Cormack v Queensland Police Service - Weapons Licensing Unit [2015] QCATA 115

CITATION: Cormack v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing Unit [2015] QCATA 115 PARTIES: Robert Cormack (Applicant/Appellant) v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing Unit (Respondent) APPLICATION NUMBER: APL073-15 MATTER TYPE: Appeals HEARING DATE: On the papers HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Senior Member Stilgoe OAM Member Traves DELIVERED ON: 4 August 2015 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane ORDERS MADE: 1. Leave to appeal granted. 2. The appeal is dismissed. CATCHWORDS: APPEAL OF REVIEW – revocation of firearms licence – statutory discretion to admit additional evidence - practical onus - fit and proper person – mental fitness – public interest Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 3(b), s 3(d), s 4(c), s 20, s 28(3)(c), s 28(3)(d), s 95, s 121, s 122, s 127, s 123, s 142, s 147(2) Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), s 3, s 10, s 10B, s 14, s 28, s 29, s 30 CDJ v VAJ (1998) 157 ALR 686 Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296 Gadon v Police Review Board [2014] TASSC 23 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 Lacey v A-G (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573. Lovell v Lovell (1950) 81 CLR 513 -- 1 of 13 -- 2 Ludgate v Commissioner of Police [2013] WASAT 151 McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 6 Nom v DPP [2012] VSCA 198 Saba v Commissioner of Police New South Wales Police Force [2014] NSWCATAD 129 Underwood v Department of Communities [2013] 1 Qd R 252 APPEARANCES: This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act). REASONS FOR DECISION [1] Robert Cormack held a Firearms Licence issued by the Queensland Police Service, which was suspended by Notice on 11 December 2014. [2] Mr Cormack was given 21 days by the terms of that Notice to provide a medical report outlining his suitability to continue to possess firearms pursuant to that licence. Mr Cormack failed to produce a report within that time. His licence was revoked on 24 February 2014 on the basis he was not a fit and proper person to hold a licence. [3] Mr Cormack filed an application to review the revocation decision on 24 April 2014. On 9 December 2014, the Tribunal gave its decision affirming the decision of the Service to revoke Mr Cormack’s licence. [4] Mr Cormack has applied for leave to appeal that decision. Leave to Appeal [5] This is an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal exercising its review jurisdiction. Mr Cormack is entitled to appeal under s 142 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act). However because the appeal concerns questions of mixed law and fact, Mr Cormack must first obtain the leave of the Appeal Tribunal to appeal.1 Leave to appeal is given. The common law principles concerning further evidence and the s 147(2) discretion [6] An appeal lies under s 142 of the QCAT Act. An appeal is not a retrial of the matter.2 In an appeal against the exercise of a discretion, the Appeal Tribunal will not interfere unless it can be shown the Member acted upon a 1 QCAT Act s 142(3)(b). 2 Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296 at 304. -- 2 of 13 -- 3 wrong principle, or made mistakes of fact that affected the decision, or was influenced by irrelevant matters.3 It is not enough that the Appeal Tribunal may have exercised the discretion differently: the decision must be shown to be plainly unjust or unreasonable and to have involved a clear misapplication of the discretion.4 [7] An appeal on a question of mixed law and fact is decided by way of rehearing and whether additional evidence is permitted is a matter for the Appeal Tribunal.5 [8] Mr Cormack sought to rely on a letter from Dr Lekatsas dated 17 December 2014. This letter postdates the hearing and constitutes further evidence. Section 147(2) gives a broad discretion to the Appeal Tribunal to admit “additional” evidence. [9] The statutory discretion is not expressed to be limited as is sometimes the case, by a requirement that “special grounds” or “special leave” be shown before evidence can be adduced.6 The extent of the discretion is primarily a matter of statutory construction. In this respect, it is relevant that the Tribunal is required by s 4 to ensure proceedings are conducted in an informal way that minimises costs and “is as quick as is consistent with achieving justice”.7 Further, the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence that apply to courts of record and may “inform itself in any way it considers appropriate”.8 The Tribunal must also act with as little formality and technicality and with as much speed as the requirements of [the] Act…and a proper consideration of the matters before the tribunal permit”.9 These provisions are in furtherance of the objects of the QCAT Act, which are, relevantly, to deliver justice fairly, economically and quickly10 while at the same time enhancing the “quality and consistency of decisions made by decision-makers”.11 In view of these considerations, it is our opinion that the discretion to admit additional evidence should be approached with caution.12 [10] The common law principles that apply to applications to admit further evidence have been described as “principles, bordering on fixed rules”.13 Although these principles are not necessarily applicable to s 147, those matters may nonetheless be relevant as factors to be considered in the exercise of the discretion.14 In CDJ v VAJ the High Court, in considering 3 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504. 