Clayton & Ors v Valuer-General [2012] QLC 30

LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Clayton & Ors v Valuer-General [2012] QLC 30 PARTIES: Dianne Clayton (VLA243-10) Alf and Carmela Mangano and Orazio and Josie Scimone (VLA244-10) John Burton and Lauren Dorothy Goss (VLA245-10) Timothy Grimmond (VLA247-10) Alan Steven and Kathleen Daphne Sanders (VLA248-10) Kerry Ann Hampstead (VLA249-10) and Annette Margaret Julius (VLA250-10) (appellants) v. Valuer-General (respondent) FILE NOS: VLA243-10, VLA244-10, VLA245-10, VLA247-10, VLA248-10, VLA249-10 and VLA250-10 DIVISION: General Division PROCEEDING: Appeals against annual valuations under the Valuation of Land Act 1944 DELIVERED ON: 21 June 2012 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARD AT: Stanthorpe PRESIDENT: CAC MacDonald -- 1 of 14 -- 2 ORDER: VLA243-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 69 on BNT 136, County of Clive, Parish of Tenterfield is determined at One Hundred and Fifteen Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($115,500.00) as at 1 October 2009. VLA244-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 2 on RP 71191 and Lot 2 RP 71192, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield, is determined at One Hundred and Seventeen Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($117,500.00) as at 1 October 2009. VLA245-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 1 on RP 92998, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield, is determined at One Hundred and Six Thousand Dollars ($106,000.00) as at 1 October 2009. VLA247-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 3 on RP 71192, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield, is determined at Ninety-Two Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($92,500) as at 1 October 2009. VLA248-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 1 on RP 54487, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield, is determined at Eighty-Three Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($83,500.00) as at 1 October 2009. VLA249-10 1. The appeal is allowed. -- 2 of 14 -- 3 2. The unimproved value of Lot 6 on RP 71192, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield, is determined at Sixty-One Thousand Dollars ($61,000) as at 1 October 2009. VLA250-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 2 on RP 92998, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield, is determined at One Hundred and Twelve Thousand Dollars ($112,000.00) as at 1 October 2009. CATCHWORDS: Valuation - unimproved value - rural land - whether to be valued as rural residential or primary production land - alleged difference in value. Valuation - unimproved value - sales evidence of rural residential land only - no sales evidence of primary production land. Evidence - no sales evidence by valuer as to value of primary production land. APPEARANCES: Ms D Clayton, an appellant, on behalf of the appellants Mr J Tate of Crown Law for the respondent [1] This decision deals with seven appeals brought by landowners (the appellants) under the provisions of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 against the unimproved valuations of their land as issued by the respondent Valuer-General as at 1 October 2009. [2] The properties the subject of the appeals are all located at Paling Yard Road, Wallangarra - either adjoining and/or across the road from one another. The issues raised were common to all of the appeals and the appeals were heard together, the evidence in one being received, where relevant, in each other appeal. [3] Ms D Clayton, one of the appellants, appeared on behalf of all the appellants and gave evidence. The appellants say they had sought assistance from valuers and real estate agents to present their case in this Court, but none of those who were approached was willing to value their properties while the litigation with the respondent was in progress. [4] Mr J Tate of Crown Law appeared for the respondent and Mr N Hoffman, a registered valuer, gave evidence on behalf of the respondent. [5] The scheme of this decision is that the matters of general principle and common interest will be considered initially before the individual value of each property is determined. -- 3 of 14 -- 4 Grounds of appeal [6] The grounds of appeal were similar in each appeal other than the first ground below which was in Ms Clayton's appeal only. The grounds were as follows -  When compared to similar properties there is a large discrepancy in valuations and a reduction in valuation should be made. The properties are similar because: - they are in the immediate vicinity - adjoin a number of our properties - have similar topography - have access to Paling Yard Road. Please see the original objection for details.  An acknowledgment of a properly made objection was received therefore the matters raised do relate to valuation matters.  