution made an application in the Industrial Magistrates Court for a joint trial of three defendants charged with summary offences under s 31 of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 ("the MQSH Act"). [2] The proceedings themselves arise from a fatal workplace incident which occurred on 6 March 2014 when Jordan Taurima suffered a fatal crush injury to his head. [3] As a result of the fatality, six entities, or persons, were prosecuted for breaches of safety obligations under the MQSH Act. [4] The charges are not identical but reflect the different obligations owed by an operator for a mine and a contractor at a mine. It is submitted by the appellant that the facts and the evidence underpinning the charges against the respondents are substantially the same. [5] The learned Magistrate concluded that there was no power under the Justices Act 1886 ("the Justices Act") to make an order for a joint trial and dismissed the application. -- 2 of 13 -- 3 [6] The prosecution now appeals that decision and asserts in the Application to Appeal that the learned Magistrate erred in the following two respects: 1. The learned Magistrate erred in refusing to order joint trials for defendants Brian Corrie, Mount Isa Mines Ltd and Chelden Pty Ltd; and 2. The learned Industrial Magistrate erred in concluding that she had no jurisdiction to order a joint trial. [7] The appellant seeks orders setting aside the decision of the learned Magistrate and for the complaints against the two respondents in this matter, namely Mount Isa Mines Limited ("MIM"), and Chelden Pty Ltd, to be heard jointly in the Industrial Magistrates Court. The third defendant was convicted in the Industrial Magistrates Court and is not a party in these proceedings. [8] MIM contends that there is no express statutory power in the Justices Act to hear summary trials for multiple complaints against multiple defendants and accordingly, the appeal ought to be dismissed. MIM also contents that Munday v Gill and Others1 ("Munday") prevents summary trials for multiple complaints from being joined. Legislative context [9] The safety obligations allegedly breached by the respondents are contained within Part 3 of the MQSH Act. It is not necessary to extract those obligations within the body of this decision and it is sufficient, for present purposes, to note that a breach of an obligation contained in Part 3 is an offence against the MQSH Act. [10] Part 14 of the MQSH Act governs legal proceedings. Relevantly, s 234 of the Act provides as follows: "234 Proceedings for offences (1) A prosecution for an offence against this Act is by way of summary proceedings before an industrial magistrate. … (3) A person dissatisfied with a decision of an industrial magistrate in proceedings brought under subsection (1) who wants to appeal must appeal to the Industrial Court. (4) The Industrial Relations Act 1999 applies, with necessary changes, to a proceeding before an industrial magistrate brought under subsection (1) and to a proceeding on appeal…" 1 (1930) 44 CLR 38. -- 3 of 13 -- 4 [11] It follows then that the Industrial Relations Act 1999 ("the IR Act") applied to the proceedings before the Industrial Magistrate hearing the prosecution of the appellents in this matter. [12] Chapter 14 of the IR Act is entitled "Legal proceedings"; section 677 is especially relevant to this matter: "677 General application of jurisdictional provisions The provisions of this Act providing for the power of and procedures before the court, the commission or an Industrial Magistrates Court apply in relation to the jurisdiction of the court, the commission or an Industrial Magistrates Court under this or another Act, unless the contrary intention appears." [13] As is section 683: "683 Offence proceedings generally (1) Proceedings for an offence under this Act are to be heard and decided by the court or a magistrate, within the limits of the court's or magistrate's jurisdiction. (2) Proceedings before a magistrate are to be heard and decided summarily under the Justices Act 1886, but the Industrial Magistrates Court where the proceedings are taken is to be constituted by a magistrate sitting alone. [14] As a result of section 683 of the IR Act, the Justices Act otherwise informs the operation of summary proceedings before an Industrial Magistrate. The procedures of the Magistrates Court are governed by Part 4 of the Justices Act. Section 42 provides for the commencement of proceedings: "42 Commencement of proceedings (1) Except where otherwise expressly provided or where the defendant has been arrested without warrant, all proceedings under this Act shall be commenced by a complaint in writing, which may be made by the complainant in person or by the complainant’s lawyer or other person authorised in that behalf. … [15] Section 43 of the Justices Act prescribes the way in which complaints are to be dealt with: "43 Matter of complaint (1) Every complaint shall be for 1 matter only, and not for 2 or more matters, except - -- 4 of 13 -- 5 (a) in the case of indictable offences - if the matters of complaint are such that they may be charged in 1 indictment; or (b) in cases other than cases of indictable offences - if the matters of complaint - (i) are alleged to be constituted by the same act or omission on the part of the defendant; or (ii) are alleged to be constituted by a series of acts done or omitted to be done in the prosecution of a single purpose; or (iii) are founded on substantially the same facts; or (iv) are, or form part of, a series of offences or matters of complaint of the same or a similar character; or (c) when otherwise