Director of Child Protection Litigation v PAV & HOK (No 2) [2016] QChC 14

CHILDRENS COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Director of Child Protection Litigation v PAV & HOK (No. 2) [2016] QChC 14 PARTIES: THE DIRECTOR OF CHILD PROTECTION LITIGATION (appellant) v PAV (first respondent) and HOK (second respondent) FILE NO/S: 3576/16 and 3577/16 DIVISION: Appeal PROCEEDING: Appeal from application for temporary protection order. ORIGINATING COURT: Childrens Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 16 September 2016. DELIVERED AT: Childrens Court of Queensland at Brisbane HEARING DATE: 9 September 2016 JUDGE: Dearden DCJ ORDER: (1) The decision of the learned magistrate at Brisbane on 30 August 2016, in which he declined to make an order granting temporary custody of either if the children, to the Chief Executive, be set aside. (2) Order that interim custody of HYA and HYB be granted to the Chief Executive for the period of the adjournment. (3) Order that PAV have no contact, direct or indirect, with HYA or HYB, for a period of three months from 9 September 2016. (4) Order that an authorised officer or police officer enter and search any place the officer reasonable believes the child is, to find the child, to enforce the order. -- 1 of 13 -- 2 CATCHWORDS: LEGISLATION: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES – where there are concurrent Family Law Court and Queensland Childrens Court proceedings - whether the learned magistrate erred at law in failing to grant a temporary custody order FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE – CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION – CHILDREN IN NEED OF PROTECTION – PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO CARE AND PROTECTION – whether the children are in need of protection – whether the children have suffered or are suffering emotional harm – whether the harm is significant Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 3, 5A-5C, 9, 10, 104, 105, 120, 121 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 69ZK CASES: COUNSEL: Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 ASW & ECW v Director General, Department of Communities (Child Safety) [2011] QChC 23 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 JP v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability services [2015] QChC 4 Ms J Aylward for the appellant The first and second respondents appeared self-represented SOLICITORS: Director of Child Protection Litigation for the appellant The first and second respondents appeared self-represented Introduction [1] On 30 August 2016 the learned magistrate at the Brisbane Childrens Court declined to make an order granting temporary custody of either of the children, HYA and HYB, to the Chief Executive. That decision was appealed to the Childrens Court of Queensland (sitting in its appellant jurisdiction) in respect of both children and was heard before me on 9 September 2016. Given the urgency of the matter, I granted the appeal in respect of each child and made orders. I provided brief oral reasons with -- 2 of 13 -- 3 the orders, and adjourned the proceedings to Friday 16 September 2016, indicating to the parties that I would then deliver detailed written reasons for my decision. Grounds of appeal [2] The grounds of appeal are as follows: - (a) The learned magistrate erred in law by placing insufficient weight on the evidence of Ms Lauren Davis about the significant emotional harm suffered by the children and the unacceptable risk of future emotional harm should they continue to reside with PAV; and (b) The learned magistrate erred at law by placing too much weight on the concurrent family law proceedings for parental orders, and failed to recognise that the child protection proceedings were different in nature and take precedents over family law proceedings pursuant to s 69ZK of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). [3] The appellant sought (and was granted) leave to adduce “fresh evidence” by way of a report of Dr Simon Kennedy, which is an exhibit to an affidavit of Ms Lissa Lyons, child safety officer, in an affidavit sworn 5 September 2016. The court also granted leave by way of “fresh evidence” for affidavits of PAV sworn 28 June 2016 but filed on the appeal on 29 August 2016 (Exhibit 3), a further affidavit sworn 29 August 2016 and filed the same date (Exhibit 4) and an affidavit sworn 9 September 2016 and filed on that date (Exhibit 5) to be tendered on the appeal. Background [4] On 23 June 2016, Ms Lissa Lyons, child safety officer, applied for a child safety protection order in the Brisbane Childrens Court seeking an order that the Chief Executive supervise HYA and HYB’s protection for a period of 12 months in relation to the following matters: - (a) The children stated an emotional and psychological health and wellbeing. (b) The appropriateness of the interactions the mother has with the children and whether she is having conversation with or exposing the children to