Davis v Chief Executive Officer, Department of Community Safety - Queensland Fire and Rescue Service [2013] QIRC 136

CITATION: Andrew Davis AND Chief Executive Officer, Department of Community Safety - Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (PID/2013/1 and 2) - Decision <http://www.qirc.qld.gov.au> QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 - s. 48 - application for an injunction against a reprisal Andrew Davis AND Chief Executive Officer, Department of Community Safety - Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (PID/2013/1 and 2) INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER KNIGHT 5 September 2013 DECISION Overview [1] Under s. 48 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (PID Act) an employee may apply for an injunction - interim or permanent about a reprisal (defined by s. 40) to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission if the reprisal has caused or may cause detriment to the employee within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (IR Act); and involves or may involve a breach of the IR Act or an industrial instrument under that Act. [2] The Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (the Commission) may grant such an injunction if it is satisfied that a person has engaged, is engaging or is proposing to engage, in conduct amounting to a reprisal. [3] The form of the order is left to the Commission. The Commission's power to grant mandatory relief is further developed by s. 52 of the PID Act which provides that the Commission "may grant an injunction, under this part, requiring the person to take stated action to remedy any detriment caused by the conduct". [4] The Applicant, Mr Andrew Davis is a full-time Area Training and Support Officer for Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS) and reports into the Rockhampton Rural Operations Area Office. [5] The Applicant, who sought and was granted the status of public interest disclosure by the Ethical Standards Unit of the Department of Community Safety, has filed two applications to prevent alleged reprisal action by the Respondent toward the Applicant within the meaning (s. 339ZB(2)) of the IR Act and Chapter 4, Part 1 and Part 2 of the PID Act. [6] The first application seeks an urgent interim injunction pending final decision to prevent any further detriment to the Applicant as set out in s. 339ZB(2)(a) of the IR Act, including the termination of his employment contract by the Respondent and to not cause, or attempt to cause any further form of detriment to the Applicant pending final decision by the Commission. [7] The second application (and the more relevant given both applications were set down on the same day for hearing rendering the initial application for an interim injunction largely academic) seeks a permanent injunction to prevent the already stated reprisal above relating to the termination of the Applicant's employment contract, but also requiring the Respondent to: • return the Applicant to his normal duties in his normal place of work; and • pay damages to the Applicant, the amount of which would normally have been paid had the Applicant not been withdrawn from on-call duties, suspended, and missed regular over-time earnings. Background [8] On 3 May 2012 the Applicant lodged an incident report alleging harassment and bullying by a direct manager, Inspector Brian Smith (Inspector Smith) in the Rockhampton Rural Operations Area Office. Over a period of six months the QFRS took steps to investigate the complaints made by the Applicant. [9] At different times during the investigation period and in response to the Applicant's complaints relating to bullying and intimidation, the QFRS requested the Applicant undertake work away from his direct manager in a variety of work arrangements including a re-allocated project role, working from home and also continuing work in his substantive role when Inspector Smith was on leave. [10] In late May and early June 2012 the Applicant sought and was granted public interest disclosure status under s. 36 of the PID Act by the Ethical Standards Unit of the Department of Community Safety. In the months of -- 1 of 9 -- 2 June, July and August 2012 the Applicant continued to work in a number of locations with the objective of minimising contact between himself and Inspector Smith whilst the investigation was undertaken. [11] In early September 2012, the Applicant was formally suspended from duty on full pay following his alleged refusal to work from home at a time which the QFRS submits it was attempting to mitigate any further risk of injury to the Applicant and ensure the Applicant was not subject to any potential reprisal arising out of his original complaint. [12] At the time of the Applicant's suspension he was advised the QFRS would take time to consider its options in relation to any further disciplinary actions that might be taken by the Agency in response to the Applicant's failure to follow a lawful direction to work from home whilst the investigation was being finalised. [13] On or