Coolwell v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General & Anor (No 2) [2015] QSC 261 (2015) 254 A Crim R 199

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Coolwell v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney- General & Anor (No 2) [2015] QSC 261 PARTIES: COOLWELL (applicant) v CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL (first respondent) and SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND REGIONAL PAROLE BOARD (second respondent) FILE NO/S: BS7855/15 DIVISION: Trial Division PROCEEDING: Application DELIVERED ON: 9 September 2015 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 27 August 2015 JUDGE: Jackson J ORDER: The order of the court is that: 1. The separate questions be answered as follows: (a) Was the parole order made by the first respondent in relation to the applicant on 31 July 2015 a parole order within the meaning of s 205(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld)? Answer: yes. (b) Was physical release of the applicant from custody upon the parole order a condition precedent to the second respondent’s power to suspend the parole order under s 205(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld)? Answer: no. 2. The proceeding is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed. -- 1 of 11 -- 2 3. There is no order for costs of the application to determine and the hearing of the separate questions. CATCHWORDS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – ERROR OF LAW – where the applicant was a person entitled to be released on parole – where the first respondent made a parole order granting release of the applicant on parole – where the second respondent suspended the first respondent’s parole order – where the applicant remains in custody – whether the definition of “parole” under the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) applies to s 138(7) of the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), ss 4, 32A, 32AA Corrective Services Act 1988 (Qld), ss 10, 165 Corrective Services Act 2000 (Qld), ss 141, 276, sch 2 Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), ss 200, 205, 518, sch 3, sch 4 Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 30 Juvenile Justice Act 1992 (Qld), ss 191A, 191B Juvenile Justice and Other Acts Amendment Act 2009 (Qld) pt 4, s 9 Juvenile Justice Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Qld), s 5 Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), ss 138, 176, 233, 276D, 282 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 483 Adams v Lambert (2006) 228 CLR 409; [2006] HCA 10, followed Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41, followed Coolwell v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General & Anor [2015] QSC 213, related Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297; [1981] HCA 26, followed Legal Services Board v Gillespie-Jones (2013) 249 CLR 493; [2013] HCA 35, followed Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; followed Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277; [1908] HCA 63, cited COUNSEL: S Keim SC for the applicant D Kent QC and M Woodford for the respondent SOLICITORS: Prisoners’ Legal Service for the applicant Crown Solicitor for the respondent [1] Jackson J: On 31 July 2015 I gave judgment in Coolwell v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General & Anor 1 (“Coolwell No 1”). The 1 [2015] QSC 213. -- 2 of 11 -- 3 judgment declared that the applicant was entitled to be released on parole and the first respondent was obliged to release the applicant by issuing a parole order. [2] The parole order was to be made under a power implied in s 138(7) of the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) (“YJA”). It was required to be issued under the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) (“CSA”). In Coolwell No 1, I decided that s 138(7) “provides… that a release on parole will occur by means of a parole order under the CSA”.2 [3] The parole order was to be made under the CSA because the statutory command under s 138(7) of the YJA is that the offender must be “released on parole”, and Sch 4 of the YJA defines “parole” to mean “a parole order under the Corrective Services Act 2006”.3 [4] On 31 July 2015, acting on the declaration, a delegate of the first respondent made a parole order directing that the applicant be granted and released on parole. [5] On the same day, acting under the power contained in s 205(2) of the CSA, the second respondent made a decision to suspend the parole order for an indefinite period. [6] The result is that the applicant remains in custody. Under s 138(6) of the YJA, the CSA applies to him relation to the period of detention served in a corrective services facility under s 138(3) of the YJA. [7] This application is for a statutory order of review under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) (“JRA”) of the second