Copeland v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QCAT 385
CITATION: Copeland v Queensland Building Services
Authority [2013] QCAT 385
PARTIES: Paul Copeland
(Applicant)
v
Queensland Building Services Authority
(Respondent)
APPLICATION NUMBER: OCR323-12
MATTER TYPE: Occupational regulation matters
HEARING DATE: 18 July 2013
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Michelle Howard, Member
DELIVERED ON: 26 July 2013
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
ORDERS MADE: 1. The decision of the Queensland Building
Services Authority is set aside.
2. Paul Copeland is categorised as a
permitted individual.
CATCHWORDS: OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION -
APPLICATION TO BE CATEGORISED AS A
PERMITTED INDIVIDUAL - where liquidation of
company of which applicant was a director -
whether applicant took all reasonable steps to
avoid the coming into existence of the
circumstances which led to the liquidation -
where circumstances resulting in the liquidation
brought about by a series of events - where
applicant took steps including taking advice and
putting in place arrangements for credit
management - whether all reasonable steps
taken
Queensland Building Services Authority Act
1991 s 56AD
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
Act 2009 ss 20, 24
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Younan v QBSA [2010] QDC 158, followed
QBSA v Meredith [2010] QCATA 50, cited
QBSA v Meredith [2013] QCATA 152, cited
APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):
APPLICANT: Mr Copeland represented himself
RESPONDENT: Ms S Van Eyk appeared for the Queensland
Building Services Authority
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] Mr Copeland holds a builder’s licence. Copeland Holdings (Australia) Pty
Ltd (the company) operated a design business which went into voluntary
liquidation in November 2010. Mr Copeland was a director of the
company. As a result, Queensland Building Services Authority (QBSA)
advised Mr Copeland that it considered he was an excluded individual
under the Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991 (the QBSA
Act).1 The consequence is that his building licence must be cancelled by
the QBSA, unless he is categorised as a permitted individual.2
[2] He applied unsuccessfully to the QBSA for permitted individual
categorisation. He now seeks review by the Tribunal of the QBSA’s
decision to refuse to categorise him as a permitted individual.
[3] The purpose of the review is to produce the correct and preferable
decision.3 For the review, the Tribunal stands in the shoes of the decision-
maker (that is, in this case, the QBSA) and makes the decision afresh.4
The Tribunal’s decision is then taken to be a decision of the decision-
maker.5
[4] A person may be categorised as a permitted individual only if the person
took all reasonable steps to avoid the coming into existence of the
circumstances that resulted in the happening of the relevant event6 which
led to the person becoming an excluded individual.7 The QBSA Act
requires that in determining whether all reasonable steps were taken by a
person that certain matters must be considered.8 These include whether
the person kept proper books of account and financial records; sought
appropriate legal and financial advice; had appropriate credit management
1 QBSA Act s 56AC.
2 QBSA Act ss 56AD, 56AF.
3 QCAT Act s 20.
4 QCAT Act s 20.
5 QCAT Act s 24(2).
6 See QBSA Act s56AC regarding relevant events.
7 QBSA Act s 56AD(8).
8 QBSA Act s 56AD(8A).
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arrangements in place; and made appropriate provision for taxation debts.
Other matters may also be considered.9
[5] All reasonable steps does not mean all possible steps. The steps are
those that were reasonable for the individual in his or her circumstances,
with the information he or she had at the time.10 The focus of the section is
on prevention, and about being a prudent business manager.11 The test
has sometimes been described as the ‘reasonable builder test’.12
[6] In determining the application, essentially 4 matters are to be
determined.13 Firstly, the relevant event must be identified. Secondly, the
circumstances which led to the happening of the event must be identified.
Thirdly, a determination must be made about whether the person took all
reasonable steps to avoid the coming about of those circumstances.
Finally, if so, whether the discretion should be exercised to classify the
person as a permitted individual.
[7] Mr Copeland’s evidence about the events that transpired is unchallenged.
He presented as a credible witness. The available documentary evidence
tends to support his version of events. I accept that events occurred as he
recounted them.
The Event
[8] There is no issue that the relevant event is the voluntary winding up of the
company in November 2010.
The circumstances which led to the happening of the liquidation
Background to the establishment and operation of the business
[9] Mr Copeland was in the process of migrating to Australia on a 5 year
temporary visa. He made arrangements for the company’s establishment
and for the purchase of an existing design business for $450,000 in 2006.