around 18 October 2012 the investigation report dealing with the Applicant's initial complaints of bullying and intimidation by Inspector Smith was provided to the QFRS. The findings of the investigation concluded the evidence collected during the course of the investigation, on the balance of probabilities, was not capable of substantiating the Applicant's allegations. [14] In a letter from the QFRS to the Applicant dated 8 November 2012 the findings of the report were confirmed and the Applicant was provided with an opportunity to respond to new concerns arising out of the investigation suggesting the Applicant's original complaints about Inspector Smith may have been frivolous and vexatious. [15] On 16 November 2012, Together Queensland requested a full copy of the investigation report on behalf of the Applicant to assist with his response. This request was initially rejected by the QFRS due to the confidential and sensitive nature of the report; however the Applicant was able to obtain a copy of the final report following a Right to Information request. [16] On 7 January 2013 the Applicant contacted the Ethical Standards Unit raising concerns about what he alleged to be reprisal action being taken against him by the QFRS in direct response to his public interest disclosure. [17] On 6 February 2013 (Exhibit 1), the Applicant received a letter from Commissioner Johnson confirming the QFRS did not intend to take any further action, disciplinary or otherwise in relation to the Agency's concerns the Applicant's original complaint about Inspector Smith may well have been of a vexatious and frivolous nature, expressing a view that the Applicant may be entitled to immunity in relation to the initial complaint under the current construction of the PID Act. [18] Separate to these particular allegations which are no longer being pursued, however, the QFRS has confirmed it is considering what steps it will take in response to an incident where the Applicant allegedly refusal to comply with a lawful direction to work from home whilst the investigation into his complaints around bullying and intimidation were being investigated. [19] Whilst the initial application and submissions of the Applicant detailing the reprisal action, which is alleged to have been taken by the Respondent was somewhat confusing at times during the proceedings, it is clear the remaining allegation dealing with the Applicant's alleged refusal to follow an instruction to work from home and the subsequent suspension and disciplinary action that may be taken by the Respondent in the future forms the foundations for the reprisal action the Applicant alleges has been taken by the QFRS in response to his intial public interest disclosure. [20] The Applicant contends the actions set out in paragraph [18] (above) are being taken directly because he made the original complaint in relation to Inspector Smith. [21] Conversely, the Respondent contends that actions in paragraph [18] (above) are an entirely separate disciplinary process that arose due to a failure on the Applicant's part to repeatedly follow a lawful instruction from a QFRS officer. Relevant Legislation [22] The legislative provisions dealing with this application are found in Chapter 4 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010. Part 1 of Chapter 4 provides as follows: "36 Immunity from liability A person who makes a public interest disclosure is not subject to any civil or criminal liability or any liability arising by way of administrative process, including disciplinary action, for making the disclosure. … -- 2 of 9 -- 3 40 Reprisal and grounds for reprisal (1) A person must not cause, or attempt or conspire to cause, detriment to another person because, or in the belief that - (a) the other person or someone else has made, or intends to make, a public interest disclosure; or (b) the other person or someone else is, has been, or intends to be, involved in a proceeding under the Act against any person. (2) An attempt to cause detriment includes an attempt to induce a person to cause detriment. (3) A contravention of subsection (1) is a reprisal or the taking of a reprisal. (4) A ground mentioned in subsection (1) as the ground for a reprisal is the unlawful ground for the reprisal. (5) For the contravention mentioned in subsection (3) to happen, it is sufficient if the unlawful ground is a substantial ground for the act or omission that is the reprisal, even if there is another ground for the act or omission. … 45 Reasonable management action not prevented (1) Nothing in this part is intended to prevent a manager from taking reasonable management action in relation to an employee who has made a public interest disclosure. (2) However, a manager may take reasonable management action in relation to an employee who has made a public interest disclosure only if the manager's reasons for taking the action do not include the fact that the person has made the public interest disclosure. (3) In this section - manager, of an employee, means a person to whom the employee reports