Astonland Pty Ltd v HTW Valuers (Central Qld) Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 380
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Astonland Pty Ltd v HTW Valuers [2001] QSC 380
PARTIES: ASTONLAND PTY LTD
(Plaintiff)
v
HTW VALUERS (CENTRAL QLD) PTY LTD
(Defendants)
FILE NO: S400/2000
DIVISION: Trial Division
DELIVERED ON: 8 September 2001
DELIVERED AT: Rockhampton
HEARING DATE: 27th and 28th June, 16th, 17th and 18th July 2001.
JUDGE: Dutney J
ORDERS: Judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant
for the sum of $406,194.60.
CATCHWORDS: NEGLIGENT MIS-STATEMENT – BREACH OF
CONTRACT – MISLEADING CONDUCT –
Whether unqualified advice appropriate – Whether
competent valuer was or would have been aware of
possible impact of new shopping center.
DAMAGES - ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES – date
at which value of property ascertained – whether
decline in value of shops causally related to the
negligence, breach of contract or misleading or
deceptive conduct of the defendant.
Anstey v Austrust Limited (1999) 197 CLR 1 referred
to.
Bateman v Slatyer (1987) 71 ALR 553 referred to.
Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick
Hungerford (1996-1996) 188 CLR 241referred to.
Haines v Bengal (1991) 172 CLR 60 referred to.
Henville v Walker [2001] HCA 52 applied.
I and L Securities v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd
[2000] QCA 383 considered.
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Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999)
199 CLR 413 applied.
Marks v GIO (1999) 196 CLR 494 referred to.
Mooney v Williams (1905-1906) 3 CLR 1 followed.
RAIA Insurance Brokers Ltd v FAI General
Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 112 ALR 511 referred to.
San Sebastian Pty Ltd v The Minister (1986) 162
CLR 340 followed.
Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 referred to.
Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74
referred to.
Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992)
175 CLR 514 followed.
Trade Practices Act 1974 ss53, 82, 87.
COUNSEL: J Bell QC with him G O’Sullivan for the Plaintiff
VG Gibson for the Defendant
SOLICITORS: Russell Hanley & Johnson for the Plaintiff
Thynne & Macartney for the Defendant
[1] Dutney J: The plaintiff is the registered proprietor of land comprising a small
shopping arcade in Central Street, Sarina known as “Central Street Plaza”
(“the Plaza”). The property was acquired in July 1997 upon completion of a
contract of purchase dated 28 April 1997 for a consideration of $485,000.00.
[2] The Plaza has not been the success the plaintiff hoped for and expected. It is
now worth considerably less than the amount paid and is alleged to have been
worth considerably less both as at the date of settlement and as at the date of
contract. The plaintiff’s case is that it was induced to purchase the Plaza by
negligent or misleading advice given to it prior to contract by Mr Barry
Deacon, a director of the defendant.
[3] John Foster is an engineer. Since about 1996 he has conducted a building
business through a company, John Foster Projects Pty Ltd. His wife is Lyn
Foster. She is a chartered Accountant working part time as an employed tax
agent. At one time the Fosters lived in Brisbane. They subsequently moved to
Mackay but retained ownership of their home in Brisbane, which was rented.
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In early 1997 the Fosters decided to sell their Brisbane home and invest the
money in other property. To this end they looked at Commercial property in
the Mackay region. The immediate incentive to change investments in this
way was the low return and low capital appreciation being received for the
Brisbane house. The intention was to invest in commercial property with a
higher rate of return.
[4] In order to accommodate this proposed foray into commercial investment the
Fosters reorganised their affairs by setting up a discretionary trust with John
Foster Projects Pty Ltd as trustee. Mrs Foster resigned as a director of the
trustee leaving John Foster as the sole director. A second company with Mrs
Foster as the sole director was incorporated for the purpose of acquiring the
new investment. Ultimately the new company became Astonland Pty Ltd, the
plaintiff. This company was incorporated on 15 April, 1997.
[5] The Fosters calculated that they were in a position to invest, with borrowings,
a sum of around $500,000.
[6] Mrs Foster contacted a number of Mackay real estate agents seeking
information as to whether their proposed budget was realistic and what was
available in that price range. Eventually she spoke to a Mr Woosley at
Honeycombs Real Estate in Mackay. Mr Woosley provided Mrs Foster with a
brochure giving details of a number of properties they had listed at that time.
One in particular seemed to interest them. This was the Plaza which was said
to be returning $63,619 net per annum. The principal attraction of the Sarina
property initially was the fact that it had 8 tenants which theoretically provided
breathing space to obtain new tenants as old tenants left. In other words, if a
tenant left there would still be 7 tenants paying rent while a replacement was
being found. The Fosters were also interested in possibly developing a
warehouse and office at Paget in Mackay.
[7] Neither of the Fosters was particularly familiar with Sarina despite its being
only a short distance out of Mackay and despite Mr Foster’s company having
constructed extensions to the Sarina Leagues Club in about 1995 or 1996.
