CSR Ltd v Casaron Pty Ltd & Dance [2002] QSC 376
State Reporting Bureau
[30023 osc 3~fe
Queensland Government
Department of Justice and Attorney-General
Transcript of Proceedings
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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CIVIL JURISDICTION
MOYNIHAN J
No S6708 of 2001
CSR LIMITED (ACN 000 001 276) Plaintiff
and
CASARON PTY LTD (ACN 077 155 4290 First Defendant
and
PETER JOHN DANCE Second Defendant
and
ELIZABETH ANN DANCE Third Defendant
BRISBANE
. .DATE 16/10/2002
JUDGMENT
WARNING: The publication of information or details likely to lead to the identification of persons in some proceedings is a criminal
offence. This is so particularly in relation to the identification of children who are involved in criminal proceedings or proceedings for
their protection under the Child Protection Act 1999, and complainants in criminal sexual offences, but is not limited to those
categories. You may wish to seek legal advice before giving others access to the details of any person named in these proceedings.1
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4th Floor, The Law Courts, George Street, Brisbane, Q. 4000 Telephone: (07) 3247 4360 Fax: (07) 3247 5532
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HIS HONOUR: This is an application for orders that:
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1. Pursuant to rule 371, the third defendant, within 21 days
of the order, disclose to the plaintiff each and every
document which is in her possession or control and which 10
is directly relevant to the allegations in paragraphs
2(a), 2 (bb) and 2(d)(i) of her defence and counterclaim.
2. Pursuant to rule 223, the third defendant, within 21 days
of the order, disclose to the plaintiff each and every
document which is in her possession or control and which 20
is within the following class of document :
(a) Any guarantees or indemnities which the third
defendant has ever given to any person ("creditor") in
respect of debts owed or likely to be owed by any other
person ("debtor") to the creditor; 30
(b) Any mortgages or other securities which the third
defendant has ever given to any person ("creditor") in
respect of or as security for debts owed or likely to be
owed by any other person ("debtor") to the creditor;
(c) Documents evidencing or relating to the refusal by 40
the third defendant to provide any guarantee for, or any
mortgage or other security in respect of or to se cure
the debts of any other person;
(d) Documents evidencing or relating to the conduct by
the third defendant of any role or duties as director or 50
secretary of any company;
(e) Documents relating to the third defendant's
educational or vocational training;
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(f) Documents evidencing or relating to the third 1
defendant's involvement in any business or the management
thereof;
(g) Any advice the third defendant has obtained about
the nature or effects of any guarantees or other 10
securities that she has given or refused to give or been
asked to give in relation to the debts of any person;
(h) Her employment and income over the period of ten
years before 18 December 1988.
3. Pursuant to rule 223, to the extent that any document
within any of the classes described in paragraph 2:
(a) Do not exist; or
(b) Have been, but are no longer in the possession or
control of the second defendant - 30
The third defendant, within 21 days of the order, file
and serve an affidavit stating -
(c) That the specified document or class of documents
does not exist or has never existed; or
(d) The circumstances in which the specified document or AM
class of documents ceased to exist or passed out of her
possession or control.
The action is one in which the plaintiff sues the first
defendant for a debt guaranteed by the second and third tin
defendants. By Uniform Civil Procedure Rule 211(1) a party to
a proceedings has a duty to disclose each document in the
possession or under the control of that party and directly
relevant to an allegation in issue in the pleadings.
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JUDGMENT
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The allegation in issue relevant to the proceedings in the
circumstances of this case arises in the following fashion.
The third defendant raises the plea that it would be
unconscionable to enforce the guarantee against her in
circumstances where she did not understand its purport and
effect, gained no benefit from the contract guaranteed and the
guarantee was procured by her husband whom the plaintiff ought
to have known she would have trusted and have confidence in.
It is pertinent to note at this stage that rule 211(1) imposes
an obligation in respect of disclosure of documents in the
possession or under the control of the party but does not deal
with documents which had been under the possession and control
of the party. This is taken up by rule 223(2) which permits
the Court to order a party to file and serve an affidavit
stating that a specified document or class does not exist or
never existed or, it having ceased to exist or passed out of
the possession or control of the disclosing party, the
circumstances in which that occurred. That is the provision
which it is sought to enliven by paragraph 3 of the
application .
