AMP Life Ltd & Ors v Department of Natural Resources and Mines [2002] QLC 99 (2002) 23 QLCR 300

LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: AMP Life Ltd & Ors v Department of Natural Resources and Mines [2002] QLC 99 PARTIES: AMP Life Limited & AMP Asset Management Australian Mutual Provident Society and Kent Street Pty Ltd (applicants) v. Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines (respondent) FILE NOS: AV2000/0637, AV2001/0308 AV2001/0087, AV2001/0134 DIVISION: Land Court of Queensland PROCEEDING: Hearing of Applications DELIVERED ON: 18 December 2002 DELIVERED AT: BRISBANE HEARD AT: BRISBANE MEMBER: Mr RP Scott ORDER: The applications are refused. CATCHWORDS: Statutory Valuation – Valuation of Land Act 1944 – New and higher valuation figure proposed by Chief Executive at appeal – Whether limitations on such course – Contrast limitations on amending a valuation (s.28 s.29) or deviating from appeal grounds [s.45(4)] – Jurisdiction of Court to assess all evidence and make determination (s.66). Statutory Valuation – Valuation of Land Act 1944 – Presumption of correctness of Chief Executive's figure (s.33) – Such not abandoned by leading of new valuation at appeal – Court already seized of jurisdiction to determine. -- 1 of 24 -- 2 Practice and Procedure – Equity and good conscience provision of Land Court Act 2000 (s.7) – Requirement cannot be used to deprive Court of jurisdiction. Practice and Procedure – Application for determination of a single issue – issue part of a wider case proposed for full appeal hearing – Proper to decide issue on application if decision would bring finality to that issue. Statutory Valuation – Valuation of Land Act 1944 – Power of Chief Executive to alter a valuation under appeal. APPEARANCES: Mr J Gallagher QC, with him Mr J Horton, for the applicants Mr T Quinn for the respondent [1] The applicants own land in Brisbane and on the Gold Coast, upon which the well-known shopping centres of Garden City and Pacific Fair have been developed respectively. Issue has arisen between the parties as to the value that ought to apply to these lands at various dates, pursuant to the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (the Act). Garden City  As at relevant dates of 1 October 1999 and 1 October 2000 the Chief Executive issued annual valuation notices valuing this land at $41,000,000 (the original Garden City valuations).  The applicant objected to each of these valuations and having failed to convince the Chief Executive to reduce the figure, appealed to this Court. The Notice of Appeal includes an estimate of value of $37,000,000.  Pursuant to orders the Chief Executive filed valuation reports with the Court on 10 May 2002 valuing the land at: - $106,000,000 as at 1 October 1999 - $110,000,000 as at 1 October 2000 (both valuations are referred to compendiously as the higher Garden City valuations.)  The applicant filed a valuation report valuing the land at $32,700,000 as at 1 October 1999. Pacific Fair  As at relevant dates of 1 October 1999 and 1 October 2000 the Chief Executive issued annual valuation notices valuing this land at $40,000,000 (the original Pacific Fair valuations) -- 2 of 24 -- 3  Again the applicant unsuccessfully objected against each of these valuations, then lodged Notices of Appeal with this Court which included a value estimate of $27,280,000.  Pursuant to orders the Chief Executive filed valuation reports with the Court on 15 May 2002 valuing the land at each relevant date at $215,000,000 (the higher Pacific Fair valuations).  The applicant filed a valuation report valuing the land at $18,550,000 as at 1 October 1999. [2] The Chief Executive intends to lead evidence to the higher valuations when each appeal is heard, such evidence being in the form of valuation reports. The applicants brought before me applications in each of the above appeals, seeking orders that the Chief Executive be precluded from pursuing the higher valuations in each case unless valuation notices are issued by the Chief Executive in the higher valuation figures. By consent, the applications were heard together. A conclusion in favour of the orders being sought would, in my opinion, be a conclusion that the Land Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the higher valuations unless the Chief Executive alters the original valuations in the manner provided for in the Act and which I discuss below. [3] "The Land Court is purely a Court of statutory creation and all of its jurisdiction must be so conferred" (Mellish v Valuer-General (1960) 28 CLLR 102 at 104). The Court is created by s.4 of the Land Court Act 2000 and by s.5(1) of that Act: "(1) The Land Court has the jurisdiction given to it under any Act." [4] The Valuation of Land Act is such an Act and it provides in s.55(1): " (55.(1) An owner who has duly objected to the chief executive against a valuation made by the chief executive may, if dissatisfied with the decision of the chief executive upon the objection, appeal to the Land Court." [5] Section 66 provides: " 66. Upon an appeal under section 55 the Land Court or, upon the rehearing of any such appeal, the Land Appeal Court may – (a) affirm the valuation appealed against; or (b) reduce or increase the amount of that valuation to the extent necessary in its opinion to determine the same correctly under, subject to, and in accordance with this Act; and, subject to section 70, make such order as it deems fit with respect to the payment of costs." -- 3 of 24 -- 4 [6] It will be convenient to also include at this point provisions which I refer to in the following discussion. They are s.45 which relevantly provides: "45.(3) An appeal shall be instituted by filing a notice of appeal in the Land Court registry. (4) Such notice shall state the grounds of appeal and the appeal shall be limited to the grounds so stated and the burden of proving any and every such ground shall be upon the owner. (5) Such notice shall also state the amount which in the opinion of the appellant should be the valuation of the subject land." and s.33: "33. Any and every valuation, or alteration of the valuation, of any land made, or purporting to be made, under this Act by the chief executive shall be deemed to be correct until proved otherwise upon objection or appeal or until altered or further altered." [7] Notwithstanding the apparent breadth of s.66, the jurisdiction of the Court under the Valuation of Land Act is limited in its scope by the grounds of appeal. See, for example, Franklin v Valuer-General (1978) 5 QLCR 181 at 185: "At the same time, as the Act is presently drawn, the Court is not an investigating tribunal and we do not see how it could uphold or dismiss an appeal on grounds other than those specified in the appellant's Notice of Appeal. " [8] The primary contention of the applicants is that the Chief Executive cannot "lawfully pursue valuations significantly higher than the valuations appealed against, without first seeking to correct the valuations". [9] The applicants submitted that certain provisions of the Act create an "envelope" which contains the parameters able to be pursued by the parties at trial. The argument says that the case is limited by the grounds of appeal on the one side (see s.45(4)), whilst the Chief Executive is limited by the valuation which is deemed by s.33 of the Act to be correct. The proposition is that the effect of s.33 is to set in place the valuation of the Chief Executive for a particular property, which valuation cannot be changed except in accordance with the Statute. It is the valuation against which the appeal is made, therefore, once the appeal is lodged the "envelope" is defined. It will be useful then to consider whether the inclusion of s.33 in the Act was intended to have that effect. [10] In Muller v Dalgety & Co Ltd (1909) 9 CLR 693 Griffith CJ observed at 696 that a "deeming" provision would usually be employed to create a "statutory fiction". (See Hill v East and West India Dock Co 9 App. Cas. 448 at 456). I am of the view that this is the sense in which s.33 deems the Chief Executive's valuation to be correct. It is a valuation -- 4 of 24 -- 5 which has not been subjected to consideration by any arbitral or judicial process but is said to be correct for some statutory purpose and as the Chief Justice said "When used in that sense it becomes very important to consider the purpose for which the statutory fiction is introduced". [11] Sections 45(4) and 33, as they are now identified, were introduced into the Act by the Valuation of Land Acts Amendment Act 1958 (see s.6(7) and s.12(b)). Parliamentary Hansard of 15 April 1958 at pp.2182-2183 records the then Minister for Public Works and Local Government as saying: "The clause also adds a sub-section 7 to this section to provide that the Valuer-General's valuation shall be deemed to be correct until proved otherwise upon objection or appeal. In a recent case doubt was expressed as to whose responsibility it was to prove that the valuation was correct or otherwise since the Act contained no specific provision in this regard. This new sub-section should remedy this defect and is complementary to the proposed amendment to the last paragraph of section 21(1) of the principal Act." [12] The Minister was referring to the then equivalents of s.33 and s.45(4) ("the proposed amendment to the last paragraph of section 21(1) …"). I do not understand the Minister to be saying that these two provisions are complementary in the sense that just as the appellant is limited to his grounds of appeal, so is the Chief Executive limited to his original valuation during the process of a trial. It is clear to me that the Minister was simply referring to the plain meaning of these two provisions read together and that is that unless the appellant is successful in proving his case as contained within his grounds of appeal, the Chief Executive's valuation remains unaffected and need not be shown to be correct by evidence called by the Chief Executive. Prior to the introduction of the amendments referred to, the Act provided for objections and appeals to be made against a valuation carried out by the Valuer-General (as the relevant Chief Executive was then called) and for such an appeal to be dealt with in Court. The new provision now contained in s.33 did not alter that broad process. It did not graft onto the process some element that changed the nature of the Chief Executive's valuation other than to say that it is deemed to be correct unless altered by one of the processes enunciated, that is objection, appeal or alteration. All those processes can do is to address the assumption of correctness which on the face of the statutory provision is a rebuttable presumption. The inclusion of objection and alteration as methods of rebutting the presumption do nothing to change this conclusion. Without clear words in the Act giving the valuation some other status, s.33 simply addresses an evidential issue thought by the Minister to warrant attention. For a conclusion to be drawn that the Chief Executive is precluded from -- 5 of 24 -- 6 leading evidence to the higher valuations, unless he alters his valuations in accordance with the statute, such a conclusion needs to be found outside the plain language of s.33. I will now explore the concept of an "envelope" from a broader perspective. [13] In Franklin v. Valuer-General the Land Appeal Court was concerned with an attempt by the landholder to amend his grounds of appeal. The Court referred to the wording of s.45(4), then said at 184-185: " It seems to us that it is not competent for an appellant before us to add to his grounds of appeal as initially contained in his Notice of Appeal to the Land Court. If he were permitted to do so he would be flouting the mandatory provisions of the Valuation of Land Act previously enumerated. In simple terms in the conduct of his appeal before us an appellant remains limited to the grounds of his original Notice of Appeal to the Land Court. On the other hand, the Valuer-General is not limited as to the nature of the reply he makes to an appellant's appeal. He may decide to restrict his case to the specified grounds of appeal or, as more often happens, he places before the Court the whole basis of the valuation appealed against and in so doing endeavours to answer the specific grounds of appeal. The latter procedure is more conducive to satisfying an appellants dissatisfaction, and if in so doing matters other than those raised in the appellant's grounds of appeal emerge, it would seem unfair if the Court denied cross-examination on them. " [14] This case is one of the many which make it clear that an appellant is bound by his grounds of appeal, yet the Chief Executive is not limited to those grounds of appeal in the conduct of his case. This decision of the Land Appeal Court does not, however, deal with the question of whether the Chief Executive is bound by his valuation. The case is, however, of interest from another perspective which was discussed by the Court at 184. " The provisions of the Valuation of Land Act as to the appeal procedure are restrictive in their operation more especially to an appellant who has made his appeal on narrow and particular grounds rather than on a broad general ground such as 'the valuation is excessive and contrary to law'." [15] Viewed in the abstract, it may be correct to say that the grounds of appeal construct part of an "envelope", but reality can present a different picture. It is, as the Court pointed out, open to an appellant to rely on grounds of appeal that are drawn so broadly that the only limitation imposed on them and by the evidence adduced in reliance on them is concerned with whether they are relevant to the issue of value. It is usually the case that a landholder is not aware of the method of valuation, nor of any evidence of value relied upon by the Chief Executive, in striking the value appealed against. In such circumstances the adoption of narrow grounds of appeal would be more a matter of guesswork or poor advice. More importantly, however, it is difficult to conclude that an -- 6 of 24 -- 7 "envelope" can in practice be created which on the side of the appellant is generally as open as the grounds of appeal say (grounds which the Chief Executive can go beyond), but on the other is fixed by a particular valuation figure, that figure being the figure first settled upon by the Chief Executive. Nevertheless I accept that both the appellant and the Court are limited by the grounds of appeal. [16] This brings me to the question of whether an appellant is bound by the estimate of value provided by him in the Notice of Appeal. In Schokman v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources (1998) 19 QLCR 386 the Court had to consider the question of whether an appellant could advance a figure different from that included in the Notice of Appeal. At pp.388-389 the Member expressed his view on this question: " The issue was considered in Brooker v The Valuer-General (1966) 33 CLLR 159. The Valuer-General had originally determined the value of the land to be £1,310. On objection the owners claimed that the unimproved value of the land was £400. The objection was allowed in part and the Valuer-General determined the value of the land to be £980. The owners appealed to the Land Court but the person compiling the notice of appeal wrongly inserted £980 as the amount which the appellants stated to be the unimproved value of the land. The Valuer-General submitted that the Land Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the notice of appeal did not disclose that the Valuer-General had any case to answer. The Court held that an incorrectly stated amount did not, in itself, make the notice of appeal defective and, in the circumstances of that case, the Valuer-General’s interests had not been prejudiced by the insertion of incorrect figures. The Court cited decisions in rental and valuation cases where courts had permitted an appellant to lead evidence to an amount lower than that stated in the notice of appeal (see Universal Building Co Pty Ltd v The Valuer-General (1962) 29 CLLR 321 and (1963) 30 CLLR 160, Alfred Grant Estates (Surfers Paradise) Pty Ltd (receiver appointed) v The Valuer-General (1964) 32 CLLR 23 at 35 and 33 