Attard v Hore & QBE Insurance Ltd [2002] QSC 437
State Reporting Bureau
Transcript of Proceedings
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[2002] QSC 437
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CIVIL JURISDICTION
DUTNEY J
Mackay Registry No S30 of 2002
LORETTA KAY ATTARD Plaintiff
and
BENJAMIN PETER HORE
and
QBE INSURANCE LIMITED
First Defendant
Second Defendant
ROCKHAMPTON
..DATE 30/08/2002
ORDER
REVISED COPIES ISSUED
State Reporting Bureau
Date: 3 September, 2002
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30082002 T8-9/RAP09 M/T ROK2/2002 (Dutney J)
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HIS HONOUR: This is an application by the defendants in a
personal injuries action arising out of a motor vehicle
accident for disclosure of the plaintiff's Centrelink file.
The statements of loss and damage, which have been filed on
behalf of the plaintiff, disclose that there is a claim for
economic loss not discounted as the result of any residual
earning capacity.
The material filed on behalf of the defendants in support of
their application discloses that in order to obtain either
parenting or New Start allowances from Centrelink, information
that is relevant to working capacity has to be disclosed. It
is thus said that the material contained on the file would be
directly relevant to an issue in the trial.
The plaintiff resists the application on the basis, firstly,
that the Centrelink file is not in the possession or under the
control of the plaintiff. I have been referred to a decision
of Robertson DCJ in Erskine v McDowell (2001) QDC 192, in
which his Honour, in paragraph 11 of the judgment, reaches the
conclusion that the Centrelink file was not in the power or
control of the plaintiff.
The case is somewhat different from the present one because
there was no argument in that case as to the relevance of the
material in the file. It was a case of a de facto property
dispute in which the existence of a de facto relationship was
conceded but there was a debate about the extent of the
relationship and its duration. Because of the information
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supplied to Centrelink, the file would have, in that case,
contained information which identified, at least generally,
the period during which the parties claim to have been in the
de facto relationship.
Notwithstanding that the file was not in the possession or
control of the parties, Robertson DCJ ordered the defendant to
obtain copies of the file under the Freedom of Information
Act. Apparently if a request is made by the Centrelink
customer, a copy of the file will be provided under that
legislation without any fee being payable. His Honour
exercised power under rule 223.4(b) or, alternatively, rule
367 to make the orders which he did.
The second basis of the objection by the plaintiff in this
case is that the file is not directly relevant. It is said
that the provisions of the relevant legislation require
disclosure of all information concerning work history and
medical conditions as a condition of being able to institute
the proceedings, and that is certainly right.
It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that to require
this further step, that is the disclosure of Centrelink file,
would be an unwarranted intrusion into the civil liberties of
the plaintiff.
I am not persuaded that the civil liberties argument can be
sustained in a case where a party comes to the Court seeking
an order from the Court that she be paid a substantial sum of
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30082002 T8-9/RAP09 M/T ROK2/2002 (Dutney J)
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money as a result of injuries which she says she has suffered.
It seems to me that the price of seeking such an order from
the Court is disclosure of a great deal of material which in
other circumstances would be considered confidential.
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, that is the price they pay if
they want to receive a substantial damages award.
The question of whether the file is directly relevant concerns
me a little. The contents of the file are unknown. It is not
known whether the forms lodged are consistent or inconsistent
with the claims being made by the plaintiff in the action.
Nonetheless, on balance, I am persuaded that they probably
have sufficient relevance to meet the test identified by
Demack J in Robson v REB Engineering Pty Ltd (1997) 2
Queensland Reports 102 at 105, where his Honour held that
directly relevant meant "something which tends to prove or
disprove the allegation in issue".
Although the evidentiary value of a statement as to her
working capacity made by the plaintiff in applying for a
benefit from Centrelink may not have a great deal of weight,
it does seem to me to be relevant to the question of whether
or not she has any residual working capacity.
In view of Judge Robertson's decision in Erskine, a decision
which seems to me to be correct in so far as it refers to
power and control, I do not think that the ordinary disclosure
rules of the Court are sufficient to cover a file which is in
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30082002 T8-9/RAP09 M/T ROK2/2002 (Dutney J)
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the possession of a Commonwealth department. The issue then
is whether I am persuaded that I should make orders under the
other powers which the rules provide to direct parties to act
in particular ways.
I am told, and it seems to be correct, that the department is
not amenable to the usual third party processes of the Court.
Neither is the department prepared to act on the statutory
consent which the plaintiff has given to access records held
by Government departments. The file will not be released by
Centrelink to the solicitors for the defendant unless a
particular authority is provided by the plaintiff in that
respect.
In all the circumstances it seems to me to be a slight
intrusion on the rights of a plaintiff to require the
plaintiff to give a further authority specifically directed to
Centrelink to release the file to the solicitors for the
defendant for the purposes of the litigation.
In view of the relief which the plaintiff seeks, it seems to
me that the slight intrusion to which I have referred, when
weighed against the benefit which the plaintiff seeks to
obtain from litigation is such that the intrusion is
warranted.
Accordingly, I propose to order that the plaintiff execute an
authority provided to her by the solicitors for the defendants
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directed to Centrelink requesting the release to those
solicitors of the Centrelink file.
Now is that all you require, Mr Hollyoak?
MR HOLLYOAK: I was just checking with my solicitor, your
Honour. I believe so. That’s - I understand that’s all we
need is that specific authority which I think is already
exhibited to the material.
HIS HONOUR: All right. Well, I make an order in those terms
then if you are satisfied that that is all you require?
MR HOLLYOAK: Yes. Would your Honour mind giving me liberty
to apply in the event that there is some consequential
paperwork that’s necessary?
HIS HONOUR: All right. Well I give the parties liberty to
apply. And what about costs?
…
HIS HONOUR: What I propose to do, Mr Hollyoak, is order that
the plaintiff pay the defendants' costs of the application in
any event, and I make that order.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2002/437