Bates v Horsnell [2011] QCATA 329
CITATION: Bates v Horsnell [2011] QCATA 329
PARTIES: Javvab Bates
(Applicant/Appellant)
v
Trevor Horsnell
Lauren Horsnell
(Respondents)
APPLICATION NUMBER: APL331-11
MATTER TYPE: Appeals
HEARING DATE: On the papers
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Justice Alan Wilson, President
DELIVERED ON: 25 November 2011
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
ORDERS MADE: Leave to appeal refused.
CATCHWORDS: APPEAL – LEAVE TO APPEAL – MINOR CIVIL
DISPUTE – RENTAL TENANCY – Where
applicant rented premises from the respondent –
Where the respondent claimed for cleaning fees
outstanding rent and repair costs – Where
applicant cross claimed for failure to maintain
premises in good tenantable condition – Where
Magistrate awarded the respondent some of the
claim sought – Where Magistrate dismissed the
applicant’s cross claim – Where applicant seeks
leave to appeal that decision – Whether grounds
for leave to appeal
Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549, applied
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, applied
APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):
This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (QCAT Act).
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REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] Ms Bates rented residential premises at Mount Isa from Mr and Mrs
Horsnell. She vacated the premises in March 2011 and, later, they
brought proceedings in QCAT’s Minor Civil Disputes jurisdiction claiming
$1,658.92 for outstanding rent, cleaning fees and repair costs.
[2] Ms Bates filed a cross-application disputing the Horsnells’ claim and
claiming, for herself, the sum of $5,000 ‘… by way of compensation for
personal injury’ caused, it is alleged, by the Horsnells’ failure ‘… to ensure
the premises were in good tenantable state of repair upon commencement
of the lease’.
[3] The matter was heard by an acting Magistrate, sitting as a QCAT Member,
in Mount Isa on 7 July 2011. The learned Magistrate adjourned his
decision and delivered it, with reasons, on 28 July 2011. The QCAT
Appeal Tribunal directed that Ms Bates’ application for leave to appeal
would be determined on the papers, with written submissions from both
parties, which they have now filed.
[4] The learned Magistrate rejected a number of the Horsnells’ claims – for
carpet cleaning; pool chemicals; repairs to screens on doors; and, for a
letting fee. He allowed two claims – outstanding rent of $488.57, and two-
thirds of the replacement cost of a blind, in the sum of $178.57. He also
awarded the Horsnells $30 for part, but not all, of their filing fees. The
ultimate order was that Ms Bates must pay the Horsnells $697.15.
[5] The learned acting Magistrate also dismissed Ms Bates’ counter
application for $5,000 for compensation for personal injuries, on the basis
that it is a claim for unliquidated damages and is outside QCAT’s powers
in its Minor Civil Disputes jurisdiction, and should be brought under the
Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002.
[6] Ms Bates’ submissions contend that the decision involves substantial
miscarriages of justice because, in summary, the acting Magistrate
wrongly relied on the evidence of the Horsnells about the material of which
the blind was made; and, because he wrongly found that the Horsnells and
their letting agent had acted reasonably in their attempts to relet the
premises. In effect, Ms Bates alleges the Horsnells did not take all
reasonable and necessary steps to mitigate their damages for lost rent in
the period before they found a new tenant.
[7] Ms Bates’ submissions helpfully address the principles operating in this
Appeal Tribunal when questions about leave to appeal arise. Leave will
ordinarily only be granted where there is some question of general
importance upon which further argument, and a decision of the Appeal
Tribunal, would be to the public advantage; or, there is a reasonably
arguable case of error in the primary decision and a reasonable prospect
that the applicant would obtain further substantive relief. Another question
sometimes asked is: is leave necessary to correct a substantial injustice to
the applicant, caused by some error?
[8] Ms Bates specifically contends that there is a question of general
importance upon which further argument, and a decision of the Appeal
Tribunal, would be to the public advantage: namely, whether the learned
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acting Magistrate erred in the way in which he applied, and reached his
decision about, the test as to whether the Horsnells had proved their claim
on the balance of probabilities.
