Company Solutions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Keppel Cairncross Shipyard Ltd (In Liquidation) & Ors [2004] QSC 379
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Company Solutions (Aust) Pty Limited v Keppel Cairncross
Shipyard Limited (In Liquidation) & Others [2004] QSC 379
PARTIES: COMPANY SOLUTIONS (AUST) PTY LIMITED ACN 056
571 049
(applicant)
v
RICHARD JOHN DENNIS and SCOTT ANGUS
BLACKWOOD as liquidators of KEPPEL CAIRNCROSS
SHIPYARD LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 059 830 287
(first respondents)
&
CGU INSURANCE LIMITED
(second respondent)
FILE NO/S: S3580 of 2002
DIVISION: Trial Division
PROCEEDING: Application
ORIGINATING
COURT: Supreme Court
DELIVERED ON: 29 October 2004
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 8 June 2004
JUDGE: Douglas J
ORDER: THAT RICHARD JOHN DENNIS AND SCOTT ANGUS
BLACKWOOD AS LIQUIDATORS OF KEPPEL
CAIRNCROSS SHIPYARD LIMITED (IN
LIQUIDATION) ACN 059 830 287 DELIVER TO THE
APPLICANT A COPY OF THE CGU PUBLIC
LIABILITY INSURANCE CONTRACT BETWEEN CGU
INSURANCE LIMITED AND KEPPEL CAIRNCROSS
SHIPYARD LIMITED.
CATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE -
QUEENSLAND - PRACTICE UNDER RULES OF COURT -
Other matters before trial - Disclosure of documents - Documents
beyond those directly relevant to issues – Disclosure of insurance
policy in aid of application for leave to proceed – Disclosure of
insurance policy to allow party to consider whether it should
continue with litigation – Disclosure in special circumstances and
where the interests of justice require it – Uniform Civil Procedure
Rules 1999 (Qld), r 223
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Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 rr. 211, 223
Glaister v Banwell Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 101, considered
Re Gordon Grant & Grant Pty Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 196,
considered
Lampson (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ahden Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd
[1999] 2 Qd R 252, followed
Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network
Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276, 283, applied
COUNSEL: M T O’Sullivan for the applicant Company Solutions (Aust) Pty
Ltd
J W Lee for the applicant Danny Pavlic
No appearance for the first respondents
C A Wilkins for the second respondent
SOLICITORS: O’Mara’s Lawyers for the applicant Company Solutions (Aust)
Pty Ltd
Keith Scott & Associates for the applicant Danny Pavlic
No appearance for the first respondents
Carter Newell for the second respondent
[1] DOUGLAS J: Mr Pavlic was employed by Company Solutions (Aust) Pty Ltd
(“Company Solutions”) on 13 May 1998 when he claims to have been injured in an
accident. Company Solutions was a labour hire company which had provided his
services to Keppel Cairncross Shipyard Limited (“Keppel Cairncross”). That
company is now in liquidation. It had been insured with CGU Insurance Ltd
(“CGU”) but CGU has denied indemnity in respect of this claim.
[2] Company Solutions was sued by Mr Pavlic for damages arising out of the accident
and, on 27 November 2001, it obtained leave to proceed with its claim against
Keppel Cairncross for contribution or indemnity in respect of Mr Pavlic’s claim
against it on the basis that his injuries were caused by Keppel Cairncross’s
negligence or breach of statutory duties. Mr Pavlic has also brought an application
for leave to proceed against Keppel Cairncross in liquidation. He had not originally
joined it as a party to his action and is now out of time to do so in the normal course
of events.
[3] Company Solutions obtained its leave to proceed against Keppel Cairncross without
having obtained disclosure of the insurance policy with CGU. Apparently there was
then no issue as to whether the policy provided the necessary cover. It now wishes
to obtain disclosure of that document in order to consider whether it is worth
continuing with its third party proceedings. Had it made such an application before
it obtained leave to proceed there seems little doubt that disclosure would have been
ordered; see Glaister v Banwell Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 101 at [14]. There Master
Sanderson adopted the reasoning of Master Lee QC in Re Gordon Grant & Grant
Pty Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 196, 199 where he had held that leave to proceed was more
likely to be granted where there was an insurance company standing behind the
company in liquidation to pay any judgment which the plaintiff might obtain against
it.