Sale prices of similar properties support that a reduction in the valuation should be allowed. [7] The grounds of objection referred to in the notices of appeal were annexed to the notice of appeal. They were extensive and are not set out in full here. In summary - All of the properties in Paling Yard Road with the exception of 88 Paling Yard Road were increased in value for the 2009 valuation by an amount between 338% to 341%. The increase for 88 Paling Yard Road was 226%. The useable land of the Paling Yard Road properties and the Mt Norman Road properties was flat to very slightly undulating. Those properties that back on to Girraween National Park have timbered, granite boulder hills at their rear and side - typical Granite Belt topography. Other than fencing and street-lined avenues of two properties, there are no discernible features that would distinguish one property from another. The only access to the usable land of the Paling Yard Road properties is from Paling Yard Road itself. The appellants do not know - what negative features impacted on 88 Paling Yard Road for it to have such a low new valuation compared with their properties; - why there is such a massive difference in the new valuation of No. 88 and their properties; - why there is such a large difference in the per hectare value of all Paling Yard Road properties. [The valuations per hectare range between $700 and $775 per hectare for 88 Paling Yard Road up to $28,716 per hectare for 70 Paling Yard Road]; - how DERM arrived at these very differing valuations. Similar issues were raised in relation to two other comparison properties - 86 and 278 Mt Norman Road, which also increased in value by 226% - - The appellants also say that 86 Mt Norman Road has town water and postal deliveries whereas the Paling Yard Road properties do not; 86 Mt Norman Road has three bitumen road frontages, one being over 500m to Paling Yard Road; the Mt Norman Road property has exactly the same topography as the Paling Yard Road properties. - The appellants say that the topography of 278 Mt Norman Road is very similar to that of 163, 169, 197 and 216 Paling Yard Road, that is flat land -- 4 of 14 -- 5 with timbered, granite boulder hill. The flat land of 278 Mt Norman Road is very similar to all the Paling Yard Road properties. 278 Mt Norman Road enjoys access to Paling Yard Road, Mt Norman Road and Springborg Lane. 278 Mt Norman Road, together with 163, 169, 197 and 216 Paling Yard Road, have Girraween National Park as a boundary. The properties situated at 163, 169, 197 and 216 Paling Yard Road have boundaries with Girraween National Park. They are considered as buffer zones to the National Park and therefore further restrictions are placed on the use of the land; at least one- third of 163 and 169 Paling Yard Road is unusable for rural pursuits as it consists of heavily timbered, granite boulder hill - typical Granite Belt topography; the properties at 197 and 216 Paling Yard Road have an even larger proportion of unusable land consisting of the same heavily timbered granite country; the usable land of those four properties can only be accessed from Paling Yard Road. The appellants considered that these factors were omitted when the land values were considered. [8] The appellants accept that the 2004 valuations of their individual properties reflected appropriately the differences between each of the properties. They also accept that if the appropriate methodology for determining the unimproved value of their properties is by comparison with appropriate sales, then it would be logical that the unimproved values of their properties would be increased by the same percentage to reflect the increased sale prices of similar local properties. They disagree with the percentage increase that has been applied to their properties, approximately 340%, and say that the sale prices of properties located in the Wallangarra area show an increase of 196%. They contend therefore that the unimproved land values of their properties should be just under double the 2004 unimproved land value. [9] The valuations under appeal were issued under the provisions of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (the Act) which, by s.13, requires the Chief Executive to decide the unimproved value of the land to be valued for the Acts under which Local Authorities are established. [10] There is a lengthy definition of "unimproved value" in s.3 of the Act. For current purposes it is sufficient to consider s.3(1) which provides that - "3 Meaning of unimproved value (1) For the purposes of this Act - unimproved value of land means - (a) in relation to unimproved land—the capital sum which the fee simple of the land might be expected to realise if offered for sale on such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona fide seller would require; and (b) in relation to improved land—the capital sum which the fee simple of the land might be expected to realise if offered for sale on such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona fide seller would require, assuming that, -- 5 of 14 -- 6 at the time as at which the value is required to be ascertained for the purposes of this Act, the improvements did not exist." [11] As the subject properties are improved, the applicable provision is s.3(1)(b), that