[9] It is said, as to the blind, that the Member was wrong to accept the
evidence of a witness, Ms Leonard, that the blind was made of aluminium
when Ms Bates’ evidence was that it was made of plastic. This is,
however, simply a finding of fact based upon the choice the learned acting
Magistrate was obliged to make between the conflicting evidence of these
two witnesses. He explained in his Reasons that he accepted and
preferred Ms Leonard’s evidence because she had visited the premises
frequently and was familiar with their construction, and the blind and its
condition. The fact that Ms Bates contended it was constructed of different
material and gave evidence to that effect is not, in itself, persuasive that
she was correct. The learned acting Magistrate discharged, with respect,
his responsibility: to consider the evidence and the conflict in it, to make a
finding based upon his choice between the two conflicting versions, and to
explain his reasons for that choice.
[10] Findings of fact by a tribunal will not usually be disturbed on appeal if the
facts inferred by the tribunal, upon which the finding is based, are capable
of supporting its conclusions, and there is evidence capable of supporting
any inferences underlining it1. That was the case here. Simply because
Ms Bates believes her evidence was more persuasive does not make the
learned acting Magistrate’s decision wrong.
[11] The same conclusion applies to the submission about outstanding rent. In
his reasons the Magistrate referred to Ms Bates’ submission that there had
been a serious failure on the part of the Horsnells, and the real estate
agents, to have the house relet as soon as possible, given the nature of
the rental market in Mount Isa. Again, the Magistrate explained his finding
in the face of this conflicting evidence, and his reasons for it – he said the
actions of the other parties were reasonable, taking into account the need
to ensure the suitability of prospective tenants and all the prevailing
circumstances. That finding was, with respect, reasonably open to him in
the face of the evidence and, of course, on the balance of probabilities.
[12] Ms Bates’ submissions also attack the award of $30 to the Horsnells for
costs. It appears their actual filing fee was $92. Their original claim was
for $1,658, but they only recovered about $670 – i.e. something slightly
more than one-third of their total claim. To award them an amount of
about a third of the filing fee was, in the circumstances, a decision which
was appropriately commensurate with the findings made in the action
itself.
[13] It is not entirely clear if Ms Bates seeks leave to appeal the decision
dismissing her cross-claim for damages for personal injuries. At page 8 of
them she says she seeks orders that her appeal be allowed; that it be held
that she does not owe any amount to the Horsnells; and, that they pay the
cost of the appeal, but does not appear to seek any different decision in
1 Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549 at 561; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at
125-126.
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respect of the learned acting Magistrate’s dismissal of her claim for
damages for personal injuries.
[14] Elsewhere, however, in her submissions at pages 3 and 4 she refers to
other alleged breaches of the lease and says that these would ‘… mandate
a finding in the appellant’s favour due to all of the breaches of the lease
that led to serious personal injury …’.
[15] The Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 applies in relation to all
personal injuries arising out of an incident which happened before, on or
after 18 June 2002: s 6. Claims may be brought in a court, with jurisdiction
to hear them.
[16] In the jurisdiction in which the learned acting Magistrate was sitting, the
only claims which may be brought are those falling within the definition of
‘minor civil disputes’ in the third Schedule to the QCAT Act 2009. Under
that definition, claims are limited to debts or liquidated demands, matters
arising out of contracts between consumers and traders; damage to
property arising out of the use of a vehicle, or defects in them; and, for
tenancy matters or dividing fence disputes.
[17] Tenancy matters are those arising under the Residential Tenancies and
Room and Accommodation Act 2008. Under that Act, a tenant may apply
for termination for injury caused to the applicant (s 312) and termination
orders can be made if the Tribunal is satisfied that injury has occurred
(s 344(1)); but, otherwise, nothing in that legislation or the QCAT Act
appears to invest the Tribunal with the power, in its Minor Civil Disputes
jurisdiction, to award damages for personal injury or give the Tribunal
power, in that jurisdiction, to hear and determine claims to which the
Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 applies.
[18] Ms Bates has not been able to point to any error on the part of the learned
acting Magistrate warranting a grant of leave to appeal, and her application
must be refused.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCATA/2011/329