4 Lovell v Lovell (1950) 81 CLR 513. 5 QCAT Act s 147(2). 6 See CDJ v VAJ (1998) 157 ALR 686 at [107]. 7 QCAT Act, s 4(c). 8 Ibid s 28(3)(c). 9 Ibid s 28(3)(d). 10 Ibid s 3(b). 11 Ibid s 3(d). 12 Underwood v Queensland Department of Communities (State of Queensland) [2012] QCA 158 at [40]. 13 CDJ v VAJ (1998) 157 ALR 686 at [104]. 14 CDJ v VAJ (1998) 157 ALR 686 at [104]. -- 3 of 13 -- 4 an application under a provision which conferred a similarly broad discretion to admit further evidence in a family court proceeding, held: “In an application under s 93A(2) and similar provisions, the Full Court or Court of Appeal weighs factors, although it may of course develop guidelines for weighing those factors and exercising the discretion.”15 [11] In cases involving the application of the discretion in s 147 to admit additional evidence the Tribunal has commonly applied the following common law principles: Could the evidence have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; Would the evidence, if allowed, probably have an important influence on the result of the case (although it need not be demonstrated to be decisive); Was the evidence credible?16 [12] The Supreme Court of Queensland applied these principles to the exercise of the discretion in s 147 in Underwood v Queensland Department of Communities (State of Queensland).17 [13] In our opinion, therefore, although the discretion in s 147 is broad it is not unfettered and should be considered in view of the objects of the QCAT Act and guided by considerations developed at common law. [14] In view of these considerations, as the evidence is credible and potentially important to Mr Cormack’s appeal, we are prepared to grant leave to rely upon it. The Statutory Framework [15] The entitlement to own and use firearms is regulated by the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld). [16] Section 3 sets out the principles and object of the Act: (1) The principles underlying this Act are as follows— (a) weapon possession and use are subordinate to the need to ensure public and individual safety; (b) public and individual safety is improved by imposing strict controls on the possession of weapons and requiring the safe and secure storage and carriage of weapons. (2) The object of this Act is to prevent the misuse of weapons. 15 CDJ v VAJ (1998) 157 ALR 686 at [104]. 16 Clarke v Japan Machines (Aust) Pty Ltd (1984) 1 Qd R 404 at 408. 17 [2012] QCA 158 at [48]. -- 4 of 13 -- 5 [17] A firearm licence may be issued to an individual under s 10. A licence may only be issued if the individual is a fit and proper person to hold a licence.18 [18] Section 10B(1) provides that in determining whether a person is fit and proper the following matters, among other things, must be considered: (a) the mental and physical fitness of the person; and (b) whether a domestic violence order has been made against the person; and (c) whether the person has stated anything in or in connection with an application for a licence, or an application for the renewal of a licence, the person knows is false or misleading in a material particular; and (ca) whether there is any criminal intelligence or other information to which the authorised officer has access that indicates— (i) the person is a risk to public safety; or (ii) that authorising the person to possess a weapon would be contrary to the public interest; and (d) the public interest. [19] Before deciding an application, the officer with whom the application is lodged may require the applicant to give further information the officer reasonably needs to be satisfied about the applicant’s identity or physical or mental health, including, relevantly, a report from a doctor or psychologist about the applicant’s mental health.19 If the applicant refuses to provide the information within a stated reasonable time, the application is taken to have been withdrawn.20 [20] Under s 28 a licence may be suspended if the officer considers, on reasonable grounds, that the licensee may no longer be a fit and proper person to hold a licence.21 The licence is suspended until the officer is satisfied the person is a fit and proper person to hold a licence or 30 days from the date of suspension, whichever is earlier.22 A person who is given a suspension notice must comply with the directions in the Notice.23 An extension of time for compliance may be sought before the end of the compliance time.24 [21] Section 29 provides, relevantly, that a licence may be revoked if an authorised officer is satisfied of any of the following things: (a) the licence has been obtained through fraud or deception; 18 Weapons Act s 10(2)(e). 