discussion about the legal, parenting and/or family law issues between the mother, PAV and the children’s father HOK. (c) The adequacy or suitability of the accommodation in which the children are residing and whether it is met in their care and protection needs. [5] The applications came before the Brisbane Childrens Court on 26 June 2016 and Magistrate Schubert ordered the preparation of a social assessment report and a mental health assessment report. The social assessment report was prepared by Ms -- 3 of 13 -- 4 Lauren Davis who had been provided with reports concerning the family that had been prepared for Family Court proceedings. That report was forwarded to the Department of Child Safety on 15 August 2016 and as a consequence, an application was made for an ex-parte temporary custody order for the children on 25 August 2016. This application was granted by Magistrate Quinn on that date and expired at midnight on 30 August 2016. PAV was ordered to have no contact with the children. [6] The Director of Child Protection Litigation (DCPL), who is deemed to be the applicant in these proceedings, indicated that it intended to amend the applications for supervision orders to custody orders as a result of the concerns raised in the social assessment report by Ms Davis. Those applications were listed for mention at 9.00am on 30 August 2016. PAV then filed a notice of appeal on 26 August 2016 which was heard before Smith DCJ in the Childrens Court of Queensland. He made the following orders: - (a) The application is adjourned to 10.00am on 30 August 2016 before the Childrens Court. (b) The application currently listed on that date in the Brisbane Childrens Court is stayed pending the hearing of the application. (c) The appellant is to file and serve material by 10.00am on 29 August 2016. (d) The respondents are to file and serve any response by 9.00am on 30 August 2016. [7] The matter then came before Judge Reid in the Childrens Court of Queensland on 30 August 2016. PAV’s application for a stay was refused. [8] The matter then came before the learned magistrate in the Brisbane Childrens Court at 2.00pm on 30 August 2016 where the DCPL sought the following orders: - (a) Leave to amend the applications before the court and to seek a 12 month short term custody order to the Chief Executive. (b) Interim custody to the Chief Executive. (c) An order that PAV have no contract with the children as recommended by Ms Davis. [9] That court made the following orders: - (a) The proceeding to adjourn to 11 October 2016 at 9.00am for further mention of the application (b) An interim order was made in relation to each child as follows: (i) Authorising an authorised officer or police officer to have contact with the child. (ii) That the children be separately legally represented in these proceedings. -- 4 of 13 -- 5 (iii) The Department of Child Safety is to immediately provide all the material filed in these proceedings to the independent children’s lawyer in the federal circuit court proceedings and to inform the registrar, before whom the parents will be appearing on Thursday 2 September 2016 of the Department of Child Safety concerns. (iv) Leave was granted to the Director of Child Protection Litigation to amend the child protection applications. [10] In respect of the appeal to this court, relevantly, the learned magistrate declined to make an order granting interim custody to the Chief Executive. As the temporary custody order expired at midnight on 30 August 2016, the children were returned to the first respondent, PAV. [11] On 5 September 2016 the appellant received the mental health assessment ordered by the Brisbane Childrens Court on 26 June 2016 under the hand of Dr Simon Kennedy.1 On 5 September 2016, the appellant filed a notice of appeal in respect of each of the children.2 The law [12] The Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) (CPA) s. 120(1) relevantly provides that “An appeal against a decision of a magistrate…on an application for…a temporary custody order is not restricted to the material before the magistrate.” CPA s. 120(2) provides: “an appeal against another decision must be decided on the evidence and proceedings before the Childrens Court,” with the proviso that “the appellate court may order that the appeal be heard afresh, in whole or part.”3 [13] The powers of the appellate court are set out at CPA s. 121: “In deciding an appeal, the appellate court may – (a) confirm the decision appealed against; or (b) vary the decision appealed against; or (c) set aside the decision and substitute another decision; or (d) set aside the decision appealed against and remit the matter to the magistrate or Childrens Court that made the decision.” 1 Exhibit LL3, Affidavit of Lissa Lyons sworn 5 September 2016. 2 Background set out in paragraphs 4-11 above draws on the outline of argument of the appellant on the appeal. 