Dart v Singer; Hajridin v Singer [2014] QCA 263
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Dart v Singer; Hajridin v Singer [2014] QCA 263
PARTIES: In Appeal No 40 of 2013:
DART, Frederick William
(appellant)
v
SINGER, Clifford
(respondent)
In Appeal No 41 of 2013:
HAJRIDIN, Megan Ann
(appellant)
v
SINGER, Clifford
(respondent)
FILE NO/S: CA No 40 of 2013
CA No 41 of 2013
DC No 645 of 2011
DC No 646 of 2011
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Appeal against Conviction & Sentence
ORIGINATING
COURT: District Court at Townsville
DELIVERED ON: 17 October 2014
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 17 June 2014
JUDGES: Margaret McMurdo P and Muir JA and North J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court,
each concurring as to the orders made
ORDERS: In CA No 40 of 2013:
1. The appeal is allowed with costs.
2. The orders made by the District Court at Townsville
on 21 December 2012 are set aside. Instead it is
ordered:
"1. The appeal against conviction for the offence of
contravention of a prohibition order contrary to
s 187 Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld)
is allowed. The conviction is set aside and a verdict
of not guilty substituted.
2. The convictions entered in the Magistrates Court
at Townsville on 1 December 2011 are otherwise
confirmed.
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2
3. The appeal against sentence is allowed to the
extent of setting aside all sentences of three years
probation imposed in the Magistrates Court at
Townsville on 1 December 2011 for breaching
a duty of care under s 17(2) Animal Care and
Protection Act and substituting sentences of two
and a half years probation. The sentences
imposed in the Magistrates Court at Townsville
on 1 December 2011 are otherwise confirmed.
4. The ancillary orders made in the Magistrates
Court at Townsville on 1 December 2011 are
otherwise confirmed.
5. The respondent is to pay the appellant's costs of
the appeal."
In CA No 41 of 2013:
1. The appeal is allowed with costs.
2. Orders 1, 2 and 6 made by the District Court at
Townsville on 21 December 2012 are set aside.
Instead, it is ordered:
"1. The appeal against the two convictions for the
offences of contravening a prohibition order on
22 December 2008 contrary to s 187 Animal Care
and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) and the appeal
against conviction for the offence of contravening
a prohibition order contrary to s 187 Animal Care
and Protection Act on 30 December 2008 are
allowed. The convictions are set aside and verdicts
of not guilty are entered.
2. The convictions entered in the Magistrates Court
at Townsville on 1 December 2011 are otherwise
confirmed.
3. The respondent is to pay the appellant's costs of
the appeal."
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL –
EVIDENCE – MATTERS RELATING TO PROOF –
MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS – where each appellant was
convicted and sentenced in the Magistrates Court for
a number of offences against the Animal Care and Protection
Act 2001 (Qld) ("the Act"), including contravening a prohibition
order under s 187 of the Act – where each appellant appealed
unsuccessfully against their convictions to the District Court
– where the appellants contend that the magistrate erred in
misconstruing the prohibition order of 12 December 2008;
that it had only prospective effect; and that the respondent did
not prove that the appellants were not already in possession
of the relevant animals at the time the prohibition order was
made – whether the magistrate erred in not considering
whether the appellants took possession of the animals after
the prohibition order was made – whether the appeal against
conviction should be allowed
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3
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL –
APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR
INTERFERENCE – OTHER MATTERS – where the first
appellant was sentenced to three years probation and a fine –
where the second appellant was sentenced to three months
imprisonment suspended after one month for an operational
period of 12 months – where the District Court judge varied
the sentence to three months imprisonment wholly suspended
– whether each appellant's sentence/s should be varied
Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld), s 17(2), s 149(2),
s 187
Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 222
Dart v Singer; Hajridin v Singer [2013] QCA 255, related
Dart v Singer; Hajridin v Singer, unreported, District Court,
Qld, DC Nos 645 and 646 of 2011, 21 December 2012,
related
Singer v Dart & Ors [2011] QMC 37, related
COUNSEL: In Appeal No 40 of 2013:
The appellant appeared on his own behalf
J R Hunter QC for the respondent
In Appeal No 41 of 2013:
The appellant appeared on her own behalf with F W Dart
assisting
J R Hunter QC for the respondent
SOLICITORS: In Appeal No 40 of 2013:
The appellant appeared on his own behalf
Roberts Nehmer McKee for the respondent
In Appeal No 41 of 2013:
The appellant appeared on her own behalf with F W Dart
assisting
Roberts Nehmer McKee for the respondent
[1] MARGARET McMURDO P: The background to these appeals is set out in this
Court's reasons for extending time to apply for leave to appeal:1
"[1] The applicants, Frederick Dart and Megan Hajridin, were
convicted of offences against the Animal Care and
Protection Act 2001 (Qld) ("the Act") on 7 November 2011
after a trial in the Townsville Magistrates Court extending
over seven days between January and April 2011. Mr Dart
was convicted of one offence of contravening a prohibition
order under s 187 of the Act, five offences of breach of
a duty of care under s 17(2) of the Act and one offence of
1 Dart v Singer; Hajridin v Singer [2013] QCA 255, [1]-[3].
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possession of a seized animal in contravention of s 149(2) of
the Act. Ms Hajridin was convicted of four offences of
contravening a prohibition order under s 187 of the Act, five
offences of breach of duty of care under s 17(2) of the Act
and one count of possession of a seized animal in contravention
of s 149(2) of the Act.
[2] On 1 December 2011, Mr Dart was fined $2,000 for the
offence of possession of a seized animal which was referred
to the State Penalties Enforcement Registry (SPER). On all
other offences, he was sentenced to three years probation.
He was ordered to pay court costs of $187.50. Ms Hajridin
was sentenced on each offence of contravening the prohibition
order to three months imprisonment suspended after one
month with an operational period of 12 months. On each
offence of breach of duty of care, she was placed on three
years probation. On the offence of possessing a seized
animal, she was fined $2,000 which was referred to SPER.
She was prohibited from purchasing, otherwise acquiring or
taking possession of any animal for trade or commerce other
than desexed companion animals permitted by any local
government local law for a period of five years. She was
also ordered to pay compensation of $200 and court costs of
$337.50. All the animals seized, together with any other
animals presently registered or in the possession of the
appellants not being companion animals as permitted by any
local government local law, and the two pet carrying cases,
were forfeited to the Royal Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). Each applicant was ordered
to pay the RSPCA's costs of seizure and accommodation
totalling $80,481.20 under s 189 of the Act.
[3] Each applicant appealed against their conviction and
sentence to the District Court under s 222 Justices Act 1886
(Qld). Ms Hajridin was granted bail pending appeal. The
appeals were heard in late July 2012. On 21 December
2012, Mr Dart's appeal against convictions was dismissed as
was his appeal against sentence. Ms Hajridin's appeal
against convictions was also dismissed but her appeal
against sentence was allowed in part. The sentence ordering
that she serve three months imprisonment suspended after
serving one month was varied so that it was wholly
suspended. Her sentences were otherwise confirmed."
[2] This Court ordered that time be extended and that the applicants have leave to
appeal limited to the following questions:2
"whether the applicants contravened the prohibition order of
12 December 2008 if the respondent failed to establish that they
did not purchase or otherwise acquire or take possession of any
dog or rat for trade or commerce prior to the date of the
prohibition order; and
2 Above, [16]-[19].
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5
if so, whether their convictions for the offences of contravening
the prohibition order should be quashed and verdicts of acquittal
entered; and
if so, whether their sentences for their remaining convictions
should be varied."
[3] Each appellant's lengthy outline of argument is in similar terms. Much in their
outlines extends well beyond this Court's limited grant of leave to appeal and to that
extent must be disregarded.
The appeals against conviction
[4] This Court gave the following reasons for extending time and granting limited leave
to appeal:3
"[9] … The magistrate noted the respondent's concession that,
until the decision of the court of 12 December 2008 making
the prohibition order in respect of each applicant, neither
applicant was constrained from "purchasing or otherwise
acquiring or taking possession of any dog or rat for trade or
commerce".4 Her Honour continued:
'[89] … However, following the making of the order,
these defendants were at immediate risk of breaching
the order, should they continue to possess any dog or
rat for trade or commerce.
