Berado & Anor v State of Queensland & Anor [2007] QSC 214
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[2007] QSC 214
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CIVIL JURISDICTION
MULLINS J
JAMES LEONARD BERADO
and
ROBERT ANSETT
First Applicant
Second Applicant
and
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
and
NEIL LAURIE, CLERK OF THE PARLIAMENT
OF QUEENSLAND
First Respondent
Second Respondent
BRISBANE
..DATE 09/08/2007
ORDER
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HER HONOUR: The applicants in this application are electors
on the electoral roll for the State of Queensland. They apply
against the second respondent, Mr Neil Laurie, the Clerk of
the Parliament of Queensland, for a declaration pursuant to
section 78(6) of the Constitution of Queensland 2001 that the
Local Government Reform Implementation Bill 2007 has no effect
as an Act if assented to in contravention of section 78 of the
Constitution and an injunction pursuant to the same provision
preventing the presentation for assent of the Bill in
contravention of section 78 of the Constitution.
The applicant was filed by leave this evening as an urgent
matter. In view of the history that Mr Harrison related of
the Bill being introduced into Parliament on Tuesday, the 7th
of August and the second reading speech commencing on Tuesday,
the 7th of August, the applicants were concerned that the
other stages of the Parliament dealing with the Bill may be
undertaken quite quickly and therefore sought an interim
injunction to prevent the presentation for assent of the Bill.
Argument has been heard this evening which primarily focused
on the construction of section 78 of the Constitution.
The argument for the second respondent was there was no
purpose in the granting of an injunction even on an interim
basis if the applicants could not show that the Bill which is
the subject of the application is a Bill for an Act ending the
system of local government in Queensland. Section 78(1)
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3 ORDER
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specifies that section 78 applies for a Bill for an Act ending
the system of local government in Queensland.
The applicants contended that the system of local government
in Queensland was the system in place when the Constitution
was enacted (in 2001) and referred to the Local Government Act
1993 and the detailed provisions in that Act for ascertaining
or fixing local government areas. In particular, the
applicants rely on section 19, subsection (2), that specified
at least three classes of a local government area being city,
town and shire.
The Bill implements reforms that have been the subject of much
public debate in recent days in Queensland. I was informed
that a consequence of the Bill, if enacted, would be to reduce
157 existing local government areas to 73 local government
areas. Thirty-seven existing local government areas are
unaffected by the Bill.
Some indication of the general effect of the changes can be
gleaned from schedule 1(a) of the Bill which sets out in part
1 new local governments that are in a new class called
"region". In part 2 there is a list of adjusted local
governments which appear to be based on the class of shire and
city. Then in part 3 there are continuing local governments
which are based on shire and city.
The argument for the applicants was that "region" is a
distinctly different concept to what has been the existing
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regime of cities, towns and shires in that a region is not
local in the sense of being centred on a locality.
The submissions for the respondent focus on part 7 of the
Constitution and commence with section 70(1) which specifies
that there must be a system of local government in Queensland.
Subsection (2) of section 70 states that the system consists
of a number of local governments. In section 71(1) the
requirements for a local government are specified: "A local
government is an elected body that is charged with the good
rule and local government of a part of Queensland allocated to
the body."
Subsection (2) of section 71 recognises that other legislation
may provide for the way in which a local government is
constituted and the nature and extent of its functions and
powers. The Local Government Act 1993 is such legislation.
Part 3 of Chapter 7 of the Constitution sets out special
procedures for particular local government Bills. Although
some reference was made in passing to section 77 of The
Constitution, that was not the basis on which the interim
injunction was sought.
Section 78, which is found in Part 3, was the provision relied
on by the applicants.
The issue that was argued is a construction issue. Although
there were reasons that the applicants put forward for having
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a trial of the matter there is little point in allowing the
matter to go forward, if there are little or no prospects of
success.
Although it is unusual on an interim injunction application to
decide the matter on the basis of a final view of the relevant
legislative provision, I consider that I am able to do that in
this case because it is a relatively straightforward
construction of section 78 of the Constitution that has to be
considered.
The competing constructions have been put before me. The
construction contended for by the applicants is very narrow.
It in effect does not give weight to the powers of the
Parliament. The Bill amends the Local Government Act 1993.
It leaves the fundamental system of local government in place.
It changes the detail of that system in the sense of enlarging
a number of local government areas but the system of having a
number of local governments in Queensland remains intact.
I do not accept the argument of the applicants that changing
the detail of the current system amounts to ending the system
of local government in Queensland. That is why I would refuse
the application for the interim injunction.
...
HER HONOUR: As I indicated in the reasons that I have just
given, I formed a concluded view on the construction. I do
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not think that there are any real prospects of success for the
applicants in this matter.
The interim injunction application is very much the substance
of the relief that is sought in the originating application.
In those circumstances I am prepared to order costs in favour
of the second respondent.
I therefore order that the applicants pay the second
respondent's costs of the application for the interim
injunction, to be assessed.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2007/214