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[8] In 1997 the Bruce Highway passed directly through Sarina from north to
south. Some years earlier it had turned right at Central Street and run past the
allotment on which the Plaza was constructed. This change in direction
occurred in about 1980. The main thoroughfare in Sarina since that time has
been Broad Street.
[9] Having identified a property in which they had some interest Mr and Mrs
Foster discussed their next move and resolved that Mr Foster would speak to
Mr Deacon at HTW Valuers. Mr Deacon had either been recommended to Mr
Foster by someone or had become known to Mr Foster through some building
activity.
[10] The Fosters gave evidence that they resolved to seek the advice of a valuer
because he had no pecuniary interest in a sale of any particular property,
unlike a real estate agent, and his advice was more likely to be objective.
[11] Mr Foster telephoned Mr Deacon in early April 1997 and spoke to him briefly.
Mr Foster said that he told Mr Deacon that he and his wife were interested in
making a commercial property investment and inquired generally about
Mackay and Sarina. Mr Foster said that Mr Deacon gave him a run down on
aspects of the property market in Mackay and Sarina. In relation to Mackay,
Mr Deacon said that commercial development was subdued in the office and
retail sectors. In the retail sector there was some uncertainty with major
shopping centres on both the north and south sides of the river and uncertainty
over the effect of a proposed east/west connector road. Mr Deacon said
$500,000 was a good entry-level investment. In relation to Sarina Mr Foster
said that Mr Deacon told him that it was a good area with gradual growth and
new farms. A capitalisation rate on a purchase of 13% was too high and 12%
was more realistic. Mr Foster made some brief notes of some of the
information Mr Deacon Provided.
[12] Mr Deacon had a recollection of speaking to Mr Foster by telephone about the
time suggested by Mr Foster. He did not recall the conversation but agreed
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that what was said by Mr Foster in evidence seemed to be the type of thing he
would have said at that time. I accept that such a conversation occurred and
that it was generally as recounted by Mr Foster.
[13] Mr & Mrs Foster discussed the information Mr Foster had been given by Mr
Deacon as a result of which they agreed that Mr Foster would have a face to
face meeting with Mr Deacon. An appointment was made for Thursday, 17
April, 1997. Mr Foster attended a meeting with Mr Deacon on that day and
took with him a tenancy schedule that had been provided by Honeycombs and
the brochure showing the Paget and Sarina properties.
[14] Mr Foster’s account of the meeting is as follows. Mr Foster showed Mr
Deacon the brochure and the tenancy schedule and indicated to Mr Deacon
that they were interested in the Sarina property. Mr Foster is adamant that he
did not mention that he was there on behalf of John Foster Projects Pty Ltd.
Mr Deacon appeared to have at least some knowledge of the property because
he queried whether it was the “Trindorfer property”. This was a reference to
the vendor. Mr Foster told Mr Deacon that they would like him to prepare a
brief report on the sustainability of rents in Sarina. He also inquired as to what
impact “titivation” of the property by his building company might have on it.
There was also some discussion of the viability of industrial sheds at Paget and
Mr Deacon was asked to collect information on previous developments where
he had information relating to building costs and resales.
[15] Mr Deacon’s recollection of the meeting is that Mr Foster provided him with a
schedule of tenancies with rents and rates per square metre written down the
side. Mr Foster indicated that he was unfamiliar with rents in Sarina and
asked whether Mr Deacon could provide him with rental levels for retail shops
in Sarina. According to Mr Deacon Mr Foster said he needed to know because
he wanted to know whether the Plaza rentals were right and how they fitted in
to the Sarina market generally. Mr Deacon also recalls being asked whether
he could advise as to the demand in Sarina for retail tenancies and the
availability of tenants.
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[16] In relation to this conversation as outlined above I prefer the evidence of Mr
Deacon. I generally found Mr Foster to be a vague and unsatisfactory witness.
In a matter which had such significance for him I would have expected a fairly
clear recollection even after this lapse of time. Mr Deacon, on the other hand,
had the benefit of contemporaneous notes. In relation to his instructions Mr
Deacon’s note reads:
“Indicative Market Rents – Sarina”
“Supply & demand – Retail in town”.
The notes also make reference to John Foster Projects Pty Ltd but the context
in which it was raised is not indicated. I do not find that Mr Foster told Mr
Deacon he was being engaged on behalf of that company. It seems to me to be
just as likely that the company name was mentioned in the course of general
discussion in which Mr Foster identified himself. I do not place any
significance on the fact that Mr Foster made no notes either at the meeting or
in subsequent conversations with Mr Deacon and Mr Woosley. I would have
been more surprised if Mr Foster had claimed to have contemporaneous notes
where he was giving instructions rather then being provided with information.