CLLR 1) and referred to “what has become the accepted practice of allowing parties to call evidence of valuation at a figure at variance with that contained in any document filed in the Court prior to the hearing”. It held that the appellant could call evidence to a lower figure than the amount of the valuation (mistakenly) stated in the notice of appeal. In a subsequent case, Glen Kyle Pty Ltd v The Valuer-General (1985) 10 QLCR 220, the Land Court held that there was no authority to support the amendment of the amount stated in the notice of appeal when the matter is called on for hearing. The Court, however, cited the decision in Brooker’s case as authority supporting the proposition that it is open for appellants to lead evidence to a lower figure than that stated in the notice of appeal. In my opinion, section 45 does not prevent an appellant from leading evidence of valuation to an amount lower than that stated in the notice of appeal. Nor does it prevent the Court from determining that the unimproved value of the land was an amount lower than the amount stated there. The authorities support that conclusion." -- 7 of 24 -- 8 [17] I adopt this reasoning. There is a clear distinction between the language of s.45(4), which expressly provides that the appeal is limited to the grounds of appeal stated in the Notice of Appeal and that of s.45(5) which expresses no such restriction. It is also clear that the figure provided as the appellants' estimate of value does not constitute a ground of appeal, though the inclusion of an estimate of value is an essential component of a valid Notice of Appeal (Schirmer v The Valuer-General (1974) 1 QLCR 144). [18] It follows, in my view, that the appellants' estimate of value cannot be considered as forming part of the suggested "envelope". Just as s.45(5) does not limit the evidence of value that may be adduced by the appellant, I can find no express provision limiting the Chief Executive to provide evidence in support only of his original value. Indeed, it would be difficult to reconcile such a provision with the duty of the Court expressed in s.66. Whilst the Court is limited to the grounds of appeal in considering any change (usually a reduction) in the Chief Executive's valuation in favour of the appellant (see, for example, Dillon v Valuer-General (1987) 11 QLCR 231), it is not limited in terms of quantum by either the appellant's estimate of value or the Chief Executive's deemed correct value. Section 66 gives the Court unlimited jurisdiction as to quantum. (See, for example, Re Gatton Appeals – Louis Sabburg & Ors (1949) 22 CLLR 204 at 221). [19] The essential proposition put by the applicants is that it is the Chief Executive's valuation figure against which appeals have been lodged (the original valuations) and such valuations cannot be altered except in accordance with the Act. The corollary to that proposition is, it was submitted, that the Chief Executive would be prevented from leading evidence to any value apart from the original value unless an alteration in accordance with the Act had been effected. Now that suggested prohibition is not based on any question of the admissibility of the evidence on general principles. At the outset, at least, the proposition raises a question of construction. [20] Chief Justice Barwick in Kilcoy Shire Council v. Brisbane City Council (1970-71) 124 CLR 60 at 67 makes it clear that for a valuation to become the relevant valuation for the purposes of the Act, it acquires the status of becoming the valuation by having satisfied the various requirements of the Act. In Kilcoy the question in issue was concerned with the need for the formal adoption of a date of valuation. " I have come to think that the key to the meaning of Pt VI in relation to the ambit of objection and appeal is to be found in the assignment of precise meaning to the words 'the valuation' there used. As often occurs in the statutes, the definition of 'valuation' in the definition section of the Valuation Acts adds nothing to knowledge or understanding. Valuation is there said to mean, subject to context, 'Valuation under this Act'. One could not hope for less enlightenment. The Valuer-General is required to 'make a valuation of the unimproved value of' parcels of land. See s.11(1). -- 8 of 24 -- 9 Here the word 'valuation' covers both the activity of assessing value and the reduction of that assessment to written form. That operation is expressed as a valuation: but it is not at that stage the valuation of the land for the purposes of the Valuation Acts or those of the Local Government Acts. Only after a date on or after which the assessment may be acted upon does the activity of the Valuer-General become the valuation. The Governor-in-Council is to proclaim a date on or after which the Valuer-General's quinquennial valuation shall be the valuation of the lands in the valuation district. Section 11(2)(iii) of the Valuation Acts requires the Valuer-General to fix the operative date of his amendment where it is not otherwise fixed by or under the Act so that on or after that date the amended value will be 'the valuation'. When in either case an operative date has been fixed what the Valuer-General has done becomes the valuation for the purposes of the Acts to which I have referred." (Emphasis provided in the original). [21] The term "valuation" in the context of s.33 was considered by Justice Gibbs, as he then was, in Brisbane City Council v Valuer-General (1978) 140 CLR 41 at 56. "The word 'valuation' is used in the Act in shifting senses, and, as was said in Kilcoy Shire Council v. Brisbane City Council, it 'covers both the activity of assessing value and the reduction of that assessment to written form.' However, I accept that in s. 13(7) it at least includes the amount of the valuation, and that there is a presumption that the value in money terms shown by the Valuer-General in his notice of valuation is correct." (Citation deleted). [22] It follows that it is the valuation figure which becomes protected by s.33 as long as it is a valuation made or altered "under this Act". [23] No point is taken by either side that the original valuations are anything other than valuations of the Chief Executive made under the Act, therefore gaining the special status accorded by s.33. It is common ground that the higher valuations have not been subjected to the formal processes required under the Act which would lead to them becoming the valuations under the Act which are deemed to be correct by s.33. In particular, the original valuations have not been altered by any of the processes expressed in s.28 and s.29. [24] I will return to those last-mentioned provisions shortly, however will first deal with a submission for the applicants that the higher valuations are not valuations made by the Chief Executive under the Act and are therefore nothing but a frolic on the part of the authors of the respective valuation reports. I should first record that counsel for the Chief Executive informed me that his instructions from his client were that the Chief Executive intended to pursue the higher valuations at trial and to effectively abandon the original values. Whilst this disposes of any suggestion that the valuers who wrote the higher valuation reports were on a frolic of their own, it is not sufficient to dispose of the -- 9 of 24 -- 10 question of whether the Chief Executive may proceed with the higher valuations without resorting to a formal alteration of the original valuations. [25] John Brian O'Rourke deposed that the Chief Executive accepted that the original valuations were no longer entitled to the presumption of correctness bestowed on them by s.33 because the higher valuations more properly reflected the application of the relevant provisions of the Act, in particular s.3(2). The higher valuations which the Chief Executive intends to rely on purport to value the land in each case by utilising two valuation methods, one said to be supported by s.3(1)(b) and the other by s.3(2). The original valuations, I am told, employed s.3(1)(b) alone. "3. (1) For the purposes of this Act - 'unimproved value' of land means – (b) in relation to improved land - the capital sum which the fee simple of the land might be expected to realise if offered for sale on such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona fide seller would require, assuming that, at the time as at which the value is required to be ascertained for the purposes of this Act, the improvements did not exist." (2) However, the unimproved value shall in no case be less than the sum that would be obtained by deducting the value of improvements from the improved value at the time as at which the value is required to be ascertained for the purposes of this Act." Given the conclusions that I draw on the applications, I see no need to consider various submissions of the parties concerning the requirement to employ two such methods of valuation. Those are matters for another day. I am concerned, however, to address Mr O'Rourke's apparent understanding of s.33. [26] The Chief Executive cannot by some unilateral statement displace his valuation which, by statutory process, has become the valuation deemed to be correct by s.33. That section provides the means by which an original valuation can be displaced: by objection, appeal, alteration or further alteration. Each of these processes is provided for in the Act. Sections 42 to 44 deal with objections, with s.43 giving the Chief Executive power to allow an objection and therefore adjust the valuation objected against. Section 48(e) provides for the valuation roll to be amended following a successful objection and also where there is a successful appeal. Alteration and further alteration are provided for in s.28 and s.29 in particular, as well as in other provisions not relevant for present purposes, for example, s.68 and s.28A. An appeal is provided for in s.45, whilst s.66 empowers the Land Court or the Land Appeal Court to affirm, reduce or increase the valuation. I return -- 10 of 24 -- 11 to s.66 below. Suffice it to say at this point that the proof required by s.33 in an appeal is proof sufficient to lead the Court to exercise its jurisdiction and to determine a value different from the value which to that point is deemed to be correct. The Chief Executive cannot by an act such as an admission displace the jurisdiction of the Court in such circumstances where the Court is properly seized of the matter. Once an appeal is correctly lodged the Court is seized of the matter. [27] Once valuation evidence is given by both sides, the Court must consider the factual issues and draw its own conclusion with respect to them. In such circumstances the Court considers the totality of the evidence (State Government Insurance Office v Valuer- General (1981) 7 QLCR 171 at 193-194) and the presumption of law raised by s.33 generally fades into insignificance. It is not the appellant's task in such a case to prove positively that the value is lower than that adopted by the Chief Executive. As was said by Justice Gibbs, as he then was, in Brisbane City Council v Valuer-General at p.56: "In my opinion once it is shown that in making the valuation the Valuer- General acted upon a wrong principle, or made a serious error of fact, the presumption created by s.13(7) is rebutted." (Section 13(7) was the equivalent of s.33). [28] Since none of the statutory processes mentioned in s.33 have been taken through to completion, none of the original valuations is changed and each is still deemed to be correct. In such circumstances the applicants submit that the Chief Executive ought not be permitted to rely on the new and higher valuations in the appeals. The Chief Executive, it was submitted, can lead evidence only to the valuation being the valuation which has been the subject of the relevant statutory processes. [29] The applicants made reference to State Government Insurance Office v The Valuer- General (1981) 7 QLCR 171 at 177 where the Court said: " A valuation made for the purposes of the Valuation of Land Act is for the special purposes of that Act and though some concepts to the Act may be dictated by policy and not commercially real – for example section 11(1)(vii) – valuations for the purposes of the Act must be made strictly in accordance with the provisions thereof." [30] The then President was clearly referring to the method and content of a valuation report. An issue on that subject does not arise in the present applications. [31] In Appeals against Determinations of Valuer-General – Shire of Peak Downs (1972) 39 CLLR 85, a valuer for the Valuer-General included in his valuation report valuations determined by the Valuer-General for properties other than the property being valued. He said in evidence that he did not agree with all of the relevant Valuer-General valuations mentioned and supplied his own opinion of the values that should apply to those -- 11 of 24 -- 12 properties, then used his values in his valuation process. Learned Member Dodds at 90- 91 said: "However, Mr Moore when he brought in Paringa for direct comparison purposes with the appeal property of Mr Penrose, disregarded the Valuer- General's valuation of $7 per acre for Paringa, and relying on his own analysis of the sale at $8.50 per acre, used his own applied overall value of $7.50 per acre to assist him in arriving at a value for the appeal property. In my judgment a valuer cannot proceed in this manner. In defence of his action Mr Moore urged his integrity as a valuer, and I fully concede that he is not bound to agree with the Valuer-General's valuation of Paringa or of any other property. What I am saying is that whatever he thinks of any Valuer-General's valuation under the Act he must accept it for the purposes of the Act. He cannot alter it, and apply his own or that of anyone else for the purposes of the Act. Subsection (7) of section 12 of "The Valuation of Land Acts, 1944 to 1959", in my opinion makes this clear beyond any doubt. It provides in plain terms that any and every valuation or alteration of the valuation of any land made . . . under the Act by the Valuer-General shall be deemed to be correct until proved otherwise upon objection or appeal or until altered . . . pursuant to a provision of section 13. In my judgment this provision is binding on the Court and on all persons for the purposes of the Valuation of Land Acts, including the Valuer-General himself." [32] I adopt the Court's reasoning, however see that to be of no assistance to the applicants before me. In Peak Downs the relevant valuations of the Valuer-General enjoyed the presumption of correctness supplied by the predecessor of s.33, just as in the present case the original valuations have that same status. These are not, however, cases where a valuer for the Chief Executive is attempting to employ an independent mind, but these are cases where the instructions of the Chief Executive are to tender the valuation reports leading to the higher valuations and this is intended to be done in the process of an appeal: one of the circumstances included in s.33 as being a means of overcoming the deemed correctness of the original valuation. [33] In Mackay Harbour Board v. Valuer-General (1974) 1 QLCR 67 at 73 learned Member Mr Dodds said: " The Valuer-General is a statutory person created to administer the Valuation of Land Act subject to the Minister. As such he derives his powers and authorities solely from the Act itself. He has no inherent discretion to make such valuations as he deems desirable or necessary for purposes decided by himself outside the framework of the Valuation of Land Acts or perhaps of some other enabling Act through which the Legislature confers on him a power to make a valuation." (the underlining is mine) [34] The facts of the case were such that the Court concluded that the land under consideration was exempt from the payment of local government rates. The provision which imposed -- 12 of 24 -- 13 the obligation on the then Valuer-General to carry out valuations was s.11(1)(i) of the Valuation of Land Act which relevantly said: "11. (1) Valuer-General to make valuation. (i) The Valuer-General shall in each Area, make a valuation of the unimproved value of any land granted by the Crown in