19 Ibid s 14(1)(b)(ii). 20 Ibid s 14(3)(a). 21 The grounds in s 10B are relevant matters for consideration: see Note to s 28 and s 8A. 22 Weapons Act s 28(2)(c). 23 Ibid s 30(3). 24 Ibid s 30(6). -- 5 of 13 -- 6 (b) the licensee has been convicted of an offence against any law in force in Queensland or elsewhere involving the use, carriage, discharge or possession of a weapon; (c) the licensee has contravened a condition, participation condition or special condition of the licence; (d) the licensee is no longer a fit and proper person to hold a licence; The decision of the Tribunal [22] The Tribunal confirmed the decision revoking Mr Cormack’s licence.25 The learned Member was satisfied that Mr Cormack was no longer a fit and proper person to hold a licence. During the course of the telephone hearing, and in the learned Member’s reasons for decision, the following matters were raised and were relevant to the exercise by the learned Member of her discretion: Threatening violence to the Member for Nanango in correspondence dated 16 November 2013.26 Mr Cormack admits sending the email but denies it constitutes a threat.27 Threats and inappropriate language to QCAT in relation to the proceedings.28 Mr Cormack not providing medical evidence within the 21 days given to him.29 Mr Cormack’s continuing failure to provide medical information regarding mental fitness.30 Mr Cormack argues he tried but could not get a report.31 However, he had over a year to provide a report.32 The letter from Dr Lekatsas dated 24 July 2014 was not enough to satisfy the licensing requirements and was in the nature of a referral rather than a report. Further, it was the view of Dr Lekatsas that Mr Cormack would benefit from a psychological evaluation.33 Grounds of appeal [23] Mr Cormack challenged the learned Member’s finding that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a licence. Related to this were his arguments that the Service held the onus of proving he was not a fit and proper person and that his medical evidence had been dismissed. The issue as to Mr Cormack’s fitness to hold a licence was the focus of the original hearing. 25 Transcript of Proceedings 1 -14, line 35. 26 Ibid 1-4. 27 Ibid 1-6, line 5. 28 Ibid 1-13, line 30. 29 Ibid 1-13, lines 5-15. 30 Ibid 1-5, line 18. 31 Ibid 1-7, lines 1-10. 32 Ibid 1-14, line 30. 33 Ibid 1-14, lines 10-20. -- 6 of 13 -- 7 [24] Mr Cormack raised other matters: his application to attend the hearing by remote conferencing was not processed prior to the hearing; the Tribunal did not provide a copy of the reasons for decision prior to the time for leave to appeal expiring; witnesses were not called and he was not therefore given the opportunity to question them; the Tribunal failed to compel the production of further information in relation to the proceedings from the respondent; the letters relied on by the respondent did not constitute a ‘threat’ to the recipient; the Tribunal exceeded the scope of his application and, therefore had no jurisdiction; and the Weapons Act contravenes United Nations Human Rights Articles 7, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 19. Ground 1 – Fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence [25] The issue on appeal is not whether Mr Cormack was a fit and proper person to hold a firearm’s licence. The issue is whether the Tribunal on review erred in exercising its discretion under s 29 to revoke the licence. It would have done so, relevantly, if it approached the statutory exercise in s 29 in an incorrect manner or acted on an incorrect fact. [26] Here the relevant issue of fact was whether the Tribunal was entitled to be ‘satisfied’ that the appellant was not a fit and proper person to hold a licence. The relevant issue concerning the manner in which the exercise was approached was whether the Tribunal erred in not proceeding on the basis that the Service held the onus of establishing that Mr Cormack was not a fit and proper person. [27] The issues are interrelated. The application of onus of proof principles [28] In order to revoke a firearms licence the Service had to be ‘satisfied’ that the licensee was no longer a fit and proper person to hold a licence.34 Mr Cormack argued that the Service held the onus of proving he was not a ‘fit and proper person’ to hold a licence. We disagree with that proposition. [29] Onus of proof is a common law concept developed to help solve practical issues of litigation between parties in courts of law. It has legal and evidentiary aspects and its use outside courts of law is to be approached with ‘great caution’.35 This is particularly the case with an administrative 34 Weapons Act s 29. 