Brandies v IME Pty Ltd [2013] QCATA 169
CITATION: Brandies v IME Pty Ltd [2013] QCATA 169
PARTIES: Heidi Brandies
(Applicant/Appellant)
v
IME Pty Ltd t/as SAS Property Group
(Respondent)
APPLICATION NUMBER: APL082-13
MATTER TYPE: Appeals
HEARING DATE: On the papers
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Peta Stilgoe OAM, Senior Member
DELIVERED ON: 15 July 2013
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
ORDERS MADE: 1. Leave to appeal granted.
2. Appeal allowed.
3. The decision of 31 January 2013 is set
aside.
4. The proceeding is remitted to the
tribunal at Southport for hearing before
a different member or adjudicator.
5. Each party shall file and serve in
Southport MCDT 1342/12 any further
material on which they wish to rely by 5
August 2013.
CATCHWORDS: MINOR CIVIL DISPUTE – where application
for tenancy signed – where application
subject to house being completed – where
tenancy agreement sent and signed by tenant
– where tenancy agreement not signed by
lessor – where bond paid – whether tenancy
agreement – whether grounds for leave to
appeal
Residential Tenancies and Rooming
Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) ss 12, 53, 61,
62, 111, 116, 182
Residential Tenancies and Rooming
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Accommodation Regulations 2008 (Qld)
Schedule 1 Part 2, cll 4, 18, 19
Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1
QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd
R 41
Cachia v Grech [2009] NSWCA 232
Glenwood Properties Pty Ltd v Delmoss Pty
Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 388
McIver Bulk Liquid Haulage Pty Ltd v
Fruehauf Australia Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 577
Clarke v Japan Machines (Australia) Pty Ltd
[1984] 1 Qd R 404
APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):
The appeal tribunal heard and determined this matter on the papers in
accordance with section 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
Act 2009 (Qld).
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] In September 2012, Ms Brandies packed up her house in Penrith, loaded
her three children in the car and moved to the Gold Coast to fulfil her
dream. Unfortunately, the new house she thought she had rented was not
finished, she could not move in, and the dream became a nightmare. The
letting agent, SAS Property Group, kept promising that she could move in
to the house. Eventually, Ms Brandies gave up waiting and rented a
different house. She claimed compensation from SAS. The learned
Adjudicator refused her claim, saying that she did not have a tenancy
agreement.
[2] Ms Brandies wants to appeal the learned Adjudicator’s decision. She says
that she did have a tenancy agreement, quoting a number of sections from
the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld)
(“Residential Tenancies Act”). She also says that the learned Adjudicator
did not give her an opportunity to present all her evidence.
[3] Because this is an appeal from a decision of the tribunal in its minor civil
disputes jurisdiction, leave is necessary. The question whether or not leave
to appeal should be granted is usually addressed according to established
principles. Is there a reasonably arguable case of error in the primary
decision?1 Is there a reasonable prospect that the applicant will obtain
substantive relief?2 Is leave necessary to correct a substantial injustice
caused by some error?3 Is there a question of general importance upon
1 QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41.
2 Cachia v Grech [2009] NSWCA 232 at 2.
3 QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41.
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which further argument, and a decision of the appeals tribunal, would be to
the public advantage?4
[4] Ms Brandies found the property on the internet. She made inquiries with
SAS and that office sent her an application form. Page 4 of the application
states:
I acknowledge that this is an application to lease the property for which I am
applying and that my application is subject to the owner’s approval and the
availability of the premises on the due date. No action will be taken against
the landlord or the agent should the premises not be ready for
occupation on the due date or if my application is not successful
[5] Ms Brandies signed the application and returned it to SAS on 30 August
2012. On 3 September 2012, she received an email from SAS advising that
her application was approved and asking for two weeks rent in advance.
The email also advised Ms Brandies that she had to pay the bond at least
48 hours before the lease commenced and that the start date was 27
September 2012. Ms Brandies received the tenancy agreement by email
on 4 September 2012. She signed it and returned it the next day. She also
paid $820 – two weeks rent – to SAS. On 26 September 2012, Ms
Brandies paid the bond into the SAS trust account. She expected to take
possession of the property on 28 September 2012. On 18 October 2012,
the property was still not ready so Ms Brandies arranged a tenancy of
another property through another agent.
[6] SAS argued, and the learned Adjudicator accepted, that there is no
tenancy agreement unless and until the lessor, or the lessor’s agent, signs
and returns the tenancy agreement.
[7] Section 12(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act states that a residential
tenancy agreement is an agreement under which a person gives someone
else a right to occupy residential premises. The agreement created by s
12(1) does not need to be in writing.5
[8] The requirement for writing and the standard terms of a tenancy are found
in s 61. Section 61(6) says that nothing in s 61 affects the enforceability of
an agreement that is not in writing. By implication, nothing is s 61 can affect
the enforceability of an agreement that does not contain the standard
terms.