[90] The [applicants] argue that 'possession' as stated in
the prohibition order should be interpreted other than
as contained in the dictionary of the Animal Care
and Protection Act 2001. That definition states that
'possession includes control and custody'. This is an
inclusive definition. In those circumstances, the
ordinary meaning of 'possession' should be used.
The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary meaning
of 'possession' is 'actual holding or occupancy;
visible power of exercising such control as attaches
to (but may exist apart from) lawful ownership'.
[91] I have already found that the purported transfer of
the business Topdogzdownunder and the purported
transfer of ownership of the animals previously
owned by Megan Ann Hajridin and Frederick
William Dart to Sydney Dart were shams. Added to
this the fact that Megan Ann Hajridin was the person
left in charge of, and in Sydney Dart's clear
evidence, she was in possession of the animals and
the animals resided in the same building as
Ms Hajridin and Mr Frederick William Dart, I am
satisfied that Megan Ann Hajridin and Frederick
William Dart had possession of the animals.'5
3 Above, [9]-[11].
4 Singer v Dart & Ors [2011] QMC 37, [89].
5 Above, [89]-[91].
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[10] The magistrate's ruling at [89] of her reasons appears to be
inconsistent with the prohibition order made against each
applicant on 12 December 2008 which was in these terms:
'I order that each of the defendants, Frederick DART and
Megan HAJRIDIN having been convicted of an animal
welfare offence must not purchase or otherwise acquire or
take possession of any dog or rat for trade or commerce, for
a period of two years from this date.'6
[11] Consistent with the terms of the prohibition order, the
applicants contend that it had only a prospective effect. If
they were in possession of the dogs or rats the subject of the
present charges prior to the issue of the prohibition order,
they were not in breach of it. They contend that when the
respondent closed its case before the magistrate, he did not
prove that, when the prohibition order was issued on
12 December 2008, they were not already in possession of
the dogs or rats. They contend that the respondent gave
evidence that he did not and could not know whether the
dogs and rats were in the applicants' possession prior to
12 December 2008. Although the applicants did not place
the relevant portions of the transcript before this Court,
since the hearing I have checked the transcript and note that
this last submission is accurate and consistent with the
respondent's evidence before the magistrate.7"
[5] The appellants relevantly contend in these appeals that the evidence before the
magistrate did not establish that either appellant was in possession of dogs at all and
certainly not after 12 December 2008. Further, the prohibition order did not extend
to their breeding from animals in their possession before 12 December 2008. Their
convictions for contravening a prohibition order should be quashed. They contend
that, as a result, their remaining convictions should also be quashed.
[6] The respondent, Clifford Singer, was the complainant in the charges brought against
each appellant and was an employee or officer of the RSPCA. His counsel
concedes in these appeals that the magistrate's reasoning set out above is flawed.
That concession is rightly made for the following reasons.
[7] The Act relevantly provides in s 183 that
"(1) The court may order (a prohibition order) that a person
convicted of an animal welfare offence must not purchase or
otherwise acquire or take possession of –…
(c) any animal, or a stated type of animal, for trade or
commerce or another stated purpose.
(2) A prohibition order may be made permanently or for a stated
period."
6 Dart v Singer; Hajridin v Singer, unreported, District Court, Qld, DC Nos 645 and 646 of 2011,
21 December 2012, [29].
7 Magistrates Court hearing (25.01.2011) T2-81.
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[8] I have set out the terms of the relevant prohibition order earlier. Under s 187 of the
Act a person against whom a prohibition order has been made must not unlawfully
contravene the order. The maximum penalty is 300 penalty units or one years
imprisonment. Mr Frederick Dart was charged with contravening a prohibition
order on 30 December 2008. Ms Hajridin was charged with two counts of contravening
a prohibition order on 22 December 2008; one on 30 December 2008 and one on
14 April 2010. In determining whether either appellant had contravened the prohibition
order made on 12 December 2008, the magistrate ought to have considered whether
Mr Dart or Ms Hajridin took possession of the dogs for trade or commerce after the
12 December 2008 prohibition order was made. Mr Singer conceded in cross-
examination during the Magistrates Court trial that he was unable to say whether
either appellant had taken possession of any of the dogs before 12 December 2008.8
It was therefore reasonably possible that the animals in the possession of the
appellants on 22 and 30 December 2008, only days after the prohibition order was
made, were already in their possession at the time of the order. It followed that the
prosecution established neither the charge under s 187 of contravening a prohibition
order against Mr Dart on 30 December 2008 nor the first three charges of
contravening a prohibition order against Ms Hajridin, two on 22 December 2008
and one on 30 December 2008. The appeals against these convictions must be
allowed, the convictions set aside and verdicts of not guilty substituted.
