Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders' Labourers' Federation (Queensland Branch) Union of Employees for Reid v Shepherd Contracting Pty Ltd [2006] QIRC 112 (2006) 183 QGIG 626

[Extract from Queensland Government Industrial Gazette, dated 22 September, 2006, Vol. 183, No. 8, pages 626-632] QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION Industrial Relations Act 1999 - s. 278 - application for unpaid wages Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders' Labourers' Federation (Queensland Branch) Union of Employees for David Reid AND Shepherd Contracting Pty Ltd (B/2005/1226) COMMISSIONER BLADES 7 September 2006 Recovery of unpaid wages - Section 278 Industrial Relations Act 1999 - Matters of fact - Appointment of Workplace Health and Safety Officer - Underpayment of hourly rate - Travel allowance - "No lunch" penalty rates - Crib allowance - Time and wages records - Evidence and proof. DECISION This application is brought under the provisions of s. 278 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (the Act) seeking the payment of $36,516.42 in unpaid wages alleged to be due to David Reid. The application is brought by the Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders Labourers Federation (Queensland Branch) Union of Employees (Union) on behalf of Mr Reid against the respondent company Shepherd Contracting Pty Ltd (respondent). The application alleges that the respondent employed David Reid at various sites on the Gold Coast and Brisbane as a Workplace Health and Safety Officer (WHSO), Foreman and Concreter and the employee did the following work: "was the company's acting WHSO on the Gold Coast Convention Centre (this project required every subcontractor to have their own certified WHSO), as well as the leading hand/foreman and under took general concreting duties. On the Thiess GH1 Medical and Oral Health Facility project David was the foreman and supervised the placing and finishing of all concrete and other related activities.". It is also alleged that Mr Reid was employed under the company's certified agreement, Shepherd Contracting Pty Ltd - Certified Agreement No. CA 689 of 2003 (the CA). The relevant Award is the Building Construction Industry Award - State 2003 (the Award). The amount claimed covers the period 1 January 2003 to 27 April 2005 and is comprised of:  Crib allowance, clause 6.2.4 of the Award - $1,805.96;  Travel allowance, clause 8.1.1(d) of the Award - $18,292.09;  Travel allowance, clause 8.1.1(i) of the Award - $364.40;  "No lunch" penalty rates, clause 6.3.3. of the Award - $1,940.35; and  Under payment of ordinary hourly rate, time and a half hourly rate, double time hourly rate, annual leave and annual leave loading - $14,113.62. Alleged errors in the payslips make up part of the claim but the significant issues relate to whether Mr Reid was appointed the WHSO and whether he was entitled to travel allowance. The evidence produced in support of the claim came from Mr Reid himself and a former Supervisor Mr Jaakko Tiainen. The onus of proof rests on the applicant Union to prove on the balance of probabilities a just entitlement to the amounts claimed. The proving of a claim in the nature of a civil action is normally by way of admissible evidence. While the Act in s. 320(2) provides that the Commission is not bound by the rules of evidence, it has often been said that those rules are founded in experience, logic and common sense. In De Domenico v Marshall (1999) 94 FCR 97 at 114 Madgwick J said that in a case bearing many of the characteristics of ordinary civil litigation "what may be called the spirit of the rules of evidence, if not their letter, becomes of more importance than in other kinds of administrative enquiries". In The King v The War Pensioners Entitlement Appeal Tribunal and Another, ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 at 256 it was remarked by Evatt J that because a tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence does not mean that they may be ignored as of no account. Fisher C in Barker v Queensland Fire and Rescue Authority (2001) 168 QGIG 237 at 238 said that the Court and the Commission have adopted the view that although the rules of evidence do not bind the Commission, they should generally be followed to ensure fairness and justice are served. Significant sums of money may be involved and any liability must be properly based. The case involves issues of credibility. Nothing about underpayment of wages or allowances was raised by Mr Reid until after he was dismissed. He claims that he was intimidated and feared for his job so he did not raise these issues with the respondent. That fear is not so much unusual or unlikely as to make it improbable that it was genuinely held but it is a fear which is easy to express and difficult to counter. There is evidence which is relevant to the credibility of that expressed fear. Mr Reid's demeanour did not convey to me that he was some sort of "shrinking violet" or of a timid nature. He was assertive and aggressive in the witness box. He produced as exhibits numerous pay slips and time sheets showing that he had challenged, at that time, the amount he had been paid and he gave evidence of numerous challenges. His