respondent’s decision to suspend the parole order. By ground 1 of the application, the applicant contends that the second respondent’s decision was not authorised by the enactment under which it was purported to be made or otherwise involved an error of law. [8] There are other grounds of the application for a statutory order of review. However, the parties joined in requesting that I determine the questions raised by ground 1. I am able to make a declaration on the resolution of those questions under s 30 of the JRA as to the rights of the parties in relation to any matter to which the decision relates. [9] Broadly speaking, the applicant contends that the second respondent had no power to suspend the parole order made by the first respondent for two reasons. First, s 205(2) of the CSA does not apply to the parole order made by the second respondent. Second, even if s 205(2) might otherwise apply, it did not apply in the circumstances because the applicant was not physically released on parole before the second respondent purported to suspend the parole order. [10] It is unusual but appropriate in this case to proceed to determine the questions raised by ground 1 as separate questions under r 483 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). That is because if those questions can be promptly determined in favour of the applicant, his release might quickly follow. 2 Coolwell v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General & Anor [2015] QSC 213, [25]. 3 Coolwell v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General & Anor [2015] QSC 213, [19]-[20]. -- 3 of 11 -- 4 No physical release before the decision to suspend [11] I will deal first with the contention that even if s 205(2) of the CSA might otherwise apply, it did not apply in the circumstances because the applicant was not physically released on parole before the second respondent purported to suspend the parole order. [12] It is unnecessary to say more about this point than to refer to my reasons on the same point in Coolwell No 1 at [63] as follows: “In my view, that argument must be rejected. There is no textual support for it in the language of the sections or their statutory context. The powers in ss 201(2) and 205(2) of the CSA apply to a court ordered parole order made under s 199 of the CSA. In Foster v Shaddock Daubney J held, in my view rightly, that a court ordered parole order made under s 199 may be suspended under s 201(2) before the prisoner has been physically released.” (citations omitted) [13] That is to say, physical release of the applicant from custody upon the parole order made by the first respondent was not a condition precedent to the exercise of the second respondent’s power to suspend the parole order under s 205(2) of the CSA, if the second respondent otherwise had that power. A parole order issued under the CSA [14] In support of his principal contention, the applicant submits that a parole order made under s 138(7) of the YJA is not a parole order under the CSA. He submits that the definition of “parole” in Sch 4 of the YJA does not apply in s 138(7). This submission is contrary to a finding that I made in Coolwell No 1 about a parole order made under s 138(7),4 but the respondent did not suggest that it was not open to me to reconsider the question. [15] In my view, the applicant’s submission must be rejected for a number of reasons. First, s 4 of the YJA provides that the dictionary in Sch 4 defines particular words used in the YJA. The word “parole” is used in s 138(7) of the YJA. Prima facie, s 4 requires that the definition of “parole” is to be applied in s 138(7) of the YJA. As a matter of language, the text of the definition can be substituted for the word “parole” in s 138(7) without difficulty, as follows: “However, the offender may only, and must, be released on [a parole order under the Corrective Services Act 2006] on the day the offender would have been released under a supervision order if the offender was serving a period of detention in a detention centre.” [16] Second, the following sub-section, s 138(8) of the YJA refers to “an exceptional circumstances parole order”. An exceptional circumstances parole order is defined in Sch 4 of the YJA to mean an exceptional circumstances parole order under the CSA. 4 Coolwell v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney-General & Anor [2015] QSC 213, [19]-[20]. -- 4 of 11 -- 5 [17] Third, the word “parole” only appears in a handful of places in the YJA. They are s 138(7), a note under s 176(6), the heading to s 233, s 276D(3), s 282(3)(c) and the dictionary in Sch 4 of the YJA. In particular, s 276D5 operates in a similar way to s 138 and s 276D(3) is a similar provision to s 138(7). [18] Having regard to context of the rest of the YJA, I can see no reason why the definition of “parole” does not apply in s 138(7). In particular, there is no reason, in my view, why