[9] The position is different, however, in respect of the charge of contravening a
prohibition order against Ms Hajridin on 14 April 2010, 16 months after the
prohibition order. The evidence on that count included the following. On 14 April
2010 RSPCA inspectors attended the residence of Ms Hajridin's mother at
Buchanan Street, Mt Louisa, with a search warrant. Ms Hajridin was inside the
house but refused to open the front door. Entry was forced at the rear of the house.
Ms Hajridin ran outside carrying a large bag containing puppies and holding several
other puppies in her arms. She was agitated and screaming to her friend,
Ms Christine Jackson, to claim the puppies as hers or they would kill them.
[10] Ms Jackson gave evidence that Ms Hajridin had provided her with a constant supply
of dogs since December 2008. Ms Hajridin would bring dogs for her to look after
as Ms Jackson had empty cages from when she kept exotic birds. She apprehended
from Ms Hajridin that all these dogs belonged to Ms Hajridin, not Mr Dart's father.
A litter of seven to nine puppies whelped at Ms Jackson's house. She and
Ms Hajridin agreed to sell them from Ms Jackson's mother's property. She gave her
mother the money from the sale of two pups. She gave Ms Hajridin the rest of the
money from the sales. On another occasion one of Ms Hajridin's bitches died at
Ms Jackson's house while giving birth to four puppies. Ms Hajridin told her to drop
the pups off to the home of Ms Hajridin's mother in Buchanan Street. When she
arrived, Ms Hajridin was there keeping her mother company. On the day the
RSPCA arrived at the Buchanan Street house, Ms Jackson dropped two of her own
dogs off for Ms Hajridin to look after while Ms Jackson took her mother to hospital.
When Ms Jackson returned, the RSPCA had arrived.
[11] Ms Helen Osterman gave evidence that when her bitch became pregnant in April
2009 she contacted Ms Hajridin who agreed to purchase the pups. Ms Osterman
subsequently delivered them to her in Cairns. Either that year or the following year,
she sold the father of the pups to Ms Hajridin for $400.
8 T 2-66 lines 10-28.
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[12] Ms Hajridin gave evidence denying that she had taken possession of any animal for
the purpose of trade or commerce after 12 December 2008. She said the dogs
belonged to Mr Dart's father, Mr Sydney Dart. She was taking them on his behalf
for a vet check on 22 December 2008. All money paid into her account from the
sale of dogs was given to Mr Sydney Dart. The dogs found at her mother's house on
14 April 2010 belonged to her mother.
[13] Mr Frederick Dart gave evidence that he had not taken possession of any animals
after 12 December 2008 save for those born to animals already in his possession.
He and Ms Hajridin transferred property in all their animals to his father in return
for him allowing them to reside at their Calcium premises which they had also
leased to Mr Sydney Dart for $100 per year.
[14] Mr Sydney Dart gave evidence similar to that of Mr Frederick Dart and Ms Hajridin.
[15] As noted earlier, the term "possession" is defined in the schedule dictionary to the
Act as including control and custody. I do not accept the appellants' contention that
puppies bred from dogs in the appellant's possession prior to 12 December 2008 is
not a contravention of the prohibition order. The puppies were found at the home of
Ms Hajridin's mother on 14 April 2010 about 16 months after the prohibition order.