evidence of "being intimidated" is just not consistent with those previous challenges. He claimed others had been sacked for raising issues but could not advance any names. He claimed in evidence that he was the -- 1 of 6 -- 2 only one prepared to stand up for himself and he also said that he was not easily frightened. At all times he was a member of the Union. He also did not raise with Mr Tiainen, who gave evidence on his behalf, any dissatisfaction with wages or allowances. He said that he was always at odds with the company over workplace health and safety issues which he took very seriously, an attitude which appears to me to be inconsistent with his claim that he was afraid of raising matters with them. The Office Manager for the respondent, Jocelyn Gillard gave evidence that if there were any queries, and there were a few, they were investigated and rectified. She said she thought she had a good rapport with Mr Reid. There are other reasons why someone might raise underpayment of wages after a dismissal and that might include dissatisfaction with the dismissal itself, generating a "get square" motive. It must be remembered however that an applicant has 6 years within which to prosecute wages claims. These matters are all related to credibility and how particular evidence is viewed. There is other evidence though which casts doubt on Mr Reid's credibility. He claimed that each week, he recorded on the pay slips his dissatisfaction with the pay for that particular week. The originals of those documents were called for and produced. They were separated into two bundles, one bundle having been completed with a blue biro and the other bundle having been completed with a black biro. The texture and colour of the biro markings indicate that those markings were made by the same two biros, a highly unlikely phenomenon if the notes were made weekly over a period of 2 years and 4 months. One would have expected more variation. Mr Reid denied placing the markings on the documents when he took them to the Union. I do not believe his evidence that he made notations weekly. He further endeavoured to corroborate his evidence about those weekly markings by claiming that he kept a diary. He failed to produce that diary, yet it must have been just as important to this wages claim as the markings on the pay slips which he had kept since 28 January 2003. There was then, some basis for the submission that Mr Reid lacked credibility. Yet the respondent's witnesses also carried the baggage of loyalty to the respondent company engendered from many years of service and an obvious good relationship. In one case, there was mention of the respondent's understanding and assistance for a child needing open heart surgery. So in determining matters of fact, it is always best to look for some independent or written evidence to assist in the fact finding process. Time sheets and pay slips: Numerous time sheets and accompanying pay slips were produced in evidence and the notations written on the pay slips by Mr Reid constituted the evidence relied upon for the claim. For example, the pay slips may have contained the markings "Lunch not paid correctly; half hour taken; Gold Coast" or "1 x tea money not paid; no lunch not paid correctly; 1 hour taken.". The pay slips referred back to a relevant time sheet. These time sheets were signed by Mr Reid and some, perhaps most, were signed by an officer of the respondent as "Authorised by". Yet many were not. If they were not signed as authorised, the respondent said they were taken at face value and accepted. This was clearly a very loose arrangement. The evidence to support the individual claims where an explanation might be required was just non-existent. The method of proof adopted by the Union was not ideal and should have been more precise. The Industrial Officer should have been called to explain the calculations. The spreadsheets were produced at the behest of the Commission. The respondent seems not to have been given a copy until the Commission received its copy. The Union should have laid bare its claim at a point in time approximate to the conference and some more sense might have then been able to be made of the claim. In the absence of oral evidence to explain and support the spreadsheets, the assessment of the liability of the respondent has been made most difficult. In themselves, the spreadsheets are not evidence unless based on evidence. Some of the Union's calculations have not been supported by evidence, either written or oral from Mr Reid and they cannot be accepted. Where the calculations on the spreadsheets are supported by documentation either authorised or accepted by the company, as later explained, sufficient proof on the balance of probabilities has been provided. Workplace Health and Safety appointment: Mr Reid gave evidence that in early December 2002, he was approached by Mr Brian McLean of the respondent and asked to work for the company on the Gold Coast Convention Centre in the capacity of a concreter and WHSO. That evidence was denied by Mr McLean who said that Mr Reid was never appointed as a WHSO and at no stage did he ever instruct for him to be paid the CW4 rate as per clause 1.10 of the CA for performing as a WHSO. He