For this purpose, he engaged accountants, Gateway Financial Partners.
Lawyers were also engaged for the purchase and to give advice about
director’s duties. Although Mr Copeland had operated businesses
previously in the United Kingdom and the Middle East, he had not done so
in Australia.
[10] The company began operation of the business in December 2006. It was
initially a building design business, but later became an architectural
practice. It initially operated in the commercial/industrial sector. As Mr
Copeland was not a designer or architect, he employed other persons in
these roles.
9 QBSA Act s 56AD(8B).
10 Younan v QBSA [2010] QDC 158 at [26] per McGill DCJ.
11 Ibid, [24].
12 For example, see QBSA v Meredith [2013] QCATA 152.
13 Younan v QBSA [2010] QDC 158 at [26] per McGill DCJ.
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[11] Mr Copeland invested considerable personal capital into the purchase and
operation of the business. He explained what might have appeared to be
unusual entries in the financial records regarding the purchase of a house
by the company. This purchase, made in the very early days of operation
through the company, was done on advice because of his non-permanent
resident status. I accept Mr Copeland’s explanation including that the
associated costs to the company were limited.
[12] Initially, Mr Copeland was successful in increasing turnover and
profitability of the business. From December 2006 to June 2007, gross
income before deduction of expenses was $367,061 (averaging $52,437
gross per month). Taxable income was $2,576. For the 2008 to 2009
financial year, gross income was $890,691 (averaging $74,224 gross per
month). Taxable income of the company was $77,283. Unfortunately, in
the 2009-2010 tax year, gross income dropped to $666,772 (which
translated to a nett loss of some $103,266), resulting in a taxable loss of
$77,968. In 2009-2010, gross income was $199,573. The company made
a significant loss of $471,458.
The Global Financial Crisis
[13] From as early as June 2008 when commercial interest rates rose, Mr
Copeland says that there were signs that business was slowing in the
sector in which he operated. He acknowledges that by late 2008, the
global financial crisis (GFC) began to affect the business. There was
simply less business available. At this stage, he sought advice primarily
from Action Coach, business coaches/consultants, about effective
marketing strategies and about whether to seek registration with
government for economic stimulus work.
[14] He implemented the strategies and accepted the advice to continue to
focus efforts in the private sector, due to the cumbersome process of
seeking registration and uncertainties about the stimulus work that would
flow from it and the time period for which it would be available. This is a
decision Mr Copeland now regrets as the stimulus work lasted several
years, and he considers that the companies which concentrated on
obtaining that work are still operating.
[15] In the private sector, he ended up taking on work which was non-
commercial, less lucrative than previously available and at reduced rates.
During this period, some staff left and were not replaced, although no
other active strategies were taken to reduce costs. Mr Copeland said that
this was because, other than wages, the business had predominantly fixed
costs related to the leasing of the premises from which it operated and of
equipment. When asked about why steps were not taken to sell motor
vehicles, he explained that this was because he needed to be able to get
to work.
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The liquidation of S & L Developments
[16] In about mid-2008, Scott Juniper, a director of S & L Developments Pty
Ltd, approached Mr Copeland to discuss bringing some work to the
business. It was Stage 1 of a Noosa project. The work was subsequently
done later in 2008. It generated fees of $80,000, the largest for some time.
Invoices were paid promptly by S & L Developments.
[17] In late 2008, Scott Juniper asked for some design work for his own home.
This was done and the design cost was billed to Mr Juniper. At the time,
he said he had some temporary cash flow problems and would endeavour
to pay. S & L Developments also engaged the business to do Stage 2 of
the Noosa project. It was done and the fees paid in accordance with the
usual terms on which the business operated.
[18] Mr Juniper contacted Mr Copeland again, saying that Stage 3 was
imminent and that he had a Sippy Downs Project worth $170M due out of
Council. He suggested that the cost of the design work for his home be
included in the Sippy Downs project design work. Mr Copeland was
reluctant to do this, but eventually agreed to on the basis that the personal
invoice would remain outstanding until the invoices for design work for the
Sippy Downs project was paid. Fees for Stage 1 of the Sippy Downs
Precinct job were $65,000. The first part of those works was completed
and invoiced in about February 2010.
[19] However, that invoice was not paid. The company followed its usual credit
management procedures and was told by S & L Developments
representatives that they were refinancing their banking arrangements, but
that it would be business as usual once this was done. The next month,
April 2010, Mr Copeland learned that S & L Developments had gone into
liquidation. Until May or June 2010, he says he was still being told that the
company would be paid.
