Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2007] QCA 235 [2008] 1 Qd R 304
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Amos v Monsour Legal Costs P/L [2007] QCA 235
PARTIES: EDWARD AMOS
(plaintiff/applicant/appellant)
v
MONSOUR LEGAL COSTS PTY LTD
(ACN 010 644 989)
(defendant/respondent)
FILE NO/S: Appeal No 9984 of 2006
DC No 2347 of 2005
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)
ORIGINATING
COURT: District Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 24 July 2007
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 4 April 2007
JUDGES: McMurdo P, Wilson J and Lyons J
Judgment of the Court
ORDER: 1. The application for leave to appeal is granted but
limited to the applicant's first two contentions set out
in paragraph [6] of these reasons
2. The appeal is dismissed with costs to be assessed
CATCHWORDS: COSTS – JURISDICTION – GENERAL – where costs were
assessed by the Magistrates Court under Uniform Civil
Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) Ch 17 (Pt 2) – whether the
Magistrate had the power to undertake an assessment of costs
under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 681(2) –
whether there was any other statutory authority giving
Magistrates Courts power to award costs
COSTS – DEPARTING FROM THE GENERAL RULE –
ORDER FOR COSTS ON AN INDEMNITY BASIS – where
costs were assessed on an indemnity basis – whether the
concept of reasonableness under Uniform Civil Procedure
Rules 1999 (Qld) r 704(3) involved a consideration of
proportionality
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 69(1)
Magistrates Courts Act 1921 (Qld), s 5A(4), s 14(f),
s 30(2)(b)
Statutory Instruments Act 1992 (Qld), s 8, s 9
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2
Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld), s 221
Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld), s 118
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), Ch 17 (Pt 2),
r 681, r 690, r 704
Bottoms v Reser [2000] QSC 413, SC No 28 of 1998,
29 November 2000, considered
Henley & Anor v State of Queensland & Anor [2005] QDC
94, DC No 3997 of 2000, 29 April 2005, applied
Knight v F.P. Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178,
applied
Lownds v Home Office [2002] 1 WLR 2451, considered
McKeand v Thomas [2006] NSWSC 1356, considered
Moore v Moore [2004] NSWSC 587, considered
Skalkos v T & S Recoveries Pty Ltd (2005) 65 NSWLR 151,
considered
Yvancich v Kennedy (No 2) [2004] NSWCA 397, considered
COUNSEL: A M Daubney SC, with M D Ambrose, for the
applicant/appellant
M F Wilson for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Keller Nall & Brown for the applicant/appellant
McInnes Wilson for the respondent
[1] THE COURT: The seed for this application for leave to appeal was sown some
years ago when the applicant, Mr Amos, a frequent litigator in these courts,
commenced an action against the National Australia Bank Limited. On 17 July
2000 the parties settled the action on terms which required Mr Amos to pay the
bank's costs as assessed by the present respondent, Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd
("Monsour P/L"). Mr Amos was dissatisfied with Monsour P/L's assessment of the
bank's costs and decided to dispute it in court, despite the term in the settlement
agreement preventing him from disputing the assessment. He brought an
application to challenge both the settlement agreement and the assessment of costs.
His challenge in the Trial Division of this Court was ultimately unsuccessful and he
was ordered to pay costs of that action on an indemnity basis: see Amos v National
Australia Bank Limited.1
[2] Undeterred, he then commenced an action against Monsour P/L in contract and or
alternatively negligence in the Brisbane Magistrates Court, claiming damages of
$22,898.30. That action was heard on 27 July 2004. On 31 August 2004 the
magistrate delivered her reasons for dismissing his claim and ordered that he pay
Monsour P/L's "costs of the proceedings on an indemnity basis, such costs to be
assessed by the court".2
[3] Mr Amos appealed to the District Court from the magistrate's orders, including the
costs order. His appeal was wholly unsuccessful and was dismissed with costs to be
assessed on the standard basis.3
1 [2001] QSC 31.
2 Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd M17192 of 2001, 31 August 2004.
3 Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2005] QDC, BD1204 of 2004, Wylie DCJ, 17 May 2005.