3 Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 120(3). -- 5 of 13 -- 6 [14] An appeal against a child protection order under the CPA is a “rehearing” and the appellate court should conduct “a real review of the hearing and of the reasons”.4 [15] The appellant is required to establish on appeal “some legal, factual or discretionary error” at first instance by the primary court.5 In respect of any exercise of discretion by the learned magistrate (as in this case) or primary judicial officer, error is established if there has been a failure to “take into account some material consideration.”6 [16] The Childrens Court in exercising its jurisdictional powers must have regard to the principles set out in s. 5A-5C of the CPA, and has an obligation to state reasons.7 The Childrens Court is not bound by the rules of evidence,8 and where “the Childrens Court is to be satisfied of a matter, the court need only be satisfied of the matter on the balance of probabilities.”9 [17] In the decision of ASW & ECW v Director General, Department of Communities (Child Safety),10 I examined at some length the concept of the terms “child in need of protection”,11 “harm”,12 and “significant harm”,13 and summarised my conclusions as follows: “[25] In summary, a “child in need of protection” is a child who has suffered, is suffering or is at risk of suffering harm, whether physical, psychological, emotional, or from sexual abuse, which is significant, and does not have a parent able and willing to protect the child from harm. [26] “Significant harm” requires probative evidence, on the balance of probabilities, of not insignificant or trivial harm, sufficient to justify the intervention of the State to remove a child from the custody and guardianship of their parents. The risk needs to be assessed at the point at which protective intervention was initiated, and where the child is not in the parent/guardian's care at the child protection hearing, 4 JP v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability services [2015] QChC 4, para 7, applying Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at para [25]. 5 Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at para [23]. 6 ASW & ECW v Director General, Department of Communities (Child Safety) [2011] QChC 23, para 20, para [23] applying House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499. 7 Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 104. 8 Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 105(1). 9 Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 105(2). 10 [2011] QChC 23. 11 Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 10; see ASW & ECW v Director General, Department of Communities (Child Safety) [2011] QChC 23, at para 12. 12 Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 9. 13 ASW & ECW v Director General, Department of Communities (Child Safety) [2011] QChC 23, paras [13] – [20]. -- 6 of 13 -- 7 requires an examination of the anticipated risk, which must be more than a bare possibility of significant harm. A child may still be exposed to a significant risk of harm “where the parent does not have the capacity to care safely for the child despite a desire to do so.” [27] In short, a court assessing a child protection application needs to assess the nature and degree of the risk, in the context of the harm that may be caused, and decide whether, in the light of that assessment, the State should intervene and remove a child from the custody and guardianship of the parent(s).”14 [18] In order to establish an appellable error, it is necessary to consider the principles set out in House v R.15 Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ outline the approach in these terms: “The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.”16 Discussion [19] The report of Ms Lauren Davis17 dated 15 August 2016 18 was the primary basis for the application before the learned magistrate. The report was prepared on material from a variety of sources including interviews with the subject children, as well as with PAV and HOK, and the report concluded in these terms: - 14 ASW & ECW v Director General, Department of Communities (Child Safety) [2011] QChC 23, paras [25]-[27]. 15 (1936) 55 CLR 499. 16 House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504. 17 Exhibit LL3, Exhibit 6 (affidavit of Lissa Lyons sworn 5 September 2016). 18 Exhibit DM7, affidavit of Drew McGowan affirmed 25 August 2016. -- 7 of 13 -- 8 “12.5 In summary, based on the available information I note the following with regard to the PAV/HOK family:- 12.5.1 It is important to note that this is a challenging case for assessors, the department and the court. There are a number of competing allegations that have been made by PAV and HOK, which often occurs in situations where there are family law processors. It can be very difficult to assert where the truth lies in such situations, particularly when there is limited or no objective evidence provided by the parties. In these situations it is necessary to consider the broader picture and particularly the available information from independent and professional third parties. In doing so, there emerges a highly concerning situation for the children in this matter. I note that a large number of professionals who I am aware have had contact with this family (i.e. CYMHS staff, school staff, contact supervision staff, departmental staff, independent family report writer, independent psychiatrist) have wrote varying degrees of concern about the behaviour and functioning of PAV and the impact on the children. 