expressly provided. (2) When 2 or more matters of complaint are joined in the 1 complaint each matter of complaint shall be set out in a separate paragraph. (3) At the hearing of a complaint in which 2 or more matters of complaint have been joined but which does not comply with the provisions of this section - (a) if an objection is taken to the complaint on the ground of such noncompliance - the court shall require the complainant to choose 1 matter of complaint on which to proceed at that hearing; or (b) if no such objection is taken to the complaint - the court may proceed with the hearing and may determine the matters of complaint, and may convict or acquit the defendant in accordance with such determination. (4) If, at the hearing of a complaint, it appears to the court that a defendant may be prejudiced or embarrassed in the defendant’s defence because the complaint contains more than 1 matter of complaint or that for any other reason it is desirable that 1 or more matters of complaint should be heard separately, the court may order that such 1 or more matters of complaint be heard separately." [16] Section 83A outlines the operation of a directions hearing before a Magistrate: "83A Direction hearing (1) This section applies to a proceeding for an offence. (2) A magistrate, on his or her own initiative, may direct the parties to the proceeding to attend at a direction hearing. -- 5 of 13 -- 6 (3) A party to the proceeding may apply to a court, in the approved form, for a direction hearing. (4) The party must serve a copy of the filed application on each other party at least 2 clear days before the day nominated for the direction hearing, unless the court directs otherwise. (5) At a direction hearing, a magistrate may give a direction he or she is entitled to make at law about any aspect of the conduct of the proceeding, including, for example, about any of the following - (aa) disclosure under the Criminal Code, chapter 62, chapter division 3; (a) a party providing a copy of - a medical, psychiatric or other expert report; or a statement, report or other stated information relevant to the proceeding; (b) psychiatric or other medical examination of the defendant; (c) joining complaints; (d) receiving evidence or submissions by telephone, video link or other form of communication; (e) issuing a summons or warrant; (f) changing the usual practice of the court in a way that helps an alleged victim of the offence to give evidence in the proceeding; …. (10) In this section— direction hearing means a hearing before the court for a direction about the conduct of the proceeding." (emphasis added) [17] The Justices Act does not expressly provide an Industrial Magistrate, or any Magistrate, with the power to join the summary trials of the defendants. [18] The Appellant submits that in the absence of an express power to jointly hear complaints the powers of the Industrial Magistrate will be governed by the common law. [19] In Munday the High Court considered the power of a justice under the Justices Act 1902 (NSW) to jointly hear different complaints against different defendants. In Munday nineteen miners were charged with knowingly continuing in an unlawful -- 6 of 13 -- 7 assembly. All the offences were summary offences. The case against one of the defendants came on for trial at which time it was proposed that the defendants' charges be heard together. One of the defendants objected. The Magistrate proceeded with hearing that charge and the defendant was convicted. The remaining matters came on for trial and were heard together with the consent of the defendants' counsel. Each of the defendants were convicted. [20] In Munday the relevant provision of the Justices Act 1902 (NSW) was in the following terms: 2 "Every information shall be for one offence only, and not for two or more offences. Every such complaint shall be for one matter only and not for two or more matters." [21] The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal held that the simultaneous trial of several informations (complaints) for several offences in a Court of summary jurisdiction was, whether with or without consent of the accused persons, without jurisdiction and a nullity. [22] On appeal the High Court overturned the decision of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal. After comprehensively surveying the relevant authorities, Dixon J (as his Honour then was) wrote: "It may be conceded that defendants charged upon different informations for summary offences are entitled to separate hearings, but these cases show that in England, Victoria, and New Zealand it was long been considered that failure to give effect to this right does not go to the jurisdiction of the justices, not to the validity of the conviction, but is an irregularity only which the defendants may waive. This view is in accordance with principle as well as with justice and convenience. The statutory requirement that an information shall be confined to one offence does not appear to affect the question whether a defendant may waive his right to a separate hearing of every information."3(emphasis added) [23] Munday is not authority per se for the proposition that a defendant charged with a summary offence is entitled to a separate trial, be that trial for other offences by the same defendant or different defendants. Rather, Munday is authority for the proposition that the irregularity of a joint hearing containing more than one information can be corrected, or approved of, by the consent of the defendant. [24] Dixon J's comments in Munday are tempered by the remarks of Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ: "In some instances, the irregularity is so serious that the consent of the accused will not cure it; in others consent overcomes the irregularity; whilst in yet others it is very slight and unattended by any serious consequences to the accused, so that no substantial miscarriage of justice takes place and the Court refuse to interfere. Much must therefore depend upon the nature of the charge, the character of the irregularity, and the conduct of the parties at the hearing. 