or a person who directly or indirectly supervises the employee in the performance of the employee's functions as an employee. reasonable management action, taken by a manager in relation to an employee, includes any of the following taken by the manager - (a) a reasonable appraisal of the employee's work performance; (b) a reasonable requirement that the employee undertake counselling; (c) a reasonable suspension of the employee from the employment workplace; (d) a reasonable disciplinary action; (e) a reasonable action to transfer or deploy the employee; (f) a reasonable action to end the employee's employment by way of redundancy or retrenchment; (g) a reasonable action in relation to an action mentioned in paragraph (a) to (f); (h) a reasonable action in relation to the employee's failure to obtain a promotion, reclassification, transfer or benefit, or to retain a benefit, in relation to the employee's employment.". [23] Part 3, Chapter 4 of the same Act provides as follows: "48 Right to apply to industrial commission (1) An application for an injunction about a reprisal may be made to the industrial commission if the reprisal - (a) has caused or may cause detriment to an employee within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 1999; and (b) involves or may involve a breach of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 or an industrial instrument under that Act. … (3) The Industrial Relations Act 1999, section 277 applies to the application, but this part prevails if it is inconsistent with that section. … 51 Grounds for injunction The industrial commission or Supreme Court may grant an injunction under this part, in terms it considers appropriate, if it is satisfied that a person has engaged, is engaging or is proposing to engage, in conduct amounting to - (a) a reprisal; or (b) attempting a reprisal; or (c) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring a reprisal; or (d) inducing or attempting to induce, whether by threats, promises or otherwise, a reprisal; or (e) being in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, a reprisal.". -- 3 of 9 -- 4 [24] In addition, the relevant legislative provisions in the Industrial Relations Act 1999 are found in Chapter 8, Part 2. Section 277 relevantly provides as follows: "277 Power to grant injunctions (1) The commission may, on application, grant the injunctive order it considers appropriate - (a) to compel compliance with an industrial instrument, a permit or this Act; or (b) to restrain a contravention, or continuance of a contravention, of an industrial instrument, a permit or this Act.". Submissions and Evidence Applicant [25] Section 48 of the PID Act provides for an employee to make an application for an injunction - interim or permanent about a reprisal (defined by s. 40) to the Commission if the reprisal has caused or may cause detriment to the employee within the meaning of the IR Act; and involves or may involve a breach of the IR Act or an industrial instrument under that Act. [26] In addressing the two limbs of s. 48 of the PID Act, both of which must be satisfied to establish jurisdiction for a claim for injunctive relief, the Applicant has submitted the Respondent "have and may cause detriment to Davis (the Applicant) within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 and pursuant to s. 339ZB(2)(a) - (e)", which he submits contains the only definition of detriment within the IR Act. [27] Section 339ZB(2)(a) - (e) is located in Chapter 8A of the IR Act which deals with the operation of the Queensland Workplace Rights Office and Ombudsman and sets out certain activities which "subjecting a person to detriment" might include such as: "(a) terminating the contract under which the person performs work; (b) injuring the person in relation to the terms and conditions on which the person performs work; (c) altering the position to his or her detriment; (d) refusing to employ or engage the person to perform work; (e) discriminating against the person in the terms or conditions on which the person is to be employed or engaged to perform work.". [28] The Applicant has submitted the reprisal action taken by the QFRS, which has and may cause detriment in accordance with the above definition of detriment, includes: • threatening to terminate his employment contract as a result of a public interest disclosure; • directing the Applicant to engage in unlawful acts of working from home without adequate Workplace Health and Safety provisions or compensation; • withdrawing the Applicant from an operational pre-season workshop and participation on the on-call roster; • directing the Applicant not to perform work at his designated location; • suspending the Applicant from duty for attending the work at the designated location and time; • failure to follow the principle of natural justice in the execution of the Applicant's suspension process; and • failure to comply with s. 192(2)(a) of the Public Service Act 2008 and the Public Service Commission guidelines in relation to the Applicant's suspension and subsequent