fee-simple and of any other lands held from the Crown which may from time to time be required to be valued under the provisions of The Local Government Acts, 1936 to 1943, ..." [35] The Court concluded, after consideration of the The Local Government Acts that the only land required to be valued is rateable land, therefore the relevant land did not fall to be valued. On p.74 of the reported judgment the learned Member said: " In these circumstances I find that the Valuer-General was acting in excess of his powers under the Act in valuing the subject land." [36] I understand the reasoning of the Court, which I accept, to be based on the valuations being "outside the framework of the Valuation of Land Act". The valuation was outside that framework because the Valuer-General was not empowered or required by the Statute to carry out the valuation and have it subjected to such provisions of the Valuation of Land Act as the objection and appeal process provisions. The present applications are quite different in that the question which I am asked to consider is whether the higher valuations may be received as evidence of valuation in circumstances where the original values have not been altered following the use of statutory processes such as might be available under s.28 and s.29. No question arises as to whether the Chief Executive has the power to value the subject lands. The question is whether, having placed certain values on the lands, the Chief Executive may subsequently lead evidence to different higher values. If he may, then he is not acting contrary to the framework of the Act, in my view. [37] Section 28(1) of the Valuation of Land Act precludes the alteration of a valuation except in certain enumerated circumstances. The provision is introduced with these words "28. (1) No alteration shall be made in the valuation of any parcel of land during the period during which any annual valuation relating to the area in question is in force or, in the case of an annual valuation which has not come into force, during the period between the issuing of an annual valuation notice under part 4, and the date of the valuation coming into force –" [38] I will not list all of the exceptions to that provision, but useful reference may be made to s.28(1)(h): "(h) unless the valuation is affected by error or omission which the chief executive considers it necessary to correct, other than an error of law or mistake of fact that may be corrected under section 28A;" -- 13 of 24 -- 14 [39] It is convenient to provide the wording of s.28A and s.29 at this stage: " 28A. (1) This section applies if – (a) a valuation (the 'first valuation') is made; and (b) the first valuation is the subject of an objection or appeal under part 4, an objection under part 6 or an appeal under part 6A; and (c) before the objection or appeal is finalised, another valuation (the 'later valuation') of all or part of the land valued by the first valuation is made; and (d) the outcome of the objection or appeal is that the first valuation is altered because of an error of law or mistake of fact affecting the valuation. (2) The later valuation may be altered if the chief executive considers that - (a) the later valuation is also affected by the error of law or mistake of fact; and (b) it is necessary to correct the error of law or mistake of fact for the later valuation. 29. (1) The chief executive may at any time alter the valuation of any land the valuation of which may be altered under section 28 or 28A. (2) The chief executive may include in 1 valuation the several parcels of land referred to in under section 28(1)(k). (3) Every alteration of the valuation of any land made under this section must be taken to be a valuation and the provisions of part 6 about notices of valuation and objections and part 6A about appeals apply." [40] In the circumstances of these applications it is clear to me that s.28A has no application. While the facts are concerned with what I have called original and higher valuations, there is no "first" or "later" valuations of the type considered in s.28A. That provision is concerned with valuations with different relevant dates which, it is intended, will become the valuations upon which local government rates are assessed. This brings me back to s.28(1)(h). [41] I need to make it clear that I see no need in the present application to decide whether this provision applies to the facts before me, nor whether the Chief Executive is authorised to alter the original valuations in reliance on this provision. I confine myself to consider whether in circumstances such as the present this provision applies in such a way as to oblige the Chief Executive to alter the original valuations. Clearly, it does not say this, nor can I find elsewhere in s.28 or s.29 or in any other provision of the Act any requirement for the Chief Executive to alter the original valuations in circumstances such -- 14 of 24 -- 15 as the present. The language in the relevant provisions might be described as empowering rather than mandating an obligation to alter a valuation:  Section 28(1)(g) "unless, in the opinion of the chief executive …"  Section 28(1)(h) "unless … the chief executive considers it necessary …"  Section 29(1) "The chief executive may …" [42] Some reliance was placed by the applicants on Application for Rehearing – Appeal against Valuer-General – Shire of Herberton (1975) 2 QLCR 180 where the learned Member said at 182 to 183: " Now, let me state here that I go along with Mr Gaffney's submission that s.21 of the Act is a code in itself setting out the provisions governing appeals to the Court. Indeed I go further than he has gone while recognising that he has gone only as far as he needs to go for the purposes of this case. I have on another occasion, during the hearing of an appeal by Colin Ray Newport in Toowoomba in June 1974, stated that in my opinion the whole of Part VI of the Valuation of Land Act is a code governing a valuation from the time of its notification to the owner by the Valuer-General until it is finally determined by one of the means provided by Part VI, and I adhere to this opinion." [43] It was submitted by the applicants that as the parts of the Act relevant to these applications are a code, no departure from their otherwise clear terms can be justified. This submission recognises that the question is at its outset one of construction. It follows from that, I think, that the task that I have embarked upon in these reasons of attempting to understand the relevant provisions by a textual analysis and purposive construction is the correct one. Characterisation of the Act or any parts of it as a code does not advance that task. [44] The applicants recognise that there have been and will be in the future instances in which the Court may properly allow the Chief Executive to depart from his original valuation in the process of the hearing of an appeal. For example, in Muir v The Valuer-General (1977) 4 QLCR 81 the Land Appeal Court allowed an increase in valuation above the original figure of the Valuer-General, as that figure assumed an area smaller than the actual area of the land. [45] In Hymix Industries Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Department of Lands (1994) 15 QLCR 174 the Chief Executive had placed a value of $1,725,000 on the subject land but advised the appellant that he would lead evidence to a figure of $3,400,000. The appellant provided an estimate of $1,500,000 in its Notice of Appeal. The main point of difference between the parties lay in the question of whether the valuation ought to take into account the presence of meta-greywacke (or blue metal) on the land, which was used for hard- rock quarrying purposes. At the hearing the parties agreed that if the meta-greywacke -- 15 of 24 -- 16 should be taken into account, the value would be $3,000,000 and if not, it should be $1,612,500 [46] My research has revealed no decided cases in which the Court has identified an impediment to either the appellant or the Chief Executive leading evidence to figures different from their respective original valuation figures. The applicants concede that