35 McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 6 at 9. -- 7 of 13 -- 8 tribunal such as QCAT, which is not bound by rules of evidence and can inform itself in any way it thinks appropriate.36 [30] In McDonald v Director-General of Social Security37 Woodward J observed: Such a tribunal will still have to determine practical problems such as the sequence of receiving evidence and what to do if it is unable to reach a clear conclusion on an issue, but it is more likely to find the answer to such questions in the statutes under which it is operating, or in considerations of natural justice or common sense, than in the technical rules relating to onus of proof developed by the courts. [31] McDonald involved an issue similar to the issue here. The statutory social security scheme permitted the decision maker to cancel a pension if he or she was of the opinion that the person was no longer permanently incapacitated. It was held that if the decision maker was of the opinion a person was no longer permanently incapacitated then he or she had both a right and a duty to cancel the pension. Further, that: In doing so he must act in good faith on the information available to him, but no question of onus arises.38 [32] In effect, a common sense approach is to be adopted in respect of the evidence.39 As Woodward J said in McDonald: It is true that facts may be peculiarly within the knowledge of a party to an issue, and a failure by that party to produce evidence as to those facts lead to an unfavourable inference being drawn — but it is not helpful to categorise this common-sense approach to evidence as an example of an evidential onus of proof. The same may be said of a case where a good deal of evidence pointing in one direction is before the Tribunal, and any intelligent observer could see that unless contrary material comes to light that is the way the decision is likely to go. Putting such cases to one side there can be no evidential onus of proof in proceedings before the AAT unless the relevant legislation provides for it …40 [33] Rather than treating the issue as one of onus of proof, the correct approach therefore is to construe the relevant statute to determine who, practically, has to provide evidence of what. This has been otherwise referred to as the ‘practical onus’.41 [34] Further, the statutory weapons licensing scheme does not support an onus upon the authorised officer to prove that the licensee was no longer a fit and proper person to hold a licence. First, the principles of the Act make it clear that weapon possession and use are subordinate to the need to 36 QCAT Act s 28(3). 37 (1984) 6 ALD 6 at 9. 38 Ibid per Woodward J at 11. 39 Nom v DPP [2012] VSCA 198 at [83]. 40 (1984) 6 ALD 6 at 11; cited in Nom v DPP [2012] VSCA 198 at [83]; Dr Butler v Fourth Medical Services Review Tribunal (1997) 47 ALD 647. 41 See for example, Ludgate v Commissioner of Police [2013] WASAT 151 at [36]; Gadon v Police Review Board [2014] TASSC 23 at [13]. -- 8 of 13 -- 9 ensure public and individual safety.42 And, secondly, the authorised officer may revoke the licence ‘if satisfied’ the licensee is not a fit and proper person – that the discretion should arise from the opinion of the authorised officer is inconsistent with that officer bearing an onus to prove, in fact, that the holder is not fit and proper. [35] Accordingly, we find that the decision maker did not bear the onus of proving that the licensee was not a fit and proper person. [36] We must then look at whether there was sufficient evidentiary basis for the decision maker to be satisfied that Mr McCormack was not a fit and proper person. [37] The fact of the decision evidences the conclusion of the decision maker that it was ‘satisfied’ the applicant was not a fit and proper person. Was the decision maker entitled to be satisfied? This depends on the strength of the evidence viewed in the context of the statutory scheme. We have set out above the evidence relied upon by the Tribunal on review.43 [38] The discussion and submissions at the hearing focussed on the issue of mental fitness. Mr Cormack argued that insufficient weight had been given to a letter from Dr Tel Lekatsas dated 24 July 2014. Mr Cormack refers to a sentence in that letter, which is a referral letter from the doctor to a psychologist, which says ‘He presents with pressured speech, but has no overtly psychotic features’. [39] The Tribunal found the letter did not constitute a report and was of insufficient weight to be accepted as evidence that Mr Cormack was ‘psychologically fit’.44 It is noted that the letter also said that Mr Cormack ‘would benefit from a psychological assessment’; that he should ‘see the psychologist for six visits and to return for review if a further four visits are required’; and that ‘A GP Mental Health Treatment Plan Item 2715 was completed at another practice recently’. In effect, the Tribunal found that the first letter from the medical practitioner was inconclusive. [40] Mr Cormack refers to a second letter from Dr Lekatsas dated 17 December 2014 addressed ‘To Whom it May Concern’. This letter states: I have seen Mr Cormack on a number of occasions since July 2014. I have spoken at length with him at each session. In my opinion there is no evidence of psychosis or delusions. He does present with some intensity and pressured speech, but this does not appear to be related to any mental disorder. [41] Both letters fall short of providing evidence that the applicant is a fit and proper person. The letters are brief. The first does not purport to be a report but a referral and within it refers to a GP Mental Health Plan having been undertaken by another GP. Rather than providing an assurance of mental 42 Weapons Act s 3(1). 