It is pertinent to note that on 15 October, as a conclusion to
an exchange of correspondence, the solicitors for the third
defendant wrote to the plaintiff's solicitors on an open
basis . They advised that the third defendant was prepared to
consent to an order in the terms set out in the letter which
included that the costs of and incidental to the application
be costs in the cause.
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JUDGMENT
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This application falls to be disposed of on the basis that the 1
offer was made and rejected. In other words, I do not
construe the letter as an admission on the part of the third
defendant that she was obliged to give the more limited
disclosure than that presently sought which is set out in the 10
letter .
It is convenient to return to the issue canvassed by paragraph
3 of the application and Rule 223(2). This relates to
documents which did not exist or were no longer in the
possession or control of a party and the application of the
provision of the rules which deals with that.
The third respondent has filed an affidavit by leave today
dealing with the question of documents which may have been in 30
her possession or control. She deposed to documents damaged
or destroyed as a consequence of flood and that she is not
able to specify with any degree of particularity the documents
or class of relevant documents which might have been in her
possession or control. In my view, the affidavit sufficiently 40
deals with the issue of documents which may have been but no
longer are in the third defendant's possession or control.
The question which remains is whether there are proper grounds
for concluding that there has been insufficient disclosure. 50
In my view, the application in any event casts too wide a net.
I am not persuaded for that the respondent ought to be
compelled to swear as to whether the broad categories of
documents - mortgage documents, any documents relating to
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JUDGMENT
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educational or vocational training, any documents evidencing
or relating to her involvement in any business, documents
relating to employment or income - are disclosable. If they
were it would, in my view, be oppressive with the relevant
issue confined in the way that I have identified to require
that to be done.
I do not accept that the respondent ought to be required to
disclose documents in relation to activities after the date at
which the guarantee was given.
The issue then is whether the material discloses reasonable
grounds for concluding that documents which ought to have been
disclosed have not been.
The evidence establishes that the plaintiff is the registered
owner of residential real estate which is the subject of a
mortgage. There is no issue here about her knowledge as to
the nature of a mortgage. The issue here is in relation to a
guarantee and, as I say, I am not persuaded that her knowledge
of mortgage in terms of having had one or more is directly
relevant in the appropriate sense.
There is also evidence that she was a co-director and/or co
shareholder of private companies controlled by, essentially I
think, the first defendant.
The respondent has now sworn to the lack of knowledge and
participation in the affairs of those entities. Nothing has
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JUDGMENT
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1 emerged which would indicate that, given her being a
shareholder or a director of those companies, she has failed
to disclose relevant documents.
So far as any legal advice is concerned, assuming that to be 10
the case, I should have thought that it be privileged. In any
event, I have some difficulty in seeing its direct relevance
to the issue having regard to the terms in which it arises.
The considerations being those that I have endeavoured to
identify, I am not persuaded that it has been established the
respondent has failed to discharge her obligations as to
disclosure. The considerations being those I have canvassed.
I dismiss the application.
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HIS HONOUR: I turn to the question of costs. I note that on
23 July 2002 the plaintiff's solicitors wrote to the third
defendants under rule 444 seeking delivery of a list of 40
documents. That led to a response of 30 July containing a
list of documents. There was then another letter from the
plaintiff's solicitors, again in reliance on rule 444, stating
that the list was inadequate. It was said it did not disclose
documents relevant to the issue which I have identified
earlier and requiring the disclosure of documents in three
general categories identified by the letter or, alternatively,
confirmation "that no such documents" existed or were not in
the respondent's possession or control.
7 JUDGMENT
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1 The response to that is the letter of 15 October 2002 which
was written after the application had been filed. It is true
that the necessity of resorting to an order pursuant to
Uniform Civil Procedure Rule 223 (2) to file and serve an
affidavit dealing with the existence of specified documents 10
might have been avoided had the earlier letter been responded
to and it is, as I have indicated, avoided by the filing of
the affidavit by leave today accounting in my view
satisfactorily for the documents.
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The respondent has otherwise, on the view I have taken on the
matter, successfully resisted the making of an order for
further disclosure and, in my view, is entitled to the costs
of having done so. I had contemplated whether some
apportionment might satisfy the consideration but, in the end, 30
I think that that would involve a degree of refinement which
is not necessary here.
The application was brought by the applicant, it has failed in
relation to the further disclosure areas, and there has been 40
an answer which might have been provided earlier but was not
in respect of the existence of the documents but, as I say, it
seems to me the appropriate order in the end is to order that
the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application to
be assessed. 50
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JUDGMENT
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2002/376