[17] Mr & Mrs Foster said that following this meeting their interest in the Plaza
waned. They gave as reasons for this their overall ignorance of Sarina and the
limited growth potential in a small town. On Saturday, 19 April 1997 Mr
Foster says that he received a phone call from Mr Woosley who is said to have
told him that it looked likely that there would be an offer on the Plaza at
$475,000. Mr Foster says he responded by saying they were no longer
interested and would not be pursuing it.
[18] Mr Woosley denies having any such conversation. He says that he had no
such offer and he would not have tried to influence a potential purchaser by
pretending he had one. Mr Woosley’s diary was tendered. It has no entries
for Saturday 19 April 1997. I am not satisfied that the absence of a record of a
phone call such as the one alleged is significant particularly if its purpose was
to “urge” the potential purchasers. On this matter I accept the evidence of Mr
Foster. I found Mrs Foster generally to be a reliable witness. She gave
evidence that immediately following the alleged conversation with Mr
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Woosley Mr Foster recounted its contents to her. She was also present when
the call was said to be made and heard Mr Foster say that they were no longer
interested.
[19] The next contact between Mr Foster and Mr Deacon was alleged to be on
Monday morning 21 April 1997. Mr Foster says that he telephoned Mr
Deacon on Monday morning and told him there looked like being an offer on
the Plaza of $475,000 and not to worry about that aspect of the report. Mr
Foster also says that Mr Deacon also said that the Plaza was “good buying” at
$475,000. Mr Deacon is alleged to have said that the report was already
finished and he would fax it anyway.
[20] Mr Deacon denies ever expressing the view that the Plaza was “good buying”.
Mr Deacon’s recollection is that the only mention of the sum of $475,000 was
at the meeting on 17 April 1997. Mr Deacon gave evidence that at that
meeting Mr Foster asked him whether the Plaza would be "good buying” at
$475,000. Mr Deacon responded by saying he had not done a valuation of the
property. He had not previously done any work in relation to the property and
did not know what its value was.
[21] I accept that Mr Deacon had the conversation about which he gave evidence
and I also accept that at that point in time he could not have expressed any
view as to the value of the Plaza. In relation to the conversation allegedly held
on 21 April I am left with the evidence of Mr Deacon who I found generally to
be credible and that of Mr Foster. Mr Foster’s evidence, however, is again
corroborated by Mrs Foster. Mrs Foster was not present when this
conversation was alleged to have taken place. Mrs Foster said that it had been
arranged that Mr Foster would telephone Mr Deacon on the Monday morning
and tell him they were no longer interested in Sarina. She said that when she
saw her husband on the Monday evening he showed her the report from HTW
and told her that Mr Deacon had said that the Plaza was “good buying” at
$475,000. In the end it seems to me that if Mr Deacon thought he was in fact
in a position to express a view on 21 April it is probable he would have done
so. For reasons given below I find that the statement was made. I am not
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concerned that Mr Deacon does not remember this conversation. It had no
significance to him but would have had some significance to the Fosters
whether or not any opinion was offered. The statement that the property was
“good buying” in the context seems to me to be a throwaway comment in
response to being told someone else had offered that price.
[22] Whether the property was “good buying” at $475,000 or any other price seems
to me to be determined simply by applying a capitalisation rate to the
maintainable earnings. In my view a full valuation of this property as an
income producing investment is no more than the selection of the appropriate
capitalisation rate based on comparable sales evidence and its application to
future maintainable earnings. Future maintainable earnings are an expression
of the valuer’s professional opinion based on an assessment of the factors
likely to influence rent levels and the availability of tenants at those levels. Mr
Deacon half heartedly suggested there was more to the exercise than this but
the matters he raised really only went to the maintainability of the rent.1 In
assessing the likelihood of whether Mr Deacon made a statement of the type
attributed to him I am conscious that I have found that Mr Deacon had already
expressed a view as to an applicable capitalisation rate of 12%.
[23] The only work Mr Deacon had done on the property related to his retainer
from the Fosters. If one takes the letter of advise at face value he was in a
position to express an opinion as to future maintainable rents. Prima facie if
the rents are maintainable the income must also be maintainable subject to a
reasonable margin for vacancies.
[24] In the end, it seems to me that the advice contained in the letter is the critical
issue in this trial. If it in fact contains an opinion as to future maintainable
rents as alleged by the plaintiff it probably does not matter what was said
orally because Mrs Foster as an accountant was perfectly capable of assessing
value based on earnings and capitalisation rates. In fact she did so on the basis
of what she understood the effect of the written advice to be. If the written
1 Transcript pages 396-397.
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advice is as understood by the plaintiff the general statement that the property
was “good buying” at a particular price, adds little. It is not the sort of
statement Mrs Foster would be likely to act on. I thought her a careful person
who would not have risked her capital unless she had satisfied herself that the
investment was sound. It is thus necessary to look at the written advice.