12.5.2 Based on my assessment and on the balance of probabilities, it is my view that while PAV is willing to parent her children, the children have experienced significant emotional harm while in her care. It is my view that there is no likelihood that this will change if they remain living with their mother and that there are significant risks to the children’s short and long term emotional and psychological wellbeing associated with continuing to live with their mother. Based on my assessment and the balance of probabilities, it is my view that HOK is both willing and able to parent his children. 12.5.3 It is recommended that the department consider a change of custodial arrangements for the children. This recommendation is not made lightly and it is acknowledged that there are no options without risks at the present time. It is acknowledged that this would be a significant change for the children, however as previously stated it is my view that there is no likelihood that the issues noted in this case will change that the children remain living with their mother. A foster placement might be considered to be an option, however there are risks associated with this given the potential for PAV to influence the children (i.e. at school) and the general issues associated with placement of children in non-familiar environments. Certainly if it is accepted by the department and the court that HOK is a willing and able parent, he should be considered as the first option to have custody of the children. 12.5.4 If the decision is made for a change of residence to occur for the children, it is my strong recommendation that this occur immediately. From the time of the decision being made to the time of HOK taking custody of the children, no unsupervised contact should occur between PAV and the children. Further it is my recommendation that should a change of residence occur, there be no -- 8 of 13 -- 9 contact at all between PAV and the children for a period of three months. This is not a recommendation made lightly but is made due to the significant influence of PAV on the children, the unacceptable risk of PAV seeking to sabotage the children’s change of residence and the high risk that PAV would breach any conditions put in place to attempt to moderate her behaviour in contact with the children. Following in this time, supervised contact between the children and their mother could commence. Should the decision be made for a change of residence to occur, it will be crucially important that the children be supported through a therapeutic relationship with a suitable qualified professional/s, who has been fully briefed on the family situation through provisions of key reports.” [20] At the proceedings before the learned magistrate, PAV relied on a report from Ms Ana Borges dated 29 August 2016, who identified herself as being “the treating psychologist of PAV”. Dated 29 August 2016,19 a copy of that report has been provided on this appeal. Ms Borges makes clear that the report writer has been the treating psychologist of PAV for over two years. The report writer expresses that she has “grave concerns for the emotional wellbeing of these children being removed from their mother in such extreme situation” (sic) and expresses this opinion namely: - “It is my professional opinion that these children should be returned immediately to their mother and the family, that survived domestic violence perpetrated by the father, should be emotional and particularly supported to remain together” (sic). [21] As a result of this court making a decision to permit fresh evidence on the appeal, the court also has the benefit of the report of Dr Simon Kennedy, psychologist dated 25 August 2016,20 which was not received prior to the hearing before the learned magistrate. Assessment summary [22] Doctor Kennedy states:- “To summarise briefly the clinical evaluation with the family, it is concluded that the dynamic of the children in this matter resisting and refusing time with their father is associated with both children being alienated from the father by PAV. The children’s presentation and evaluations were stereotypical of children who had been court in the resisting and refusal dynamic, or alienation processes. While their mental health assessment excluded the presence of current disorders, this result is typical of children in alienation processes. 19 See T1-48 – 1-49. 