Clark v Q-COMP [2012] QIRC 34

CITATION: Isla Clark AND Q-COMP (WC/2011/280) - Decision <http://www.qirc.qld.gov.au> QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 - s. 550 - appeal to commission Isla Clark AND Q-COMP (WC/2011/280) COMMISSIONER THOMPSON 2 May 2012 DECISION Introduction [1] On 26 July 2011 Isla Clark (Appellant) filed with the Industrial Registrar a Notice of Appeal pursuant to s. 550 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (the Act) against a decision of the Q-COMP Review Unit (Q-COMP) released on 6 July 2011. [2] The original Workers' Compensation claim had emanated as a result of the death on 20 July 2010 of Christopher Catley (the Worker), the partner of the Appellant, and Q-COMP had set aside the original decision of the Insurer (WorkCover) pursuant to ss. 200 and 201 of the Act in relation to the Appellant and to the Appellant's son. In doing so, the determination was that, in accordance with s. 200(2)(a) an amount of $497,285 was identified as compensation to be dispersed to the Appellant and the Appellant's son. [3] The matter subject to appeal was, in effect, the quantum determined by Q-COMP and whether another amount should be substituted in its place. Jurisdictional Documents [4] The jurisdictional documents [Exhibit 1] tendered by Q-COMP were as follows:  WorkCover Queensland Application for Compensation - dated 23 July 2010;  Correspondence - WorkCover Queensland to the Appellant - dated 20 December 2010;  Correspondence - WorkCover Queensland to Hall Payne Lawyers (on behalf of the Appellant) - dated 9 March 2011;  Q-COMP Application for claim review - dated 28 April 2011;  Q-COMP Reasons for Decision - dated 6 July 2011; and  Notice of Appeal - filed 26 July 2011. Relevant Legislation [5] The legislation relevant to this Appeal is ss. 194, 200(1) and (2)(a) and 205 of the Act: "194 Application and object of pt 11 (1) This part applies if a worker dies because of an injury. (2) However, this part does not apply if - (a) a worker dies because of a latent onset injury that is a terminal condition; and (b) the worker had received a payment of lump sum compensation or damages for the latent onset injury under this Act, another Act or a law of another State or the Commonwealth. (3) The object of this part is to provide for payment by an insurer of - (a) particular expenses arising from the worker's injury and death; and (b) compensation to persons having an entitlement to compensation under this part… 200 Total dependency (1) This section applies if at least 1 of the worker's dependants was, at the time of the worker's death, totally dependent on the worker's earnings. (2) The amount of compensation payable for the worker's dependants is - (a) if the worker has left dependent members of the worker's family, for the members - $374625… -- 1 of 10 -- 2 205 Variation of payments for injuries (1) If QOTE varies, each payment or amount under part 3, division 5 or part 6, 10 or 11 that is not expressed as a percentage of QOTE must be varied proportionately. (2) An amount varied under subsection (1) is to be rounded up to the nearest $5. (3) The Authority must notify a variation under this section by gazette notice.". Nature of the Appeal [6] The Commission is required to determine whether the rate of compensation was that of the amount identified in the Q-COMP decision, or of a subsequent amount that became effective from 1 July 2011, of which the quantum was $511,460.00. Evidence [7] The parties to the Appeal, by way of agreement, had decided that there would be no evidence adduced in the course of the hearing and that they would simply rely upon submissions. Appellant [8] In written submissions it was stated that at the time of the Worker's death, the Appellant was partially dependant upon his income and that shortly after his passing she gave birth to their child. On 23 July 2010 the Appellant lodged an Application for Worker's Compensation which was accepted on 9 March 2011 whereby various levels of dependency were determined. The Appellant, on 28 April 2011 lodged an application with Q-COMP for the decision of WorkCover to be reviewed and on 6 July 2011 Q-COMP released a decision that set aside the original position determined by WorkCover, substituting the following amounts:  "Section 200(2)(a): $497,285.00; and  Section 200(2)(c): A weekly amount equal to 10% of QOTE while the child is under the age of 16 or a student.". [9] The issue for consideration in the Appeal was that on 24 June 2011 the Queensland Government Gazette Notice No. 65 (Gazette Notice No. 65) was issued, adjusting the applicable amounts of compensation under various sections of the Act (including s. 200(2)(a)). The terms of the Gazette Notice No. 65 had the effect of increasing the rate of compensation applying under s. 200(2)(a) to the amount of $511,460.00 (from 1 July 2011) with the contention of