[25] The material parts of the letter of advice of 21 April 1997 are as follows:
“We refer to our meeting of 17 April 1997 wherein you
requested advice relating to:
• Retail rental levels in Sarina
• Industrial investment premises at Paget
Our investigations indicate very limited rental evidence
for commercial premises in Sarina. We believe this to be
a result of:
• A relatively high proportion of owner occupation
• Historically business in Sarina has been fairly stable
and little expansion of the retail precinct has happened
• Where new tenancies have been established, they
have been primarily the result of a developer
providing space for specific tenants requirements
Within the town at present there are only limited
vacancies. Ten (10) specialty shops to be constructed in
conjunction with a 1500 square metre new supermarket on
Beach Road have attracted reasonably strong interest.
Two lease commitments at rents of $220 per square metre
have been signed and names have been put on the other
shops. Only one of these prospective tenants are currently
in business in rental premises in Sarina.
The eight (8) interested tenants are awaiting finalisation of
the supermarket lease before being prepared to commit to
the centre.
Other rental evidence includes:
• Cnr Anzac Street & Broard Street
This is a one year old, colonial style retail complex
with a highway frontage divided into five (5) shops,
which are occupied as two tenancies. Sarina Realty
occupies 100.3 square metres at a rent of $18,200 per
annum ($181/square metre) and the Leisure Time
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Centre occupies 224 square metres at a rent of
$41,600 ($186/square metre). Both tenants pay some
outgoings in addition to the rent.
• Sarina Plaza (Subject)
Shops 7 and 8 are new rentals established during 1996
which reflect $117 and $143 gross respectively.
• We are aware of one vacant shop in Broard Street
(Police Station side) with an area of approximately 60
square metres, which has a rent of $130 per week
($112/square metre).
While the available information is only limited we believe
it suggests that the current rental levels are maintainable,
and some are at the lower end of the market range.
However it may be difficult to increase rental levels to any
significant degree without some titivation of the building.”
[26] There was a debate over what Mr Deacon’s actual instructions were but I am
satisfied that what they were is irrelevant in the sense that Mr Deacon tendered
and the Fosters accepted the letter of 21 April as being in satisfaction of them.
[27] Mrs Foster says that her interest in the Plaza revived when she read the letter
of advice. It seems to me that this document had a much greater impact on
Mrs Foster than the oral advice. I assess Mrs Foster as liking to work things
out for herself rather than being told whether a property was “good buying” or
not. It seems that it was Mrs Foster who persuaded Mr Foster to go along with
the purchase after the advice was received.
[28] Mrs Foster’s interest in the purchase was revived as a result of her calculation
that a purchase of the property at $475,000 resulted in a net return on
investment of 13.4% as against an interest payment of 7.8%. At the projected
rate of return the investment would be entirely self-funding and there was
sufficient margin to allow for periodic vacancies as tenants came and went.
[29] Much debate in the evidence centred on the meaning of the expression
“current rental levels are maintainable” and on the effect of the qualification
that information was limited.
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[30] In his evidence in chief Mr Deacon said2 that he intended to convey by the
reference to rents being maintainable that rents in the range of $91.00 to $143
per square metres would continue to be applicable and appropriate for each of
the tenancies in the Plaza. In assessing those maintainable rents Mr Deacon
says that he factored in the likely effect of the Beach Road shopping centre. In
cross examination Mr Deacon said3:
“… Why would a purchaser be interested in [maintainable
rentals]? – So that he would continue to expect to receive
those rents.
Exactly. In the future; correct? – Yes
Should one fall over, he can get another one? – Yes.”
This corresponds almost exactly with Mrs Foster’s understanding of
maintainable rents.4
[31] I accept that there is a difference between maintainable rentals and rental
income. It seems to me to be obvious however that a reference to
maintainable rentals includes an expression of opinion as to the availability of
tenants at those rentals in the foreseeable future. Of course a valuer
expressing that view is not warranting that such tenants would be immediately
available or that intervening circumstances might not act to cause him to
revise that view. Nonetheless if Mr Deacon’s researches had caused him to
hold the view that the rentals were maintainable it must follow as a purely
mathematical exercise that he regarded the Plaza as “good buying” at
$475,000. This supports my finding that Mr Deacon did make a comment to
that effect to Mr Foster on the telephone on 21 April 1997.
[32] Whether the advice contained in the letter or the opinion voiced in the
telephone conversation is actionable depends in the first instance on whether
the opinion as expressed was reasonable from a person claiming the particular
expertise of the defendant. This is essentially the same whether the cause of
action is framed in negligence5, contract or breach of s52 of the Trade
2 Transcript p353
3 Transcript p371
4 Transcript p195
5 In Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 at 483 the High Court reiterated that the standard of care
required is that of the ordinary skilled person professing the special skill of the defendant. This
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Practices Act 1974.6 The issue for me to determine is whether or not the
opinion is one which on the facts as I find them to be a prudent valuer could
legitimately express.