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3
[4] The assessment of Monsour P/L's costs against Mr Amos arising out of the order of
31 August 2004 proceeded before the magistrate on 27 June 2005. It took up the
whole day. The magistrate assessed costs of the action (which was one for damages
for less than $23,000) at $49,996.00 and ordered that Mr Amos pay them by 11 July
2005.
[5] Mr Amos appealed from that order to the District Court. The appeal was heard on 6
and 7 April 2006. The appeal was allowed to the extent of reducing the costs award
by $4,490.00 but was otherwise dismissed and Mr Amos was ordered to pay
Monsour P/L's costs of the appeal to be assessed on the standard basis.4
[6] Mr Amos now seeks leave to appeal from that order under s 118(3) District Court of
Queensland Act 1967 (Qld). The applicant contends that the application raises three
issues which warrant the grant of leave to appeal. The first is the proper
construction and application of Ch 17 (Pt 2) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999
(Qld) ("UCPR") relating to the award of costs, particularly indemnity costs in the
Magistrates Court. The second is the proper construction and application of UCPR
r 704(3) in that an assessment of "the reasonable amount of costs reasonably
incurred" necessarily invokes the notion that to be reasonable, costs should be
proportionate to the litigation. The third is that knowledge of the law is a lawyer's
stock in trade and it is wrong in principle to allow the costs of a solicitor to educate
himself in the pertinent field of law, especially where the solicitor claimed to have
"extreme expertise"5 in the pertinent area of law.
[7] If Mr Amos were granted leave to appeal his proposed notice of appeal now
contains 15 grounds. Ground one concerns Mr Amos's first contention set out
above. Grounds 2 to 14 inclusive concern whether the magistrate erred in
exercising her discretion as to various aspects of the assessment of the amount of
costs awarded. The second contention set out above is arguably contained in the
second proposed ground of appeal: that the judge erred in finding the magistrate's
discretion did not miscarry in upholding the assessment of costs for an
uncomplicated one day trial in the amount of $45,506.00. The applicant's third
contention set out above is contained in ground 15 of the proposed notice of appeal.
The magistrate's approach
[8] In the reasons delivered on 31 August 20046 the magistrate found the following.
The settlement agreement did not, contrary to Monsour P/L's submissions, give rise
to an estoppel precluding a suit in negligence. Mr Amos did not have a contractual
relationship with Monsour P/L and no cause of action against it for breach of
contract. Although Monsour P/L owed Mr Amos a duty of care, Mr Amos did not
provide any evidence to support his allegation of negligence against Monsour P/L.
[9] The magistrate was impressed by Mr Monsour's evidence on behalf of his company
and concluded that his costs assessment reflected his considerable experience as a
legal costs assessor and demonstrated the highest ethical standards and
professionalism which could be expected by Mr Amos.
4 Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2006] QDC 485, BD2347 of 2005, 2 November 2006.
5 Clause 6 of the "Client Agreement" between Monsour P/L and their lawyers described the solicitor
as "… an extreme expert in the area of litigious disputes regarding the nature of the work identified
in Clause 1 …"
6 Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd M17192 of 2001, 31 August 2004.
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4
[10] The magistrate also concluded that Mr Amos was intent on pursuing all objections
to Monsour P/L's assessment of costs notwithstanding the absence of any cogent
evidence to support his allegations and the express provisions of the settlement
agreement. The magistrate was persuaded that Mr Amos's conduct of the
proceedings before her demonstrated a disregard for any proper consideration of the
prospects of success of the action, noting:
"Given the paucity of evidence adduced by [Mr Amos], when
considered in the context of [Mr Amos's] conduct in prosecuting
these proceedings, I am satisfied that the facts and circumstances of
this case support a finding that these proceedings were conducted for
an ulterior purpose (refer White Industries re Flower & Hart
unreported Federal Court of Australia, per Goldberg J, 14 July
1998)."