is the value to be ascertained is the capital sum that the fee simple of the land might be expected to realize if negotiated as a bona fide sale on the assumption that the improvements did not exist as at the relevant date. [12] The evidence was that the subject properties had originally been valued under the mass appraisal process whereby a percentage increase was applied to the previous (2004) valuations of the properties, the percentage being determined by analysis of the sales evidence of similar properties in the same market area. [13] Mr Hoffman said that the market evidence showed that there are two types of purchasers for rural land in the vicinity of the subject properties. Analysis of the relevant sales showed that persons who are interested in "rural lifestyle" properties pay a higher price for such properties as compared with those who are purchasing rural land for primary production purchases. Because the appellants' properties are used for rural lifestyle purposes, Mr Hoffman valued their properties in the rural lifestyle category, that is, in the 2009 valuation the value of the lifestyle properties was increased at a higher rate than those properties that are used for primary production. Accordingly at the mass appraisal stage of the valuation process, he had applied an increase of approximately 340% to the 2004 valuations of the subject properties, for the purposes of determining their value as at 1 October 2009. Consistently with that approach, Mr Hoffman selected as the relevant sales for the purposes of defending the valuation under appeal, properties which had been purchased for rural lifestyle purposes. Mr Hoffman said that rural properties used for primary production were valued concessionally pursuant to s.17 of the Act. An increase of approximately 200% had been applied to those properties. [14] That process provides Mr Hoffman's explanation for the differing increases between the values of the properties identified in the appellants' grounds of objection and the values of the subject properties. Increases of 226% were applied to 88 Paling Yard Road and 86 and 278 Mt Norman Road because they are used for primary production as compared with 340% applied to the subjects. [15] The appellants have challenged this valuation methodology saying that Mr Hoffman had wrongly drawn a distinction between rural lifestyle properties and primary production properties. It was illogical that properties that could be used for either purpose should be categorized by the valuer into one category or the other and receive differing valuations -- 6 of 14 -- 7 accordingly. They also challenged the comparability of the sales evidence selected by Mr Hoffman to support his valuation. [16] In my opinion, the distinction drawn by Mr Hoffman between the values of rural lifestyle properties and primary production properties is difficult to accept. The subject properties are zoned rural pursuant to the Stanthorpe Shire Council Planning Scheme 2004. Such zoning enables properties within the zone to be used either for residential or for primary production purposes. If therefore any particular property in the rural zone is assumed to be unimproved, as is required by s.3(1)(b) of the Act, the prudent purchaser has the choice as to whether to use such a property for residential or for primary production purposes. Without further explanation, it is inconceivable that a prudent purchaser who wishes to use such an unimproved property for residential purposes would pay a premium as compared with those purchasers who might wish to use the same property for primary production purposes. Indeed such a purchaser could not be described as a prudent purchaser. It is to be remembered that - "To arrive at the value of the land at that date, we have, as I conceive, to suppose it sold then, not by means of a forced sale, but by voluntary bargaining between the plaintiff and a purchaser, willing to trade, but neither of them so anxious to do so that he would overlook any ordinary business consideration. We must further suppose both to be perfectly acquainted with the land, and cognizant of all circumstances which might affect its value, either advantageously or prejudicially, including its situation, character, quality, proximity to conveniences or inconveniences, its surrounding features, the then present demand for land, and the likelihood, as then appearing to persons best capable of forming an opinion, of a rise or fall for what reason soever in the amount which one would otherwise be willing to fix as the value of the property."1 [17] Mr Hoffman was unable to articulate any convincing explanation as to why the market would draw such a distinction between the two types of property. He did say in his report that "(t)he development of rural land for rural residential development generally means the subdivision of the land into small, unviable, lots for the purpose of residential use." It is possible to draw an inference from that statement that the subject properties were unviable for primary production, perhaps because of their size and/or topography. However, when