[33] The principal complaint made by the plaintiff about the advice is that Mr
Deacon did not qualify his advice by reference to the potentially negative
impact on rental levels and thus income in the Plaza of the opening of the
Beach Road shops. That Mr Deacon was aware of the likely opening of the
Beach Road shops and that they were a potentially significant factor in relation
to the future of the Plaza is apparent from the references to them in the letter of
21 April 1997.
[34] Mr Deacon’s researches prior to giving the opinion of 21 April 1997 are
described by him from page 444 of the transcript. He visited Sarina and drove
down the main street and Central Street looking for "For Lease" signs in shop
windows. This was apparently his way of identifying the level of demand.
Mr Deacon also looked at the external features of the Plaza. Mr Deacon then
visited Mr Wright a local real estate agent who was involved in commercial
lettings including the proposed new Beach Road centre. The information in
the letter of advice concerning potential tenants for Beach Road came from Mr
Wright. Of the two committed tenants, one, the music shop, was an existing
Sarina business. The hairdressing salon which was the second committed
tenant was a new business. Of the balance Mr Wright conveyed only that
most of those which had expressed interest would be new to Sarina if they
later committed. It followed that some were existing Sarina businesses. Mr
Wright provided some rental information on the vacancies Mr Deacon had
imposed no different standard to that expressed earlier by Windeyer J in Voli v Inglewood Shire
Council (1963) 110 CLR 74 at 84. The same standard is applicable to both contractual and tortious
claims.
6 An opinion of an expert generally conveys that it is honestly held upon rational grounds involving an
application of relevant expertise: see RAIA Insurance Brokers Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd
(1993) 112 ALR 511 where the Full Court of the Federal Court approved the following statement of
Burchett J from Bateman v Slatyer (1987) 71 ALR 553 at 559, “It is of course clear law that a
statement of opinion cannot be regarded as false or misleading, or as misleading or deceptive, simply
because it turns out to be incorrect: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Pty Ltd … But
such an opinion may convey that there is a basis for it, that it is honestly held, and when it is expressed
as the opinion of an expert, that it is honestly held upon rational grounds involving an application of the
relevant expertise.”
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observed on his drive through Sarina. Mr Deacon looked at the site for the
Beach Road shopping centre, which was, then only at the slab stage. He said
that he formed the view that it either would not go ahead and thus have no
impact on other Sarina shops or it would contain within Sarina some business
that would otherwise have gone to Mackay and not adversely impact on
existing Sarina shops.
[35] Mr Dodds, a valuer from Mackay gave evidence concerning the impact of new
shopping centres on traditional town centres in smaller communities such as
Sarina. It was conceded by all parties that the impact of large sub-regional and
regional shopping centres on traditional town centres in larger regional cities
like Mackay and Rockhampton had been disastrous. The effect of smaller
centres on smaller communities was not as clear cut. I found Mr Dodds an
impressive witness. His experience in and knowledge of this topic was
extensive. As at April 1997, Mr Dodds was aware of the proposed Beach
Road shopping centre in Sarina and of the view that, despite previous
setbacks, it would proceed7. As early as 1996, valuations issued by Mr Dodds
office in relation to retail property in Sarina had carried qualifications relating
to the possible negative impact on existing premises of the Beach Road
centre.8 The Beach Road shopping centre was completed and occupied in mid
1998. Mr Dodds experience of neighbourhood shopping centres on traditional
town centres in smaller communities had been largely negative although not
uniformly so and depended on the distance between the new and existing
shopping precincts.
[36] In the case of the Plaza it is useful to look at its history following acquisition
by the plaintiff in mid 1997. At the time of contract the Plaza was fully
tenanted. It contained a video store in shop 1, a ladies fashion retailer in shop
2, a bookkeeping and stationery business in shop 3, A bearing retailer in shop
4, a delicatessen in shop 5, a laundremat in shop 6, a hobby and book business
in shop 7 and a second hand baby wear business in shop 8. On 7 July 1997 the
video shop vacated the premises although it continued to pay rent under the
7 Transcript page 222-223.
8 See exhibits 29 and 30.
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terms of the unexpired portion of the lease. This was the major tenant at the
street front. As at April 19989, shops 1 and 2 were vacant although rent was
being received under unexpired leases. Shop 8 was also vacant. The other
tenants remained in place. By March 200010 shops 4, 5, 6 and 8 were vacant,
the bearing shop had shifted to shop 2, a bakery was in shop 1, and a
newsagent was in shop 3. The bakery was on a one year tenancy from 18
February, 2000 at about half the previous rental and the newsagent was also on
a one year tenancy from January 2000 at about one third of the previous rental.
[37] Marketing efforts to obtain tenants11 attracted no interest. This was despite
some cosmetic improvement to the building by Mr Foster or his company.
[38] Variously attempts were made during the course of the trial to attribute this
depressing history to the poor management of the building, the Beach Road
shopping centre and the downturn in the economy. No evidence was called
which established any real link between the management of the Plaza and the
decline in its fortunes after it was bought by the plaintiff. Chronologically it
seems to me that the Plaza had some problems before the opening of the
Beach Road centre although it was still a viable proposition. After the
opening of the Beach Road centre the Plaza failed rapidly such that by March
2000 its net rental had reduced to just $15,069 per annum compared with
nearly $60,000 at the time of the contract. Sarina is basically a sugar town and
the beaches provide a weekend recreational area for miners in the hinterland.