said Mr Reid was employed as a concreter. Mr Reid did not raise the issue with the company or as part of the weekly notations on the pay slips, nor was it ever mentioned to Mr Tiainen. His explanation was he was unaware of the correct rate. -- 2 of 6 -- 3 Mr Reid relied for corroboration of his evidence on his understanding that almost all sub-contractors engaged on the Gold Coast Convention Centre were required to supply their own WHSO. No evidence of the practice of contractors, if relevant at all, was produced. He also relied upon the principal contract which he alleged required the appointment of a WHSO. Although the contract could have been subpoenaed, it was not and it was not produced, his evidence was hearsay and of no weight. It was not for the respondent to prove the applicant's claim. Section 93 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 provides that an employer must appoint a suitably qualified person as a WHSO for a workplace if 30 or more workers are normally employed at the workplace. It was alleged by the respondent that there were never 30 or more employed at the workplace so that, by law, the respondent was not required to appoint a WHSO. This was not accepted by Mr Reid but he could not give any details of the numbers employed other than a very general denial which was not very credible. Mr Tiainen, at the time the Supervisor for the Gold Coast Convention Centre and called on behalf of Mr Reid, said that he was informed by both Murray Ward and Brian McLean that Mr Reid was the company's Safety Officer for the project. That evidence was disputed by both Mr Ward and Mr McLean. While it was suggested that Mr Tiainen's evidence might lack weight due to errors in his affidavit as to his address and whether he was an employee, as he claimed, or a contractor as he truly was, he had some independence when compared to others. Exhibit 9 was a series of documents relating to safety. There were two documents from Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd dated 24 May 2003 and 31 May 2003, both with the subject "Safety Notice" and addressed to Brian McLean relating instructions regarding aspects of safety. There were also two documents from Multiplex dated 10 May 2003 and 21 May 2003 for attention of "Jakko (sic) Tiainen" also comprising Site Instructions and dealing with safety issues. There is also a document under the hand of Mr Tiainen dated 13 June 2003 acknowledging receipt of other Site Instructions from Multiplex and indicating that the instructions would be passed on at the next toolbox meeting. This evidence is to be viewed in the light of Mr Tiainen's written statement where he said that "Although I was in charge of the employees on this project I was required to heed David's advice on matters concerning health and safety". It was claimed that the evidence does not support the allegation that Mr Reid was the WHSO because all safety concerns were addressed to others but in my view, the evidence is ambivalent. In support of his claim that he was appointed the WHSO, Mr Reid exhibited a reference purportedly from Pat Brandenburg, Site Manager for Thiess Contractors Pty Limited dated 6 January 2005. The reference related that Mr Reid had worked as the Site Foreman on the Thiess GH1 Medical and Oral Health Facility project for the previous 12 months; that he had demonstrated a strong focus on the Safety Management of Shepherd activities and provided valuable input into the management of general safety on the project; that his supervision of the concreting works and attention to site coordination and workplace health and safety has met all of Thiess' expectations. The reference does not purport to prove that Mr Reid was appointed as the WHSO for the respondent (although tendered for that purpose) but it is classic hearsay. Mr Brandenburg was not called to give evidence. Similarly, there was a "To Whom It May Concern" document dated 27 November 2004 from Brian Maynard Site Manager of Multiplex Constructions who said that Mr Reid's "concern for program, workmanship and safety assisted in the successful completion of the Gold Coast Convention & Entertainment Centre". Once again, this reference does not provide proof of, and is not evidence of, the fact that Mr Reid was appointed by the respondent as its WHSO. Mr Reid also gave evidence that in February 2003, the respondent paid for him to complete a course in Health and Safety Management and in May 2003, paid for him to complete a Plan Reading course. While there is a question whether the respondent actually paid for those courses, it is accepted that Mr Reid's wages for the day were paid. But again, in the light of the denials the evidence is ambivalent as to whether he was appointed the WHSO. Exhibit 7 which is the "Site, Health, Safety and Environmental Plan" adopted by Mr Reid and applicable to him as Leading Hand via clause 5.0 made provision regarding safety issues including health and safety management plan, recording procedures for injuries and accidents and other related matters and might well explain his attendance at those courses without constituting evidence that he was appointed as the WHSO. But there is evidence which is not ambivalent and left unexplained, as it has been, raises a