examples such as Muir and Hymix can be found but submit that the present appeals are different in that the amount of increase in the figures ($40,000,000 to $215,000,000 in the case of Pacific Fair and $37,000,000 to $106,000,000 and $110,000,000 in the case of Garden City) is so great that the valuations the Chief Executive now wishes to pursue are valuations of a different character from the original valuations. The applicants say that in the case of Muir the value per unit area was maintained by the Valuer-General, with the area only being adjusted, whilst in Hymix there was agreement between the parties that the issue would be confined to a single point. Jurisdiction cannot, of course, be conferred by agreement. [47] I cannot discover any rational way by which the fact situations in Muir and Hymix (and other examples I could imagine) can be neatly compartmentalised by any expression of principle which would have the effect that in the case of the present appeals I could conclude an absence of jurisdiction, whilst jurisdiction would be found to exist in cases such as Muir and Hymix represent. In truth, the distinction between those cases and the present appeals can only be described as distinctions of degree albeit of substantial degree. [48] Jurisdiction cannot be dealt with as a question of degree. I find no support for any suggestion that this Court can consider the amount of the valuation intended to be relied on by the Chief Executive or the issues to be canvassed before deciding whether it has jurisdiction. Section 66 makes it clear that the Court may determine value at a higher figure than the original valuation of the Chief Executive. It follows that evidence to that end can be admitted. Given the jurisdiction of this Court bestowed by s.66 and the absence of any express provision in the Act requiring the Chief Executive to employ s.28 and s.29 to alter the original valuations, there is an absence of a clear line of reasoning and authority in support of the applicants' contention which would have the effect of denying jurisdiction unless the original valuations are altered. Also, there is nothing in the language of s.33, nor in its introduction into the Act, which points to the conclusion sought by the applicants. [49] There are practical implications from the conclusions I have drawn. A decision in favour of the applicants could not, I think, be confined to instances of substantial increases in -- 16 of 24 -- 17 valuations on the part of the Chief Executive and would mean that no evidence of a higher valuation, however small and on whatever basis, could be received unless and until the Chief Executive had altered the valuation by utilising the powers in s.28 and s.29. I am aware that annual valuations are struck by the use of mass appraisal techniques and that refinement of the valuation figure will often be justified once a complete valuation report is prepared. This was recognised by the High Court in The Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Gold Estates of Australia Ltd (1903) 51 CLR 509 where their Honours said at 514: "It is apparent that a valuation made in the ordinary course of routine administration is unlikely to have received the same consideration and care as had been bestowed by the witnesses called at the hearing upon the estimates to which they deposed. Those estimates had been made after thorough inspections and a full examination of all the comparable sales that could be discovered. All the materials upon which they formed their opinions were laid before the Court, and the reasoning upon which they proceeded was explained." [50] The conclusion that I have drawn finds some support in another area of jurisdiction of this Court. In The Australian Pastoral Company Limited v The King (1920) St.R. Qd73 the Full Court considered the question of whether valuation evidence could be led to a higher figure than that originally notified by the Crown in accordance with s.29 of The Land Act 1910. That section provided that the Crown was required to furnish to the Court a report and valuation made by a Land Commissioner. By analogy with the present matter such a valuation would be the valuation of the Crown for the purposes of the Act. The Full Court held, however, that it had jurisdiction to determine an amount in excess of the valuation provided and that the Crown could lead evidence to a higher figure even though it was precluded from amending its original report and valuation. [51] One consequence of the conclusion that s.33 creates a presumption of correctness for the original valuations and not the higher valuations the Chief Executive now wishes to pursue is that the lowerG21 riginal valuations can be increased only by one of the methods contained in that section. In the case of an appeal which proceeds to trial, the Chief Executive is confronted with the presumed correctness of the original valuations and therefore needs to prove to the Court's satisfaction that higher values ought to be determined. The use of the words "proved otherwise" in s.33 do not indicate to me that it is evidence from an appellant only that can be considered by the Court in exercising the powers provided in s.66. It is the evidence as a whole that needs to be considered whether it be from the appellant or the Chief Executive. In my view it need not be "proved otherwise" by the Chief Executive -- 17 of 24 -- 18 adducing evidence to show that the original value is wrong, but can be the outcome of the leading of evidence to a higher valuation. [52] The appeal by the landholder remains as an appeal against the original value, but for evidential purposes would logically be understood to be against any figure higher than the original value. If the appellant elected to withdraw the appeal before trial, the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the matters would be determined and the Chief Executive would need to utilise a means other than the appeal process to have the higher valuations become the valuations under the Act. If the Chief Executive were to employ s.28 and a.29 to alter the valuations, then s.29(3) would have the effect of creating an opportunity for the landholders to object and subsequently appeal against the new higher valuations. [53] What I have said in the above paragraph is not intended to suggest a stratagem to either the applicants or the Chief Executive, but merely to point out one of the implications of s.33. Indeed, circumstances such as the present would be very likely to create a dilemma for an appellant and elevate the Chief Executive to a position of dominance. An appellant may be concerned, for example, that his grounds of appeal are not sufficiently wide to address a different and higher valuation and therefore may see an advantage in being able to construct fresh grounds of appeal. He may, however, be concerned that any withdrawal of an appeal may not be followed by an alteration of valuation under s.28 and s.29 with the result that the original valuation, which he thinks to be too high in any event, retains its status of being presumed correct under s.33. Any Court would treat with considerable concern any attempt by the Chief Executive or his employees to take advantage of that situation. [54] I should say that counsel for the Chief Executive submitted that the grounds of appeal in each of the cases appear sufficiently wide to encompass any valuation advanced by the Chief Executive, the suggestion being that the applicants would gain no advantage in being able to construct new grounds of appeal. That may be so, however it is not something on which I can or should draw a conclusion without a full consideration of the evidence as it unfolds. Apart from that, it is not a matter for me to form a conclusion as to whether a landholder would or would not gain any benefit from being able to prepare fresh grounds of appeal. That is solely a matter for the parties. [55] The question was raised in argument as to whether the Chief Executive retains a power to alter a valuation under s.28 and s.29 once the Court is seized of the matter by virtue of the lodgment of an appeal. It is not a question that the