[11] For those reasons, on 31 August 2004 the magistrate exercised her discretion to
depart from the usual practice of awarding costs on a standard basis and instead
directed Mr Amos to pay Monsour P/L's costs of the proceedings on an indemnity
basis and ordered that such costs be assessed by the court. As earlier noted, Mr
Amos's appeal from those orders was dismissed. 7
[12] Prior to the magistrate assessing costs in accordance with those orders Mr Amos
lodged a 35 page document containing general objections to Monsour P/L's claimed
costs. In hearing and determining the assessment of costs on 27 June 2005, the
magistrate noted that Mr Amos had made "not one concession throughout the
document of 35 pages in relation to any of the items claimed". Her Honour
accepted Monsour P/L's submission that a high degree of involvement by its
solicitors was warranted in this case because of the manner in which Mr Amos
conducted the proceedings. There were some unusual features, for example, an
allegation that senior counsel for Monsour P/L had misled the court and there was a
dispute over whether service had been effected and both a judgment in default and a
statutory demand had to be set aside. The magistrate did not accept the submission
made on Mr Amos's behalf that research of the law by Monsour P/L's lawyers was
an expense of self-education. The magistrate did not consider the case was a simple
one and thought there were a number of novel points of law argued in the
proceedings which required quite extensive research, notwithstanding Mr Amos's
remote prospects of success. The magistrate did not consider the case was a
relatively simple professional negligence case; it was of some complexity. The
magistrate individually reviewed the items claimed by Monsour P/L and made
adjustments she considered appropriate to the items claimed, reducing the total sum
claimed by $2,255.60.
The approach of the District Court judge
[13] There were in essence three points taken by Mr Amos on appeal to the District
Court. The first related to the setting aside of subpoenas and is not relevant to the
present application. The second was essentially the applicant's first contention in
this Court and concerned the construction and application of Ch 17 Pt 2 UCPR so
far as it relates to indemnity costs in the Magistrates Court. The remaining points
raised related directly to the magistrate's exercise of discretion in assessing the
costs.
7 Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2005] QDC, BD1204 of 2004, Wylie DCJ, 17 May 2005.
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5
[14] The judge held that when assessing costs on the indemnity basis under UCPR
r 704(3) the taxing officer "must allow all costs reasonably incurred and of a
reasonable amount";8 "considerable liberality" should ordinarily be extended in
assessing reasonableness.9 The costs agreement between the party awarded costs
and that party's lawyers will determine the actual costs incurred by the party. Under
UCPR r 704(3) the reasonableness of the actual costs claimed is ascertained by
reference to the costs agreement, the relevant scale of fees prescribed, and the
charges ordinarily payable to a solicitor for the work. The starting point in
determining whether a claim should be disallowed on the grounds of
unreasonableness is normally the costs agreement.10 It would be an unusual case
where costs payable under a costs agreement would be disallowed under the
reasonableness test: Bottoms v Reser.11
[15] In practical terms, the test to be applied is that all costs are to be allowed unless
unreasonably incurred or in an unreasonable amount. In applying that test, the party
benefiting from the award of costs is to be given the benefit of any doubt (Bottoms v
Reser12 ).13 After referring to dicta in Beardmore v Franklins Management Services
Pty Ltd,14 the judge rightly observed that the appeal was not from an order for costs
to be assessed on the indemnity basis but from the assessment made on the
indemnity basis. The judge noted the submission that any costs on the indemnity
basis had to be assessed by reference to the appropriate Magistrates Court scale
under UCPR r 690(4). His Honour adopted the approach of his Honour Judge
McGill in Henley & Anor v State of Queensland & Anor15 which determined that an
assessment of indemnity costs in the Magistrates Court should be carried out in
accordance with the test in UCPR r 704(3) and that UCPR r 690(4) merely
identified the appropriate scale for the purposes of r 704(3)(a). His Honour
concluded that the magistrate was right in adopting a like approach.