The magistrate was entitled to conclude beyond reasonable doubt, from
Ms Hajridin's conduct in respect of those puppies, that she was exercising control
over them and was therefore in possession of them on 14 April 2010. This was so,
whether or not the puppies were bred from dogs in Ms Hajridin's possession before
12 December 2008. The magistrate was also entitled to conclude beyond reasonable
doubt that she had possession of the puppies on 14 April 2010 for the purpose of
trade or commerce in contravention of the prohibition order. These conclusions
were consistent with the evidence of Ms Jackson and Ms Osterman. The magistrate
was entitled to reject the appellants' and Mr Sydney Dart's evidence that the
appellants genuinely transferred ownership of all their animals to Mr Sydney Dart.
In any case, there was convincing evidence that Ms Hajridin was exercising control
over the dogs at her mother's house for trade and commerce, even were she passing
on the sale proceeds to Mr Sydney Dart. It follows that Ms Hajridin's appeal against
the conviction for contravening a prohibition order on 14 April 2010 must be dismissed.
[16] The appellants' further contentions that the quashing of these convictions affects the
convictions on the remaining offences are unpersuasive. But in any case, those
contentions are outside the ambit of the limited grant of leave to appeal and are irrelevant.
Appeals against sentence
[17] The next issue in accordance with the limited grant of leave to appeal is whether
each appellant's sentence/s for the remaining convictions should be varied in light of
the acquittals.
[18] The facts of each appellant's offending were succinctly summarised in the District
Court Appeal:
". The appellants on 12 December 2008 pleaded guilty to and
were sentenced on over 130 charges made under the Act.
. On 12 December, 2008 a 'prohibition order' was made by his
Honour Magistrate Smith that the appellants 'must not
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purchase or otherwise acquire or take possession of any dog
or rat for trade or commerce for a period of two years', from
the date of the order. …
. Within ten days after the order was made [a potential
purchaser] had internet negotiations involving the sale and
purchase of a dog from Ms Hajridin for a sum of money.
. [The potential purchaser] made a google search about
Ms Hajridin and discovered that the appellants had been
prohibited from selling dogs. She contacted the RSPCA.
. The RSPCA induced Ms Hajridin to bring the dog that was
for sale to a veterinary clinic. She was intercepted and
questioned about her conduct.
. Ms Hajridin allegedly made false representations to RSPCA
officers as to why she had the dog in her possession.
. A covert operation was arranged, with a RSPCA officer
posing as a purchaser of another dog and [Ms] Hajridin was
intercepted attempting to sell that dog.
. On 22 December 2008 RSPCA inspectors attempted to enter
premises of the appellants at Calcium but were refused entry.
. On 30 December 2008 RSPCA inspectors attended that
premises with a warrant to enter and in the company of
police officers.
. A search of the premises revealed 20 small breed dogs in
sheds, 16 to 18 small breed dogs in an open pen area and
a large number of pink and black carrier cages in a shed,
each marked with the words 'TopDogzDownUnder'.
. There were also a large number of cages containing large
numbers of rats and mice.
. A veterinary surgeon, Ms Lomax, also attended the premises
in the company of the inspectors.
. The rat and mice cages were overcrowded, in an unsanitary
condition and there was an inadequate supply of water.
Some of the animals had untreated injuries.
. The inspectors formed the view that the animals were being
kept for commercial purposes. The animals were all seized.
. On 14 April 2010 inspectors attended with a warrant to enter
premises at 8 Buchanan Street, Mount Louisa, a property
owned by the parents of Ms Hajridin.
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. One of the dogs was identified by its microchip as a dog that
had been seized in the earlier proceedings that were concluded
before his Honour Magistrate Smith in December 2008." 9
[19] In sentencing Mr Dart, the magistrate noted that the seven charges of which he had
been found guilty included a breach of duty of care to 567 rats; a breach of duty of
care to 272 mice; a breach of duty of care to one rat with a lesion; a breach of duty
of care to a dog suffering from infected teeth and gums; a breach of duty of care to
a dog suffering a severely infected ear; and possession of a seized animal. He was
the registered owner of the property where the animals were located and he lived
there with his partner, Ms Hajridin. He was 48 years old and had no criminal
history prior to the offences committed on 12 December 2008 for which he was
placed on two years probation. He produced good character references and some
referees attended court. He had been in stable employment for about 20 years. The
magistrate noted that the references showed his compassion and his responsible
employment which he carried out "efficiently and, it would seem, with grace". Her
Honour considered that his conscious participation in attempting to circumvent the
court order of 12 December 2008 was an aggravating feature, as was his support of
Ms Hajridin in her business of possessing the dogs, rats and mice for trade and
commerce and his ignorance or indifference to their treatment. The magistrate was
"particularly concerned at the direct flouting of the prohibition order". For the
offence of possession of a seized animal for which the maximum penalty was
$10,000 she convicted and fined him $2,000 which she referred to SPER.10 On the
remaining counts she convicted him and placed him on three years probation. She
also prohibited him from purchasing otherwise acquiring or taking possession of
any animal for trade or commerce other than de-sexed companion animals permitted
by any local government local law for five years. He was further ordered to pay
court costs of $187.50.