the Appellant being that when making their decision, Q-COMP should have applied the revised rate. [10] At paragraph 11 of the written submission, it was stated that: "(a) That as the decision of the Respondent was made after 1 July 2011 the proper rate of compensation is that as set out in Gazette Number 65 for injuries occurring on or after 1 January 2008; (b) That the quantum of an assessment ought be made having regard to the gazetted rates as at the date of the decision; and (c) That the Appellant is entitled to the sum of $14,175.00 representing the increase from $497,285.00 to $511,460.00.". [11] The relevant statutory provisions of the Act were identified as:  s. 196;  s. 200(1) and (2)(a);  s. 205; and  s. 194(3). [12] The submission argued that there was no specific provision within Chapter 3, Part 11 of the Act that provides for compensation upon a Workers' death, and more particularly in s. 200 of the Act as to the appropriate date for assessment of the quantum of compensation payable. [13] In terms of case law, the Appellant relied on the decision of McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ in Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority1 where it was stated: 1 Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] 194 CLR 355 -- 2 of 10 -- 3 "The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. The meaning of the provision must be determined 'by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole'. In Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos, Dixon CJ pointed out that 'the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed'. Thus, the process of construction must always begin by examining the context of the provision that is being construed.". [14] On the general principle of interpretation, the submission was put that in the absence of any authority, a court must seek to ascertain the statutory purpose and legislative intention from the words of the relevant statute themselves. If the intention of parliament is clear, then a court will be obliged to relay that intention. In the circumstances surrounding this matter, it was clear by reference to the statute itself that there was no evidence of any express intention by Legislature to support that the quantum should be assessed at the date of death. [15] The Commission was taken to s. 180(3) of the Act which provides for the calculation of lump sum compensation for permanent impairment under the table in the Act with the provision stating that: "The amount of lump sum compensation is to be calculated as at the day the insurer makes an offer of lump sum compensation to the worker under section 187.". It was the case that if the table of injuries were to be revised after the date upon which a worker was injured but before the date of offer is made, then pursuant to s. 180 of the Act, the lump sum offer would have to be made in accordance with the newly revised table. [16] The interpretation of s. 200 of the Act, in these circumstances, is that the amount applicable is that of the amount at the date of the decision which is the amount contained within the Gazette Notice No. 65. This interpretation is not inconsistent with other provisions of the Act relating to weekly compensation payments and totally consistent with the philosophy of s. 180 of the Act as it relates to lump sum compensation. [17] Further reference was made to the judgement in Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority2, which was said to support the Appellant's submissions by relying on the following extract: "Furthermore, a court construing a statutory provision must strive to give meaning to every word of the provision. In The Commonwealth v Baume Griffith CJ cited R v Berchet to support the proposition that it was 'a known rule in the interpretation of Statutes that such a sense is to be made upon the whole as that no clause, sentence, or word shall prove superfluous, void, or insignificant, if by any other construction they may all be made useful and pertinent'.". [18] Given the amendment contained within Gazette Notice No. 65, it was submitted that to accept the position of Q-COMP, the Commission would fail to: "…strive to provide meaning for every word of the provision so that no clause, sentence or word is made superfluous, void, or insignificant, if by any other construction they may all be made useful and pertinent". [19] It was submitted that the appropriate finding is for the Commission to set aside the Q-COMP decision and substitute the following decision: "That the Applicant and the Applicant child are entitled to the apportionment of compensation in the following amounts:-  Section 200(2)(a): $511,460.00.". Q-COMP [20] In written submissions provided, Q-COMP submitted that the Appeal related to a narrow point, being what was the correct rate of lump sum compensation to be paid to the Appellant and her son