The drop in the price of sugar in 199912 would have been reflected in
payments to growers in 2000. To some extent this drop would have been
offset by boom prices for cattle.13 In any event the decline in the Plaza’s
fortunes preceded the decline in sugar payments to growers. I am therefore
left to conclude on the balance of probabilities that the early rapid decline was
due in large measure to the opening of the new shops and movement of the
shopping focus in Sarina even further away from Central Street. The big
9 See exhibit 6 page 9
10 see exhibit 7 page 11
11 see exhibit 13
12 see exhibit 38
13 Transcript page 327.
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decline in new house approvals also post dated the opening of Beach Road
shopping centre although precisely how this would affect retailing was not
revealed.
[39] A useful insight into the situation with regard to the Plaza comes from the
evidence of Mr Wright. Mr Wright is a local real estate agent in Sarina. He
has operated in that capacity in Sarina either on his own account or as an
employee of another agency since 1991. He operated the Sarina squash courts
for 17 years before that. He impressed me as a reliable witness with a good
knowledge of Sarina and the factors impacting on its local economy. Mr
Wright was, of course, the person from whom Mr Deacon sought information
in April 1997.
[40] Even in 1997 Central Street was a fringe area of the commercial centre of
Sarina. Its principal drawback appears to have been that it was cut off from
the balance of the shopping precinct both by distance and by a level crossing
where long delays were and are experienced. Mr Wright said at one point of
his own office’s move from Central Street14:
“… Well we were actually in there, and we were paying a
hundred dollars a week in – when we left in about 1994,
and we moved to Broad Street to pay three times the rent
and – and to get closer to the shopping centre and, you
know, Central Street’s an out of the way place and, yeah, I
was very worried about Central Street.”
[41] Mr Wright’s evidence was to the effect that the majority of the Sarina
population was located between the shopping centre and the beaches. They
would have to pass the Beach Road shops before arriving at the town centre or
heading to Mackay. The Beach Road shops would therefor almost necessarily
have an adverse impact on any comparable businesses existing in Sarina and a
more severe impact generally the further the business was from Beach Road.
Since Central Street was in effect at the opposite extremity of the shopping
precinct from the Beach Road shops and already marginal as a shopping area
the effect would be greatest there. The effect of any downturn in the economy
14 Transcript page 315
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would also be greatest there. This analysis derives some support from the
figures supplied by Mr Sheahan, the defendant’s valuer. Mr Sheahan’s
analysis showed that since the opening of the Beach Road shops and even
ignoring the Plaza, rents have dropped generally in Central Street, but
remained static or risen in other parts of the town centre15. This suggests to
me that it was always in fact a vulnerable area and more likely to be adversely
affected by Beach Road than other parts of Sarina. When asked whether in his
opinion the statement regarding rents in the letter of advice of 21 April 1997
should have been qualified by noting the uncertain effect of the new shops Mr
Sheahan avoided the question by relying on the uncertainty as to whether or
not the centre would in fact be completed.16 In this respect I found him a
somewhat unsatisfactory witness. His response was not in my view helpful to
the defendant because Mr Deacon despite his doubts in the witness box had
clearly proceeded on the assumption that the centre would be completed as is
evident from the letter of advice.
[42] Whatever Mr Deacon’s personal view as to whether Beach Road was likely to
affect the Plaza rentals adversely and I accept him when he says that he did not
think it would have an adverse effect he could not as a competent expert have
failed to appreciate the risk and ought, in my opinion to have qualified his
advice by cautioning the reader that the effect was uncertain. The objective
evidence suggests that a more careful researching of the issue would have
identified Central Street as a fragile area and one where any impact was likely
to be quite severe. Centres such as Beach Road had had mixed effects on
traditional town centres and this fact was apparently well known in the
industry17. The geographic relationship between Beach Road and Central
Street satisfied all the criteria for negative impact identified by Mr Dodds.
What effect the Beach Road Shops might be expected to have was something
on which opinions might have differed but it was clear that it was sufficiently
likely to be detrimental to require caution to that effect. I do not consider the
position is in any way retrieved by saying that market information was limited.
15 see exhibit 25 pages 16 to 19 and transcript at page 488.
16 Transcript page 458.
17 See also exhibit 28
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17
Mr Deacon knew that the Fosters were seeking his advice as a professional
person for the purpose of deciding whether to buy the Plaza. In my view the
failure to appropriately qualify the opinion he gave fell below the necessary
standard of care or did not involve the application of the relevant expertise.
[43] Whether a statement such as that contained in the letter of advice of 21 April
1997 or the oral statement as to the property being “good buying” is negligent
depends on the circumstances in which it is made and the use to which it is put
by the recipient. Three conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, the giver of the
advice must know or ought to know that the recipient will rely on his advice;
secondly, it must be reasonable for the recipient to rely on that advice; thirdly,
it must be foreseeable that the recipient is likely to suffer loss if the advice
turns out to be unsound.18 To these should be added that the recipient must in
fact rely on the advice.