[20] I consider that the magistrate was right to record convictions, especially in light of
his 2008 like offending. It seems that in setting the probation period at the three
year maximum, the magistrate was imposing a global penalty to encompass the
totality of his offending, apart from the offence of possession of a seized animal for
which a $2,000 fine was imposed. Her Honour particularly noted her concern as to
his flouting of the prohibition order, a reference to the conviction which must now
be set aside. This Court should therefore determine whether, in light of that
acquittal, a lesser global penalty is apposite. After balancing the exacerbating and
mitigating features, including his much lesser role than Ms Hajridin's in this
offending and in the 2008 offending, I consider that the appropriate global penalty is
to record convictions and place the appellant on two and a half years probation for
those offences.
[21] In sentencing Ms Hajridin, the magistrate noted that she had been found guilty of
four breaches of a prohibition order when she had dogs in her possession for trade
or commerce (three of which have now been set aside); a breach of duty of care to
567 rats; a breach of duty of care to 272 mice; a breach of duty of care to a rat with
a lesion; a breach of duty of care to a dog with infected teeth and gums; a breach of
duty of care to a dog with an infected ear; and possession of a seized animal. She
9 Dart v Singer; Hajridin v Singer, unreported, District Court, Qld, DC Nos 645 and 646 of 2011,
21 December 2012, [17].
10 The State Penalties Enforcement Register.
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was 52 years old and in precarious mental and physical health. Her relationship
with Mr Dart had broken down. A character reference from a veterinarian referencing to
her expertise in caring for animals over the last 18 months and medical reports
relating to her poor health following a motor vehicle accident were tendered.
[22] The magistrate accepted Ms Hajridin had some skills in caring for animals and that
she did care for her animals a great deal. The animal care at the property on
30 December 2008 was a vast improvement from that at the time of the previous
raid. It was still, however, not to the standard of a responsible pet owner. The
authors of Ms Hajridin's medical reports had prepared them for her personal injuries
case following a May 2009 motor vehicle accident and were not available for and
had not been tested in cross-examination. They did not refer to these or her
previous court proceedings and did not suggest that the present offending was
related to her mental health. The magistrate nevertheless accepted that Ms Hajridin's
mental state was precarious. She had no remorse and appeared to tell different
people different things at different times to benefit herself. Her four charges of
breaching a prohibition order (now one charge) showed a repeated contempt for
court orders which were put in place to protect animals from harm. She also had
earlier convictions on 31 August 2010 for stealing and fraud offences committed
between 2002 and 2007 for which she was sentenced to imprisonment with
immediate court-ordered parole. The present offences were committed during that
parole period and immediately after she was sentenced in 2008 for like offences.
She clearly had no respect for court orders. Her conduct warranted community
denunciation and her sentence should reflect the need for general and personal
deterrence.
[23] On each of the offences of breaching a prohibition order, the magistrate sentenced
her to three months imprisonment suspended after one month for an operational
period of 12 months. On each offence of breach of duty care, the magistrate placed
her on three years probation.
[24] As noted earlier, Ms Hajridin was successful in her appeal against sentence to the
District Court in that her sentence of three months imprisonment for contravening
the prohibition order was wholly suspended. The District Court judge noted:
"[212] Whilst deterrence generally was arguably a matter of
significance in the sentencing of the appellant Ms Hajridin,
personal deterrence was specifically referred to in the
context of the appellant being a person who had defied court
orders in the past in respect of orders for disqualification.