handling of the matter. [29] In addressing the second limb of s. 48 of the PID Act in so far as "a breach of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 or an industrial instrument under that Act", the Applicant has submitted the reprisal action by the QFRS involves or may involve a breach the IR Act and a number of other Acts including: • Section 73(2)(f)(i) Industrial Relations Act 1999 - unfair dismissal for the making, or a belief that anyone had made or may make a public interest disclosure under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010; • Section 30(1)(e) Fire and Service Act 1990 - disciplinary action; • Section 33(1) Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 - suspension; • Section 20(2) Work Health and Safety Act 2011 - duty of care; • Sections 34, 35, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 48 of the Work Health and Safety Regulation 2011; • Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Interim Award - State 2003; and • Queensland Public Service Award - State 2012. Respondent -- 4 of 9 -- 5 [30] The Respondent has submitted the Applicant has failed to satisfy the two limbs of s. 48 under the PID Act and is therefore excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission and its capacity to provide any injunctive relief. [31] The Respondent has further submitted there is no action being undertaken by the QFRS which constitutes a reprisal under the PID Act, contending the substantive matter for which the Applicant sought public interest disclosure status has now been completed and no action is being taken or is being contemplated by the QFRS in relation to that matter. [32] Commissioner Johnson, the most senior officer within the QFRS, was called as a witness by the Applicant to give evidence. Commissioner Johnson gave evidence a show cause letter relating to concerns around frivolous and vexatious claims made by the Applicant that arose out of recommendations contained in the final investigation report into the Applicant's original bullying claims (Annexure NG11 to Exhibit 3) was sent to the Applicant, but subsequently withdrawn following the Commissioner Johnson's decision it was not the best course of action. [33] In a letter to the Applicant on 6 February 2013 (Exhibit 3) Commissioner Johnson confirmed the initial investigation report found there was no substance to the allegations made by the Applicant about Inspector Smith and that his complaint had been found to be frivolous and groundless. The letter also confirmed the QFRS did not intend to progress his concerns around the frivolous nature of the complaints due to Commissioner Johnson's view the Applicant may be entitled to immunity under the PID Act. [34] The Respondent also submitted that any action currently being taken by the Respondent in response to the Applicant's conduct is legitimate disciplinary action in accordance with s. 45(3)(d) of the PID Act as the disciplinary action is solely associated with the Applicant's breach of s. 30(1)(e) of the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 - that is, "wilful failure to comply with a lawful direction of the chief executive or another person having authority over the officer". [35] In his evidence, Commissioner Johnson stated the basis for the Applicant's suspension was his alleged wilful disobedience and refusal to comply with an order given to him by an officer of the QFRS. [36] Commissioner Johnson gave evidence the Applicant had been requested to work from home in early September 2012, with the objective of protecting him from any further alleged intimidation, bullying or harassment whilst his complaints were being investigated. The Commissioner contended the subsequent action taken by the QFRS in response to the Applicant's refusal to follow the request to work from home was not directly linked to the Applicant's original complaint but instead, was an entirely separate disciplinary process. [37] Under cross-examination, when asked as to whether the issuing of show cause letters to the Applicant for refusing to follow a lawful direction to work from home was influenced in any way by the Applicant's public interest disclosure, Commissioner Johnson said: "No, it was a singular matter, dealt with in a process of a disciplinary matter. So no other matter came - was an influence or issue. What I'm concerned about obviously when allegations were made of people that disobey an order that's - that's a serious matter within the service.". (T1, p38, L20-30). [38] Assistant Commissioner Neil Gallant gave evidence that it was he who gave the original direction to the Applicant's acting supervisor (Acting Inspector Andrew Allan) that the Applicant was to resume working from home on the return of Inspector Smith from leave whilst the investigation into the Applicant's complaints continued. [39] Assistant Commissioner Gallant indicated he had made a decision at the time that the best way to remove the Applicant's exposure to any further alleged bullying and harassment by Inspector Smith, against who the original