challenged by Ms Clayton, under cross examination, Mr Hoffman accepted that the subject properties could be used for either rural residential or primary production purposes. [18] There was also some evidence that smaller areas of land, for example lots of approximately 2 ha, may be in higher demand because of certain cut-offs about land ownership in the social security system. While that may be correct, none of the subject properties are 2 ha - they range in area from 6.832 ha to 40.21 ha. Moreover, the 1 Spencer v The Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418 at 441, per Isaacs J. -- 7 of 14 -- 8 application of a 340% increase, across the board, to the subject properties would indicate that there are not varying levels of demand for properties within that size range. Further, it is noted that 88 Paling Yard Road, which has been valued as a primary production property, is 7.869 ha and has similar topography to the subjects. It appears therefore that size does not explain the differing increases. And although Mr Hoffman said in evidence that a lifestyle purchaser might like a hilly, rough block covered in trees and a farmer would only pay a minimal amount for such a property, that is not borne out by the valuation of 88 Paling Yard Road, as the appellants' evidence, which I accept, was that 88 Paling Yard Road has similar topography to the subjects'. [19] Mr Hoffman's evidence was that he believed that properties with similar uses should be used as sales evidence. So for primary production valuations he had relied on sales of genuine farming concerns. He had analyzed the sales to take account of all the improvements to reach an unimproved value. Similarly he had selected rural residential sales to value rural residential properties and analyzed the sales by taking off the added value of the improvements to reach the unimproved values. [20] It is accepted that s.17 of the Act is relevant to the valuations under appeal. Relevantly, s.17(1) provides that - "17(1) In making a valuation of the unimproved value of land exclusively used for purposes of a single dwelling house or for purposes of farming, any enhancement in value because the land has been subdivided by survey or has a potential use for industrial, subdivisional or any other purposes shall be disregarded irrespective of whether or not, in case of potential use as aforesaid, that potential use is lawful when the valuation is made." [21] The effect of the section is that where land is used exclusively either for the purposes of a single dwelling house or for the purposes of farming, it is to be valued on the basis of the existing use and any increase in value caused by other potential uses of the property is to be ignored. Contrary to Mr Hoffman's evidence, the appellants do not seek valuations made on a primary production basis. The subject properties were valued as single dwellings or "rural lifestyle" properties by the respondent and accordingly any potential higher use was ignored. [22] Mr Hoffman said that the primary production properties in the region of the subject properties had been valued under s.17 and accordingly had a concessional value. However s.17 does not require any deduction or discount to be made in valuing property used for primary production. All that s.17 requires is that such properties are to be valued for primary production purposes and any potential higher use is to be ignored. The existence of s.17 does not in my opinion explain why a prudent purchaser who is -- 8 of 14 -- 9 seeking to purchase unimproved rural land would pay more for a so called lifestyle use than for primary production purposes. [23] Mr Hoffman also said, at one point, that primary production properties usually were more highly improved than rural properties used for residential purposes. If Mr Hoffman relied on improved sales at the mass appraisal stage of the valuation, there may be some error in the values attributed by Mr Hoffman to the improvements on the primary production properties, or indeed those properties may be over-capitalized. To some extent this is speculation on my part, but the point to be made is that the valuations are to be carried out on the assumption that the subject properties were unimproved as at the relevant date, and Mr Hoffman should have selected sales of unimproved or lightly improved properties, if they were available, for the purposes of the valuation. [24] Unfortunately, Mr Hoffman did not adduce evidence at the hearing to support his assertion that there is a difference in value between rural residential and primary production properties. This is because the only sales evidence given by Mr Hoffman was of properties which, he said, having questioned the purchasers, were intended to be used for lifestyle purposes. No sales evidence was given establishing the value of unimproved or lightly improved properties purchased for primary production purposes and therefore Mr Hoffman's opinion has not been verified by the appropriate factual evidence. While it may be that such evidence was available, the failure to produce the evidence at the hearing means that the respondent has not addressed a critical issue raised by the appellants, namely the lack of relativity in the increases applied to their properties as compared with 88 Paling Yard Road and 86 and 278 Mt Norman Road. [25] It appears that the effect of the 2009 valuation was to destroy the existing relativities between the properties in Paling Yard Road and those in Mt Norman Road. The appellants presented a table showing the relative increases between 13 properties in Paling Yard Road and five properties in Mt Norman Road. The valuations of 12 of the properties in Paling Yard Road, including the subjects, were increased by approximately 340% in the 2009 valuation. 