Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v G [2005] QSC 71
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Attorney-General v G [2005] QSC 071
PARTIES: RODNEY JOHN WELFORD, ATTORNEY-GENERAL
FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(applicant)
v
G
(respondent)
FILE NO/S: S10326/04
DIVISION: Trial
PROCEEDING: Application
ORIGINATING
COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 31 March 2005
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 31 March 2005
JUDGE: McMurdo J
ORDERS: 1. The Court is satisfied to the requisite standard that G is a
serious danger to the community in the absence of an
order pursuant to Division 3 of the Dangerous Prisoners
(Sexual Offenders) Act 2003
2. The respondent be subject to the following conditions of
supervision until 23 August 2009, or further earlier order
of the Court.
The respondent must:
(a) be under the supervision of a corrective services
officer (“the supervising corrective services
officer”) for the duration of this order;
(b) report to the supervising corrective services officer
at the Department of Corrective Services Area
Office closest to his place of residence between
9am and 4pm on Friday 1st April 2005 and therein
to advise the officer of the respondent’s current
name and address;
(c) reside at a place within the State of Queensland as
approved by a corrective services officer by way of
a suitability assessment. The place not to be within
500m of a school, or 300m from some other public
place or business where children are cared for or
supervised;
(d) report to and receive visits from the supervising
corrective services officer at such frequency as
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determined necessary by the supervising corrective
services officer;
(e) notify the supervising corrective services officer of
every change of the prisoner’s name at least two
business days before the change happens;
(f) notify the supervising corrective services officer of
the nature of his employment, the hours of work
each day, the name of his employer and the address
of his premises where he is employed;
(g) notify the supervising corrective services officer of
every change of employment at least two business
days before the change happens;
(h) notify the supervising corrective services officer of
every change of the respondent’s place of residence
at least two business days before the change
happens;
(i) not leave or stay out of Queensland without the
written permission of the supervising corrective
services officer;
(j) not commit an offence of a sexual nature during the
period for which these orders operate;
(k) obey the lawful and reasonable directions of the
supervising corrective services officer;
(l) respond truthfully to enquiries by the supervising
corrective services officer about his whereabouts
and movements generally;
(m) not join, affiliate with, attend on the premises of or
attend at the activities carried on by any club or
organisation in respect of which there are
reasonable grounds for believing there is either
child membership or child participation;
(n) notify the supervising corrective services officer of
the make, model, colour and registration number of
any motor vehicle owned by, or generally driven by
him;
(o) not be on the premises of any shopping centre,
without reasonable excuse, between 8.00 am to
9.30 am and between 2.30 pm and 4.30 pm on
school days other than for the purposes:
(i) employment;
(ii) to attend a bona fide pre-arranged
appointment with a government agency,
medical practitioner or the like;
(p) not without reasonable excuse be in an area within
500m of a school between 8.00 am and 9.30 am and
2.30 pm and 4.30 pm on school days or be in area
within 300m of a school at any time;
(q) not visit public parks without prior written
permission from the supervising corrective services
officer;
(r) not without reasonable excuse to be within 500m of
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a children’s playground or child care area;
(s) not undertake unsupervised care of children;
(t) not establish and maintain contact with children
under 16 years of age;
(u) not access pornographic images containing
photographs or images of children on a computer or
on the Internet;
(v) abstain from the consumption of alcohol for the
duration of this Order;
(w) abstain from illicit drugs for the duration of this
Order;
(x) take prescribed drugs as directed by a medical
practitioner;
(y) submit to alcohol and drug testing as directed by a
corrective services officer, the expense of which is
to be met by the Department of Corrective
Services;
(z) not visit premises licensed to supply or serve
alcohol;
(aa) attend a psychiatrist who has been approved by the
supervising corrective services officer at a
frequency and duration which shall be
recommended by the treating psychiatrist, the
expense of which is to be met by the Department of
Corrective Services;
(bb) permit any treating psychiatrist, psychologist or
counsellor to disclose details of medical treatment
and opinions relating to his level of risk of re-
offending and compliance with this Order to the
Department of Corrective Services if such request
is made in writing for the purposes of updating or
amending the supervision order and/or ensuring
compliance with this order;
(cc) attend any program, course, psychologist or
counsellor, in a group or individual capacity, as
directed by the treating psychiatrist and the
supervising corrective services officer the expense
of which is to be met by the Department of
Corrective Services;
(dd) agree to undergo medical testing or treatment
(including the testing of testosterone levels by an
endocrinologist) as deemed necessary by the