2 Justices Act 1902 (NSW) s 57. 3 (1930) 44 CLR 38, 89-90. -- 7 of 13 -- 8 The fact that the accused person has consented to the irregular procedure is weighty, and one that is often decisive; but it is not conclusive of itself and the Court must consider the whole of the circumstances."4 [25] There appears to be no hard rule or authority which conclusively binds this Court to the effect that in summary matters the defendant is entitled have each charge heard separately. Isaacs CJ was of the opinion that the protections afforded to those charged with indictable offences should also extend to matters dealt with summarily.5 [26] The reasons of Dixon J, with whom Rich J concurred, and that of Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ, allow for the joining of different informations. Such an occurrence was, in their Honours' view, only an irregularity and, as such, the resulting proceedings were not a nullity. Moreover, the only way for such an irregularity to be 'cured' is, at the very least, via the consent of the defendant. [27] In the matter currently before the Court there is no consent to a joint trial. [28] The Appellant relies predominately on the reasoning of Williams J in R v Davidson6 ("Davidson") as authority for the proposition that two or more complaints can be heard together. Counsel for MIM questions the authority of Davidson and its usefulness given the directly contradictory High Court authority of Munday.7 [29] Davidson is a case involving a police undercover drug surveillance operation. The appellant/defendant was arrested on three charges which were recorded on the Bench Charge Sheet. The prosecutor applied to the Magistrate for the three charges to be joined and heard together. Counsel for the appellant objected to the third charge being heard together with the other two. The three charges were heard together and the appellant convicted on each charge. [30] Williams J, with whom Campbell CJ and Connolly J agreed, wrote: "The Court in Munday v. Gill was concerned with a situation where there were a number of complaints alleging the same offence against separate defendants; here the Court is concerned with a number of related charges against the same defendant. But it seems to me that the principles governing the hearing together of such charges must be the same. There is no doubt, adopting the majority view in the High Court in Munday v. Gill, that a defendant who has consented to a number of related charges against him being heard together cannot subsequently rely on that "irregularity" to have the convictions set aside. But in my view since 1930 there have been such changes in the legislation governing the applicable procedure that further consideration from this Court is called for on the question whether related charged against a defendant may be heard together even against his objection. In my view the reasoning of Lord Roskill in Clayton's case is correct and should be adopted and applied in 4 (1930) 44 CLR 38, 80-81. 5 (1930) 44 CLR 38, 51-52. 6 [1985] 1 Qd R 332. 7 (1930) 44 CLR 38. -- 8 of 13 -- 9 Queensland. There is no statutory prohibition against the hearing together of separate, but related, charges against the one defendant. The Court should do nothing to discourage the adoption of rules of procedure and practice which would facilitate the attainment of justice in the magistrates court, provided that "necessary safeguards" are maintained to prevent any risk of injustice to defendants."8 (citations omitted) [31] Williams J further observed that: "Though the Justices Act does not expressly provide for separate charges to be heard together, that practice has been adopted in the magistrates court. If such a procedure were not permissible the magistrates courts would not be able to handle the volume of work coming before them pursuant to the provisions of the Justices Act." [32] Williams J was influenced by the reasoning of Lord Roskill in Chief Constable of Norfolk v Clayton9 ("Clayton"). In his speech, Lord Roskill observed: "My lords, the practical difficulties which arise from rigid adherence to the rule of practice enunciated in Edwards v Jones [1947] KB 659 and in the later cases to which I have referred are indeed manifest. Common sense today dictates that in the interests of justice as a whole magistrates should have a discretion in what manner they deal with these problems. Suppose a defendant has 10 or 12 motoring offences charged in separate informations laid against him. He does not appear. If the present rule of practice is allowed to prevail, each of those 10 or 12 informations must be heard separately, often with the same witness or witnesses called and recalled 10 or 12 times to repeat themselves. Obstruction by a defendant is put at a premium. Today I see no compelling reason why your Lordships should not say that the practice in magistrates' courts in these matters should henceforth be analogous to the practice prescribed in Reg v Assim [1966] 2 QB 249 in relation to trials on indictment. Where a defendant is charged on several informations and the facts are connected, for example motoring offences or