BSC Holdings Pty Ltd v Shearn [2005] QSC 189
State Reporting Bureau
[a«)GSC IT<{
Queensland Government
Department of Justice and Attorney-General
Transcript of Proceedings
Copyright in this transcript is vested in the Crown. Copies thereof must not be made or sold without the written authority
of the Director, State Reporting Bureau.
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CIVIL JURISDICTION
MUIR J
No 7522 of 2004
BSC HOLDINGS PTY LTD ’
and
ELAINE SHEARN
BRISBANE
. .DATE 16/06/2005
JUDGMENT
REVISED COPIES ISSUED
State Reporting Bureau
Date: 6 July, 2005
Plaintiff
Defendant
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. 1
th Floor, The Law Courts, George Street, Brisbane, Q. 4000 Telephone: (07) 3247 4360 Fax: (07) 3247 5532
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1 HIS HONOUR: The plaintiff, BSC Holdings Pty Ltd, sues for
specific performance of a contract for the sale and purchase
of land, dated 23 October 2002, entered into between it as
purchaser and the defendant, Elaine Shearn, as vendor.
The purchase price stated in the contract is $1,400,000.
Under clause 4 the contract was subject to development
approvals being obtained. Clause 4 (b) permitted the plaintiff
to extend the time within which approvals was to be obtained
by three months should it be unable to obtain the approvals by
the specified date. That happened. Clause 4(d) permitted the
plaintiff, by notice in writing, to waive the benefit of the
clause .
The plaintiff waived the benefit of the clause. After it did
so, the parties agreed to vary the contract by:
(a) extending the date for completion to 1 July 2004;
(b) payment of "further deposit moneys of $48,000" on or
before 28 November 2003;
(c) payment of a further "balance of deposit" of $42,000
to be held by the plaintiff and "used to pay the seller's
agent commission" ;
(d) increasing the contract price to $1,454,000.
Those terms were set out in a letter dated 18 November 2003
from the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant notified
her acceptance of the terms by signing a copy of the letter.
A further variation of contract is recorded in a letter from
the plaintiff to the defendant dated 2 July 2004, a copy of
which was also signed by the defendant notifying her
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1 acceptance of the terms. That variation extended the date for,
settlement to 8 January 2005, increased the contract price to
$1,526,500, and provided for payment of "additional deposit"
of $72,500 within five days of 2 July.
The $72,500 was not paid within the time provided and on 14
July 2004 Mr James Woolford, the defendant's husband,
delivered to the plaintiff a letter of that date which stated:
"I refer to your letter dated 2 July 2004. To date I am
not in receipt of the $72,500 as was a written agreement
stated in your letter.
I now wish to cancel the above contract, effective
immediately. "
The letter was signed by Mr Woolford, purportedly on behalf of
the defendant. I should mention that irrespective of how
other copies of that letter may or may not have been given on
behalf of the defendant to the plaintiff, one copy of it was
sent by facsimile transmission to the Queensland State Manager
of the plaintiff, Mr Bermingham.
There were some telephone conversations between Mr Bermingham
and Mr Woolford, in consequence of which a meeting took place
between them and Mr Cahill, a director of the plaintiff, at
the Morayfield Sports Club. A discussion ensued, in
consequence of which Mr Woolford agreed to provide the
telephone number of the defendant, whom he said was at that
time in New Zealand. There was a telephone conversation the
next day between Mr Woolford and Mr Bermingham and Mr
Bermingham arranged for Mr Woolford to meet him later that
morning in the plaintiff's offices in Wickham Street, The
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Valley.
A meeting between the three men then took place. In the
course of it, Mr Woolford said words to the effect that he
held a power of attorney from the defendant and was authorised
to act on her behalf. He also indicated that he had documents
with him to enable settlement of the transaction to take
place.
The upshot of the discussion at the meeting was that Mr
Woolford signed a letter dated 14 July 2004 addressed to the
plaintiff stating:
"I hereby confirm that the notice of cancellation in my
letter of 12th July 2004 is now withdrawn."