a contrary intention sufficiently appears in s 138(7) that the definition of “parole” in Sch 4 of the YJA is not to be treated as exhaustive so that it does not apply in s 138(7) by reason of the context or subject matter.6 The CSA definition of “parole order” [19] At par [60] of the reasons in Coolwell No 1 I said that there was a question whether the power of the second respondent under s 205(2) of the CSA to suspend a parole order would be available if a parole order were made by the first respondent in respect of the applicant. The question is whether a parole order made under the implied power conferred by s 138(7) of the YJA is a parole order within the meaning of s 205(2) of the CSA. [20] Section 205(1) and (2) are set out below: “205 Amendment, suspension or cancellation (1) A parole board may, by written order, amend a parole order— (a) by amending or removing a condition imposed under section 200(2) if the board reasonably believes— (i) the condition, as amended, is necessary for a purpose mentioned in the subsection; or (ii) the condition is no longer necessary for a purpose mentioned in the subsection; or (b) by inserting a condition mentioned in section 200(2) if the board reasonably believes the condition is necessary for a purpose mentioned in the subsection; or (c) if the board reasonably believes the prisoner poses a serious risk of harm to himself or herself. (2) A parole board may, by written order— (a) amend, suspend or cancel a parole order if the board reasonably believes the prisoner subject to the parole order— (i) has failed to comply with the parole order; or (ii) poses a serious risk of harm to someone else; or (iii) poses an unacceptable risk of committing an offence; or (iv) is preparing to leave Queensland, other than under a written order granting the prisoner leave to travel interstate or overseas; or 5 The text of s 276D also appears in Coolwell v Chief Executive, Department of Justice and Attorney- General & Anor [2015] QSC 213, [10]. 6 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), ss 4, 32A, 32AA; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27. -- 5 of 11 -- 6 (b) amend, suspend or cancel a parole order, other than a court ordered parole order, if the board receives information that, had it been received before the parole order was made, would have resulted in the parole board that made the order making a different parole order or not making a parole order; or (c) amend or suspend a parole order if the prisoner subject to the parole order is charged with committing an offence.” (emphasis added) [21] There is no express provision either in the CSA or in the YJA that applies the power to suspend a parole order under s 205(2) of the CSA to a parole order made under s 138(7) of the YJA. [22] The constructional question stems from the definition of “parole order” in Sch 4 of the CSA. That definition is set out below: “parole order— (a) means, generally— (i) a parole order mentioned in section 194; or (ii) a court ordered parole order; but (b) for— (i) chapter 5, part 1, division 1, subdivision 2, see section 178; and (ii) chapter 5, part 1, division 2, see section 186” [23] A parole order made under the CSA by the first respondent under the implied power under s 138(7) of the YJA is not any of those categories of parole order. The respondent submits, however, that the definition should not be construed as exhaustive, because the word “generally” appears after the word “means” in par (a) of the definition. [24] The starting point is that the context of the rest of the CSA requires that regard must be had to any definition of a term used in the section. In s 4 of the CSA, it is provided that the dictionary defines particular words used in the Act. Section 32AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) (“AIA”) provides: “32AA Definitions generally apply to entire Act A definition in or applying to an Act applies to the entire Act.” [25] Section 205(2) of the CSA uses the words “parole order”. The dictionary in s 4 defines “parole order” as set out above. [26] It is common drafting practice, when defining a term, to provide that the term “means” something in order to define it exhaustively and exclusively.7 By way of contrast, it is common drafting practice to provide that a term “includes” something in order either not to define it exhaustively or to extend its meaning to the thing included. 7 D. Pearce and R. Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 6th Ed, 2014, LexisNexis, Chatswood, [6.56]. -- 6 of 11 -- 7 [27] Against that background, to define a term as one that “means, generally” something may represent a contradiction in terms. Use of the expression is unusual in statutory provisions in this State. An electronic search of the online database of current Queensland statutes reveals that there are only seven provisions, including the definition under consideration, that do so at the present time. [28] In the context of the definition of “parole order”, the explanation of the use of “means, generally” appears from the inter-operation of par (a) and par (b) of the definition. The general meaning is that set out in par (a), “but for” two specifically identified places in the CSA, where it has a different meaning set out in two particular sections of the CSA. In that way, par (b) gives a more restricted meaning to “parole order” in the particular places where it applies. [29] Taking that into account, the wider meaning of “parole order” in par (a) is intended to apply “generally”, meaning generally in the CSA. The word “generally” is not intended to repel the inference that the scope of the meaning of “parole order” in the Act generally is exhaustively defined in the definition. [30] The closest thing to an express provision that the CSA applies to an offender released on parole under s 138(7) is s 138(6) of the YJA. It provides that the CSA applies to a relevant offender in relation to the “period of detention served in a corrective services facility” under s 138(3) of the YJA. The applicant makes the point, however, that a person released on parole under s 138(7) of the YJA is not in a corrective services facility. The applicant submits that s 138(6) of the YJA does not have the effect of applying the CSA to him in relation to any period of detention that he is serving whilst on a parole order made under the implied power under s 138(7) of the YJA. [31] The purpose of s 138(6) of the YJA is to apply the provisions of the CSA to an offender from when they begin to serve a period of detention in a corrective services facility under s 138(3) of the YJA. However the applicant submits that that is only intended to last so long as an offender is in a corrective services facility. [32] In effect, the applicant submitted in chief that if he is released from a corrective services facility the provisions of the CSA do not apply to him. In reply, the applicant narrowed that submission, at least to the extent of accepting that some provisions might apply, but maintained the position that they do not include s 205(2) of the CSA. Statutory history [33] The present text of s 138 YJA was introduced as s 104D of the Juvenile Justice Act 1992 (Qld) (“JJA”) by s 42 of the Juvenile Justice Amendment Act 2002 (Qld). [34] A definition of “parole” was first inserted into the JJA by s 5(2) of the Juvenile Justice Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Qld), which provided that “parole” means “parole under part 4 of the Corrective Services Act 1988 (Qld)” (“CSA 1988”). The definition was included at the same time as two other provisions concerning the detention of children for life.8 The effect appears to have been that for children sentenced to detention for life, the definition of “parole” in the CSA 1988 applied. 8 Juvenile Justice Act 1992 (Qld), ss 191A, 191B. -- 7 of 11 -- 8 [35] Under the CSA 1988, the term “parole order” was defined as “an order under part 4 directing that a prisoner be released on parole”.9 In part 4 of the CSA 1988, s 165 provided that a person serving a term of imprisonment could be released on parole by written order of the Queensland Community Corrections Board. [36] In 2000, the definition of “parole” in the JJA was amended to provide that “parole means a parole order under the Corrective Services Act 2000” (“CSA 2000”).10 Schedule 3 of the CSA 2000 provided that “parole order” means “a parole order under section 141(1)(c)(ii)”. [37] Section 141(1)(c)(ii) of the CSA 2000 stipulated that a corrections board, which was either the Queensland Board or a regional board, could release a prisoner on parole by a parole order. [38] In 2006, the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) (“CSA”) came into force. It amended the definition of “parole” in the JJA to “parole means a parole order under the Corrective Services Act 2006”.11 At the same time, it introduced the definition of “parole order” in the CSA that still appears currently, as set out previously. [39] It can thus be seen that the definition of “parole order” in the CSA, introduced in 2006, did not extend to a parole order under the CSA made under s 138(7) of the JJA (formerly s 104D of the JJA) even though the definition of “parole” in the JJA (which became the YJA)12 was specifically amended in 2000 to refer to a parole order under the CSA. In my view, the omission should be treated as a mistake, a drafting oversight, because of the discussion below. Discussion [40] In my view, inserting the relevant definition of “parole order” into s 205(2) of the CSA leads to an absurd result if the consequence is that a parole order made under the CSA under s 138(7) of the YJA is not a parole order under s 205(2) of the CSA. [41] If the intention had been that an offender who was serving a period of detention under the YJA should be released under