20 Exhibit LL3, Exhibit 6 (affidavit of Lissa Lyons sworn 5 September 2016). -- 9 of 13 -- 10 … There was no material or background provided by any party that would allow the conclusion that the children’s response was due to a history of family violence by the father.”21 [23] Dr Kennedy indicates:- “The evaluations with the children presented a picture of the children as emotionally caught in a family dynamic of resisting and refusing time with their father despite multiple court interventions. It was identified that there was enmeshment with the mother. Their own external expression of mental health showed a typical pattern of them being enmeshed emotionally with the mother and her demonising of the father. There was a lack of appropriate boundaries between themselves and the mother, particularly in relation to issues concerning the father, and with the children having adopted a set view regarding the fathers universal negative features that reflected the position of them mother.”22 [24] At paragraph 141, Dr Kennedy quotes Walters & Friedlander:23 “‘in general, severely alienating behaviour may be understood as emotional abuse, particularly when done consciously, with malicious intent and when it clearly places the parents needs over those of the child, however there is no clear delineation of when and where that line into abuse is crossed. The determination of whether the favoured parent’s behaviour constitutes abuse may require an independent evaluation by a mental health professional with a specialization in divorce and alienation.’”24 [25] At paragraph 142 Dr Kennedy opines: - “In this matter there is sufficient evidence through the convergence of date, such as the two pervious family evaluations, and the lengthy child protection involvement, as well as the current elevation, to indicate that the children’s mental health functioning is at risk due to the process of alienation, due to a resist/refused dynamic perpetuated by the mother of the children. In this matter, this alienation is emotionally abusive.”25 [26] At paragraph 145, Dr Kennedy goes on to state: - “The processes identified are likely to have caused emotionally harm to date. It is inevitable if the children remain in the current situation with the mother, there will be significant long term damage to their mental health due to irreparable damage to the relationship with their 21 Exhibit LL3, Exhibit 6 (affidavit of Lissa Lyons sworn 5 September 2016, paras 116, 119). 22 Exhibit LL3, Exhibit 6 (affidavit of Lissa Lyons sworn 5 September 2016, para 136). 23 Walters, MG & Friedlander, S (2016) “When a child rejects a parent: working with the intractable resistance/refused dynamic”, Family Court Review 54(3): 424-445. 24 Exhibit LL3, Exhibit 6 (affidavit of Lissa Lyons sworn 5 September 2016, para 141). 25 Exhibit LL3, Exhibit 6 (affidavit of Lissa Lyons sworn 5 September 2016, para 142). -- 10 of 13 -- 11 father, the process of the alienation itself, and the enmeshment with their mother.”26 [27] Dr Kennedy notes (among other matters) in his recommendations: Typically, in these matters, there is a requirement that the children live with the non-preferred parent (in this case the father). In severe cases there should be a break in in time from the children seeing the preferred parent (in this case, the mother) in the same format as usual. There may be need for a complete break in contact for severely months. Contact with the mother needs to be included so assist all parties with the period of separation but not reignite alienation dynamics, and would need to be time limited and supervised. Therapy with the children and families should be instituted as soon as possible in that time, and time between mother and children recommended by the parent – coordinated, depending on the children’s needs and the progress of the family as determined by the treating clinicians.”27 [28] In conclusion Dr Kennedy notes at para 148: - “Based on the current information, the chance of the mother working therapeutically to resolve the behaviour in question are slim. Nevertheless, there should be efforts to assist her deal with the children more appropriately through her involvement with the clinician(s) mentioned above [a reference to proposed family therapy, perhaps involving more than one treating clinician].”28 [29] It is submitted that in the light of Ms Davis’ report, and the report of Dr Kennedy received as “fresh evidence” on this appeal, that the learned magistrate clearly fell into error by concluding that he was “unable to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities… that it would be in the best interest of the children” to grant the temporary custody order.29 [30] I have no hesitation in concluding that the learned magistrate placed insufficient weight on the conclusions of Ms Davis, and given, as I have indicated, the further report of Dr Kennedy now before this court, I consider that the learned magistrate erred in the exercise of his discretion by failing to make the order sought. [31] The second issue on this appeal was the weight that the learned magistrate placed on the concurrent family law proceedings. 26 Exhibit LL3, Exhibit 6 (affidavit of Lissa Lyons sworn 5 September 2016, para 145). 