Carmody v June Anstee & Associates & Ors [2001] QSC 93

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Carmody v June Anstee & Others [2001] QSC 093 PARTIES: MICHAEL CARMODY (plaintiff) v JUNE ANSTEE & ASSOCIATES SOLICITORS (AS TRUSTEE OF MONEY HELD ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF FAUSTINA DOSSI) (first defendant) and GUGLIELMO DOSSI (second defendant) and RICCARDO ANTONIO DOSSI (third defendant) and ANNA-MARIA NARCISSA ROBSON (fourth defendant) and ANTONIO EMANUELLE DOSSI (fifth defendant) FILE NO: 637 of 2001 DIVISION: Trial Division DELIVERED ON: 6 April 2001 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 27 February 2001 JUDGE: Mackenzie J ORDER: A. On the plaintiff's application: 1. That, pursuant to s72C of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 the disclaimer dated 13 December 2000 by the fifth defendant of an interest in the estate of Faustina Dossi be set aside. 2. That, subject to ss72A(1)(e) and (f) and in accordance with a notice dated 11 December 2000 pursuant to s72A of the said Act, the first defendant pay to the plaintiff forthwith moneys which it holds or may subsequently hold, being moneys which the fifth defendant would, but for the said notice, be entitled to receive as a person to whom the estate of Faustina Dossi is to be distributed according to law. 3. That the parties have liberty to make submissions in writing as to costs within 14 days. B. On the first defendant's application: -- 1 of 11 -- 2 4. That the application be dismissed. 5. That the parties have liberty to make submissions in writing as to costs within 14 days. CATCHWORDS: WILLS, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION – PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION – RENUNCIATION – whether benefit under an intestacy may be disclaimed – whether disclaimer was executed to reduce or defeat obligation to meet "registrable maintenance liability" pursuant to Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 – whether the beneficiary had received written notice pursuant to s72A(1) of Child Support (Registration & Collection Act) prior to executing the disclaimer. WILLS, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION – CONSTRUCTIOIN AND EFFECT OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS – GENERALLY – QUEENSLAND – whether disclaimer is "instrument" within s72C(6) Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act – effect of setting aside disclaimer – whether notice under s72A requires solicitor to pay to Child Support Registrar to meet "registrable maintenance liability". PROCEDURE – COURTS – CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF DIFFERENT COURTS – TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER CROSS-VESTING LEGISLATION – WHERE APPROPRIATE AND IN INTERESTS OF JUSTICE – GENERALLY – whether Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 invests in the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to make an order pursuant to Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988. Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) s 17, s 18, s72A, s 72C, s 116 Constitution s 72, s 77, s 104 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 218A Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) s 4, s 5, s 16 Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s 96 Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 52 Bassi & KD Sales Force Specialists Pty Ltd v Maas (1999) FLC 92-867; considered Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works (1943) 2 All ER 560; considered Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Cure and Deeley Ltd (1962) 1 QB 340; considered Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR -- 2 of 11 -- 3 1; applied Dr Barnardo's Homes National Incorporated Association v Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax Acts (1921) 2AC 1; considered In the Estate of Simmons [1990] 56 SASR 1; considered Metropolitan Borough & Town Clerk of Lewisham v Roberts (1949) 2 KB 608; considered O'Reilly v Commissioner of State Bank of Victoria (1982) 153 CLR 1; considered Re Wakim (1999) 163 CLR 270; applied COUNSEL: ME Eliadis for applicant PF Grey for first defendant RT Whitford for second and third defendants J Shepley for fourth and fifth defendants SOLICITORS: Australian Government Solicitor for applicant Robertson O'Gorman for first defendant de Groot and Co for second and third defendant June Anstee and Associates for fourth and fifth defendants [1] MACKENZIE J: The plaintiff's applications are as follows: 1. An application in his capacity as Child Support Registrar for an order restraining the first defendant from distributing or otherwise dealing in any manner whatsoever with funds held by it in its trust account on behalf of the Estate of Faustina Dossi, and a declaration that any disclaimer or purported disclaimer by the fifth defendant to an interest in the estate is invalid and of no effect. 2. Alternatively, an order that such disclaimer be set aside under s72C of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 is sought. [2] The first defendant's applications are for a direction under s96 of the Trusts Act 1973 that on finalisation of the administration of the estate it be directed to pay to the administrators the estate funds held by the first defendant on the estate's behalf; that it be directed to pay the funds to the second to fifth defendant; and that it be directed not to comply with the notice dated 11 December 2000 issued pursuant to s72A of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act. [3] By way of background, Faustina Dossi died intestate on 26 March 2000. On 14 August 2000 letters of administration were granted to the second to fifth defendants. The fifth defendant is a child support debtor within the meaning of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 ("the Act") in the sum of $53,875.37 