[9] Under s 62, SAS had to give Ms Brandies a copy of the tenancy agreement
on or before the day she moved in. She had to sign and return it within 5
days. So far, so good. When SAS received the signed agreement from Ms
Brandies, it had to sign and return it within 14 days. It did not do so. The
Residential Tenancies Act does not contemplate that a tenancy agreement
signed by the tenant can be held as an offer until the property is available.
[10] Ms Brandies paid a rental bond. Section 111 defines a rental bond as an
amount paid “under the agreement”. SAS could only accept the bond if it
also accepted that there was a valid tenancy agreement. Otherwise, Ms
Brandies’ payment was either a key deposit under s 156, or a holding
4 Glenwood Properties Pty Ltd v Delmoss Pty Ltd [1986] 2 Qd R 388 at 389; McIver Bulk
Liquid Haulage Pty Ltd v Fruehauf Australia Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 577 at 578, 580.
5 Residential Tenancies Act s 12(2).
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deposit under s 159. SAS’s paperwork does not reflect either of those
propositions. SAS paid the bond to the Residential Tenancies Authority
under s 116. I am satisfied that SAS accepted the bond believing that there
was a valid tenancy agreement.
[11] Ms Brandies submits that the acknowledgement in her application,
reproduced at [4] above, is a breach of s 53. Section 53 states that an
agreement is void to the extent that it purports to exclude change or restrict
the operation of the Act about the terms of a tenancy agreement.
[12] I agree with Ms Brandies’ proposition for the reasons that follow.
[13] Clause 4(1) of the tenancy agreement states that the agreement starts on
the day stated in the agreement at Item 6.2.
[14] Clause 18 of the standard terms states that the lessor must ensure there is
no legal impediment to occupation of the premises by the tenant if, when
entering into the agreement, the lessor knew about the impediment or
ought reasonably to have known about it. The Residential Tenancies and
Rooming Accommodation Regulation 2008 (Qld) give, as an example of a
possible impediment, that a certificate of classification is required under the
Building Act.
[15] Clause 19 of the standard terms gives the tenant a right to vacant
possession on the day the tenant is entitled to occupy the premises. That
right is reinforced by s 182.
[16] Ms Brandies’ tenancy did not start on the day stated in her agreement.
SAS knew there was a potential impediment, because it knew the house
wasn’t finished. It did not ensure that the impediment had been removed so
that Ms Brandies could move in. Ms Brandies did not get vacant
possession. SAS attempted to avoid the consequences of its failure by a
catch all acknowledgement in the application for a tenancy. Section 53
prevents this; the acknowledgement is of no effect.
[17] SAS argues that the tenancy agreement was subject to conditions
precedent: that the premises were available; that the house had been
completed; that the builder had given the keys to SAS; and knowledge of
the commencement date. There is no evidence to support a finding that
there were conditions precedent to the tenancy agreement. The tenancy
agreement itself is compelling evidence to the contrary, as it nominates a
start date without reservation.
[18] SAS also submits that Ms Brandies repudiated the tenancy agreement by
withdrawing her offer to be bound. Given that SAS was unable to offer Ms
Brandies vacant possession of the premises, I find the more likely
explanation is that Ms Brandies accepted SAS’s breach of the agreement.
[19] I am satisfied that the learned Adjudicator erred in finding that there was no
tenancy agreement between the parties. Leave should be granted, the
appeal allowed and the learned Adjudicator’s decision of 31 January 2013
set aside.
[20] Ms Brandies also complains that, because the learned Adjudicator found
there was no tenancy agreement, he did not consider her evidence of loss.
That is true but, in the circumstances, I am not satisfied that this is a
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breach of natural justice that justifies leave to appeal. If the learned
Adjudicator was correct in his assessment, then he had no reason to
consider the evidence about loss.
[21] Because the tribunal has not considered Ms Brandies’ evidence about loss,
the proceeding should be referred back to the tribunal for hearing. Both
parties have filed fresh material in the application for appeal. This material
should be before the adjudicator who decides the question of loss. I
therefore direct that each party files and serves in Southport MCDT
1342/12 any further material on which they wish to rely by 4:00pm on 5
August 2013. The dispute should be listed for hearing on a date to be
advised.
[22] The learned Adjudicator cautioned SAS about its practice.6 The evidence
suggests that SAS has breached the requirements of the Residential
Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) in a number of
respects. These matters warrant further investigation by the Chief
Executive Officer.
6 Transcript page 29, lines 5-17.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCATA/2013/169