The letter was signed by him on behalf of the defendant.
On it, he wrote:
"Per Elaine Shearn as per Enduring Power of Attorney."
He also signed a letter from the plaintiff to the defendant
setting out the terms of a variation to the contract on behalf
of the defendant again writing "as per Enduring Power of
Attorney" beside his signature.
The variations effected by that letter were:
(a) the new date for settlement was Friday, 6 August
2004;
(b) the purchase price, described as "the new
contract value", was $1,474,000;
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(c) a further deposit of $100,000 was payable on 14 July
(receipt of the money being acknowledged in the
letter) ;
(d) it was agreed that $42,000 be paid on behalf of the
defendant to the defendant's agents FDP Savills.
The letter confirmed that deposits paid, "Include $58,000
being the initial $10,000 paid at the date of contract and a
further $48,000'paid at 22 December 2003."
On 2 August 2004, the defendant contacted Mr Bermingham by
telephone. A meeting between them was arranged. It took
place at about 9.30 a.m. on 3 August 2004 at the plaintiff's
Wickham Street offices.
Mr Jolly, a member of the firm of Biggs & Biggs Solicitors,
was also present at the meeting but nothing much turns, I
think, on what happened at it. The defendant said that she
wanted to get to the bottom of what happened and to find out
what their position was. Mr Jolly stated the plaintiff's
position was that a variation of the contract was effected on
14 July and that completion was due on Friday 6 August. The
defendant, I think it fair to say, disputed that there was any
variation binding on her and intimated that she would get
legal advice.
The previous day, she had sent a letter to Mr Cahill in which
she stated, inter alia:
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"Jim had no rights to enter into or alter any agreements
made by me and I did not give him any authority to act on
my behalf. He has nothing to do with this property. The
Power of Attorney he showed you is not properly
witnessed, so is not legal. He tried to access my
account in which he had deposited your cheque while I was
away in New Zealand but was unable to do so. The money
is still there and I intend to return it to you. ..
My intention is to abide by our latest agreement dated
02-07-04.. .
If you would like settlement to be brought forward to the
06-08-04 with balance of money being $1,526,500 less
moneys already paid. Could you please inform me of your
intentions by 5 p.m. on 03/08/04."
In a letter of 3 August on the letterhead of Glen Alpine
Properties Pty Ltd, Mr Bermingham asserted that the letter of
14 July 2004 recorded:
"The current arrangements in relation to completion of
the sale purchase."
It contained an offer for a further variation which was not
accepted. The defendant nominated the place and time for
settlement and attended at settlement prepared to.tender the
balance purchase price under the contract as varied by the
agreement reached on 14 July 2004. The defendant did not
attend on settlement.
It is contended in the defence and counterclaim that Mr
Woolford lacked authority to enter into the variation
agreement on 14 July and to provide the letter of 14 July
confirming cancellation of the letter of 12 July.
There is something of an inconsistency in the defendant's
position. The letter of 2 August 2004, it will be recalled,
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1 asserts that Mr Woolford had no authority to act on behalf of
the defendant and that he had nothing to do with the property,
yet the defendant relies on a letter dated 12 July 2004 signed
by Mr Woolford on her behalf.
The evidence reveals that Mr Woolford had a considerable
amount to do with the property in that he exercised
considerable influence concerning the decision-making of the
defendant concerning the property and undoubtedly had her
authority for some dealings at least. His evidence was, as I
think I have already mentioned, that he held an Enduring Power
of Attorney and that was consistent with the way in which he
executed the documents .
Mr Bermingham swears to having in fact seen such a document
produced by Mr Woolford at the meeting of 14 July and to
noticing that it had what appeared to be the defendant's
signature on it.