[16] The judge rejected the public policy argument advanced that an award of indemnity
costs would discourage litigation because costs orders may be substantially greater
than the claim giving rise to the costs orders. First, indemnity costs are ordered
only in defined circumstances such as those present here where an action had been
pursued without any reasonable prospect of success. Second, indemnity costs are to
indemnify, as far as reasonably possible, the successful party for the costs of
resisting the action. Third, it is equally not in the public interest to encourage
plaintiffs to litigate actions without some prospect of success.16
[17] His Honour noted Mr Amos's complaint that Monsour P/L's solicitor-advocate was
occupied for an unreasonable period of time on trial preparation so that the costs
charged for trial preparation were about $20,000 for a one day trial in the
Magistrates Court. Because the costs were awarded on an indemnity basis, the sole
exclusionary criterion was whether the costs claimed under the client agreement
were unreasonable.17 In Bottoms v Reser the Chief Justice emphasised the liberality
8 Bottoms v Reser [2000] QSC 413.
9 Above.
10 Per McGill DCJ in Henley & Anor v State of Queensland & Anor [2005] QDC 94, para 41.
11 [2000] QSC 413.
12 Above.
13 Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2006] QDC 485, BD2347 of 2005 para 18.
14 [2003] 1 Qd R 1, McMurdo P, 11 and Ambrose J, 22, 23.
15 [2005] QDC 94
16 Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2006] QDC 485, BD2347 of 2005 para 25.
17 Above, para 31.
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6
to be extended in assessing the reasonableness of a charge on an indemnity costs
assessment; an "outlandish" charge would be an unreasonable charge. The judge
recognised however that reasonableness should be assessed in the light of the
charges ordinarily payable for the work (UCPR r 704(3)(c)) and a complete
disjunction between a charge and the fees ordinarily payable for similar work by the
profession may help identify the charge as unreasonable.18
[18] The judge accepted the magistrate's conclusion that Monsour P/L acted reasonably
in entering into the costs agreement with its solicitors because Mr Amos's claim
against it reflected upon its professional reputation and upon the professional
reputation and standing of its costs assessor, Mr Monsour. Monsour P/L had reason
to feel apprehensive about Mr Amos's conduct of the litigation because of the
default judgment he obtained without notice. Unlike the magistrate the judge did
not consider the litigation was complex, although his Honour accepted it was not
without its difficulties and was of considerable importance to both Monsour P/L and
Mr Monsour, justifying the retention of Monsour P/L's solicitor-advocate, a person
accepted as experienced in litigation and possessing "extreme" expertise in the
relevant areas of law in issue in the dispute.19 Monsour P/L was entitled to adopt a
cautious, even an over-cautious, approach to Mr Amos's litigation. Monsour P/L's
lawyers were entitled to prepare the case thoroughly and carefully and it was not
unfair that Mr Amos pay for that preparation.20
[19] Unlike the magistrate, the judge considered that for an "extreme expert", 5.5 hours
research as to the appropriateness of indemnity costs and for "drawing a
submission" bordered on the unreasonable. But as the magistrate was exercising a
discretion, the judge was not ultimately satisfied the magistrate had erred in this
respect.21
[20] The judge concluded, however, that the time charged for witness examination was
unreasonable measured against the standard of an experienced and skilled advocate
and halved the amounts so claimed.22 The judge was otherwise satisfied that the
magistrate's assessment of Monsour P/L's indemnity costs was within the range of a
sound exercise of discretion and did not interfere. Ultimately his Honour allowed
the appeal to the extent of reducing the award by $4,490.00 but otherwise dismissed
it.
The relevant provisions of the UCPR
[21] The relevant provisions are contained in UCPR Ch 17 Pt 2 (Costs) and are as
follows:
"Division 1 – Preliminary
678 Application
(1) This part applies to costs payable or to be assessed under an Act,
these rules or an order of the court.
…
18 Above, para 33.
19 Above, para 38.
20 Above, para 43.
21 Above, para 40.
22 Above, para 43.
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679 Definitions
In this part—
assessed costs means costs and disbursements assessed under this
part.
…
registrar means the registrar approved to assess costs by –
…
(c) for a Magistrates Court—the Chief Magistrate.
…
680 General provision about costs
(1) The costs a court may award—
(a) may be awarded at any stage of a proceeding or after
the proceeding ends; and
(b) must be decided in accordance with this part.
…
681 Costs in proceeding before Magistrates Court
(1) This rule applies to a proceeding before a Magistrates Court.
(2) The magistrate must make an order setting the amount of the
costs of the proceeding.
(3) However, the magistrate may, having regard to the nature and
complexity of the proceeding, order that the costs of the
proceeding be assessed by the registrar.