treating psychiatrist and the supervising corrective
services officer, if such a request is made in writing
for the purposes of updating or amending the
supervision order, the expense of which is to be met
by the Department of Corrective Services;
(ee) agree to undergo an assessment by an Aged Care
Assessment Team at the request of the supervising
corrective services officer, and the release of the
results and details of the assessment, to the
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Department of Corrective Services, if such a
request is made in writing, for the purposes of
assessing and determining the suitability of G’s
residence in light of his medical conditions, the
expense of which is to be met by the Department of
Corrective Services
3. The whole of the file, save for the Originating
Application filed 25 November 2004 will be sealed up
and marked “not to be opened without an order of a judge
of the Supreme Court”
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – JUDGMENT AND PUNISHMENT –
SENTENCE – OTHER MATTERS – QUEENSLAND –
where respondent finished sentence for sexual offences –
where application under s 13 of the Dangerous Prisoners
(Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 for a supervision order not
opposed by respondent – whether court satisfied reasonable
grounds for believing prisoner serious danger to community
in absence of order – whether proposed conditions suitable
Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 68
Corrective Services Act 2000 (Qld) ss 242, 243
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld) s 6
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) ss 8,
13, 16, 18, 19, 44
J v L and A Services (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 10, referred to
COUNSEL: A Musgrave for the applicant
D Shepherd for the respondent
SOLICITORS: CW Lohe, Crown Solicitor for the applicant
Legal Aid Office for the respondent
[1] This is an application by the Attorney-General for a Division 3 order under the
Dangerous Prisoners Sexual Offenders Act 2003.
[2] On 9 December 2004 at a preliminary hearing a judge of this Court made a risk
assessment order pursuant to section 8 of that Act, but did not make an interim
detention order. The prisoner was released from custody on or about 11 January
2005.
[3] The order sought by the Attorney is for a supervision order of the respondent and as
the matter was argued the contentious questions are ones relating only to the
conditions of such an order.
[4] Indeed, the respondent through his counsel told me that he agreed that a supervision
order should be made.
[5] Nevertheless it is necessary for me to consider whether a serious danger to the
community is established, for the existence of such a danger is essential to the
Court's power to make a Division 3 order.
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[6] A prisoner is a serious danger to the community for the purposes of this Act if there
is an unacceptable risk that the prisoner will commit a serious sexual offence if
released from custody or if released from custody without a supervision order being
made. The Court may decide that it is satisfied that there is a serious danger to the
community, only if satisfied by acceptable cogent evidence and to a high degree of
probability that the evidence is of sufficient weight to justify the decision which is
sought.
[7] In deciding whether a prisoner is a serious danger to the community the Court must
have regard to matters set out in section 13(4). If it is satisfied that there is a serious
danger to the community in the relevant sense, the Court may order that the prisoner
be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care or treatment (which is
a continuing detention order) or it may make an order of the kind which the
Attorney seeks here which is that the prisoner be released from custody subject to
the conditions the Court considers appropriate that are stated in its order (which is
called a supervision order).
[8] Section 13(6) provides that in deciding whether to make an order of either of these
kinds the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure adequate protection of
the community, and subsection 13(7) provides that the Attorney-General has the
onus of proving the prisoner is a serious danger to the community.
[9] I mentioned that this respondent was released from custody, having served any
relevant term, earlier this year. Section 8(4), however, provides that in such a
circumstance a prisoner is treated for all purposes in relation to this Act as if he
were still a prisoner.
[10] The respondent has a long and extensive history of criminal behaviour involving
sexual offences as well as offences of some other kinds. His most serious criminal
behaviour has been his sexual offending. That dates back to 1962 when he was
convicted of an offence involving offensive behaviour in a toilet block. There were
a number of convictions in relation to sexual offences from 1979 through to and
including January 1994 when he was sentenced to certain cumulative terms, the last
of which expired only on his recent release.
[11] On the 11th of January 1994 he was convicted on two counts of rape for which he
was sentenced to concurrent terms of 12 years. At the same time he was convicted
of a number of offences involving indecent dealing with girls under the age of 14
years, and certain other sexual offences. On the indecent dealing counts he was
sentenced to terms of four years concurrent with one another but cumulative upon
the sentences for the counts of rape. He was granted remission of the 12 year terms
so that they expired upon 11 January 2001 and the four year terms for the indecent
dealing counts then commenced.