43 See at [18]. 44 Transcript of Proceedings, 1-15, lines 14. -- 9 of 13 -- 10 fitness, this suggests the applicant has consulted a doctor with appropriate mental health qualifications as required by MBS Item 2715, for mental health reasons. Neither letter gives a patient history or sufficient detail of Mr Cormack’s mental health condition. It is our view that neither provides a basis for finding that the applicant was a fit and proper person to hold a licence. [42] Finally, Mr Cormack was given every opportunity to put before the decision maker sufficient medical evidence to make out his case. He did not do so. [43] In any event, we find that, putting aside the issue of mental fitness, the evidence before the Tribunal was enough to demonstrate that Mr Cormack, as a matter of public interest, should not continue to hold a firearm licence.45 [44] We note the learned Member’s reference to an onus lying on the applicant to demonstrate he was a fit and proper person to hold a licence. We would construe the observation as one not referring to a formal legal or evidentiary onus but rather, to the practical considerations of proof to which we have referred. If, contrary to our view, the reference were to be correctly construed as a reference to a formal legal or evidentiary burden, then for the reasons above we would regard that as an error. However, for the reasons we have described, there was in our view sufficient evidence for the decision maker to be satisfied that the applicant was not a fit and proper person to hold a licence; and insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the decision maker was not entitled to form that view. Were we required to exercise the discretion again, we too would revoke the licence. Ground 2 – Procedural fairness [45] Mr Cormack has raised a number of concerns relating to matters he argues constitute evidence of procedural irregularity and unfairness against him. [46] Mr Cormack made an application to attend the hearing by remote conferencing on 8 December 2014, the day before the hearing. He argues that this should have been processed prior to the hearing. The learned Member heard the application immediately prior to the hearing and granted Mr Cormack leave to appear by telephone. There is no evidence Mr Cormack was disadvantaged by this. [47] Mr Cormack argues that he was not given a copy of the reasons for the Tribunal’s decision before the time in which to apply for leave to appeal expired. He argues that he was disadvantaged by this, as he could not properly prepare for his leave application. [48] Section 121(1)(a) of the QCAT Act requires the Tribunal to give its final decision in writing to each party. This does not extend to the reasons for that decision, which may be given either orally or in writing.46 A party has the right to request written reasons but must do so within 14 days after the 45 Weapons Act s 10B(1)(d). 46 QCAT Act s 121(4). -- 10 of 13 -- 11 decision takes effect.47 The decision in this proceeding took effect when it was made.48 If a request is made, the Tribunal must comply with it within 45 days of the request.49 In complying with the request, it is enough for the Tribunal to give the person a written transcript.50 [49] Mr Cormack did not apply for written reasons within 14 days of 9 December 2014. He did however forward an email to QCAT on 5 March 2015 which reads: To the paper pushers the transcript to the judgment for case GAR145-14 seems to have been left out of the findings sent to me. Please send me a copy forthwith. You don’t want my litigation lawyer to get nasty do you. [50] This email, even if the Tribunal was prepared to treat it as a request, was well outside the 14-day time limit. Mr Cormack was not sent a copy of the reasons because he did not request them in accordance with s 122. [51] Mr Cormack also argues that witnesses were not called by the respondent, which meant he could not cross-examine them. Mr Cormack had a reasonable opportunity to call or give evidence and to make submissions to the Tribunal.51 The Service had the same opportunity. It did not exercise this right but this did not disadvantage Mr Cormack. The Tribunal, though bound by the requirement to provide natural justice or procedural fairness is not required in all circumstances to permit cross-examination.52 [52] Finally, Mr Cormack argued that the Tribunal should have compelled the respondent to answer the questions in his letter dated 20 December 2013. Mr Cormack asked, among other things:  Define not a fit person to hold a firearms licence under the framework of the firearms act.  