arising from the death of the Worker. [21] The jurisdictional documents relevant to the proceedings were identified as:  Application for Compensation lodged 23 July 2010;  WorkCover Reasons for Decision dated 20 December 2010;  Correspondence - WorkCover Queensland to Hall Payne Lawyers (on behalf of the Appellant) dated 9 March 2011; 2 Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] 194 CLR 355 -- 3 of 10 -- 4  Application for Review dated 28 April 2011;  Q-COMP Reasons for Decision dated 6 July 2011; and  Notice of Appeal dated 25 July 2011. [22] A history of the claim for compensation was provided from the time of the Worker's death on 20 July 2010 through until the decision of Q-COMP on 6 July 2011 whereby the Review Officer had determined that the quantum of compensation was to be based upon the amounts payable in the schedule contained in the Queensland Government Gazette Notice No. 59 (Gazette Notice No. 59) that had been issued on 25 June 2010 with the date of operation being 1 July 2010. Q-COMP had applied the appropriate table of benefits that were in force at the time of the Worker's death. [23] Q-COMP accepts as fact the submissions of the Appellant on the issuing of Gazette Notice No. 65 and the operative date of the revised amount, however disagrees with the contention of the Appellant that the rate from 1 July 2011 should have applied for the reason that the Q-COMP decision was released after that date. The Appellant's argument was said to be flawed in both law and logic. [24] The principle flaw in the Appellant's reasoning was the reliance upon the decision of Q-COMP as being the "event" which determines the time for assessment of the lump sum compensation to be paid to the Appellant. It was submitted that the provisions of the Act are quite clear in establishing that it is the date of the death of the Worker that is the determining event, both for determining the issue of the Appellant's entitlement to compensation and also the determination as to the appropriate quantum of compensation. [25] Q-COMP, at paragraph 17 of the submission, set out their contentions: "(a) That as the date of death of the Worker was 20 July 2010, the proper rate of compensation is that as set out in the table of benefits set out in Queensland Government Gazette Notice No. 59 which was issued on 25 June 2010 with effect from 1 July 2010; (b) That the quantum of assessment ought to be made having regard to the gazetted rates as at the date of the Worker's death; (c) That the Appellant was correctly awarded the sum of $497,285.00 pursuant to Queensland Government Gazette Notice No. 59.". [26] The relevant statutory provisions were identified as: "9 Meaning of compensation Compensation is compensation under this Act, that is, amounts for a worker’s injury payable under chapters 3 and 4 by an insurer to a worker, a dependant of a deceased worker or anyone else, and includes compensation paid or payable under a former Act.". "Division 6 Injuries, impairment and terminal condition Subdivision 1 Event resulting in injury 31 Meaning of event (1) An event is anything that results in injury, including a latent onset injury, to a worker. (2) An event includes continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same conditions that results in an injury to a worker. (3) A worker may sustain 1 or multiple injuries as a result of an event whether the injury happens or injuries happen immediately or over a period. (4) If multiple injuries result from an event, they are taken to have happened in 1 event.". "32 Meaning of injury (3) Injury includes the following - … (d) death from injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if the employment is a significant contributing factor to causing the injury". -- 4 of 10 -- 5 "196 To whom payments made for death of worker (1) Compensation for the death of a worker is payable - (a) to the worker’s legal personal representative; or (b) if there is no legal personal representative - (i) so far as the payment is by way of expenses to which a person is entitled - to the person who has incurred the expenses; or (ii) so far as the payment is by way of compensation to the worker’s dependants - to the dependants entitled to compensation.". "197 Total and partial dependants If compensation is payable for the death of a worker who is survived by persons totally dependent on the worker and persons partially dependent on the worker, the compensation may be apportioned between the total dependants and the partial dependants.". "200 Total dependency (1) This section applies if at least 1 of the worker's dependants was, at the time of the worker's death, totally dependent on the worker's earnings.". "201 Partial dependency (1) This section applies if all of the worker’s dependants were, at the time of the worker’s death, partially dependent on the worker’s earnings.". "205 Variation of payments