very strong inference that Mr Reid was the WHSO. It is not disputed that on 18 and 19 August 2003, Mr Reid underwent a "workplace health and safety officer re-certification", paid for by the respondent. Witnesses for the respondent were not aware why the respondent paid for that course. Section 31(3) of the Workplace Health and Safety Regulation 1997 provides that a certificate is valid for a maximum of 5 years and ss (2A) provides that for the renewal of an application for a certificate, the chief executive needed to be satisfied that the applicant had completed an approved WHSO recertification course. In my view, and in the light of the evidence of Mr Tiainen and Mr Reid, the recertification course was paid for because Mr Reid was the WHSO and the recertification was necessary to renew his certificate of authority as a WHSO. That payment tips the scales in the balancing process. On the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr Reid was employed as the WHSO during the term of his employment and was required to be paid the CW4 rate as provided for in the CA. -- 3 of 6 -- 4 As to quantum, I have made remarks elsewhere about the method used by the Union to prove its claim. There are no such difficulties with the proof of this aspect of the claim, except that there seem to have been some small errors in the calculations, perhaps stemming from the number of decimal places used. The claim in the affidavit attached to the application and sworn by Wayne Joseph Carter seeks the recovery of $14,113.62. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the sum of $14,019.39 is due and payable. No lunch: This claim arises because of the provisions of clause 6.3.3 of the Award which reads: "If an employer requires an employee to work during their meal break the employee will be paid at the rate of Double Time for the period worked between the usual time of the meal break and the beginning of the actual meal break taken. If the meal break is shortened at the request of the employee to the minimum of 30 minutes or to any other extent (not being less than 30 minutes) the employer will not be required to pay more than the ordinary rates of pay for the time worked as a result of such shortening, but such time will form part of the ordinary working time of the day.". There is a difference in calculations for "no lunch" and "late lunch". "No lunch" requires a payment at double time from 12.30 p.m. until the time of the cessation of duty whereas "late lunch" requires payment at those rates until the beginning of the actual meal break taken. Ms Gillard gave evidence that there was a company policy to pay 2 hours for "no lunch" and that the policy was rigid and strict. She also said that the time sheets were not useful in determining whether it was a "no lunch" or a "late lunch" situation because all employees noted "no lunch". She said she could not say whether Mr Reid had a lunch or not and there was no investigation to determine whether a lunch was taken or not. It is acknowledged by the Commission that the opening words of clause 6.3.3 are most important. "If an employer requires an employee to work during their meal break ....". Mr McLean did not accept on any occasion that it was not possible to have a lunch break. Furthermore, he exhibited 3 memos to employees, the first dated 13 December 2003 which read in part: "Under no circumstances should you not take these breaks (i.e. prescribed meal and crib breaks) without consultation of your Supervisor or Construction Manager Brian McLean." and two others dated 13 January 2003 and 24 March 2004 wherein he gave directions such as: "We ask for your co-operation in consulting with your Leading Hands and your co-workers to ensure that everyone is able to get a break by rotating labour. In the event that you believe you are not able to leave the task you are carrying out, you need to advise your Leading Hand or Supervisor so that he may make arrangements to organize alternate labour to ensure everyone has a break. It is unacceptable for any person to not have a meal break two hours beyond your allocated time. If in the event you believe circumstances may have the potential to make this occur, contact Brian McLean who will make the necessary arrangement to control this contingency.". Those instructions are clear and appear not to have been observed. An employee cannot, by wilful disobedience to instructions, generate a liability on the part of the employer to pay an allowance. Yet, as was pointed out in F.E.D.F.A. v Hinspeter Crane Services Pty Ltd A.I.R.C. Print J5451 per Grimshaw C, there is a responsibility on an employer to ensure that the employees receive their meal breaks as provided for in the Award and that it is illegal to attempt to contract out of an Award (unless the employment conditions are more favourable to the employee - s. 135 of the Act). An employer who bothers not to enforce its instructions may be guilty of wilful blindness to prohibited practices by employees and should not complain if subsequently found liable. However, there is also a clause in the CA, clause 2.12.1, which requires all time and wages records to contain at a minimum details including "Time lunch and crib breaks taken". The time and wages records