complaint was lodged by the Applicant, was to request the Applicant to work from home and to change where possible the working and reporting arrangements of the Applicant to limit his exposure to Inspector Smith during the investigation process. [40] Assistant Commissioner Gallant gave evidence it was not practical to remove Inspector Smith from the Rockhampton premises while the investigation was being completed. [41] The Assistant Commissioner advised the rationale underpinning his eventual decision to ask the Applicant to work from home once his project work had come to an end and Inspector Smith was returning from leave, was based around Inspector Smith's role as the Regional Manager for the central region area, his extensive knowledge of rural fire service operations and his integral involvement in any future operations response in the region. -- 5 of 9 -- 6 [42] Instead, the Applicant was provided with full pay and allowances while working from home and was offered payment for any consumables he would use while working from home. [43] Assistant Commissioner Gallant gave evidence the Applicant contacted him on 3 September 2012 at 3.18p.m. (Annexure NG5 of Exhibit 3) declining the request to work from home. The Assistant Commissioner wrote again to the Applicant explaining the QFRS had a duty of care to respond to the Applicant's concerns about bullying, harassment and intimidation (Annexure NG1 of Exhibit 3) and that he was required to work from home until the investigation into his initial allegations and more recent incident report were finalised. [44] On 4 September 2012, the Applicant wrote to Acting Inspector Andrew Allan (and also provided Assistant Commissioner Gallant with a copy) stating again that he did not intend to work from home. A further email was forwarded to the Applicant on 4 September 2012 again explaining the reasons for the instruction to work from home (NG8 of Exhibit 3) but this time advising the Applicant that if he deliberately disobeyed the instruction he may be subject to further action. [45] Assistant Commissioner Gallant gave evidence his instruction to the Applicant to work from home was motivated solely by his concerns that the circumstances outlined in the original complaint to the QFRS by the Applicant may have been true in whole or in part, and that he wanted to protect Mr Davis from any further risk of bullying, harassment or possible recrimination by Inspector Smith. [46] Assistant Commissioner Gallant gave further evidence the Applicant disobeyed his instruction to work from home and was found working at his desk in the Rockhampton office on 6 September 2012. The Applicant's refusal to follow this instruction was reported to Commissioner Johnson and later that day a letter suspending the Applicant from duty with immediate effect was emailed to the Applicant (NG9 & NG10 of Exhibit 3). [47] Assistant Commissioner Gallant contends he did not direct the Applicant to work from home by way of any form of detriment or punishment because he had made a complaint against Inspector Smith and, in fact, was intending to protect him in relation to the matters of which he complained. [48] Under cross-examination, Assistant Commissioner Gallant gave evidence he could not recall being advised that the Applicant had made a public interest disclosure in relation to his initial complaints about Inspector Smith, contending he only became aware of the public interest disclosure issue in his discussions with Mr Glenn Carthew (Manager, Employee Relations Unit, Department of Community Safety) in the lead up to the injunctive proceedings. However this is somewhat at odds with a statement in paragraph 17 of his affidavit (Exhibit 3) where he confirms he was advised the Applicant had applied to the Department of Community Safety and Ethical Standards Unit for public interest disclosure in June 2012. [49] The Respondent has submitted the first limb of s. 48 of the PID Act has not been satisfied by the Applicant in that no detriment within the meaning of the IR Act has or will be caused to the Applicant as a result of his public interest disclosure and, that further, aside from s. 339ZB which provides some definitional guidelines as to what such a detriment might be, there is no other reference to detriment in any other section of the IR Act and therefore a detriment under the IR Act can only apply to a person who under s. 339ZB(1) has made a complaint to or given information to the Queensland Workplace Rights Office. [50] Chapter 8A, Part 1 of the IR Act is headed "Queensland Workplace Rights Office" (QWRO). Section 339ZB(1) makes it an offence against the IR Act where a person, who has made a complaint to the QWRO regarding an industrial matter or work related matter, is then subjected to or threatened to be subject to a detriment which includes (under sub-section (2) of s. 339ZB) a number of actions that would adversely affect a person in their work or workplace. [51] The Respondent contends the QWRO was a government agency which was dismantled in May 2012 and at no time prior to the