for injuries (1) If QOTE varies, each payment or amount under part 3, division 5 or part 6, 10 or 11 that is not expressed as a percentage of QOTE must be varied proportionately. (2) An amount varied under subsection (1) is to be rounded up to the nearest $5. (3) The Authority must notify a variation under this section by gazette notice.". [27] On the matter of statutory construction, Q-COMP accepted the legal principles highlighted by the Appellant in respect of Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority3 which, in their opinion, said no more than the Act has to be read as a whole when it is being construed and that a purposive approach to interpretation should be adopted. The principles referred to in the cited passage were well accepted and long standing tenets of statutory interpretation with the second principle regarding a purpose interpretation being preferred as further confirmation by s. 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954. [28] The objects of the Act at Chapter 1, Part 2 clearly identify the intention of the parliament in that the compensation to be paid to injured workers or dependents should not be maximised by adopting artificial interpretations of the Act which would seek to twist the wording of the provisions of the Act or to add additional words into the Act. The Act at Chapter 1, Part 2 notes: "(4) It is intended that the scheme should - (a) maintain a balance between - (i) providing fair and appropriate benefits for injured workers or dependants and persons other than workers; and (ii) ensuring reasonable cost levels for employers". [29] The clear statutory intention of the Act, in the opinion of Q-COMP, is to provide fair and appropriate benefits which are to be balanced against ensuring reasonable premium costs for Employers. In the matter of Q-COMP v Hohn4 (Hohn), Hall P noted: "With respect to the Commissioner who dealt with the matter at first instance, it is not a legitimate exercise in construction assisting beneficial legislation to strike its presumed target when it is manifest that the Legislature has embarked upon the exercise of balancing interests.". [30] Q-COMP submitted that the interpretation it had adopted in this particular case satisfies the objects and purposes of the Act as it had provided a fair and appropriate benefit as well as attempting to maintain a balance by ensuring reasonable cost levels for employers. 3 Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] 194 CLR 355 4 Q-COMP v Craig Hohn [2008] 187 QGIG 139 -- 5 of 10 -- 6 [31] It was argued that the Appellant's approach in that the current table of injuries as set out in Gazette Notice No. 65, that came into effect on 1 July 2011, should apply to the assessment of compensation in respect of a death that occurred on 20 July 2010 is clearly wrong and that, in this case, the Commission should apply the compensation that applied at the date of the event. To apply a later Act or subordinate legislation to an earlier event would be an error as the principles of statutory interpretation are that legislation is presumed not to have retrospective operation unless there is a clear intention of the Legislature and there is no such indication in this present case. [32] The starting point in matters of this nature must be the event giving rise to injury which was the workplace accident that occurred on 20 July 2010 and therefore the Gazette Notice No. 59 which was in force at the time would apply. In Gers v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland5, Matthews P considered the counterpart provision of the Workers' Compensation Act 1916 and concluded (at 105): "Dependency is determined at the time of the worker's death. (Brazewell v Emmott and Wallshaw Limited (45 TLR 184)).". [33] In a further matter, Bate v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland6, the Industrial Court also confirmed that the time of death is fixed as the time for determining whether a member of the deceased worker's family is dependent or not. [34] It was the contention of Q-COMP that ss. 200 and 201 of the Act gives a patently clear legislative intention that both the entitlement to compensation and the quantum is to be assessed as at the date of the death of the worker. [35] The issue in question according to the submission had not been previously considered by the Industrial Court, however had been subject of some consideration by the Industrial Magistrates Court in the decision of Riley & Ors v Q-COMP7. Industrial Magistrate Dwyer determined that the decision of Q-COMP be set aside and be substituted with a decision in relation to an assessment on dependency. In reference to that judgement, the submission drew attention to pages 10 and 11 where the Industrial Magistrate had noted: "Thus I find the appellants were partially dependent on the earnings of Mark Riley and the dependence