What parts of the letters sent to the state member do police consider would indicate I am not a fit person to hold a firearms licence and why. Eg: probable cause and what grounds. [53] The Service gave Mr Cormack an Information Notice on 11 December 2014 and a further Information Notice on 24 February 2015. In our view both Notices gave Mr Cormack a sufficient explanation of the relevant licensing provisions and, with reference to extracts from relevant case law, expanded on the meaning of relevant phrases, in particular, ‘fit and proper’ and ‘in the public interest’. He was also referred to the relevant police website on the topic and was advised that it was the general tone of his correspondence to the local member that was threatening. 47 Ibid s 122(2). 48 Ibid s 127(a). 49 Ibid s 122(3). 50 Ibid s 123(2). 51 Ibid s 95. 52 O’Rourke v Miller (1985) 156 CLR 342; QCAT Act s 95(2)(b). -- 11 of 13 -- 12 [54] The requirements of procedural fairness must be adjusted to the statutory framework governing the Tribunal in question.53 Mason J observed: What is appropriate in terms of natural justice depends on the circumstances of the case and they will include, inter alia, the nature of the inquiry, the subject-matter, and the rules under which the decision-maker is acting: Reg v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 at 552-3; National Companies and Securities Commission v News Corporation Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 296 at 311, 319-321. In this respect the expression ‘procedural fairness’ more aptly conveys the notion of a flexible obligation to adopt fair procedures which are appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case. The statutory power must be exercised fairly, ie in accordance with procedures that are fair to the individual considered in the light of the statutory requirements, the interests of the individual and the interest and purposes, whether public or private, which the statute seeks to advance or protect or permits to be taken into account as legitimate considerations… [55] We are satisfied procedural fairness was granted. Mr Cormack had sufficient information about the licensing requirements, every opportunity to make his submission and to obtain relevant medical evidence and the matters upon which the Member relied were the subject of discussion and submission at the proceeding. Ground 3 - The correspondence did not constitute a threat [56] Mr Cormack said he had not ‘threatened’ the Member for Nanango by his correspondence. If he had, he argues, he would have been charged with an offence. [57] We find that the correspondence used threatening language designed to intimidate and scare the Member. The manner in which they were sent, in particular, by sending all three emails in quick succession on the same day, was also concerning. The Tribunal, in our view, was entitled to take the view that the content and manner of sending the letters was threatening, designed to intimidate and that this, coupled with other letters evidencing anti-social and abnormal behaviour, provided a basis for concluding that Mr Cormack was not a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence. Ground 4 – The Tribunal exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction [58] Mr Cormack argues that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in the matter was limited to granting an extension of time. We assume by that he means that he only wanted the Tribunal to grant him an extension of time in which to provide the Service with a medical report. [59] This is inconsistent with how Mr Cormack proceeded in the matter. Mr Cormack applied under s 142 of the Weapons Act for a review of the decision of the Queensland Police Service Weapons Licensing Unit to 53 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550. -- 12 of 13 -- 13 revoke his licence on 24 April 2014. In any event, by the time Mr Cormack made his initial application to QCAT his licence had already been revoked. Ground 5 – The Weapons Act contravenes the United Nations Charter [60] Finally, Mr Cormack’s submissions regarding the application of the United Nations Articles on Human Rights to the Weapons Act are misconceived. [61] Mr Cormack refers to Articles 7, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 19 from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.54 As these Articles do not form part of our domestic law, there is no action available for their breach.55 [62] The appeal is dismissed. 54 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) (1948). 55 Lina Obieta v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2007] FCA 85. -- 13 of 13 --