several charges of shoplifting, I can see no reason why those informations should not, if the justices think fit, be heard together. Similarly, if two or more defendants are charged on separate informations but the facts are connected, I can see no reason why they should not, if the justices think fit, be heard together. In the present cases there were separate informations against the husband and the wife and a joint information against them both. I can see no rational objection to all those informations being heard and determined together. Of course, when this question arises, as from time to time it will arise, justices will be well advised to inquire both of the prosecution and of the defence whether either side has any objection to all the informations being heard together. If consent is forthcoming on both sides there is no problem. If such consent is not forthcoming, the justices should then consider the rival submissions and, under any necessary advice from their clerk, rule as they think right in the overall interests of justice. If the defendant is absent or not represented, the justices, of course, should seek the views of the prosecution and again if necessary the advice of their clerk and then rule as they think fit in the overall 8 [1985] 1 Qd R 332, 339. 9 [1983] 2 AC 473. -- 9 of 13 -- 10 interest of justice. Absence of consent, either express where the defendant is present or represented and objects or necessarily brought about by his absence or the absence of representation, should no longer in practice be regarded as a complete and automatic bar to hearing more than one information at the same time or informations against more than one defendant charged on separate informations at the same time when in the justices' view the facts are sufficiently closely connected to justify this course and there is no risk of injustice to defendants by its adoption. Accordingly the justices should always ask themselves whether it would be fair and just to the defendant or defendants to allow a joint trial. Only if the answer is clearly in the affirmative should they order joint trial in the absence of consent by or on behalf of the defendant." [33] The dicta of Williams J in Davidson and the speech of Lord Roskill in Clayton are compelling reasons to warrant the departure from the High Court's decision in Munday. [34] The appellant submits, however, that s 43 of the Justices Act is now sufficiently different from the New South Wales provision in Munday to allow the observations of Williams J in Davidson to bind this Court. In my view, there has been such a discernible shift in the legislation or the context in which Munday was decided to allow this Court to follow Davidson and to distinguish Munday. [35] Section 43 of the Justices Act has been amended over time to contain explicit provisions on the circumstances in which charges can be joined in a single complaint,10 a power to compel the prosecution to elect which charge is to be proceeded upon in the case of improper joinder,11 an express power to hear improperly joined charges in the absence of any objection,12 and a power to order that charges should be heard separately in a case where a defendant would be embarrassed or prejudiced by the joinder.13 The appellant submits that these amendments allow Munday to be distinguished. I agree. [36] Section 83A of the Justices Act empowers a Magistrate to give a direction that he or she is entitled to make at law about any aspect of the conduct of the proceeding, including, for example, about any of the matters listed in the section.14 Section 83A(5)(c) specifically refers to joining complaints. [37] Section 83A of the Justices Act was inserted by Criminal Law Amendment Bill 2002. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill relevantly provide: "Clause 57 inserts a new provision, section 83A (Directions hearing) to provide a magistrate with a similar power to that given to the District and Supreme Courts in section 592A (Pre-trial directions and rulings) of the Criminal Code. Under this new provision the magistrate may give binding 10 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 43(1). 11 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 43(3)(a). 12 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 43(3)(b). 13 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 43(4). 14 Sammon v Rutherford [2005] 179 QGIG 142. -- 10 of 13 -- 11 directions to party to the proceedings about any aspect of the conduct of the proceedings."15 [38] The explanatory notes inform us that the legislature was attempting to insert a provision in the Justices Act that vested a Magistrate with a power similar to that given in the Criminal Code16 in relation to pre-trial directions and rulings in the Supreme and District Courts. [39] The respondent argued that s 83A of the Justices Act limits directions to orders that a Magistrate is "entitled to make at law" such as those under s 43 of the Justices Act. [40] The power conferred on a Magistrate to make procedural directions is a broad one even before the examples contained in s 83A(5) are considered. In my view, there can be little doubt that the examples given in s 83A(5) of the Justices Act inform the type of direction that can be given. The examples are procedural in nature. [41] The only constraint which otherwise appears operative, in that regard, is where there is another provision at law which is inconsistent with the making of the direction. [42] In this case, there is nothing to be found in the Justices Act which would prevent a Magistrate determining the manner in which the matter procedurally