[12] The risk assessment order made last December has resulted in the provision of
reports by two psychiatrists, each of whom also gave oral evidence. They are
Doctors Moyle and Lawrence.
[13] Dr Moyle says that the respondent's criminal history makes him a high risk of
reoffending against children who are aged four to 13 and of either gender. The
respondent is now aged 70 years and is in poor physical health in respects which I
will mention shortly, but in the report of each of the psychiatrists his relatively poor
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physical health and advanced age does not substantially affect the risk, because
assuming that he has no or little potency, his sexual desires and his potential for
reoffending by other means is substantial.
[14] Dr Lawrence says that the respondent is clearly a paedophile and capable of
violence and that he shows traits of dependent passive self-gratification with little
empathy.
[15] She also summarises the respondent's medical or physical illnesses as including
these matters: Diabetes Mellitus Type 2, adrenal insufficiency secondary to adrenal
haemorrhage; chronic obstructive airways disease, hypertension, osteoarthritis,
some mild dementia, a probable transitional cell carcinoma of the bladder and other
conditions.
[16] In her view the dominant factor affecting the relevant risk is the respondent's
medical status and his health. She explains that in these terms, and I here set out
paragraphs 19.4 to 19.11 inclusive of her report:
“19.4 However, it must be borne in mind that the current good
control of his chronic medical illnesses is achieved through the
consistent and reliable routine of care which he receives in the prison
setting. This is a simple routine which requires him to attend 2 or 3
times per day at the hospital to receive his necessary medications,
which are numerous, and for continuing monitoring of his blood
sugar levels by nursing staff to assist in that control. Presumably the
need for a diabetic diet with its prohibitions would be taken care of
in the prison routine. His visits to doctors are organised by the
nursing staff and others for him and he receives the necessary
transport and is escorted.
19.5 In prison, he is not exposed to the temptations or alcohol or
drugs.
19.6 In short, (G) is receiving the optimal medical care and
supervision which is achieving good control of his chronic illnesses.
However, he is very much a passive recipient in the system and
merely relies on others to tell him what to do and is compliant with
what he is told.
19.7 Were he not to be imprisoned, the organisation of his medical
care and its day-to-day administration would need to be provided for
him by others.
19.8 In my opinion, his age, limited understanding of medical
matters and such cognitive and memory deficits as he does have,
would make it almost certain that, unless his care was carefully
supervised and administered, his medical illnesses would rapidly get
out of control.
19.9 Without carefully supervised control of his medical conditions,
there is a very high probability that he would deteriorate mentally as
well as physically; he could readily lose such cognitive
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understanding as he does have that he should not drink alcohol and
consumption of alcohol would undoubtedly aggravate, not only his
medical conditions but would lead to the loss of any inhibition of
sexual impulses that he may have.
19.10 The medical and biological basis for his sexual functioning at
the present time is unclear. It is highly likely that his apparently
longstanding Diabetes, even though controlled, may well lead to
erectile failure in this man. However, it cannot be assumed that this
will invariably lead to a loss of sexual desire or drive. With the
object of his sexual fantasies in the past being children, and an
inability to participate in adult type sexual relationships, the risk of
his re-offending sexually against children is, if anything, increased.
19.11 In my opinion, if his medical condition is well controlled, the
risk of his sexual offending is low. This is consistent with his stated
attitude at the present time.”
[17] In that last paragraph, that is 19.11, she expresses the opinion that the risk of his
sexual offending was low if his medical condition is well controlled. In her oral
evidence, however, Dr Lawrence emphasised that if it is not well controlled then the
risk becomes a high one. She emphasises the difference between the medical
attention available to the respondent when he was a prisoner and what she fears will
be the relatively low attention which he will seek now that he is not in custody.
[18] The effect of her opinion is that there is a high probability that his medical condition
will deteriorate and that in summary this will make for a relatively high risk of
sexual offending.
[19] The Attorney also relies upon other evidence going to this threshold question of risk
and in particular upon the views of a psychologist, Ms Roland. According to her
report written in September 2003 there is a moderate to high risk of sexual
recidivism.