…
684 Registrar to assess costs
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, the registrar must assess costs
under this part.
…
685 Assessed costs to be paid unless court orders otherwise
(1) If, under these rules or an order of the court, a party is entitled to
costs, the costs are to be assessed costs.
(2) However, instead of assessed costs, the court may order a party to
pay to another party –
…
(c) an amount for costs decided by the court; or
(d) an amount for costs to be decided in the way the
court directs.
…
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Division 2 – Entitlement to costs
…
690 Solicitors' costs
(1) For assessing costs on the standard basis under this part, a
solicitor is entitled to charge and be allowed the costs under the
scales of costs for work done for or in a proceeding in the court.
(2) The scales of costs are in –
(a) for the Supreme Court—schedule 1; or
(b) for the District Court—schedule 2; or
(c) for Magistrates Courts—schedule 3.
(3) For an assessment for Magistrates Courts on the standard basis,
the scale in schedule 3 appropriate for the amount the plaintiff
recovers applies.
(4) For an assessment for Magistrates Courts on the indemnity basis,
the scale in schedule 3 appropriate for the amount the plaintiff
claims applies.
…
Division 3 – Costs of a party in a proceeding
…
704 Indemnity basis of assessment
(1) The court may order costs to be assessed on the indemnity basis.
(2) Without limiting subrule (1), the court may order that costs be
assessed on the indemnity basis if the court orders the payment
of costs –
(a) out of a fund; or
(b) to a party who sues or is sued as a trustee; or
(c) of an application in a proceeding brought for
noncompliance with an order of the court.
(3) When assessing costs on the indemnity basis, the registrar must
allow all costs reasonably incurred and of a reasonable amount,
having regard to –
(a) the scale of fees prescribed for the court; and
(b) any costs agreement between the party to whom the
costs are payable and the party’s solicitor; and
(c) charges ordinarily payable by a client to a solicitor for
the work."
[22] Chapter 17 Pt 2 Div 4 of the UCPR sets out the power of the registrar to assess
costs; Div 5 sets out the procedure preceding an assessment of costs by a registrar
and default assessments; Div 6 sets out the procedure on a registrar's assessment and
Div 7 sets out the procedure for a review of the registrar's assessment.
The construction of the UCPR as to the award of costs, including indemnity
costs, in the Magistrates Court
[23] Mr Amos's contentions as to the construction of the UCPR are as follows. The
magistrate was required either to set the amount of costs under UCPR r 681(2) or
order that the costs be assessed by the registrar; the magistrate had no power under
the UCPR to conduct her own assessment of the costs. Mr Amos has been denied
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9
the benefit of the process that would have been available to him had the assessment
been before a registrar. Further, any assessment of costs on the indemnity basis
under UCPR r 704 is subject to UCPR r 690(4) and limited by the scale in Sch 3
appropriate for the amount the plaintiff claimed.
[24] As the primary judge noted, the latter contention was considered in Asset Loan
Company Pty Ltd v Mamap Pty Ltd23 where his Honour Judge McGill stated:
"It is true that [UCPR r 690(3)] refers to the registrar allowing costs,
whereas in the Magistrates' Courts costs are commonly assessed by
the magistrates. I do not, however, think that that has the effect that r
704 does not apply in the Magistrates' Courts. In my opinion, the
proper relationship between r 690 and r 704 is that, when costs are
being assessed on an indemnity basis under r 704, the scale of fees to
which regard is to be had under sub-rule (3)(a) in the case of the
Magistrates' Courts is the scale of fees identified by r 690(4)."
(footnotes omitted)
[25] Like the judge whose order is the subject of this application, we respectfully agree
with Judge McGill's approach in Asset. It is consistent with the placement of r 690
and r 704 in separate but sequential Divisions of Part 2 of Chapter 17 of the UCPR.
[26] Mr Amos's alternative contention, that a magistrate can only set (not assess) the
amount of costs under r 681(2), is semantic hair splitting. How can a magistrate set
the amount of the costs of a proceeding without making some sort of assessment?