amounts to 95 per cent. The appellants are entitled to the apportion of compensation on the basis of 95 per cent partial dependence pursuant to section 201 of the Act. I note in his reasons for his decision the reviewing officer stated: 'Because the death of the claimant occurred on the 23rd March 2006, and this is the injury which is subject to the fatal claim for dependency by the applicant, the appropriate tables of benefit is one from the 2nd November 2005 to 31st December 2007. Under this table of benefits the maximum amount payable as compensation of worker's death is $426,260.' I see no reason to deviate from this position. As 95 per cent dependency equates to $404,947.". It was not contended that his decision would be binding on the Commission but given that it is a decision of a Court at the equivalent level to the Commission, within the same jurisdiction, it should be given substantial weight by the Commission. [36] On the danger of an approach to interpretation which seeks to either put a gloss on an Act or read words into an Act, the submission cited the matter of Hohn8, Hall P where he noted the following: "Each of the proposition contended for by the Commissioner and the proposition attributed to Q-COMP suffer from the same vice. Additional words are read into the statute. In my view s. 32(5) should be permitted to speak for itself. Figurative language and undue conceptualism are to be deprecated. In many cases, as on the facts in Q-COMP v Education Queensland (2005) 179 QGIG 491 at 491 (first 3 paragraphs), the correct application of the statutory language will be pellucidly clear. Doubtless, there will be difficult cases. Doubtless, it is for that reason that Industrial Commissioners and Industrial Magistrates are entrusted with the appeals.". [37] In respect of argument made by the Appellant that s. 180 of the Act had some parallel with the provisions of ss. 200 and 201 suggesting that it was the intention of the Legislature that the same procedure for assessing quantum was to occur with lump sum compensation payments under ss. 200 and 201 it was put that if that was in fact correct it would have been a simple matter when forming the legislation to have included a similar subparagraph to s. 180(3) in ss. 200 and 201. The Legislature had deliberately chosen to not include a similar 5 Gers v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland [1985] 119 QGIG 104 6 Bate v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland [1984] 117 QGIG 6 7 Riley & Ors v Q-COMP [2009] Unreported, Industrial Magistrates Court, Mackay, Dwyer IM, 12 November 2009 8 Q-COMP v Craig Hohn [2008] 187 QGIG 139 -- 6 of 10 -- 7 provision which can only be seen as confirmation that the Legislature intended for the award of compensation under the provisions of ss. 200 and 201 to be assessed differently. [38] There was a comparison made between interstate jurisdictions such as New South Wales (NSW), South Australia (SA) and Western Australia (WA) as to the approaches undertaken in those various states. In both NSW and SA it was said that it is either the date of death or the date of compensable injury which is used as the relevant date for the assessment of the quantum of compensation. In WA, it is the date of the worker's death that is deemed to be the relevant date for the purposes of the calculation of the quantum of compensation. The purpose of the comparison was to submit that some guidance could be obtained by examining how the issue is approached in the other jurisdictions. [39] Q-COMP, in concluding, submitted that the approach taken by the Review Officer in applying the relevant Gazette notice at the time of the worker's death was the correct approach and as a consequence the Appeal should be dismissed. Appellant in Reply [40] It was accepted by the Appellant that in s. 200(1) of the Act the fact that the time of the Worker's death is the relevant time to consider the issue of dependency. It is clear that the entitlement to compensation as a dependant is determined as at the date of death, with the payment of the relevant compensation being made once a decision has been made to make that payment and then when the payment is received. [41] The Appellant's position is that as from 1 July 2011 the payment to which the Appellant was entitled due to the death of the Worker was the amount set out in Gazette Notice No. 65. [42] In the judgment of Riley & Ors v Q-COMP9 cited by Q-COMP, the Appellant submitted that the applicable rate of compensation was never an issue in that matter and the judgment gave no indication that any submission was ever made on that issue. The mention by Industrial Magistrate Dwyer was for the purposes of adopting the reasons of the Review Officer. [43] The Appellant described as noteworthy the following passage from the judgment at page 2, line 38: "Both counsel agreed the only matter to be