applications call upon me to decide, nor was it one on which I received detailed submissions. I was, however, referred to Beedell Farms v Valuer-General (1979) 6 QLCR 109 in which the Land Appeal Court -- 18 of 24 -- 19 was called upon to consider the application of s.13(2), a provision which was materially similar to the present s.28 and s.29. At pages 117 to 118 the Court said: " We turn now to the second of the respondent's contentions namely that the subsequent Notices of Valuation issued pursuant to section 13(2) of the Act, following the progressive subdivision of the appellant's parcel, not only superseded the valuations previously notified but also nullified all rights of objection and appeal appertaining to such superseded valuations Looking at this proposition purely as a matter of law, divorced from practicality, we find we are unable to agree with it. Section 13(2), except in the several circumstances therein set out, prohibits an alteration being made in the valuation of any parcel of land during the period during which any valuation of an Area is in force, or in the case of valuation of an Area which has not come into force, during the period between the giving of notice of valuation of the land in question to the owner and the date of the valuation coming into force. Subdivision of land during such period is one of the circumstances consequent upon which section 13(2) permits an alteration or amendment to a notified valuation. It is further expressly provided in the last paragraph of section 13(2) that 'Every alteration of the valuation of any land made pursuant to this subsection shall be deemed to be a valuation and the provisions of this Act respecting notice of valuation, objection and appeal shall apply and extend accordingly'. Section 18 authorises the amendment of the Valuation Roll so as to record an alteration made pursuant to section 13(2). When the Valuation Roll is amended we have no doubt that the valuation last recorded becomes the valuation for the purposes of the Valuation of Land Act, as and from the date the amended valuation takes effect, which date is required by regulation to be recorded in the Valuation Roll. Although the Legislature has expressly provided for rights of objection and appeal in respect of altered or amended valuations, it has remained silent concerning any such rights which may be current in respect of the superseded valuations. Where a right of appeal is allowed by statute we think an express provision is required to take away any such vested rights. We do not accept that section 13(2) when it expressly gives rights of objection and appeal in respect of amended or altered valuations by necessary implication nullifies all rights of objection and appeal current in respect of superseded valuations. From a practical viewpoint we see good reasons why the Legislature did not nullify the right of objection and appeal in respect of superseded valuations. It is not, in our opinion, an inadvertent omission. If the amended valuation takes effect on a date after the superseded valuation has come into force and rates or land tax have been levied and paid pursuant to it, it appears to us that it would be inequitable and unjust to -- 19 of 24 -- 20 deny an owner, who has duly objected and appealed, the right to test the quantum of the valuation the consequences of which have already been financially felt by him. Admittedly in the realm of practicality, it may be said in cases where the superseded valuation has not come into force before it is amended or altered, that no adverse consequences have been suffered by the owner. It would seem, superficially at least, in such cases that nothing is to be gained by proceeding with the prosecution of duly instituted appeals against the superseded valuations. On the other hand there may be cases where some advantage would flow from proceeding with such an appeal. The instant case is such a case because the only part of the subject parcel whose value is in dispute is the in globo piece of land and the finding of its unimproved value would be a worthwhile exercise for application in ascertaining the value of the progressively decreasing in globo area." [56] It seems to me that what the Court said on that occasion answers the question in the affirmative as to whether the Chief Executive retains the power of alteration of a valuation even though the Court is seized of an appeal. The Chief Executive creates a fresh right of objection and appeal by altering a valuation under s.28 and s.29 and does not thereby interfere with the Court's jurisdiction under the original appeal. I do not understand s.68 to confine the power of the Chief Executive to amend a valuation under appeal to the circumstances described therein. "68. (1) The chief executive may after receiving notice of appeal alter the valuation in accordance with the requirements of such notice and may not less than 14 days before the commencement of the sittings of the court at which the appeal is to be heard give notice of such alteration to the appellant and to the court, as the case requires, and thereupon the appeal shall be determined. (2) Moreover the chief executive may after receiving notice of appeal reduce the valuation and may not less than 14 days before the commencement of the sittings of the court at which the appeal is to be heard give notice of such reduction to the appellant who may not less than 7 days before the commencement of the sittings give to the chief executive and to the court, as the case requires, notice that the appellant accepts the valuation as reduced and thereupon the appeal shall be determined. (3) If the appellant does not give such notice the valuation as reduced shall be deemed to be the valuation appealed against." [57] I say this for two reasons. First, the Act under consideration by the Land Appeal Court in Beedell Farms included as s.21A a provision similar to the present s.68. Second, s.68 has a quite different effect from that of s.28 and s.29 in that it operates to determine an appeal (s.68(2)) or deems a reduced valuation to be the valuation appealed against (s.68(3)). It -- 20 of 24 -- 21 would be incongruous if a valuation amended under s.68 in one of the two manners therein described had any different effect. Sections 28 and 29, however, appear to me to provide for a reduced valuation in circumstances where no appeal is lodged and where s.68 cannot be used, or for the increase of a valuation at any time. [58] In Muir the Land Appeal Court (at 84), having elected to determine the value at a higher figure than that of the original Valuer-General's valuation, observed that the Valuer- General could, following a decision of the Court, alter the determined valuation under s.13(2)(h) – (the equivalent of s.28(1)(h)). It seems to me that if such a power exists, then it follows that a power exists where there is an appeal before the Court which has not yet commenced to hear evidence. I now turn to deal with various other submissions made by the parties. Whilst I do this for completeness, I should mention that various other authorities were referred to by the parties which I see no need to refer to. [59] In the case of an appeal under the Valuation of Land Act the parties join issue at one sharp point and that is the difference in view each have of the unimproved value of the land. An appellant generally says that the valuation determined by the Chief Executive is too high. Any higher valuation would still be too high, from the appellant's perspective. Now the applicants say that they have proceeded on the basis that s.33 accords the original valuations a presumption of correctness and have been prepared to conduct their cases on that basis. They should not now be called upon to fight a case on the basis that the Chief Executive's evidence will be that the values are substantially higher than the original valuations, according to their submissions. [60] If I consider that proposition as a general one, not as a question of construction, I cannot conclude that on the basis of a consideration of the figures alone the applicants are at any disadvantage. Evidence from an applicant leading