breach that requirement. It was suggested that the Union was also in breach because in clause 2.12.2, the Union was required to give a notice to the company outlining the breach which might then have required the company to provide a reconciliation of monies owing. All I can say about that submission is that it might have been provident for the company that no such notice was given. In Ray v Radano (1967) 67 N.S.W. A.R. 471 at 480, Sheldon J said: "No doubt in the house of perjury there are many mansions, but few would be as frequented as the courts in which embittered parties contest claims for past remuneration after severance of employment. An employer who neglects to keep the statutory records, which, in their probative effect, are as much a protection to himself as to the employee, deserves little sympathy if he loses in a battle reduced to oath against oath. Also, if, through ignorance or indifference, he simply pays a wage for work done without considering the monetary differentiations made in the relevant award in respect to hours, times and days of the week, he often finds on the day of reckoning that he is faced with claims which, through accumulation, are alarming in their proportions but unanswerable in law.". -- 4 of 6 -- 5 This passage might seem to have some relevance in this case. The point is that if the respondent has neglected to keep the records required, it cannot afterwards complain if there is a dispute. In this case, the claim is based upon time and wages sheets containing information recorded by Mr Reid and either specifically authorised by a Supervisor or in the case where the authorisation was left blank, accepted on trust by the respondent. In my view, the employer is bound by the notation "no lunch". Because the spreadsheets were not accepted by the respondent, and indeed could not be having been provided so late, an extensive exercise in checking the spreadsheets has been necessary. Some claims, arising on particular dates, have not been supported by documentation and are rejected - i.e. 30.1.03; 31.1.03; 7.2.03; 10.2.03; 10.4.03; 8.7.03; 9.9.03; 25.9.03; 31.5.04; 26.11.04; and 14.2.05. After an accounting exercise and deducting amounts paid by the respondent, I find a liability of at least that claimed by the applicant in the application, viz. $1,940.35. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that sum is due and unpaid. Travel: The travel claim under clause 8.1.1(d) of the Award arises because of the underpayment of travel allowance. In brief terms, the allowance is paid where an employee who lives within a 50 kilometre radius of the GPO in Brisbane travels daily to a job located outside the 50 kilometre radial area. Mr Reid worked at sites on the Gold Coast. He lived at Ashley Court, Cedar Vale which is very close to Jimboomba. It would be understandable if it were considered to be in the Gold Coast area. It is alleged that his address fell within the 50 kilometre radius from the Brisbane GPO and that therefore, he was entitled to travel allowance based on a minimum of one half hour each way together with a per kilometre allowance. Mr McLean, who hired Mr Reid, could not specifically recall a conversation about where Mr Reid lived but he said he would have asked him about where he lived to check his proximity to the Gold Coast. Other than for the evidence of his address, Mr Reid gave no other information in evidence as to conversations at the time or as to the distance of his residence from the GPO. I would have thought that where a respondent could be liable for travel expenses, Mr McLean would have enquired of Mr Reid's address and whatever he was told, if anything, did not alert him to some travel liability. That the respondent believed that Mr Reid lived outside the 50 kilometre radius of the Brisbane GPO is borne out by evidence that on many occasions, when Mr Reid did work in Brisbane, he was paid a travel allowance from the Gold Coast to Brisbane. The allowance would not have been payable at all if he lived within that 50 kilometre radius. At no stage did he offer to refund or credit those overpayments to which he was not entitled and in my view, this is another credibility issue. An employer is entitled, in a contractual sense, to correct information as to an employee's address and I think an employee bears a measure of responsibility to either provide the correct information or at least not to mislead. (Contrast the situation where an employee changes address during the term of employment). But there is a marked deficiency in the proof of this claim. Maps were offered up from the Bar table, purporting to show that Mr Reid's house was 44.533 kilometres from the Brisbane GPO. There was no oral evidence in conjunction with those maps to provide the respondent with an opportunity to test the veracity of the recorded information. There was no evidence that Mr Reid's house was situated at the precise point delineated on the map and it is impossible to say that Mr Reid's house is at the spot shown on the map without other evidence. There was no evidence of the co- ordinates used to make the calculation. There was no evidence that the calculations were reliable. In a case where a small mistake in a calculation could affect the