the supervision regime applying under that Act, s 138(7) would provide that notwithstanding the provisions of s 138(6), the offender should be released on a supervised release order made under s 228 of the YJA. That is not what it does. [42] On the contrary, in my view, the likely assumption of the drafter of s 138(7) of the YJA (formerly s 104D of the JJA), as affected by the amendment of the definition of “parole” in the JJA made in 2006, was that a parole order made under the CSA under the power conferred under that section would operate as a parole order under the CSA. [43] The applicant’s counsel was caught in a difficult position. On the one hand, he submits that s 205(2) of the CSA does not apply to the applicant’s parole order, because it is not a parole order as defined in the CSA. On the other hand, the logical outcome of the conclusion that the applicant’s parole order is not a parole order under s 205(2) of the CSA because it is not a “parole order” as defined, is that it is not a 9 Corrective Services Act 1988 (Qld), s 10. 10 Corrective Services Act 2000 (Qld), s 276, sch 2. 11 Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 518, sch 3. 12 Juvenile Justice and Other Acts Amendment Act 2009 (Qld), pt 4, s 9. -- 8 of 11 -- 9 parole order under s 200 of the CSA either. Sub-section 200(1) of the CSA provides that a parole order must include conditions requiring the prisoner the subject of the order to be supervised on parole and not to commit an offence. And s 200(3) of the CSA provides that the prisoner “must comply with the conditions included in the parole order”. [44] Section 205(2) of the CSA relevantly authorises the second respondent to suspend a parole order in certain circumstances. One of those circumstances, under s 205(2)(a)(i) of the CSA, is when the second respondent has a reasonable belief that a prisoner has failed to comply with a parole order. [45] If s 200 of the CSA does not apply to a parole order made under s 138(7) of the YJA, no other provision appears to impose or to empower the first respondent to impose conditions of parole. If there are no conditions of parole, there is no obligation to comply with any such condition. It would be absurd to describe such a parole order as a parole order under the CSA. The CSA does not otherwise provide for parole without conditions. There is no purpose of the CSA that would be fulfilled or furthered by a category of release on parole that is not subject to any condition. [46] Faced with this difficulty, the applicant’s counsel submitted that s 200 of the CSA might apply to the applicant's parole order if it was issued under the CSA under s 138(7) of the YJA, but maintained the contention that s 205(2) of the CSA does not apply. No apparent justification or reason appears for that outcome. What purpose of the CSA or YJA would be furthered if a parole order can contain conditions under s 200 but the power of the second respondent under s 205 to suspend parole does not apply to a failure to comply with the conditions? Section 205(2)(a)(i) of the CSA is expressly engaged when a prisoner subject to a parole order has “failed to comply with the parole order”. No other relevant consequence was said to apply to non- compliance with a condition of a parole order issued under the CSA under s 138(7) of the YJA. [47] The applicant relied on the principle of statutory interpretation now known as the “principle of legality”. His contention is that s 205 of the CSA should not be construed to apply to a parole order made under s 138(7) of the CSA because that construction would interfere with a fundamental liberty of an offender. [48] I assume (without deciding) that a statutory entitlement to release on parole is a fundamental right of the kind that attracts the “principle of legality”, as it is now termed, in the common law of the construction of statutes. That statement of principle was analysed in Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission13 and in Australian law is often traced to Potter v Minahan,14 on which the applicant relied. The effect of the principle is that general words are construed as limited to the objects of the Act, and as not altering the law in a way that would infringe upon fundamental rights. In the present case, however, the important qualification explained by Keane and Gageler JJ in Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission is relevant: “Application of the principle of construction is not confined to the protection of rights, freedoms or immunities that are hard-edged, of long standing or recognised and enforceable or otherwise 13 (2013) 251 CLR 196. 