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[4] Keppel Cairncross did not appear on the application. Nevertheless, it was submitted
by CGU, which was given leave to intervene, that the issue of what cover was
provided by the insurance policy was not relevant to the proceedings between
Company Solutions and Keppel Cairncross. The evidence disclosed that Keppel
Cairncross was in possession of a copy of the policy but CGU’s submission was that
it was not required to be disclosed pursuant to r. 211(1) because it was not directly
relevant to the allegations in issue and, therefore, no order pursuant to r. 223 for
delivery or production of the policy should be made. An order by the Court under
r. 223 for disclosure of a document, in addition to the normal duty under the rules to
make disclosure without an order, is available only when there are special
circumstances and the interests of justice require it; see r. 223(4)(a).
[5] In this case the situation is complicated by the parallel application by Mr Pavlic for
leave to proceed against Keppel Cairncross. His counsel wished to delay pursuing
that application until the determination of Company Solution’s application for
disclosure of the insurance policy. On the basis of the reasoning in Glaister v
Banwell Pty Ltd, however, there is every reason why disclosure should be made to
Mr Pavlic of the insurance policy as it is relevant to the issue whether he should
obtain leave to proceed.
[6] After oral submissions had been concluded, therefore, I invited the parties to
provide written submissions whether, if the application by Company Solutions for
production of the insurance contract failed, production should nevertheless be
granted as ancillary to Mr Pavlic’s application against Keppel Cairncross because
that company was in possession of a copy of the insurance contract.
[7] I then received further written submissions from the parties which included
submissions on the merits as to whether Mr Pavlic’s application for leave to proceed
should be granted. I do not propose to deal with that issue at this stage. My only
concern is whether the policy should be disclosed to Mr Pavlic in aid of his
application for leave to proceed. The terms of the insurance policy will be relevant
to that issue. I propose to order, therefore, that the policy be disclosed to Mr Pavlic
by Keppel Cairncross.
[8] In those circumstances it is also appropriate to order that the policy be disclosed to
Company Solutions. The question of the cover provided by the insurance policy is
not in issue on the pleadings between it and Keppel Cairncross but it is highly
important to the practical issue whether that litigation should proceed. In Lampson
(Australia) Pty Ltd v Ahden Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd R 252, 256-257
Moynihan J said:
“The test of direct relevance introduced by O. 35 r. 4 replaces the
previous rule which required discovery of indirectly relevant
documents which ‘might lead to a train of inquiry’; this being the test
stated in Compagnie Financiere Et Commerciale du Pacifique v
Peruvian Guano Co. Under this discovery regime an affidavit of
discovery was conclusive unless the existence of other discoverable
documents could be established or it could be demonstrated that
documents had been excluded under a misconception, Mulley v
Manifold. In this context O. 35 r. 14(4)(a) gives power in the
circumstances there specified to order the disclosure of documents
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beyond those directly relevant to the issues in the cause or in the
circumstances contemplated by subr(4).” (My emphasis.)
[9] Coincidentally that case also dealt with an application for disclosure of an insurance
policy to assist one insurer to engage in a mediation knowing whether or not it
could look to co-insurers for contribution. The situation here is that neither
Company Solutions nor Mr Pavlic now know whether it is worth pursuing Keppel
Cairncross further. It may be true that they can prosecute their claims to finality and
then discover whether any judgment against Keppel Cairncross is valuable. It was
also submitted that they could fund the liquidators to test whether the policy
covered the company’s liability. Neither solution is commercially realistic where
the parties do not know whether it is worth pursuing a claim based on the policy.
[10] That seems to me to create special circumstances where the interests of justice
require such an order and where the overriding philosophy of the rules suggests that
the order would facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues in the
proceedings at a minimum of expense; see r. 5. As Pincus JA said in Mercantile
Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd
[2001] 1 Qd R 276, 283 at [10]:
“The former inflexible approach to applications for further discovery
… is no longer necessarily appropriate, under the current disclosure
system, and because of the notions expressed in r. 5 of the Uniform
Civil Procedure Rules. If it appeared, for example, that an order for
further disclosure would be likely to ‘facilitate the just and
expeditious resolution of the real issues’, that would enable and
perhaps require the making of such an order.”
[11] Where, as here, the form of the policy is relevant to the application pursued by Mr
Pavlic, is of great practical relevance to Company Solutions for the further conduct
of its role in the litigation, there is no doubt that the insurance policy exists and is in
the possession of Keppel Cairncross, it seems to me that there are special
circumstances and the interests of justice require the disclosure of the document.
[12] Accordingly I propose to order in each application that Richard John Dennis and
Scott Angus Blackwood as liquidators of Keppel Cairncross Shipyard Limited (in
liquidation) ACN 059 830 287 deliver to the applicant a copy of the CGU public
liability insurance contract between CGU Insurance Limited and Keppel Cairncross
Shipyard Limited.
[13] I shall hear the parties as to costs.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2004/379