In order to comply with the mandatory terms of r 681(2), a magistrate is entitled to
and would ordinarily hear submissions and receive relevant material so as to make
some form of assessment of the costs claimed. Sub-rule 681(2) contemplates that
the assessment of the costs before setting the amount of costs may be done in a
summary way. Sub-rule 681(3) gives the magistrate a discretion in more complex
cases to order the costs of the proceeding be assessed by the registrar. In the present
case the magistrate chose, as she was entitled under the mandatory terms of
r 681(2), to set the amount of costs herself, even though this process ultimately
involved an assessment which took up most of a day. Although the procedures
applicable to the review or reconsideration of a registrar's assessment of costs under
Division 7 did not apply to the cost-setting procedure adopted by the Magistrate, Mr
Amos was not materially disadvantaged by the process adopted. Significantly, he
had a right of appeal from the Magistrates decision to the District Court which he
later exercised.24 While r 704(3) refers only to "the registrar", the registrar's
authority comes from the court (see UCPR r 679) so that r 704(3) equally applies to
an assessment of costs by a magistrate setting the amount of costs under r 681(2).
[27] Mr Amos's contentions that the judge and magistrate erred in construing the UCPR
fail.
[28] Although Mr Amos is not now submitting there is no power to award indemnity
costs in the Magistrates Court, it was suggested in the course of argument (as it was
below and in Asset) that the effect of this Court's decision in Beardmore v Franklins
Management Services Pty Ltd25 was that indemnity costs were not available in the
23 [2005] QDC 295, Appeal 3 of 2005, McGill DCJ, 14 October 2005, para 47.
24 Amos v Monsour Legal Costs Pty Ltd [2005] QDC, BD1204 of 2004, Wylie DCJ, 17 May 2005.
25 [2003] 1 Qd R 1.
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Magistrates Court. McMurdo P's observations in Beardmore26 said to support that
contention were a bare recital of the submissions made by both counsel. McPherson
JA did not consider the question. Beardmore is not authority for the proposition
that indemnity costs are not available in the Magistrates Court.
Does the concept of reasonableness under UCPR r 704(3) when assessing costs
on the indemnity basis involve a consideration of proportionality?
[29] A determination of whether indemnity costs are "reasonably incurred" and "of a
reasonable amount" within the meaning of those terms in UCPR r 704(3) will
involve a consideration, at the time of the assessment of the costs, of all relevant
circumstances pertaining in the particular case. As de Jersey CJ noted in Bottoms v
Reser:27 "… In such an assessment, no niggardly or unduly narrow approach would
be warranted." 28 That is because indemnity costs are exceptional and are awarded
only for good reason, here, because Mr Amos's conduct of the litigation effectively
amounted to an abuse of process entitling Monsour P/L to be fully compensated for
its reasonable expenses in defending the action. Sub-rule 704(3) in its terms requires
the consideration of the scale of fees prescribed for the court (r 704(3)(a)); the costs
agreement between the party in whose favour the costs order is made (r 704(3)(b))
and the charges ordinarily payable by a client to a solicitor for the work (r
704(3)(c)). Other matters may also be relevant in a particular case. UCPR
r 704(3)(a) by necessary implication requires the consideration of an element of
proportionality. Cases from other jurisdictions are necessarily of limited assistance
in construing the UCPR as they turn on their own facts and statutory provisions. An
approach to the concept of reasonableness under r 704(3) which involves a
consideration of proportionality is, however, consistent with the approach taken in
Skalkos v T & S Recoveries Pty Ltd,29 Moore v Moore,30 Yvancich v Kennedy (No
2), 31 McKeand v Thomas32 and Lownds v Home Office33.34
[30] The scale of fees applicable in the Magistrates Court (r 704(3)(a)) is but one
consideration in determining reasonableness under r 704(3). Also relevant are issues
such as Monsour P/L's costs agreement with its lawyers (r 704(3)(b)) and charges
ordinarily payable by a client to a solicitor for the work (r 704(3)(c)). We are not
persuaded that either the magistrate or the judge failed to give due weight to the
issue of the amount of costs expended by Monsour P/L under the costs agreement
with its lawyers relative to the amount of fees ordinarily payable under the
Magistrates Court scale of fees or to the related issue of the amount of Mr Amos's
claim against Monsour P/L. Both the magistrate and the judge rightly accepted it
was reasonable in the circumstances for Monsour P/L to enter into the costs
agreement with its solicitors. As the learned judge noted, Monsour P/L was
defending its professional reputation and the professional reputation and standing of
its costs assessor, Mr Monsour. Monsour P/L had good reason to feel apprehensive
about Mr Amos's conduct of the litigation and to defend it vigorously by
26 [2003] 1 Qd R 1, 11 para 24.