[20] What I have said here in relation to the professional opinions deals with most of the
matters to which I must have regard according to section 13(4). I would add that so
far as the respondent's cooperation in the examination by the psychiatrist is
concerned, to a limited extent the respondent appears to have cooperated. I say
"limited" because each of the psychiatrists have said, in effect, that the respondent
gave some answers to questions and gave some responses which show some non-
cooperation in the sense at least of some lack of frankness.
[21] Subject to that matter, however, I accept that the respondent has cooperated in the
examinations.
[22] The respondent has also participated in relevant programs. He has undertaken the
Sexual Offenders Treatment Program in 1999, the Substance Abuse Relapse
Prevention Program in 1994, the Intimate Relationships Program in 1995, the
Sexuality in Relationships Program in 1995, an anger management program in 1995
and a stress management program in 1994.
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[23] I have considered each of the matters within section 13(4).
[24] The evidence of the psychiatrists, Doctors Moyle and Lawrence, is in my view
acceptable and cogent and I accept it. In my conclusion it establishes to a degree of
probability that there is an unacceptable risk that the respondent will commit a
serious sexual offence if released from custody without a supervision order being
made, and that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence
of a supervision order.
[25] I turn then to the question of the appropriate conditions for such an order. Section
16(1) requires a supervision order to contain certain requirements. Section 16(2)
provides that the supervision order may contain any other order the Court thinks
appropriate to ensure adequate protection of the community or for the prisoner's
rehabilitation or care or treatment.
[26] The relatively few conditions of the order proposed by the Attorney which are in
dispute are ones which are concerned more with what is necessary or not for the
adequate protection of the community, rather than so much with what is appropriate
for the prisoner's rehabilitation or care or treatment, although in some respects, as I
will explain, their content could have an impact upon that matter also.
[27] The first of the contentious conditions which is within the draft order handed up at
the commencement of the hearing by counsel for the Attorney is a condition that the
respondent must:
“(c) reside at a place within the State of Queensland as approved by a
Corrective Services officer by way of a suitable assessment, the
place not to be within 500 metres of a school or other public place or
business where children are cared for or supervised.”
The respondent's present residence has not yet been the subject of the suitability
assessment.
[28] The respondent is aged 70. As I have said, he is in many respects in poor physical
health and he is without any significant finances.
[29] For these reasons it will be relatively difficult for him to find suitable
accommodation and care must be taken in the prescription of a condition as to
where he may reside that some suitable residence is not denied to him.
[30] This statute and in turn orders under it are concerned with the adequate protection of
the community but, as I have mentioned, section 16(2) also recognises the relevance
of a prisoner's rehabilitation or care or treatment in the context of what is an
appropriate condition for a supervision order.
[31] The respondent submits that the limit of 500 metres is excessive. Each of the
psychiatrists were asked questions about that matter. The effect of their evidence is
that there are particular risks even from the respondent being somewhere where
children are regularly in view.
[32] The prescription of any such limit, whether it be 500 metres or otherwise, is always
at risk of being somewhat arbitrary. As I see the matter, there is a relevant
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distinction between a school and some “other public place or business where
children are cared for or supervised”. It is more likely that at a school there are
many more children in attendance than many other places which would fit that
description such as small child-care centres or preschools.
[33] The condition which is proposed by the Attorney-General will confer a substantial
and important discretion upon a Corrective Services officer. One can envisage
some cases where a place which is more than 500 metres from a school or other
relevant place might be considered to be unsuitable. On the other hand, it is quite
possible that there could be somewhere within 500 metres of a school or such other
place which having regard to the particular circumstances, might be considered
suitable. The Corrective Services officer upon whom this discretion is conferred
will no doubt approach the difficult task of the suitability assessment without
mistaking some prescription of distance, whether it be 500 metres or otherwise, as a
reliable guide so far as what is suitable is concerned.
[34] It is also relevant in this context, as it is with the prescription of other conditions, to
consider the means by which in the regime which would be imposed by this order
could be sensibly amended to meet new circumstances. Section 18 of this Act
provides for an application for an amendment of the terms of the supervision order
and section 19 empowers the Court to make such an order of amendment.
[35] Section 44 provides that the Court may decide whether it is satisfied as required
under section 18 entirely or partly from the consideration of the documents filed,
without the prisoner or witnesses appearing.
[36] Section 44 provides then a means by which, at least, in context of a variation which
is not opposed, a supervision order can be varied. That does involve some expense,
but a relatively small one. So, should it appear that there is an appropriate residence
assessed as suitable by the relevant officer, but within whatever distance is
prescribed within this condition, then there is a means of allowing the respondent to
live there.