[44] In this case there is no doubt that if either piece of advice were to be relied
upon in relation to a decision to purchase the Plaza, loss is foreseeable. In
relation to the phone advice, however, I am not satisfied that it was reasonable
to rely on it. Neither am I satisfied that the plaintiff did in fact rely on it. I
have already indicated that Mrs Foster was in my view the principal decision
maker. I do not consider she would have acted in so important a decision on
the basis of a throw away line by Mr Deacon that the property was “good
buying” at a particular price. Nor do I consider it reasonable to rely on such a
statement in the circumstances here. As I have already indicated, I consider
Mrs Foster would have made her own decision as to whether the property was
“good buying” and in my view she did so based upon her calculation of return
and margin after being advised by Mr Deacon in the letter that the existing
rents were maintainable. I consider on the other hand that the advice
contained in the letter was given in circumstances where Mr Deacon knew that
it was to be relied on in making a decision on the purchase and where it was in
fact relied on, and reasonably so, for that purpose.
18 See San Sebastian Pty Ltd v The Minister (1986) 162 CLR 340 at 372. This passage was cited in
Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerford (1996-1996) 188 CLR 241 by Brennan
J at 250, Dawson J at 257 and by Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 262.
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18
[45] The defendant resists the claim in contract on the additional ground that the
retainer was not with the plaintiff and there was thus no contractual
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. I reject this argument. I
accept the evidence of Mr Foster that he did not purport to retain Mr Deacon
on behalf of John Foster Projects Pty Ltd. I suspect that Mr Deacon addressed
his account to that company because he knew that Mr Foster traded through
that entity and assumed that a company of some sort would be used to
purchase the property. There is no evidence on the topic and it is unnecessary
to make any finding. It cannot in my view be the case that HTW can deny
liability simply because Mr Deacon did not know the name of the company
which was to act on his advice. The plaintiff was incorporated on 14 April
1997 and Mrs Foster became a director on 15 April 1997. It was acquired
solely for the purpose of this transaction.19 I find that the contract was in fact
between the defendant and the company that became Astonland Pty Ltd.20
[46] In this case Mrs Foster gave evidence which I accept that she would not have
gone ahead with the purchase without the written advice.21
[47] In my view the plaintiff has established the liability of the defendant for
damages on all of the three bases alleged. In this case irrespective of which
basis of liability is used the damages are the same. The case for the plaintiff is
that the contract would never have been entered into if there had been any
caution as to a possible negative outcome in the letter of advice22. The
position the plaintiff would have been in had the advice not fallen below the
required standard would thus have been that it would never have acquired the
property and the corresponding liabilities or expenses. Since in each of
contract, tort, and trade practices the measure of damages is the difference
19 Transcript page 105.
20 Mooney v Williams (1905-1906) 3 CLR 1 is authority for the proposition that where a person
contracts on behalf of an undisclosed principal the principal is the real contracting party and can sue on
the contract. The exceptions to this rule which are not relevant to this case are discussed in Laws of
Australia, 8.1 Agency [52] – [53]
21 Transcript pages 96 – 99.
22 Transcript page 99
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19
between the position that would have pertained had the offending conduct not
occurred with what in fact occurred the amount is the same.23
[48] In a valuation case where property would not have been acquired without the
intervention of the negligence the conventional measure of damages is to
compare the amount paid for the property with its true value at the time.
Consequential losses need to be considered separately. This case is different
from such a case. In the first place it is not in fact a true valuation case since
Mr Deacon did not relevantly value the property. Rather he gave a predictive
opinion from which Mrs Foster formed her own opinion as to value. The
negligence or breach of contract or misleading conduct was in failing to flag
the possible negative impact of the Beach Road shopping centre. In such a
case no loss is suffered until it is reasonably ascertainable that the purchaser is
in fact worse off as a consequence of the negligence or other breach.24 The
cause of action does not arise until that time. In this case it could not
reasonably be ascertained what effect the Beach Road shops would have until
they were constructed and opened. In this case the primary assessment for
damages purposes is the difference between the amount paid for the property
and its value once the anticipated market factors had operated upon it. In this
case I am entitled to have regard to what in fact happened to the property up to
the time a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have sold it.
[49] The new shops opened in mid 1998. I should therefor start by looking at a
value for the premises at a time after that, say, for example the end of 1998 or
early 1999. Exhibit 11 shows that gross rentals held up reasonably well to
about March 1999 and then collapsed. This would correspond with the
expiration of leases for shops previously vacated but for which the term of the
lease had not expired. Since there was no inquiry for the vacant space it
would be reasonable in assessing value to discount the maintainable rent to
23 See Haines v Bengal (1991) 172 CLR 60 at 63 in relation to contract and torts. Damages are
generally assessed in a similar way under s82 of the Trade Practices Act: see Marks v GIO (1999) 196
CLR 494 and most recently Henville v Walker [2001] HCA 52.