[20] However, neither the progress payment for the Sippy Downs project, nor
the design work for Scott Juniper was ever paid. These were the largest
outstanding debtors when the company went into liquidation, at
$19,937.78 and $12,584 respectively.
[21] Mr Copeland conceded that the amount owed by Scott Juniper personally
was not pursued in accordance with the company’s credit management
arrangements. He made a commercial decision, that it was preferable to
have the relationship with Mr Juniper intact and continue to receive design
work through S & L which was offering prestigious and lucrative work in a
depressed market for which payment was received in accordance with the
company’s credit management terms. It was hoped that the personal
work would also be paid for eventually.
Mr Copeland’s Family Law Proceedings
[22] In the meantime, quite apart from the GFC, the business was impacted by
the consequences of Mr Copeland’s family breakdown. Mr Copeland and
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his wife separated in January 2009. The hearing of their property
settlement proceedings occurred in February 2010. The business had
been valued. A revised valuation became available only in the days
immediately before the hearing at $204,383. Mr Copeland considered the
valuation was unrealistic but decisions had to be made at the hearing in
light of the valuation. Mr Copeland later had the company re-valued on the
same information as that used at the time for the purpose of subsequent
family law proceedings. It was ascribed a nil value.14
[23] That aside, at the hearing in February 2010, it was agreed that the
business would be sold. Mr Copeland was subsequently told by business
brokers that the business would be difficult to sell in the market as it was
at the time, but an indicative value of $60,000-$80,000 was suggested.
His wife refused to accept this. The business was eventually placed on the
market in August 2010 at $120,000. It did not sell.
[24] Throughout the period, while he tried to keep the intended sale from staff
because he was concerned it would be unsettling. However, he reports
that his wife spoke openly to staff about what was happening. Mr
Copeland says had a destabilising effect on staff. Most left, leaving only
the architect, the office manager and Mr Copeland. Then in late August
2010, they both resigned to start their own practice. Mr Copeland was not
an architect and was therefore unable to personally continue to operate
the business. On the advice of his accountants, he decided to enter the
company into voluntary liquidation.
Credit and Business Management Procedures
[25] In addition to their involvement in the acquisition of the business and set-
up of the company, Gateway Financial Partners were engaged as
accountants on an on-going basis. For the first two years, Mr Copeland
met with them to take advice each quarter. They also regularly checked
the budgets for the company. He also consulted them on an ad hoc basis,
as issues arose. If he had any concerns, he addressed them with
Gateway. They prepared comprehensive financial statements for the
company. These were provided to the Tribunal. In the final days of the
business, Mr Copeland consulted them about options. They gave advice
about liquidation.
[26] Monthly in-house management team meetings were also held at which
business issues were discussed. Records were kept and prepared
electronically on MYOB which were discussed.
[27] MYOB also contained a credit management system. The company
adopted a standard credit management procedure. Work was invoiced as
soon as completed and payment terms ‘nett 14 days’ were included on
invoices.
14 Exhibit 1.
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[28] If payment was not received accordingly, the invoice was resent, stamped
with a reminder that the account was overdue. If not paid in 30 days, it
was resent marked ‘overdue’. If unpaid at 45 days, the office manager
emailed the client requesting immediate payment and then telephoned the
client. At 60 days overdue, the procedure was repeated.
[29] After 90 days, the office manager generally advised the client that a debt
recovery service would now recover the debt from them. At this stage, Mr
Copeland made a decision about the commercial viability of pursuing the
debt through a debt recovery agency, given the not insignificant costs of
doing so.
[30] Mr Copeland acknowledges that the standard procedure was not inflexibly
followed on occasions. In circumstances of an outstanding invoice owed
by a client for whom multiple and lucrative other design work had been
undertaken, which had been paid for promptly, he occasionally decided on
a commercial basis to let a relatively small invoice ‘ride’ on the strong
possibility of future work. This happened with the work done personally for
Scott Juniper, and also in respect of another client who owed some $668
which was not recovered and owing at the time of liquidation.
[31] Outstanding amounts were discussed at weekly meetings, where the
sales register and receivables reconciliation were considered. They were
included in the Monthly Management Report.
The unpaid creditors on liquidation of the company
[32] At the time of the liquidation, the amounts (ignoring less than whole
dollars) owing to unsecured creditors were the Australian Taxation Office
(ATO) $20,339; AGL $821; Australian Equipment Rentals $1,690;
Berwicks $2,359; Clear Telecoms $1,139; Professional Collection
Services $1,210.