comprising $34,650.86 arrears of child support and penalties for late payment of $19,224.51. [4] Under s72A of the Act the Registrar may give written notice to a person who "holds or may subsequently hold money" of certain descriptions requiring the person to pay to the Registrar the amount of the debt, if there is sufficient to do so, or the whole of the money if it is not. Section 72C of the Act provides that the court may on the Registrar's application set aside an instrument or disposition (which includes sale or gift (ss72C(6)) by a payer of an enforceable maintenance liability. That is -- 3 of 11 -- 4 defined in ss4(1) to mean a registered maintenance liability that is enforceable under the Act. [5] A registered maintenance liability means a registrable maintenance liability that is registered under the Act. A registrable maintenance liability is a liability that is under s17 or s18 a registrable maintenance liability. It is deposed that the fifth defendant had a registrable maintenance liability which started on 1 February 1993 and became enforceable on 20 January 1995. There is a certificate pursuant to ss116(2) of the Act which is prima facie evidence of the matters stated in the certificate in relation to a specified registrable maintenance liability. [6] If a court is satisfied in a case where there is an enforceable maintenance liability that an instrument or disposition has been made to reduce or defeat the payer's liability to meet it the court may set aside the instrument or disposition. The evidence establishes that on 11 December 2000 an officer of the Child Support Agency in Townsville advised Mr Parry, a solicitor employed by the first defendant, that it was intended to issue a notice under s72A of the Act. The notice was issued on 11 December 2000 and faxed to the solicitors at 3.51pm on 13 December 2000. A copy was posted to the fifth defendant on 14 December 2000. [7] Mr Parry was called for cross-examination. It is apparent that the Child Support Agency was making inquiries of him about the sale of the deceased's property as early as 4 December 2000. A copy of the contract was sent to the Child Support Agency in Townsville on 11 December 2000. [8] Mr Parry had a conversation with the fifth defendant at some time on 13 December 2000 although he was not able to be sure at what precise time. Nor did he note the time in any document. He said that he thought it was before the fax containing the notice was received but said in his affidavit that he had received a telephone call from the fifth defendant telling him that he intended to disclaim the benefit of his share in the estate, that he had signed the deed to that effect and that he would forward it to the solicitors that day. In fact, no such document arrived until 18 December 2000 although, on its face, it was dated 13 December 2000. [9] In the same paragraph of the affidavit Mr Parry deposed that he "did not inform Antonio Dossi of the receipt of the notice from the Child Support Registrar during this conversation". In cross-examination he said this was the only conversation he ever had with the fifth defendant. [10] The fifth defendant gave evidence that his sister, the fourth defendant, with whom he shared a house, had typed the disclaimer. At the time he was aware that he owed money which he believed to be in the vicinity of $40,000 to the child support agency for support of his children. He denied that at the time he signed the document he knew the Child Support Agency was trying to claim his share in the estate. He said that he had decided to disclaim on advice from "friends that were going to Uni studying law" whom he only knew by their first names. He did so because he would have wasted the money on drink and gambling. Rather inconsistently, and belatedly under pressure of cross-examination, he said that he was going to put some money in a trust fund for his children, although, in his opinion, they were already well provided for. -- 4 of 11 -- 5 [11] There is also evidence that on 9 January 2001 the second and third defendants disclaimed any interest in the "residual estate" of the deceased. There are affidavits to the effect that, to avoid any further involvement and under persuasion by the fourth defendant, they signed the disclaimers. These disclaimers were supplemented by further documents signed on 23 February 2001 by the second and third defendants authorising the first defendant to pay to the Child Support Agency any further funds to which they might be entitled if the fifth defendant's disclaimer was effective and valid at law. [12] Under cross-examination the fifth defendant agreed that it seemed that if he disclaimed and his brothers disclaimed, the balance would go to the fourth defendant. However, he denied that the purpose of the scheme was to channel his share back to him through his sister. The fifth defendant was an unimpressive witness. I am satisfied that the disclaimer was made to reduce or defeat his ability to meet his enforceable maintenance liability or pay his child support debt. I will return to the remaining question relating to the power to set aside the transaction on the basis of those findings later. [13] Several distinct arguments against the relief sought were addressed on behalf of the first defendant and the fourth and fifth defendants respectively. Each will need separate consideration. There was a preliminary argument concerning jurisdiction raised by the fourth and fifth defendants which it is convenient to address immediately. [14] The relief, particularly that related to setting aside the disclaimer under s72C, was resisted on the ground that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to grant it. It was submitted that this was a consequence of s 79, 104 and 113 of the Act. Section 79 is concerned with recovery of child support debts. If I understand the argument correctly, it is that this Court is