I note that in the defendant's letter of 2 August 2004, she
did not assert that there was in fact no Power of Attorney
held by Mr Woolford. The point she made was that it was not
"properly witnessed", thereby accepting by inference that
there was in fact a Power of Attorney in existence.
I find that Mr Woolford did hold a Power of Attorney and that
he acted pursuant to it. Furthermore, I am not persuaded that
at any material time he lacked the authority of the defendant
to act as he did.
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If there be any doubt about the matter, and in my view there
isn't, it seems to me that this would be an appropriate
circumstance in which to apply the presumption of regularity:
see Carpenter v Carpenter Grazing Co Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 506
at 514, and Popovic v Tanasijevic (No 5) (2000) 34 ACSR 1.
The defendant faces the further problem that the contract
became an instalment contract within the meaning of section
71 of the Property Law Act 1974 once the monies payable under
it, whether deposit or otherwise, exceeded 10 per cent of the
purchase price. See e.g., Emlen Pty Ltd v Cabbala Pty Ltd
[1989] 1 QdR 620. That occurred on 2 July 2004.
That being the case, by operation of section 72, the contract
could not be determined because of default on the part of the
defendant in payment of any instalment of or sum of money
until the expiration of 30 days after service on the defendant
of a notice in the approved form. No such notice was ever
served, and therefore the contract necessarily remained on
foot .
It is further contended on behalf of the defendant that
because of alcohol supplied to Mr Woolford by servants or
agents of the plaintiff on 14 July 2005, Mr Woolford was at a
special disadvantage in dealing with the plaintiff, not able
to properly make judgments in his own interests or in the
interests of the defendant and was taken unconscionable
advantage of by the plaintiff.
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1 The evidence does not support any such allegation. In
particular, it does not support the existence of any lack of
mental capacity of Mr Woolford at relevant times. I see no
reason why in this regard I should not accept the evidence of
the plaintiff's witnesses, including that of Mary Trim, which
evidence was unchallenged. I accept their evidence generally.
In my view Mr Woolford's recollection was substantially
unreliable .
The evidence reveals that the plaintiff was ready, willing and
able to settle at material times, and, accordingly, I find
that the contract, as varied from time to time, remains on
foot and that the plaintiff is entitled to specific
performance.
I declare that the contract described in paragraph A of the
claim, as varied on or about 18 November 2003, 2 July 2004,
and 14 July 2004 remains on foot and that such contract ought
be specifically performed and carried into execution.
I order that:
(1) the date for completion of the said contract be
14 July 2005;
(2) that the transfer documents be produced by the
defendant to the plaintiff's solicitor for stamping
no later than five business days prior to 14 July
2005, and that such documents, unless otherwise
agreed between the plaintiff and defendant, be
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returned to the defendant after stamping;
(3) in exchange for any instrument of title to the
subject land required to register its transfer to
the plaintiff and transfer documents capable of
immediate registration, the plaintiff pay to the
defendant on completion $1,274,000 (subject to any
adjustments required under the said contract) ;
(4) the defendant pay the plaintiff's costs of and
incidental to the proceedings (including reserved
costs, if any) to be assessed on the standard basis;
(5) that there be liberty to either party to apply on
two days' notice in writing to the other.
MR WILSON: Could I be heard on the question of costs,
your Honour .
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HIS HONOUR: I add to the costs order except that the costs of
and incidental to today's hearing be assessed on an indemnity
basis, such costs being counsel's fees in respect of today's
hearing and the costs of the plaintiff's solicitors in respect
of today's hearing.
I make that order having regard to the three offers to settle,
including the one made on 16 May 2005 on terms more
advantageous to the defendants than the order made here.
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It seems to me that, at least by the time the defendant
received and perused the witness statements, it should have
been abundantly plain, if it had not been apparent earlier,
that the case had little merit 'and was unlikely to succeed.
In order to conform with those reasons, on reflection, the
only costs I will order be paid on an indemnity basis are the
costs of and incidental to today's hearing.
The formal order will be amended accordingly.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2005/189