[37] For the present, however, I am persuaded that there ought to be some prescribed
distance within which the respondent is not to reside. As I have said, I see some
distinction between a school and another place as described in the proposed
condition.
[38] The order will, therefore, include the paragraph (c) of the draft, but with this
amendment, which is that after the word “or”, where it first appears in the second
sentence, the words, “300 metres from some”, will be inserted.
[39] The next of the conditions which is controversial is in paragraph (p), which is that
the respondent “not be in the area within 500 metres directly outside a school
between 8 a.m. to 9.30 a.m. and 2.30 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. on school days and not be in
an area within 300 metres of a school at any time without reasonable excuse”. I
have just mentioned the condition in relation to the respondent's residence. That
condition as to residence is one under which the respondent is not to live within 500
metres of a school. What this condition is concerned with is not where the
respondent lives, but where he might be outside his residence.
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[40] The respondent submits that this condition is more than is appropriate to provide a
proper protection to the community. The respondent says that 500 metres is a
considerable distance, and that a condition of this kind could place a substantial
restriction on the respondent's movements. Nevertheless, it seems to me that much
of that restriction is overcome by the rider in the words “without reasonable
excuse”. It does seem to me that once those words are kept in mind the condition
which is proposed is an appropriate one. The order will be, however, for a
condition in slightly different terms, but to the same effect as that proposed. The
terms of the condition will be: “not without reasonable excuse be in an area within
500 metres of a school between 8 a.m. and 9.30 a.m. and between 2.30 p.m. and
4.30 p.m. on school days, or be in an area within 300 metres of a school at any
time”.
[41] The next of the conditions is condition (r), where the Attorney-General proposes
that the respondent “not be in the area within 500 metres of a children's playground
or child care area without reasonable excuse”. Again, it is submitted by the
respondent that the distance of 500 metres is more than is reasonably required. The
reasonableness, however, of the condition is again affected by the rider of
“reasonable excuse”.
[42] According to the psychiatric evidence there is a significant risk of temptation,
although the respondent might be at some distance from where he sees children
playing or otherwise gathering. The term which is proposed in my view is not
disproportionate to what is reasonably required. The condition, however, will be in
these terms: “not without reasonable excuse to be within 500 metres of a children's
playground or child care area”.
[43] I come then to the condition in paragraph (t) of the proposed order which is that the
respondent “not establish and maintain contact with children under 16 years of age”.
The respondent has a number of grandchildren who are under 16 years of age and
also some great grandchildren. The particular concern which the respondent,
through his counsel, expresses in this respect is in relation to the respondent's
contact with his own children. The apprehension is that on some relatively few
occasions within a year it will be necessary or desirable for the respondent to be
with not only his children, but some of their children who are under 16 years of age.
That concern is, of course, perfectly understandable and again it is necessary to
consider not only the protection of the community, but also what is appropriate for
the rehabilitation care or treatment of the respondent.
[44] The respondent suggests that the condition be qualified so that it does not relate to
children who are members of his immediate family where the relevant contact is in
the actual presence of and supervised by the parent or guardian of the child.
[45] The psychiatrists in their oral evidence were asked about this and each expressed
concern about the proposal. Some suggested further modifications or qualifications
were given by, in particular, Dr Lawrence who discussed the prospect of ensuring
that the relevant parent or guardian of the child well understood the risk presented
by the respondent's contact with the child and well appreciated the need to be at all
times present.
[46] Ultimately it seems to me that the problem with what is proposed by the respondent
is that it does have the real potential to go awry, and particularly in a social context,
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to very quickly lead to a position where the respondent is alone with a child and
succumbs to the temptations which have led to so much offending over the years.
[47] The respondent's history not only involves extensive and very serious exploitation
of vulnerable children, but in one instance it involves a serious sexual offence
against one of his own grandchildren. That demonstrates, taken in the context of all
of the evidence and his serious history, the particular risk which would be presented
by his being alone for even a very short time with a child. There is, in my view, too
great a risk involved in what the respondent proposes. Although the conditions
must be imposed with a view to the prisoner's rehabilitation it is necessary that the
conditions are such that the protection of the community, or any part of it, is
adequate.
[48] In my conclusion the condition which is proposed by paragraph (t) is an appropriate
one and ought to be included without amendment.