[33] Mr Copeland explained that the debt to the ATO comprised of 2
components. A GST component for the April to June period and
withholding tax for July to September. On one previous occasion an
arrangement had been entered into with the ATO to pay an amount which
was then paid in full in accordance with the agreement. However, he said
that on all other occasions, tax was paid as it fell due. He explained that
tax was up to date when S & L went into liquidation. He continued to follow
up with S & L Developments upon their assurances that they would
ultimately be paid until about May or June 2010, when it became clear that
the business would not recover anything in respect of the debt.
[34] Mr Copeland explained that two other amounts included in the liquidators
report as owing to Workcover Queensland of $955 and PJ and DM
Johnson of $4,681 were not unpaid or outstanding. Workcover premiums
are paid in advance and the amount referred to was for a period during
which the business did not operate. The Johnsons were the lessors and
the amount owed to them had been satisfied by the bond held.
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[35] The total owing at liquidation and unpaid to creditors was some $27,558.
Debtors owing the company at liquidation
[36] The largest outstanding debtors when the company went into liquidation of
were S & L Developments and Scott Juniper who owed $19,937.78 and
$12,584 respectively. There were 10 other amounts outstanding, but all
were small, one under $100, several for hundreds of dollars and others,
for several thousand (the largest one being $4,900).
[37] Debtors totalled some $53,361, of which over $32,500 was owed by S & L
Developments and Mr Juniper.
What circumstances were responsible for the liquidation?
[38] The liquidators report opines that economic downturn from June 2008, a
drop in clientele, inadequate cash flow and poor debtor recovery were
responsible.15
[39] Mr Copeland submits that the circumstance which led to the liquidation
were that he personally could no longer operate the business, because he
is not an architect. That said, he seems to acknowledge that other factors
impacted including market conditions, his family law proceedings which
resulted in an attempted forced sale of the business and the liquidation of
S & L Developments impacted.
[40] The QBSA suggests that the causes are the debt to the ATO, the GFC,
not recovering monies owing to it and the family law proceedings.
My Conclusions
[41] I am satisfied that the coming in to existence of the circumstances which
led to the liquidation of the company are the combined and cumulative
effects of the GFC (and associated economic downturn resulting in a
decrease in clientele), Mr Copeland’s family breakdown (and associated
property settlement proceedings), the liquidation of a major client, S & L
Developments; and the subsequent inability to pay tax which fell due
shortly after S & L entered liquidation.
Did Mr Copeland take all reasonable steps to avoid the coming about of
those circumstances?
[42] I have considered the matters in s 56AD(8A).
[43] On the basis of the evidence discussed earlier, I am satisfied that Mr
Copeland ensured that the company kept proper books of account and
financial records. Comprehensive financial statements have been
produced to the Tribunal. In addition, internal MYOB records were kept,
budgets developed and monthly management reports produced,
scrutinised and discussed.
15 Exhibit 5, page 89.
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[44] Professional financial advice was sought by Mr Copeland before the
business was purchased, and regularly throughout its operation until the
company went into liquidation. He met often with the accountants for a
significant portion of the time of operation, and also took advice from them
on an ad hoc basis as issues arose. Ultimately, he also sought their
advice regarding options and liquidation. He instructed lawyers in relation
to the purchase of the business, set up of the company and his duties as a
director. During the operation of the business, services of professional
debt collectors were engaged. On this basis, I am satisfied that Mr
Copeland sought appropriate financial and legal advice before and in
conducting business.
[45] I am also satisfied that Mr Copeland made appropriate credit management
arrangements. The procedure he explained is comprehensive, sensible
and I accept that it was generally followed, unless a commercial decision
was made by Mr Copeland that it was either not viable to collect small
amounts through a debt collectors, or that in particular circumstances,
such as those involving Scott Juniper’s design work, it was more
commercially beneficial not to do so because of past experience of
lucrative work (and prompt payment for it) flowing from the relationship
with the contact.
[46] The appropriateness of the credit management arrangements is
demonstrated in the fact that at the time of liquidation, other than the debts
associated with S & L and Scott Juniper, a small amount of bad debt was
being carried. Although the debt owed by Scott Juniper could have been
pursued at an earlier stage when it or some of it may have been
recovered, in the scheme of the fees that had been generated through S &
L Developments work, the approach taken was reasonable and a
legitimate commercial approach to debt collection.