27 [2000] QSC 413.
28 Above, p 5.
29 (2005) 65 NSWLR 151, 153.
30 [2004] NSWSC 587, para 46.
31 [2004] NSWCA 397, para 6.
32 [2006] NSWSC 1356, para 22, 24, 25.
33 [2002] 1 WLR 2451.
34 These cases are necessarily of limited assistance as they turn on their own facts and statutory
provisions or rules.
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exhaustively preparing its defence. Whilst we share his Honour's concern as to
whether the preparation time claimed by Monsour P/L's lawyers bordered on the
unreasonable (relevant under r 704(3)(c)), his Honour was entitled to ultimately
conclude that the magistrate's determination that it was reasonable was open in the
circumstances.
[31] This contention also fails.
The remaining contentions
[32] The third contention and the remaining matters raised in the proposed notice of
appeal all deal with the magistrate's exercise of discretion in assessing and setting
the amount of the indemnity costs. They do not raise matters which warrant the
granting of leave to appeal to this Court from an appeal to the District Court
concerning a costs assessment in the Magistrates Court.
Conclusion
[33] Mr Amos's first two contentions35 raise matters of considerable practical importance
beyond the immediate interests of the present parties in areas where there may be
uncertainty as to the meaning of the UCPR. They are appropriate matters
warranting the grant of leave to appeal to this Court. For the reasons given,
however, Mr Amos's contentions fail and his appeal should be dismissed.
Another matter
[34] During the hearing we asked the parties whether there were any statutory provisions
giving power to Magistrates Courts to award costs. At common law courts have no
inherent jurisdiction to award costs. The power to award costs is a creature of
statute: Knight v F.P. Special Assets Ltd.36 Neither party contends that the
Magistrates Court lacks power to award costs and both accept that the UCPR give
the Magistrates Court that power: UCPR r 3 and r 689(1).
[35] It is a little surprising that the Magistrates Courts Act 1921 (Qld) no longer confers
a general power to award costs in civil proceedings, save where they are started in
the wrong court37 or in ADR processes.38 Prior to the UCPR coming into effect,
there was provision under the Magistrates Courts Act s 14(f) 39 for the Governor in
Council to make rules of court for "costs, including the fees to be allowed to
barristers and solicitors, whether as between party and party, solicitor and client, or
otherwise, and the expenses to be paid to witnesses". By contrast the Supreme
Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 221 currently gives the Supreme Court power to award costs
in all cases brought before it. The District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld)
s 69(1) gives the District Court all the powers and authorities of the Supreme Court
in respect of civil jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 (Qld)
s 118(1) gives the Governor in Council power to make rules of court for: "(a) the
practices and procedures of the Supreme Court, the District Court, or the
Magistrates Courts or their registries …". It seems likely that the UCPR are
statutory rules and subordinate legislation under the Statutory Instruments Act 1992
(Qld) s 8 and s 9 so that the UCPR independently provide sufficient statutory
framework to empower the Magistrates Court to award costs in civil matters.
35 See these reasons, [6].
36 (1992) 174 CLR 178, 182.
37 Section 5A(4).
38 Section 30(2)(b).
39 Repealed by the Courts Legislation Amendment Act 1995 (Qld), Act No 23 of 1995.
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12
[36] We note that the issue has not been argued before this Court in any considered way.
We are presently satisfied that, despite the absence of any specific provision in an
Act giving the Magistrates Court power to award costs, UCPR Chapter 17 provides
an effective statutory basis for Magistrates Courts to award costs.
ORDER:
1. The application for leave to appeal is granted but limited to the applicant's
first two contentions set out in paragraph [6] of these reasons.
2. The appeal is dismissed with costs to be assessed.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCA/2007/235