dismantling of the QWRO in May 2012 did the QFRS receive notification from the QWRO that a complaint had been received from the Applicant. Further, at no time was the Respondent advised that the Queensland Workplace Rights Ombudsman had been provided with a complaint or information about an industrial matter or work-related matter from the Applicant prior to or during the injunctive proceedings. [52] The Respondent has submitted that in addition to satisfying the first limb of s. 48 (in which it contends the Applicant has failed), the second limb must be established - that is, a reprisal "involves or may involve a breach of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 or an industrial instrument under that Act". [53] The Applicant contends that s. 73(2)(f) of the IR Act will be breached should the QFRS continue with its disciplinary proceedings in relation to the current allegation relating to a failure to comply with a lawful instruction which may result in the termination of the Applicant's employment. The Applicant has also submitted a number of other Acts, regulations and industrial instruments (see [26] above) will be breached as a -- 6 of 9 -- 7 result of the current disciplinary proceedings which are on foot and which he says is in direct response to his original complaint about Inspector Smith. [54] The Respondent has relied on the Australian Oxford Dictionary and its definition of "breach" - the "breaking or non-observation of a law", in its submissions, contending s. 73 of the IR Act is not a breach provision and does not contravene the legislation. Instead, the Respondent asserts s. 73 gives rise to an entitlement that allows redress in the case where evidence demonstrates that a dismissal is unfair or that a dismissal was for an invalid reason. [55] The Respondent has further submitted the alleged breaches of legislative and regulatory provisions nominated by the Applicant in his closing submissions do not relate and are in no way connected to s. 48(1)(b) of the PID Act and have no relevance to the proceedings in so far as an alleged "breach" of the IR Act. [56] Further, that the Applicant has incorrectly listed the Queensland Public Sector Service Award - State 2012 as an industrial instrument that applies to the Applicant given the Applicant's conditions of employment are set out in Schedule 1 of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Award - State 2012. Considerations and Findings [57] In Krestal Coal Pty Ltd & Anor v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union & Ors.1, Chesterman J said at paragraph 15: "As I understand things a court should not grant an injunction willy-nilly but only where there is a demonstrated need for it. An injunction must be of some practical utility.". [58] However, before arriving at a point where the Commission could even consider granting an injunction it must first determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear the application as prescribed by s. 48 of the PID Act. [59] There is no argument between the parties that both limbs of s. 48 must be satisfied in order for the Applicant to access the jurisdiction of the Commission in so far as it relates to the granting of an injunction in accordance with Part 3, Chapter 4 of the PID Act. [60] The Applicant, who was self-represented and generally conducted himself in a professional manner throughout the proceedings submitted he has suffered a detriment within the meaning of s. 339ZB(1) of the IR Act, which he says should satisfy the jurisdictional objections raised by the Respondent as they relate to the first limb - s. 48(1)(a). [61] The Respondent contends that not only has no reprisal action been undertaken by the QFRS against the applicant as a result of his original complaint about Inspector Smith, but that for s. 339ZB to be relevant to the proceedings, the Applicant must be able to demonstrate a complaint was made to the QWRO, further submitting the QWRO has been closed since 2012 and that no evidence was provided by the Applicant demonstrating how he meets the criteria in relation to s. 339ZB. [62] By way of background, the QWRO and the Queensland Workplace Rights Ombudsman (the Ombudsman) were established on 1 July 2007 under the IR Act. [63] The Ombudsman exercised functions and powers as provided for in Chapter 8A, Part 2 of the IR Act, sections. 