to a lower valuation than the original valuations would equally lead to a lower valuation than the higher valuations of the Chief Executive. But, of course, there is also the question of the valuation evidence, including the method of valuation. Now apart from the fact that an appellant would not usually know at the time of lodgment of the Notice of Appeal (which includes the grounds of appeal) the valuation evidence relied upon by the Chief Executive, there is no prohibition in the Act that I can find that limits either party to any particular valuation evidence or method. Such limitations, if they arise at all, would arise as a consequence of the management of a particular case by the Court. [61] Reference was made by the applicants to this Court being guided by equity and good conscience. The applicants sought to characterise the approach of the Chief Executive in -- 21 of 24 -- 22 pursuing the higher valuations as being contrary to equity and good conscience. Section 7 of the Land Court Act 2000 provides: "7. In the exercise of its jurisdiction the Land Court – (a) is not bound by the rules of evidence and may inform itself in the way it considers appropriate; and (b) must act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to legal technicalities and forms or the practice of other courts." [62] I draw attention to the words "in the exercise of its jurisdiction". It is clear that the equity and good conscience guidance becomes operative only within the jurisdiction of the Court (see Cox v Commissioner of Water Resources (1992) 14 QLCR 304 at 309). Similarly, I would have to conclude that the requirements of s.7 cannot be employed by the Court as a means by which it can deny jurisdiction which would otherwise exist. In short, s.7 is not a source of power which can be called upon to found or to deny jurisdiction. It is a provision which supplies guidance to the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. [63] It was submitted for the applicants that s.66 does not give the Court a power to alter the original valuations at the start of the trial by allowing the higher valuations to become the valuations of the Chief Executive and to thereby override the effect of s.33. It should be clear from these reasons that I do not hold the view that any valuations other than the original valuations are deemed to be correct by virtue of s.33. It will be understood that any increase in value above the original valuations is a matter that can be put in place only by a decision of this Court following a consideration of the evidence or by the parties forming an agreement leading to a consent judgment. It follows that any evidence received by the Court of a higher valuation is merely evidence received in the course of trial and its receipt does not accord that evidence any statutory status. [64] I should also point out that the receipt into evidence of the higher valuations, should that occur, would not be as a result of the Court adopting an investigative role. It would be nothing more than the receipt of relevant evidence concerning a matter being pursued within the jurisdiction of the Court. [65] The brief history of valuations, objections and disallowance of objections set out in para 1 might be expanded upon by the inclusion of some facts considered salient by the applicants.  25 February 2002 the Chief Executive issues annual valuation for the Pacific Fair land at $40,000,000. The landholder objects.  30 April 2002 the Chief Executive disallows the objection and confirms the value of $40,000,000. -- 22 of 24 -- 23  15 May 2002 the Chief Executive lodges with the Court valuation report concerning the 1999 and 2000 valuations, the valuation report revealing a figure of $215,000,000. [66] It is reasonable to infer that the valuation report lodged would have been in the process of preparation well before 30 April 2002, yet a landowner would have understandably concluded on that date that the Chief Executive had decided not to move from the original figure of $40,000,000. [67] A less clear understanding would have applied in the case of the Garden City property. In that case a valuation of the Chief Executive dated 2 February 2002 at $37,000,000 was objected against by the landholder. That objection was disallowed by a letter dated 25 June 2002 and the valuation of $37,000,000 confirmed, yet a valuation of that property as at 1 October 1999 and 1 October 2000 in the amounts of $106,000,000 and $110,000,000 respectively were lodged with the Court on 10 May 2002. [68] Now whilst this course of events may be confusing and stressful to a landholder, a consistency lies between these events and the fact that the Chief Executive has not at this time elected to alter any of the relevant valuations by employing the provisions of the Valuation of Land Act, but had decided to lead evidence to the higher valuations. Accordingly, on the reasoning I have employed above, the valuation of the Chief Executive for the purposes of the Act remained at $37,000,000 in the case of Garden City and $40,000,000 for the Pacific Fair land. [69] Reference was also made by the applicants to the reasons for decision provided by the Chief Executive in various letters disallowing objections. I can make no useful reference to this evidence in dealing with the applications. [70] The applicants suggested that the Chief Executive in proceeding in the manner foreshadowed, is seeking a judicial basis upon which he could, if successful, amend valuations of other comparable shopping centres. It was submitted for the applicants that this is an inappropriate use of the appeal mechanism. I do not accept this submission. The task of the Court is to dispose of the appeals before it. Any consequential effects of the decisions that emerge are not matters that impinge upon the proper exercise of jurisdiction. [71] The Chief Executive submitted that it would not be appropriate to deal with the applications and to therefore determine what evidence is admissible in accordance with the hearing of the appeals. The majority of the High Court in Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334 said at 357-358: " It cannot be doubted that in many cases the formulation of specific questions to be tried separately from and in advance of other issues will -- 23 of 24 -- 24 assist in the more efficient resolution of the matters in issue. However, that will be so only if the questions are capable of final answer and are capable of being answered in accordance with the judicial process." [72] Whilst in Bass the High Court was concerned with the question of declaratory relief, the prerequisites enunciated by their Honours would seem to me to have wider application. The issues raised in the applications before me are capable of final answer in accordance with the judicial process and should be so answered in my view to assist in the more efficient resolution of the primary matter in issue, that is the issue of value in accordance with the Valuation of Land Act. It is more efficient to deal with this issue prior to, rather than during trial. [73] Having dealt with and decided the issue of the applications, it does not follow that I should also decide the question of the admissibility of the higher valuation reports at this stage. Generally speaking, questions of admissibility turn on the question of relevance. " In valuation cases the Court has not to determine whether the value put on by one side is correct, or whether the value put on by the other side is correct, but has to determine what is the correct value. There is no 'issue' in the strict sense of the word." Mobbs v Valuer-General (1922) LGR (NSW) 73 at 73) [74] That broad issue of value is, however, confined by the grounds of appeal relied upon by the appellant and the evidence adduced in support of those grounds, including the value finally contended for. The question of relevance is best determined in that context, not by the attempted application of a paradigm of some sort which anticipates the course and content of the trial. Order The applications are refused. RP SCOTT MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT -- 24 of 24 --