24 This is apparent from Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 at 527 and
was restated by each member of the court in Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199
CLR 413 by way of distinguishing the standard measure of damages in valuation cases from those
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20
substantially exclude the rent for those premises. Some attempts have been
made to sell the property. It has been listed with various agents for some
years. Mr Wright conducted an auction in 2000 where the property was
passed in at $200,000. Mrs Foster gave him instructions to obtain a contract
from the bidder but the bidder was not prepared to revive the offer. In
December 2000 a prospective purchaser orally offered to swap two houses
said to be valued at $180,000 for the Plaza but again the prospective purchaser
was not prepared to commit himself to paper. At the time of trial an offer was
open at $100,000. As early as 1998 there was a proposal prepared at a very
superficial level by Mr Woosley of Honeycombs Real Estate in Mackay to
strata title the shops and sell them that way. Mr Woosley’s letter containing
the proposal25 is dated 7 October, 1998 and suggests that sold as separate titles
the shops may have grossed $573,500. The letter does however warn that
careful consideration should be given before proceeding further. In cross-
examination26 Mr Woosley indicated that his figure was at the top of the
anticipated range and assumed 100% occupancy for the centre, a matter which
was looking over optimistic even then27. In the result I am not persuaded that
this proposal was ever realistic and no indication of the cost of strata titling the
units or the time it would take was given. In all probability the Plaza would
have been virtually unsaleable by the time any such proposal had progressed
to the selling stage. In my view the evidence shows that the plaintiff has
attempted to sell the property without success despite genuine efforts since
1999. I find that even at that time the value Mr Dodds puts on it in 2000 of
$130,000 was probably close to its realistic value.
[50] In my view questions of contributory negligence do not arise. The plaintiff
reasonably relied on advice from Mr Deacon. Having been provided with
advice that was unqualified in any material way there did not seem to me to be
any need to seek a formal valuation. Even if I took a different view the High
Court has recently confirmed that contributory negligence is not available in
where the purpose of the valuation was to achieve a particular result. While factually Kenny & Good
differs from the present case the principle is the same.
25 Exhibit 18
26 Transcript page 434 - 435
27 Mrs Foster’s evidence at page 114 puts a more realistic slant on the proposal
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21
contract28 nor under s82 of the Trade Practices Act 197429. I do not consider
that notions of fairness require me to manufacture a result using the Court’s
power under s87 of the Trade Practices Act30. There is no basis on the
evidence to conclude that any of the plaintiff’s loss is not causally connected
with the negligence of the defendant.
[51] In the result I assess the plaintiff’s primary loss before considering
consequential losses at the sum of $355,000 being the purchase price less
$130,000 which I consider to have been the value of the land more or less
since it became apparent that tenants were largely unavailable except at
minimal rentals. I consider the effect of any downturn in the Sarina economy
would not have been apparent until early 2000 by which time the fate of the
Plaza was established.
[52] In relation to consequential loss the plaintiff claims trading losses netted to
$83,409.51 after deducting profits in the sum of $3,629.29 in 1997/1998. The
figures are derived from exhibit 9 and include $49,808 shown as an annual
write off of construction costs of $12,452. I assume this is a depreciation
amount relating to the building. It does not appear to be a cash expense and
since the calculation of $130,000 as at 2000 is a valuation of the existing
property in a depreciated state, to allow it as a trading loss is, in my view, to
double count. I also do not accept the annual management fees of $8,000 for
1998, 1999 and 2000 as a legitimate expense. In my view these are not
commercial rates and should be reduced to $4,000 being for the services
provided in the main by Mrs Foster although entered in the books as payable
to John Foster Projects Pty Ltd. I therefore allow trading losses at $21,601.51.
In view of the fact that the property has not attracted a single firm offer
between the auction in 2000 and the offer of $100,000 at the time of trial I
consider that such losses should be ongoing to trial on the basis that whatever
the value of the property a buyer was not available at that price. A party can
only mitigate its loss by selling a property if there is in fact a buyer. History
28 See Anstey v Austrust Limited (1999) 197 CLR 1
29 See Henville v Walker [2001] HCA 52
30 cf I and L Securities v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd [2000] QCA 383
-- 21 of 22 --
22
shows there has not been one for this property. The additional purchase costs
assessed at $11,600 between a purchase at $485,000 and $130,000 should also
be allowed as should $8,590 spent on refurbishment.
[53] Since the trading losses in this case include interest on the funding for the
purchase of the Plaza it seems to me be to be inappropriate to award interest
on any part of the primary loss. In the result I assess the plaintiff’s loss in the
sum of $396,791.51. I award interest on $41,791.51 at 5% from 1 July 1999
being the date from which losses in my notionally adjusted accounts
commenced to accrue. This total $9,403.09.
[54] I give judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of
$406,194.60.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2001/380