14 (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304. -- 9 of 11 -- 10 protected at common law. The principle extends to the protection of fundamental principles and systemic values. The principle ought not, however, to be extended beyond its rationale: it exists to protect from inadvertent and collateral alteration rights, freedoms, immunities, principles and values that are important within our system of representative and responsible government under the rule of law; it does not exist to shield those rights, freedoms, immunities, principles and values from being specifically affected in the pursuit of clearly identified legislative objects by means within the constitutional competence of the enacting legislature.”15 [49] The critical distinguishing feature in this case, in my view, is that the applicant’s construction leads to an absurd result. How did this possibility come about? The answer to that question appears to lie in an oversight as to the operation of the definition of “parole order” in the CSA in drafting the amendment to the YJA that became the definition of “parole” in s 138(7). I note that the same flaw seems to underly s 276D of the YJA. [50] Such absurdity in the operation of a statutory provision according to ordinary meaning occurs from time to time. The courts are empowered to deal with it as a matter of constructional technique and power both generally and in the particular context of statutory definitions. [51] The Court is “to adopt a construction that will avoid a consequence that appears irrational or unjust.”16 In Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,17 Gibbs CJ said: “There are cases where the result of giving words their ordinary meaning may be so irrational that the court is forced to the conclusion that the draftsman has made a mistake, and the canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution in such a case…”18 [52] In Adams v Lambert,19 the High Court said: “…as Dixon CJ and Fullagar J said in Fitzgerald v Masters, “[w]ords may generally be supplied, omitted or corrected, in an instrument, where it is clearly necessary in order to avoid absurdity or inconsistency”. A striking example of the application of a cognate principle of statutory construction is to be found in Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.”20 [53] At the specific level of a statutory definition, s 32A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) (“AIA”) provides as follows: 15 (2013) 251 CLR 196, 310-311. 16 Legal Services Board v Gillespie-Jones (2013) 249 CLR 493, [48]; Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297, 321. 17 (1981) 147 CLR 297. 18 (1981) 147 CLR 297, 304. 19 (2006) 228 CLR 409. 20 (2006) 228 CLR 409, 417 [21]. -- 10 of 11 -- 11 “32A Definitions to be read in context Definitions in or applicable to an Act apply except so far as the context or subject matter otherwise indicates or requires.” [54] A useful statement appears in Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue,21 a case concerned with the operation of definitions: “It was common ground that giving [the section] its natural and ordinary or literal meaning, once the relevant definitions from [the definition section] were inserted into the substantive text, did not lead to an absurd result of the kind referred to in Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.”22 (footnote omitted) [55] Where the natural and ordinary or literal meaning of a definition inserted into the substantive text of a section does lead to an absurd result of that kind, the court may be able to conclude that the context or subject matter otherwise indicates or requires, and the definition to that extent does not apply. [56] The same approach or a similar approach as that required by s 32A of the AIA was taken at common law. As French CJ said of a comparable section in Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue:23 “This kind of provision …has been described as a standard device to spare the drafter the embarrassment of having overlooked a differential usage somewhere in his [or her] text”. The ninth edition of Craies on Legislation calls it: “a general gloss of a kind that would have to be inferred in any event, where a provision elsewhere in the legislation to which the definition purported to apply showed by express provision or necessary implication that the definition was not intended to apply there.” The exclusion of a particular definition where a “contrary intention” appears would be implied in any event. A contrary intention may appear from context or legislative purpose. But, as Pearce and Geddes observe: ‘A good drafter will indicate ‘the contrary intention’ clearly.’” (footnotes omitted) [57] The conclusion that follows, in my view, is that s 205(2), properly construed, should be read so that it applies to both a “parole order” as defined in the CSA and to a parole order made under s 138(7) of the YJA. [58] That is to say, the parole order made by the first respondent in relation to the applicant on 31 July 2015 was a parole order within the meaning of s 205(2) of the CSA. 21 (2009) 239 CLR 27. 22 (2009) 239 CLR 27, 46 [45]. 23 (2009) 239 CLR 27, 32 [6]. -- 11 of 11 --