Emmaland Pty Ltd v Trust Company of Australia Ltd [2003] RSLT 2
[2003] RSLT 2
THE RETAIL SHOP LEASES ACT
In the matter of
Dispute 28/03
EMMALAND PTY LTD
- Claimant
- and -
TRUST COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED
- Respondent
Chair: : A Forbes
DECISION ON JURISDICTION
Given in Brisbane on 4 August 2003
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Emmaland-v-Trust Company Decision 2
In this application there are three principal claims. One of them raises a question of
jurisdiction, namely: "The claimant seeks an order that it is not required [to pay] the
lessor rental for the period 27 November 2002 to 7 December 2002".
The basis of this claim is that there was a variation of the lease, postponing the
commencement date from 27 November to 7 December 2002.
The respondent's objection to jurisdiction is that a dispute about the commencement
date is a dispute about arrears of rent, which the tribunal is forbidden to entertain by s
109(1)(b)(i) of the Act.
Section 109 is not primarily negative. On the contrary it affirms the tribunal's power to
hear retail tenancy disputes, elsewhere defined as "any dispute under or about a retail
shop lease". Section 109(1)(b) then makes certain exceptions to that grant, while s
109(3)(a) modifies those exceptions so that "the procedure for the determination of rent
payable" is, after all, within the general grant of power in the opening words of s 109.
Essentially the tenant seeks an interpretation of the lease. It seems to me that such an
inquiry is within the general grant of power, whether or not the decision subsequently or
incidentally affects the obligation to pay rent. A determination of the commencement
date would not be a finding as to the amount of rent payable, or as to arrears. Arrears,
if any, would then be a matter for adjustment between the parties, or for proceedings in
an appropriate court. Any payment on that account would not be based on any order of
this tribunal, or any calculation by it, but on the terms of the lease and any variation
thereof. Many decisions of this Tribunal have consequences for the rent that landlords
derive from their properties, but I cannot conceive that the legislature, in creating this
tribunal to expedite and simplify the resolution of retail tenancy disputes, intended all
such proceedings to be inhibited by s109 (1) (b).
However, if a decision as to the proper commencement date is characterised as a
decision about rent it is, in my view, a decision about "the procedure for the
determination of rent, but not the actual amount of rent", within the meaning of the
affirmative clause in s 109(3)(a). It is difficult to think of anything more germane to the
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Emmaland-v-Trust Company Decision 3
rent-determination procedure than ascertainment of the time at which the rent, as
agreed by the parties, begins to accrue.
The respondent landlord refers to two decisions of this tribunal. Their respective
numbers are B/00 and 1/00. The former deals with a question of set off which is remote
from the present dispute. Decision 1/00 involved a dispute about a formula for
calculating rent. As such, it was more closely bound up with "the amount of rent
payable", within the meaning of the exclusionary section 109(1)(b)(ii), if not s
109(1)(b)(i) as well. With this difference in mind, and in the absence of any detailed
reasons for the conclusion in Decision 1/00, I consider that it is distinguishable in this
case.
If a decision as to the commencement date is intrinsically a decision about rent, which I
seriously doubt, it is, in my view, a decision about procedure for determining rent. As
such, it is within the jurisdiction of this tribunal.
A Forbes
Chair
Retail Shop Lease Tribunal
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/RSLT/2003/002