would ensue at trial. [43] Section 83A of the Justices Act is designed to allow for the proper conduct of summary proceedings and should, in my view, be construed as such. [44] In my view, a Magistrate has a discretion to hear separate complaints against different defendants at the same time. The existence of the discretion was declared by Lord Roskill in Clayton where his Lordship declined to formulate a rule of law for what he regarded as an obvious area of practice. [45] The reasoning of Lord Roskill in Clayton was approved of by Malcolm CJ in Talbot v Lane.17 Malcolm CJ wrote: "In my opinion, the decision of the House of Lords ought now be followed in Western Australia. The decision of the High Court in Munday v Gill would not seem to stand in the way as, like the earlier English cases, it may be explained on the basis that it referred only to a rule of practice, breach of which constituted an irregularity, which could be waived by the defendant." [46] Byrne J in Power v Heyward18 expressed the view that the Magistrates Court has, by implication, powers reasonably necessary to enable it to act effectively within its jurisdiction.19 His Honour wrote: "The more important of these are, 'subject to the rules of Court, and to statute, to regulate its own procedure, to ensure fairness investigative and trial 15 Explanatory Notes, Criminal Law Amendment Bill 2002, 15. 16 Criminal Code Act 1899. 17 (1994) 14 WAR 120 [139]. 18 [2007] 2 Qd R 69. 19 Thiess Pty Ltd v Industrial Magistrate Elizabeth Hall & Ors [2013] QSC 130 [27] (Boddice J). -- 11 of 13 -- 12 procedures ...' and to prevent an abuse of its process. Moreover, 'a court may exercise its ... implied powers ..., even in respect of matters that are regulated by a provision of a statute or rules of court, so long as it can do so without contravening any such provision.'" [47] The expression "reasonably necessary" was considered by Keane JA (as his Honour then was) in Higgins v Comans Acting Magistrate and DPP (Qld).20 His Honour observed: "It is not enough to justify the implication urged by the appellant that, perhaps as a matter of economy in the administration of criminal justice, it would be useful if a prosecution, that would probably be stayed at trial, could be halted at the committal stage. In this regard, I would respectfully agree with the observation of Spigelman CJ in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court, in a judgment with which Mason P and Beazley JA agreed, that ‘what is “reasonably necessary” cannot be stretched to encompass what is merely desirable or useful.'" [48] In the joint judgment of Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ in Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal21 which, while determining whether there was a valid basis for contempt proceedings, examined the power of the District Court to issue injunctive relief. They said: "The term 'necessary' in such a setting as this is to be understood in the sense given it by Pollock CB in Attorney-General v Walker (1849) 3 Ex 242, namely as identifying a power to make orders which are reasonably required or legally ancillary to the accomplishment of the specific remedies for enforcement provided in Division 4 of Part 3 of the District Court Act. In this setting, the term 'necessary' does not have the meaning of 'essential'; rather it is to be 'subjected to the touchstone of reasonableness' (State Drug Crime Commission of NSW v Chapman (1987) 12 NSWLR 477 at 452)." [49] The words "at law" in s 83A identify the fact that this is a procedural provision and there may well be, within the Justices Act, or in other legislation some preclusion upon the Magistrate from making the directions sought to be made. There is no reason why the Industrial Magistrates Court does not also have, by implication, powers reasonably necessary to enable it to act effectively within its jurisdiction, including powers in respect of matters "that are regulated by a provision of a statute or rules of court, so long as it can do so without contravening any such provision".22 [50] The Industrial Magistrates Court is a creature of statute and can only enjoy such jurisdiction as is prescribed by statute or jurisdiction which is incidental to the exercise of that jurisdiction. [51] Applying the approach adopted by Williams J, I am not inclined to conclude that the learned Industrial Magistrate had no power to join and hear the defendants in the Industrial Magistrates Court. 20 [2005] QCA 234. See also Pollock CB in Attorney-General v Walker (1849) 3 Ex 242. 21 (1999) 198 CLR 435. 22 Thiess Pty Ltd v Industrial Magistrate Elizabeth Hall & Ors [2013] QSC 130 [26] (Boddice J). See also Power v Heyward (2007) 2 Qd R 69. -- 12 of 13 -- 13 [52] It seems to me that a Magistrate should have regard to the type of advice proffered by Lord Roskill in Clayton in considering the approach which ought to be adopted in determining whether or not to grant a joint hearing. Ultimately, this is a question for the Magistrate to determine after considering the competing submissions including whether consent is or is not forthcoming (although the lack of consent is not an automatic bar to the granting of a joint trial) and the overall interests of justice.23 [53] For the reasons advanced above, I can see no reason why the learned Magistrate would not, if it was considered appropriate, be able to make an order in the terms sought by the appellant. Accordingly, I would allow the appeal and remit the matter back to the learned Industrial Magistrate to be heard and determined according to law. 23 R v Bennett 79 ACTR 1 [15] (Gallop J). -- 13 of 13 --