[49] That leaves for consideration paragraph (z) of the draft order which is in terms that
the respondent “not visit environments typically associated with the service of
alcohol or typically associated with the service of alcohol such as pubs, nightclubs,
casinos, or similar venues”.
[50] In the course of argument counsel for the Attorney-General suggested that the
condition be expressed in these terms: “not visit premises which sell or serve
alcohol”. The respondent opposes such a condition saying that it is excessive. The
respondent's principal submission is that he ought to be able to, for example, lunch
with his son at somewhere like an RSL club, and that there would be no
unacceptable risk. The particular risk is that he would drink alcohol and it is plain
from the psychiatrists' evidence that if he drinks alcohol he is a high risk of
offending.
[51] I am satisfied that there should be a condition which prevents him from being in a
place where he can acquire alcohol. But the condition proposed by the Attorney-
General goes further in that it would prevent him from going to premises which not
only sell or supply alcohol but which serve it. That will include premises where
other persons might be served alcohol which they, themselves, bring to the
premises.
[52] Counsel for the Attorney informs me that under the liquor licensing laws some
provision is made for licensing the service as well as the supply of alcohol. The
condition, however, which the Attorney proposes would extend beyond premises
having such a licence. It would extend to premises which do not require any licence
to put into a glass what a person brings along. It doesn't seem to me that those
premises represent an environment in which the relevant risk would become
material, if the respondent is unable to acquire alcohol at the premises. It doesn't
seem to me that such premises ought to be within this condition. It is true, as the
Attorney's counsel points out, that the risk would still exist of somebody with the
respondent bringing the alcohol to the premises, but that is to say that the
respondent is at risk of drinking alcohol in many places where someone is willing to
provide him with it.
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[53] In my view, what is proposed in the written draft or in the oral submissions for the
Attorney-General ought not to be included but instead paragraph (z) should be in
these terms: “not visit premises licensed to supply or serve alcohol”.
[54] The remaining conditions of the draft order are not contentious. With those
amendments there will be a supervision order in accordance with the draft handed
up at the commencement of the hearing.
[55] By that order it will be expressed that the Court is satisfied to the requisite standard
that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in absence of an order
pursuant to division 3 of the Act, and it will be ordered that the respondent will be
subject to the following conditions until 23 August 2009 or further earlier order of
the Court.
[56] The conditions, as I have said, will then be according to the draft which has been
marked A for identification and amended according to these reasons.
[57] I shall hear the parties as to any orders in relation to publication.
…
[58] The supervision order having been made, counsel for the respondent has sought an
order that the whole of the file be sealed up so that it is not available for public
inspection. The Attorney-General does not oppose that order. The reasons,
however, respectively advanced by counsel for such an order differ.
[59] The respondent submits that other statutory regimes would be undermined by the
public availability of evidence as has been given in this case. Reference is made to
sections 242 and 243 of the Corrective Services Act 2000, as well as to section 68
and following of the Child Protection Act 1999.
[60] The benefit of provisions such as in 243 of the Corrective Services Act could be
affected in certain circumstances by the public availability of evidence which
contains information which is confidential according to that section. If the
confidentiality provided by section 243 was the only consideration, in this respect
the benefit of that confidentiality to the working of the Corrective Services Act
would have to be balanced against the well established importance of proceedings
being conducted in open Court and the evidence being publicly available. As to
those considerations, see J v L and A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 10, per
Fitzgerald P and Lee J.
[61] The Attorney points, however, to a different consideration in favour of the order
which the respondent seeks, which is the protection of the privacy of persons who
were complainants in relation to the many offences which have been committed by
the respondent. It is true that there is also already some statutory protection of that
privacy and in particular a protection against a report which would reveal the
identity or details of a complainant. See section 6 of the Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences) Act 1978.
[62] However, there is a proper concern that access to the file and the extensive affidavit
material upon it would result in the disclosure of details of offences of the
complainants, such that notwithstanding the restriction upon a report, those
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complainants could be made to suffer further for what has occurred. It is highly
desirable that they be protected from that.
[63] The order which is proposed is one in which the nature and precise terms of the
application made by the Attorney would still be known as would the outcome and
the reasons given by the Court for its decision. In my view, it is appropriate that an
order of the kind which has been sought be made. There will, therefore, be an order
as I have indicated in relation to the sealing up of the file save for the originating
application itself, the supervision order as well as, of course, the earlier order made
by the Court for risk assessment.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2005/071