determined by this court is whether or not the appellants had a total dependency on the earnings of the deceased, Mark Riley, and if they did not, whether they had a partial dependency, and if so, to what extent.". [44] The Appeal before the Commission was said not to fall into the category of "difficult cases" referred to in Hohn10. In this case, the language is certainly not pellucidly clear but by reference to s. 205 of the Act, clarity is achieved with the Appellant's contention being the correct approach. Conclusion [45] In consideration of the Appeal, the Commission was required to consider a discreet point, that being the quantum of compensation paid to the Appellant following the untimely death of the Worker on 20 July 2010. [46] It is of fact that Q-COMP, in reviewing the decision of the Insurer, determined that in accordance with s. 200(2)(a) of the Act, that the appropriate amount of compensation was that of $497,285.00 and made their decision based upon Gazette Notice No. 59: "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT GAZETTE NOTICE WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION ACT 2003 1. This notification applies to Injuries occurring on or after 1 July 2010 Pursuant to Section 205 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, from 1 July 2010 the amounts shown in Column 2 of the Schedule shall be the amounts for the sections opposite in Column 1 of the Schedule. SCHEDULE Column 1 Column 2 128B(2)(a) $265,485 128B(2)(c) $265,485 9 Riley & Ors v Q-COMP [2009] Unreported, Industrial Magistrates Court, Mackay, Dwyer IM, 12 November 2009 10 Q-COMP v Craig Hohn [2008] 187 QGIG 139 -- 7 of 10 -- 8 140(1)(a) $265,485 140(1)(b) $265,485 192(2)$265,485 193(6)$300,740 200(2)(a) $497,285 200(2)(aa) $13,285 200(2)(b) $26,560 202(2)$29,875 202(3)(a) $29,875". [emphasis added] [47] The argument advanced by the Appellant was, in essence, that as the decision of Q-COMP was made available to the Appellant on 6 July 2011 the appropriate amount of compensation was that contained in Gazette Notice No. 65 being that of $511,460.00 which had become effective from 1 July 2011. Their argument was based upon the premise that the Act lacked a specific provision as to the appropriate date for the assessment of compensation to be paid at the time of death and therefore it was reasonable to expect the quantum, be that in force at the time of the Review decision and not the event that, in this case, caused the death of the Worker: Gazette Notice No. 65: "INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE NOTICE WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION ACT 2003 1. This notification applies to injuries occurring on or after 1 January 2008. Pursuant to Section 205 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, from 1 July 2011 the amounts shown in Column 2 of the Schedule shall be the amounts for the sections opposite in Column 1 of the Schedule. SCHEDULE Column 1 Column 2 128B(2)(a) $273,055 128B(2)(c) $273,055 140(1)(a) $273,055 140(1)(b) $273,055 192(2)$273,055 193(6)$309,315 200(2)(a) $511,460 200(2)(aa) $13,655 200(2)(b) $27,320 202(2)$30,730 202(3)(a) $30,730". [emphasis added] [48] The Appellant had sought to have the Commission undertake an interpretation of the Act relying upon a citation from the High Court of Australia in Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority11 where it was stated that: "The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute.". Their argument went to "the clear" reference to the statute itself that there was no evidence of any express intention by the Legislature to support the position of Q-COMP that the quantum should be assessed as at the date of death. [49] Q-COMP, in responding to the position taken by the Appellant, questioned both the law and logic of the argument based around the reliance on the content of Gazette Notice No. 65 contending that the appropriate rate of compensation was that contained within the table of benefits in Gazette Notice No. 59 in force at the date of death. [50] The Commission was taken to a number of statutory provisions contained within the Act that were said to provide the basis for the decision of Q-COMP in determining the appropriate quantum. In addition, they placed reliance upon a number of authorities, in particular Gers v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland12 where 11 Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] 194 CLR 355 12 Gers v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland [1985] 119 QGIG 104 -- 8 of 10 -- 9 Matthews P had considered the counterpart provision of the Workers' Compensation Act 1916 and concluded that: "Dependency is determined at the time of the worker's death (Brazewell v Emmott and Wallshaw Limited (45 TLR 184)).". In the matter of Bate v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland13, it was said that the