27 Exhibit LL3, Exhibit 6 (affidavit of Lissa Lyons sworn 5 September 2016, para 146). 28 Exhibit LL3, Exhibit 6 (affidavit of Lissa Lyons sworn 5 September 2016, para 148). 29 Decision of Magistrate Quinn on 30.08.2016, pg. 4 (Exhibit 2). -- 11 of 13 -- 12 [32] The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s. 69ZK provides as follows:- “(1) A court having jurisdiction under this Act must not make an order under this Act (other than an order under Division 7) in relation to a child who is under the care (however described) of a person under a child welfare law unless: (a) the order is expressed to come into effect when the child ceases to be under that care; or (b) the order is made in proceedings relating to the child in respect of the institution or continuation of which the written consent of a child welfare officer of the relevant State or Territory has been obtained. (2) Nothing in this Act, and no decree under this Act, affects: (a) the jurisdiction of a court, or the power of an authority, under a child welfare law to make an order, or to take any other action, by which a child is placed under the care (however described) of a person under a child welfare law; or (b) any such order made or action taken; or (c) the operation of a child welfare law in relation to a child. (3) If it appears to a court having jurisdiction under this Act that another court or an authority proposes to make an order, or to take any other action, of the kind referred to in paragraph (2)(a) in relation to a child, the first‑ mentioned court may adjourn any proceedings before it that relate to the child.” [33] In referring to the Family Law jurisdiction, the learned magistrate stated the following: “So I am satisfied that regardless what happens here today, what orders I make, that the concerns of the Department will be brought to the attention of the Federal Circuit Court and the material supporting the concerns of the Department will be brought before that court. In my view, there are many reasons to conclude that the issues raised by the department here would be best litigated in the federal Circuit Court given the resources that are available to that court – the steps that the court – that court has already taken, the enquiry that has already been undertaken by that court, and the proceedings in some advanced state that are currently before that court.”30 [34] With respect, it is clear from s. 69ZK of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) that the child protection proceedings take precedence31 and in any event, the issues in respect of the children arise specifically because of the steps that the mother (PAV) has taken in respect of the children in that litigation. 30 Decision of Magistrate Quinn on 30.08.2016, pg. 3 (Exhibit 2). 31 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 69ZK(1) & (2). -- 12 of 13 -- 13 [35] The learned magistrate having fallen into both discretionary and legal error, it falls to this court, on dealing with the matter afresh, to approach the decision in accordance with the legislation. [36] In respect of the application for a temporary protection order, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that each of these children is a “child in need of protection”,32 who has suffered and is suffering emotional harm;33 that that harm is “significant”,34 for which there is clear, uncontroverted, probative evidence demonstrating that the “significant harm” is not insignificant or trivial harm. Further I conclude that although there is a father who is currently involved in the family proceedings, he lives interstate and in a practical sense does not currently satisfy the provisions of CPA s. 10(b), given both the geographical separation and the current state of the family law proceedings. I have no difficulty in reaching that conclusion, given that these are proceedings at this stage in respect of the temporary protection order, and that any permanent order, if made, will no doubt require a full trial which will be some time yet in the future. Orders [37] It follows that the learned magistrate has fallen into error, and accordingly I order as follows (in respect of HYA and HYB): (1) The decision of the learned magistrate at Brisbane on 30 August 2016, in which he declined to make an order granting temporary custody of either if the children, to the Chief Executive, be set aside. (2) Order that interim custody of HYA and HYB be granted to the Chief Executive for the period of the adjournment. (3) Order that PAV have no contact, direct or indirect, with HYA or HYB, for a period of three months from 9 September 2016. (4) Order that an authorised officer or police officer enter and search any place the officer reasonable believes the child is, to find the child, to enforce the order 32 Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 10. 33 Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 9(1) and (3)(a). 34 Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 9(1). -- 13 of 13 --