339D to 339G; and Chapter 8, Part 2 of the IR Act, sections 259A to 259AA until the service ceased on 29 June 2012. [64] Whilst the IR Act provisions still exist, no one is currently appointed as the Ombudsman and the office was formally closed in mid 2012 and no further workplace complaints have been accepted by the office since this time. [65] Given this, it is clear that the gateway in so far as the Applicant's reliance on s. 339ZB of the IR Act and how the Applicant suggests the definitions contained in this section as they relate to the concept of detriment under the PID Act has well and truly shut. [66] Both parties in their submissions and evidence focussed on the definition of the word detriment in s. 48(1) of the PID Act. That is: "(1) An application for an injunction about a reprisal may be made to the industrial commission if the reprisal - 1 Krestal Coal Pty Ltd & Anor v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union & Ors. (2000) QSC 150 -- 7 of 9 -- 8 (a) has caused or may cause detriment to an employee within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 1999;" (my emphasis). [67] Even if we consider an alternative approach to the reading of this section which instead moves the emphasis to the word "employee" within the meaning of the IR Act rather than "detriment", and disregard the Applicant's submissions in relation to s. 339ZB, the difficulty I have is the Applicant has been unable to provide any compelling evidence that demonstrates the current disciplinary action he is facing for failing to follow a lawful instruction is in fact reprisal action being taken because of his public interest disclosure. At one point in the hearing the Applicant did allude to some financial detriment however no evidence of such detriment was submitted by the Applicant during the proceedings. [68] In so far as reprisal is concerned, the PID Act confirms a person must not cause, or attempt or conspire to cause detriment to another person because, or in the belief that the other person or someone else has made, or intends to make, a public interest disclosure. [69] Whilst I acknowledge there was some inconsistency between Assistant Commissioner Gallant's statement at paragraph 17 of his affidavit and his response in cross-examination in relation to his knowledge of the timing of the Applicant's original application for public interest disclosure status, it was clear from his demeanour and responses on the day of the hearing that he had limited knowledge of the public interest disclosure processes and was clearly more focussed on working his way through the investigative process with the objective of minimising any further risk or exposure for the Applicant and the QFRS. [70] I accept the submissions of the Respondent that the immunity afforded to a discloser in so far as a particular complaint is concerned is not intended to be so broad that it prevents an employer from taking legitimate and reasonable management action which can extend to a reasonable suspension, disciplinary action, a transfer or deployment - provided the action has not been taken because a person has made a public interest disclosure (my emphasis). [71] I accept the evidence of both Commissioner Johnson and Assistant Commissioner Gallant in that the current considerations around disciplinary action (if any) in relation to the Applicant's wilful refusal to follow an instruction to work from home have not arisen because of the Applicant's prior public interest disclosure and complaint in relation to Inspector Smith, but instead, directly due to his insubordination in a paramilitary command structure and refusal to follow a lawful direction. [72] The second limb of the s. 48, (provided the first limb is satisfied) enables an injunction to be sought from the Commission if the reprisal involves or may involve a breach of the IR Act or an industrial instrument under that Act. In his written submissions the Applicant has detailed s. 73(2)(f)(i) of the IR Act (for an invalid reason) - unfair dismissal for the making, or a belief that anyone had made or may make a public interest disclosure under the PID Act. [73] I do not regard "breach of the Industrial Relations Act 1999" as relating to a termination of employment because a termination is not a breach of conditions. An employee unfairly dismissed because of conduct in breach of the PID Act has remedies including reinstatement, re-employment and compensation as provided for in the IR Act in an injunction brought under the provisions of that Act but not to injunctive relief. [74] Notwithstanding a lack of any evidence in support of such claims, further references by the Applicant in his written submissions to breaches of other Acts aside from the IR Act could not be considered to be relevant to s. 48(2)(b) in so far as they relate to or could be described as a "breach" of the IR Act. [75] Likewise, the Applicant was unable to provide any evidence demonstrating a breach of a relevant industrial instrument in so far as it directly related to his employment. [76] Having been unable to address not one but both limbs of s. 48, in my view the Applicant is unable to succeed in his application for an injunction, interim or permanent. [77] The application for an injunction (PID/2013/1 and 2) is dismissed. [78] I Order accordingly. M.L. KNIGHT, Industrial Commissioner -- 8 of 9 -- 9 Hearing Details: 2013 14 February 2013 5 March (Applicant's written submissions) 2013 12 March (Respondent's written submissions) 2013 19 March (written submissions in reply) Released: 5 September 2013 Appearances: Mr A. Davis, the Applicant on his own behalf. Mr A. Herbert of Counsel, directly instructed for the Department of Community Safety - Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. -- 9 of 9 --