However, that fact does not of necessity make a wholly
suspended sentence any less a deterrent to the appellant than
a short term of actual imprisonment, given her age, her
health issues and the apparent breakdown of her relationship
with Mr FW Dart. The previous convictions for fraud, as
relevant as they are in determining sentence, do not of
necessity have that effect either.
[213] Whilst it is undesirable in my view to impose sentences of
imprisonment of very short duration, it does not necessarily
follow that it is inappropriate in every case. The terms of
imprisonment for breaches of the prohibition order were
within the magistrate’s sentencing discretion and appropriate in
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the circumstances. Whilst on the face of things a sentence
requiring a short period of actual custody was open to the
magistrate to make, it constitutes a quantum leap from
previous punishments imposed for similar offending. I have
concluded, after careful consideration, that the discretion of
the magistrate miscarried in imposing a very short term of
actual imprisonment. In my view a period of imprisonment
wholly suspended would have been a more appropriate
sentence and in the circumstances I will vary the sentence
accordingly."11
[25] Although three of Ms Hajridin's four convictions for contravening a prohibition
order under s 187 have been set aside, the fact remains that, as the magistrate and
the District Court judge rightly noted, her remaining conviction for breaching
a prohibition order on 14 April 2010 showed a repeated disregard for court orders
which were put in place to protect animals. It was committed whilst on court-
ordered parole for stealing and fraud. Her persistent recidivism and her lack of
respect for court orders warranted community denunciation through a firm sentence
reflecting the need for general and personal deterrence. For those reasons, despite
her acquittal on three of her four charges of contravening a prohibition order, I am
unpersuaded that any lesser sentence than that imposed by the magistrate as varied
by the District Court judge should now be substituted.
Costs
[26] The appellants have had considerable success in this appeal. They were self-
represented, as they were in the appeal to the District Court, so that it is unlikely
they will have incurred legal costs but they are entitled to be compensated for any
assessable costs they have incurred.
Orders
[27] I propose the following orders:
In CA No 40 of 2013 Frederick William Dart v Clifford Singer:
1. The appeal is allowed with costs.
2. The orders made by the District Court at Townsville on 21 December 2012
are set aside. Instead it is ordered:
"1. The appeal against conviction for the offence of contravention of a
prohibition order contrary to s 187 Animal Care and Protection Act
2001 (Qld) is allowed. The conviction is set aside and a verdict of
not guilty substituted.
2. The convictions entered in the Magistrates Court at Townsville on
1 December 2011 are otherwise confirmed.
3. The appeal against sentence is allowed to the extent of setting aside
all sentences of three years probation imposed in the Magistrates
11 Dart v Singer; Hajridin v Singer, unreported, District Court, Qld, DC Nos 645 and 646 of 2011,
21 December 2012, [212]-[213].
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Court at Townsville on 1 December 2011 for breaching a duty of
care under s 17(2) Animal Care and Protection Act and substituting
sentences of two and a half years probation. The sentences imposed
in the Magistrates Court at Townsville on 1 December 2011 are
otherwise confirmed.
4. The ancillary orders made in the Magistrates Court at Townsville
on 1 December 2011 are otherwise confirmed.
5. The respondent is to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal."
In CA No 41 of 2013 Megan Ann Hajridin v Clifford Singer:
1. The appeal is allowed with costs.
2. Orders 1, 2 and 6 made by the District Court at Townsville on 21 December
2012 are set aside. Instead, it is ordered:
"1. The appeal against the two convictions for the offences of
contravening a prohibition order on 22 December 2008 contrary to
s 187 Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) and the appeal against
conviction for the offence of contravening a prohibition order
contrary to s 187 Animal Care and Protection Act on 30 December
2008 are allowed. The convictions are set aside and verdicts of not
guilty are entered.
2. The convictions entered in the Magistrates Court at Townsville on
1 December 2011 are otherwise confirmed.
3. The respondent is to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal."
[28] MUIR JA: I agree with the reasons and proposed orders of McMurdo P.
[29] NORTH J: I have read the reasons for judgment of McMurdo P and agree with her
Honour and agree with the orders proposed by her Honour in both appeals.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCA/2014/263