88 Paling Yard Road was increased in value by about 225%. Similarly, three of the properties in Mt Norman Road had increases of 339% plus, and 86 and 278 Mt Norman Road were increased in value by 226%. Given that the basis of the respondent's case was that there has been a larger increase in the demand for rural home-sites as compared with primary production properties, it was incumbent on the respondent to adduce the appropriate evidence to support this proposition. This has not been done. -- 9 of 14 -- 10 [26] For the purposes of defending the valuations at the hearing, Mr Hoffman assessed the unimproved value of the subject properties by direct comparison with unimproved values analyzed from sales of properties in the locality. He supplied a schedule detailing nine sales of lightly improved properties. [27] The sales selected by Mr Hoffman were of properties which, he said, were purchased for rural lifestyle purposes. The properties range in size from 2.033 ha to 61.782 ha. Eight of the sales properties were applied at values ranging from $112,000 to $177,500; the ninth sale, which occurred some nine months after the date of valuation, was applied at $80,000. [28] Mr Hoffman's sales were located at varying distances ranging from 10 kms to 21 kms from the subjects, at Ballandean, Lyra, Glen Aplin, Eukey, Fletcher and Severnlea. All of the sales are located closer to Stanthorpe than the subject properties, although some of the sales are further from local shops than the subjects. [29] The appellants challenged Mr Hoffman's sales selection on a number of bases. One was that the sales properties were not comparable with the subjects because the sales were too far away and located in different areas from the subjects. The second was that Mr Hoffman had ignored sales of comparable properties located much closer to the subjects. The appellants also say that Mr Hoffman failed to take into account certain defects in their properties including location and access. [30] The appellants relied on the sales of four properties in the immediate vicinity of the subject properties in support of their estimates of the values of the subjects. The details are set out in the following table - Location Real Property Description Date of Sale Area Sale Price Sale Price percentage of unimproved value Paling Yard Road, Wallangarra Lot 1 RP 71192 31/03/2005 1.295 ha $10,000 75.7% ($13,200) Paling Yard Road, Wallangarra Lot 3 RP 179573 30/06/2010 17 ha $45,000 33.1% ($136,000) Longs Lane, Wallangarra Lot 2 RP 898602 30/06/2010 14.81 ha $48,000 34.5% ($139,000) Mt Norman Road, Wallangarra Lot 32 B34383 08/12/2010 14.154 ha $80,000 57.5% ($139,000) -- 10 of 14 -- 11 [31] The appellants acknowledge that Sales 2, 3 and 4 occurred after the date of valuation but say that the sales show what the market was willing to pay for rural residential land in Wallangarra. [32] Mr Hoffman's evidence was that Sales 2 and 3 were not arm's length transactions, as the properties were transferred from father to son. Mr Hoffman had also interviewed the purchaser of Sale 4 who said that he was a friend of the vendor. The purchaser had approached the vendor to buy the property, which was not listed on the market; the purchaser offered $80,000 which the seller accepted, without negotiation. Accordingly Mr Hoffman ignored the sale. Mr Hoffman considered the sale price of Sale 1 to be out of line with the market. [33] The appellants also carried out an analysis of the sale of the property at 216 Paling Yard Road in February 2009. The unimproved value of the property as at 1 October 2004, $52,000, was deducted from the sale price of $280,000 to establish the value of the improvements at $228,000. The appellants submitted that if improvements valued at $228,000 were added to the 2009 valuation of 216 Paling Yard Road, $177,500, the new sale price would be $405,500 which was unrealistic. [34] I do not accept this analysis. For the purpose of the Valuation of Land Act, the value of improvements means the added value which the physical improvements give to the land at the time at which the value is required to be ascertained irrespective of the cost of the improvements …" (s.5(1)). The appellants have not established the added value of the improvements on 216 Paling Yard Road as at February 2009, by any expert or other compelling evidence. The value of $228,000 appears to be the added value of the improvements