Industrial Court had confirmed that the time of death is fixed at the time for determining whether a member of the deceased worker's family is dependent or not. [51] The Commission was cautioned on the approach to an interpretation which would seek to put a "gloss" on the Act or read words into the Act and the matter of Hohn14 was relied upon to support this proposition. [52] In considering the material before the proceedings and having perused the Act in question, it may well be that there is no provision within the Legislation that states in "plain terms" that the date of a worker's death is clearly the date upon which an entitlement for compensation should commence, however on the other hand there is no provision within the Legislation that states in the same "plain terms" that it is the date upon which an Insurer or Review Unit (in this case) determines the acceptance of a claim that is the date upon which an entitlement to compensation commences. [53] It would be folly to suggest that the Legislature, in framing the Act, would not have identified their intentions as to when an entitlement pertaining to the death of a worker should commence. At ss. 200 and 201 of the Act which relate to Dependency and Partial Dependency, they both contain wording that enlivens those provisions of the Act with that wording being "at the time of the worker's death". The wording is not ambiguous and on the plain reading would indicate in somewhat clear terms that dependency commenced, in this case, at the time of the Worker's death which was 20 July 2010 when Gazette Notice No. 59 was in force. [54] In regards to the argument around the Gazette Notices No's. 59 and 65, one must firstly examine the purpose of those Notices to ascertain their relevance in these proceedings. The Gazette Notices are published periodically and identify increases to the table of benefits that are payable to claimants who have suffered compensable injuries or dependants of workers who have lost their life in work-related accidents. On comparison, the amounts in Gazette Notice No. 65 are all of a higher level than those in Gazette Notice No. 59 and would appear to reflect Queensland Ordinary Time Earning (QOTE) increases that occur over time so as to provide recipients with payments that are not diminished due to inflation. [55] The relevance of the Gazette Notices Nos. 59 and 65 in these proceedings solely relate to the quantum's payable under the various provisions of the Act at a specific time and do not have the purpose of determining whether a claimant has an entitlement to a benefit or otherwise. [56] On the matter of interpretation, Q-COMP referenced also the objects of the Act at Chapter 1, Part 2 which were said to provide a balance between benefits for injured workers and dependants as well as ensuring reasonable levels of costs for Employers. Supportive of their case was the matter of Hohn, ibid, where Hall P noted: "With respect to the Commissioner who dealt with the matter at first instance, it is not a legitimate exercise in construction assisting beneficial legislation to strike its presumed target when it is manifest that the Legislature has embarked upon the exercise of balancing interests.". [57] It is not of question that the Act is beneficial Legislation and to provide an interpretation that would have the effect of interfering with that balance, in most circumstances, would likely be avoided. In this case however, Q-COMP's argument is noted but not afforded more than limited weight in the overall considerations. Finding [58] The Commission, having considered the submissions and material (including authorities) before the proceedings finds that ss. 200 and 201 of the Act are provisions that determine a person becomes a Dependent or Partial Dependent at the time of a workers' death and certainly there is no inference within those provisions or elsewhere in the Act that compensation payable as a result of a work-related death should take effect from the release of a decision by an Insurer or Q-COMP. [59] The Worker in this matter met his untimely death on 20 July 2010 and the quantum identified in Gazette Notice No. 59 at Column 2 of the Schedule of $497,285 is the correct amount of compensation payable to the Appellant. [60] The Appeal is dismissed and the decision of Q-COMP is confirmed. 13 Bate v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland [1984] 117 QGIG 6 14 Q-COMP v Craig Hohn [2008] 187 QGIG 139 -- 9 of 10 -- 10 [61] On the matter of costs, neither party raised the issue, the Commission therefore determines that costs be reserved. [62] I order accordingly. J.M. THOMPSON, Commissioner. Hearing Details: 2012 24 February 18 April Released: 2 May 2012 Appearances: Mr P. Goodwin, of Counsel, instructed by Ms S. Govind of Hall Payne Lawyers, for the Appellant. Mr P. O'Neill, of Counsel, instructed by Q-COMP. -- 10 of 10 --