distance alleged, where the point of interest is near the boundary, where Mr Reid himself and the respondent both apparently thought he lived outside the 50 kilometre radius (or the other explanation is that Mr Reid was being dishonest) and where there is no proper proof of the fact in issue, it would be grossly unfair to the respondent to find that Mr Reid resided within that 50 kilometre radius. On the whole of the evidence, I am not able to find on the balance of probabilities that Mr Reid resided within that 50 kilometre radius so as to attract the provisions of clause 8.1.1(d) of the Award. That part of the claim is dismissed. There is a claim for travel arising under clause 8.1.1(i) of the Award which provides: "Transfers during working hours - An employee transferred from one site to another during ordinary working hours will be paid for the time occupied in travelling and, unless transported by the employer, will be paid reasonable cost of fares by most convenient public transport between such sites. Where an employer requests an employee to use the employee's own car to effect such a transfer and such employee agrees to do so the employee will be paid an allowance at the rate of 77 cents per kilometre.". -- 5 of 6 -- 6 The sworn affidavit of Wayne Joseph Carter attached to the application says that an amount of $364.40 is due. I can find very little evidence to support that claim. The only proof offered appears to be the notation on some pay slips "no car allowance" and, in some cases, a corresponding note on the time sheet. How the liability claimed was calculated appears to be a secret between Mr Reid and the Union. Mr Reid gave no evidence as to how far he travelled between job sites except what is recorded on those pay slips and time sheets (and then, only in some cases). There is no evidence whether the employer requested him to use his own motor vehicle. There is no evidence that he used his own motor vehicle. The Commission cannot make a guess. With respect to all time sheets bar one, any entry appearing to relate to car allowance has been paid. The time sheet of week ending 15 June 2004 and the pay slip of the corresponding date show that 60 kilometres was not reimbursed. It is inferred it was authorised by the respondent for the same reasons exposed earlier in this judgment in relation to the "no lunch" claim. I am satisfied on balance that car allowance of 60 kilometres at .73 cents per kilometre, (apparently the rate then applicable), is due and unpaid, total $43.80. Crib breaks: This part of the claim arises because of the provisions of clause 6.2.4 of the Award: "When an employee is required to work overtime after the usual ceasing time for the day or shift for 2 hours or more, the employee will be allowed to take, without deduction of pay, a crib time of 20 minutes in duration immediately after such ceasing time. Thereafter, after each 4 hours of continuous work, the employee will be allowed to take also, without deduction of pay, a crib time of 30 minutes in duration. In the event of an employee remaining at work after the usual ceasing time without taking the crib time of 20 minutes and continuing at work for a period of 2 hours or more, the employee will be regarded as having worked 20 minutes more than the time worked and be paid accordingly.". Once again, the evidence for the claim is contained in the notations made by Mr Reid in the time and wages record and either authorised by the respondent or accepted without any question, but not paid, or paid using the incorrect rate. My remarks under the "no lunch" section are equally applicable. An extensive accounting exercise has been performed. Unless Mr Reid has written "no tea money" or "no crib" on the pay slip and there is a corresponding notation on the time sheet, the various amounts written on the spreadsheet have been rejected due to lack of any evidence. In the absence of evidence from Mr Reid and/or Mr Carter to explain, the spreadsheet is hearsay and how the calculations have been arrived at remains a secret between Mr Reid and the Union. I have therefore taken into account those items fully supported by evidence and deducted the amount paid by the respondent (in all circumstances bar one, an underpayment; the other, no payment). I am satisfied that the sum of $165.12 is due and unpaid. In summary, I am satisfied that the following amounts are due and payable: Under payments of hourly rates due to WHSO appointment $14,019.39 Crib allowance $165.12 Travel allowance, clause 8.1.1(i) $43.80 No lunch penalty rates (at the least) $1,940.35 Total $16,168.66 On the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the sum of $16,168.66 is due and payable. I order that the amount be paid to the applicant Union within 30 days. B.J. BLADES, Commissioner. Hearing Details: 2006 28 and 29 August Released: 7 September 2006 Appearances: Mr R. Moxham for the Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders' Labourers' Federation (Queensland Branch) Union of Employees. Mr M. Belfield of Queensland Master Builders Association, Industrial Organisation of Employers, with him Mr P. Richardson on behalf of Shepherd Contracting Pty Ltd Government Printer, Queensland The State of Queensland 2006. -- 6 of 6 --