as at 1 October 2004. There is no evidence as to the quality and condition of the improvements as at February 2009, nor is there any evidence as to whether the sale price of $280,000 represented the fair market value of the property as at 1 October 2004. [35] My conclusions about the appellants' sales evidence are that Sales 2 and 3 cannot be relied on because they were not arm's length transactions. Sale 4 is not reliable because the property was not publicly marketed and therefore, it is doubtful whether the sale price reflects market value. It is also the case that because these sales took place after the date of valuation, I am not prepared to rely on them in the absence of evidence that the market has not altered in the intervening period. Sale 1 occurred some four and a half years before the date of valuation and of itself is not sufficient to establish market value as at that date. -- 11 of 14 -- 12 [36] Reliance on sales of comparable unimproved or lightly improved properties that took place at or about the date of valuation is the accepted method of determining unimproved value as required by the Act. [37] Mr Hoffman's sales were lightly improved properties but they were located at varying distances ranging from 10 kms to 21 kms from the subjects. The appellants say that the sales are located in a different area from the subjects and therefore should not be compared with their properties. There is some merit in this submission as the evidence has not persuaded me that the areas in which the sales properties are located are comparable with the subjects. [38] There is, however, an even more insuperable difficulty with Mr Hoffman's sales evidence. As discussed above, Mr Hoffman has only selected sales of properties to be used for rural residential purposes. There is no evidence of sales of unimproved or lightly improved properties to be used for primary production purposes. The selected sales appear to be at the high end of the market. I consider therefore that the sales evidence is not complete as it does not give a comprehensive picture of the market at the relevant date. [39] My conclusion is that the valuations under appeal are not correct. The evidence as to the alleged difference in the market for increased rural land, depending on whether the land is to be used for rural residential or primary production purposes, has produced a result which is inherently unlikely and which is not supported by the evidence given at the hearing. The appeals are, therefore, allowed. [40] The sales evidence adduced by both the appellants and the respondent is not persuasive, for the reasons given above. There is some difficulty in determining appropriate valuations for the subject lands. The effect of Mr Hoffman's evidence is that the market has shown an increase of at least 226% for some rural lands. It may be that the increase should be higher if all the sales, that is both the so called rural residential and primary production sales, were taken into account. However in the absence of any more appropriate evidence, the best I can do is to apply an increase of 226% to the 2004 valuations of each of the subjects, for the purpose of determining the values as at 1 October 2009. Accordingly I have adopted that approach, rounding the results where appropriate. -- 12 of 14 -- 13 ORDERS VLA243-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 69 on BNT 136, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield is determined at One Hundred and Fifteen Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($115,500.00) as at 1 October 2009. VLA244-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 2 on RP 71191 and Lot 2 RP 71192, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield, is determined at One Hundred and Seventeen Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($117,500.00) as at 1 October 2009. VLA245-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 1 on RP 92998, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield, is determined at One Hundred and Six Thousand Dollars ($106,000.00) as at 1 October 2009. VLA247-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 3 on RP 71192, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield, is determined at Ninety-Two Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($92,500) as at 1 October 2009. VLA248-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 1 on RP 54487, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield, is determined at Eighty-Three Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($83,500.00) as at 1 October 2009. VLA249-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 6 on RP 71192, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield, is determined at Sixty-One Thousand Dollars ($61,000) as at 1 October 2009. -- 13 of 14 -- 14 VLA250-10 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The unimproved value of Lot 2 on RP 92998, County of Bentinck, Parish of Tenterfield, is determined at One Hundred and Twelve Thousand Dollars ($112,000.00) as at 1 October 2009. CAC MacDONALD PRESIDENT OF THE LAND COURT -- 14 of 14 --