[47] There was greater commercial benefit in maintaining a relationship with Mr
Juniper and securing ongoing work than in aggressively seeking to
recover this relatively small amount (compared to the fees generated and
paid promptly for S & L Developments work), which may more likely than
not have soured the relationship and resulted in the business receiving no
further work from S & L. This is especially so, in a market which was being
depressed by the GFC.
[48] Also, I accept that it is a reasonable step and legitimate to decide in some
circumstances of small debts that the costs associated with debt recovery
are not justifiable, when there is risk that neither the debt nor the costs
associated with recovery may ultimately be recovered. There was not a
generally relaxed attitude towards credit management. Business decisions
were made from time to time not to implement the usual and established
procedures. A judgment was made having regard to the circumstances
relating to individual bad debts.
[49] The provision for taxation debts initially appeared more troubling. Mr
Copeland says taxation was generally paid as it was due. There was one
exception, in relation to which a payment arrangement was earlier entered
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into with the ATO and honoured in full. Mr Copeland’s evidence does not
suggest that monies for tax were, for example, banked into a separate
account. On the face of it, it seems that this may be an unsatisfactory
manner in which to operate.
[50] However, record and report keeping was extensive. Monthly management
meetings were held and MYOB reports and regular budgets16 were
produced. Budgets were regularly checked by the accountants. A track
was kept of GST. It is reasonable to infer, and I do draw the inference, that
Mr Copeland did budget for taxation due. This conclusion is supported by
the reality that the only amounts unpaid were for the period after the
default by, and subsequent liquidation of, S & L Developments. I accept
that, although finances had tightened, tax provision had been adequately
made. It was only after the default of a major debtor that tax liabilities
accrued which the company was unable to meet.
[51] The other matters referred to in s56AD(8A) do not appear to be relevant.
[52] I am entitled to take into account other matters in deciding whether all
reasonable steps were taken.17
[53] Mr Copeland’s evidence also reveals other steps taken to avoid the
circumstances that resulted in the liquidation. He took advice from
business consultants once the GFC became evident in order to best
position the business to trade successfully through the economic
downturn. He did have some success initially, as the 08-09 figures
demonstrate. As Mr Copeland suggested, in hindsight a better decision or
step may have been to pursue government stimulus work. However, the
steps taken are to be considered, not in hindsight, but with the information
a person had at the time. He made the decision he thought best based on
the knowledge and advice that he then had.
[54] Given the conclusions I have reached about the circumstances which led
to the happening of the event, it is evident that these were mainly outside
of Mr Copeland’s control. Mr Copeland was not responsible for the GFC
and its consequences. He was not responsible for the timing of the
hearing of his property settlement proceedings. He agreed to sell the
business, but it appears his only other choice might have been to accept
the business as part of his share of the property pool at a value which he
regarded as unrealistic and inflated at the time. He tried to minimise the
effect of the proposed sale of the business, but his former wife did not. He
was also not responsible for S & L’s liquidation. Indeed, until a short time
before its demise, it was a good client of the company, which generated
very significant fees for it. Once this major client failed, the business was
then unable to pay debts, and in particular the largest owing to the ATO,
when they subsequently fell due. Even so, the amounts owing at
liquidation were modest.
16 For example, Exhibit 5, pages 79-80.
17 QBSA Act s56 AD(8B).
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[55] Events conspired against the ongoing success of the company. These,
each in their own way, contributed to its ultimate downfall.
[56] However, Mr Copeland took a considered, responsible and conscientious
approach to his duties as a director of the company and to decision-
making for the company generally. He took advice from appropriate
professionals. He made appropriate arrangements for the company’s
management. Until the unexpected failure of a major client, all debts were
able to be met as they fell due.
[57] I am therefore satisfied that Mr Copeland took all reasonable steps to
avoid the coming into existence of the circumstances which led to the
liquidation.
Should Mr Copeland be categorised as a permitted individual?
[58] The QBSA conceded that, if the Tribunal was satisfied that all reasonable
steps were taken, that there are no factors which indicate that the
discretion should not be exercised to categorise Mr Copeland as a
permitted individual. I agree with that assessment.
[59] I am satisfied that it is appropriate to exercise the discretion to categorise
Mr Copeland as a permitted individual.
[60] Accordingly, I make orders setting aside the decision of the QBSA to
refuse categorisation, and categorising him as a permitted individual.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCAT/2013/385