in neither category. However, it is a court of unlimited monetary jurisdiction. A like argument appears to be addressed under s113, which is concerned with debts due to the Commonwealth. In my view neither are decisive of the issue. Subsection 104(1) is as follows: "104(1) Jurisdiction is conferred on the Family Court and the Federal Magistrates Court and, subject to subsection (7), the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, and each Family Court of a State is invested with federal jurisdiction in relation to matters arising under this Act." [15] Primarily, jurisdiction is given to courts exercising family law functions. The reference to investing State Family Courts with federal jurisdiction invokes ss71 and 77(iii) of the Constitution. Subsection 104(2) invests State courts of summary jurisdiction with federal jurisdiction subject to the termination of the right to institute or transfer proceedings to such courts by proclamation by the Governor- General (ss104(3)). The Act does not directly invest the Supreme Court of Queensland with federal jurisdiction under the Act. [16] Mr Eliadis for the applicant relies on the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) and the complementary Queensland Act for this. In Re Wakim (1999) 163 CLR 270 the cross-vesting scheme was declared invalid in so far as it conferred on and provided for the exercise of State judicial power in Federal Courts. -- 5 of 11 -- 6 However, so far as the exercise of federal jurisdiction by State courts is concerned Wakim does not result in invalidity. [17] There is authority for the Governor-General to suspend or declare that the Act ceases to be in force in certain eventualities (s16). However, at the time of this judgment no such proclamation had been made. [18] Section 4(1) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act (Cth) has the effect of investing this Court with jurisdiction to make an order under s72C of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act. The matter is not within the exclusion in ss4(4) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act. It is not a special federal matter. Subsection 5(1) of each Act sets criteria for transfer of proceedings commenced in a State Supreme Court in a case where the Family Court has jurisdiction from the Supreme Court to the Family Court. Such power may be exercised on the application of a party or of the court's own motion. The criteria in ss5(1)(b)(i)(A) and (B) are established, in the case of the former because this Court would not have jurisdiction to determine the question under s72C but for cross- vesting and in the case of the latter, because the matter for determination under s72C is the critical question especially if the disclaimer is otherwise effectual. [19] As to ss5(1)(b)(i), it is not established that there is a proceeding in the Family Court concerning s72C. Even if there is, the remaining question whether the interests of justice, taken into account with the other criteria in ss5(1)(b)(ii) makes it more appropriate that the proceeding be determined in the Family Court must be answered in favour of resolving all issues in the Supreme Court. It would be a more inconvenient course if the issues clearly within the jurisdiction of this Court as to the succession and Trusts Act matters and the issue of setting aside the transaction under s72C had to be determined in different courts. [20] The relief sought is structured, in that there are two lines of attack designed to prevent what would otherwise be the fifth defendant's entitlement to share in the estate of his mother being dealt with in a way which would allow him to avoid his obligations under the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act. [21] The first is to declare the disclaimer ineffective. The second is to set aside the disclaimer, if effective, on the basis that it was effected to reduce or defeat his ability to meet his obligations. Relief is also sought to enjoin the solicitors from dealing with the funds. The first defendant's application is essentially designed to allow it to transfer whatever remaining funds that have accrued in the course of getting in the estate to its administrators rather than to the plaintiff. [22] To sum up on this aspect, there is a mixture of matters which, subject to issues of accrued jurisdiction, are partly State jurisdiction and Federal jurisdiction. It is not necessary to explore whether the Family Court has jurisdiction over all of the issues. It is in my view not a case, for the reasons given, where it could be maintained successfully that it is more appropriate that the proceedings be determined in the Family Court instead of the Supreme Court. I therefore find that there is jurisdiction to deal with the matters concerning s72A and s72C of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act and will exercise it. The relief relating to succession law and the Trusts Act is within the ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. -- 6 of 11 -- 7 [23] Sub-section 72A(1) is concerned with authorising the Registrar to give written notice to third parties requiring that a person pay moneys to the Registrar if the third party falls into a category of person within the following groups: "(a) by whom money is due or accruing, or may become due, to a child support debtor; or (b) who holds, or may subsequently hold, money for or on account of a child support debtor; or (c) who holds, or may subsequently hold money on account of some other person for payment to a child support debtor; or (d) who has authority from some other person to pay money to a child support debtor." [24] In Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR 1, 23, Mason J (with whom Aickin and Wilson JJ agreed) described a provision (s218A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936) which is substantially the same as s72A(1), in the following terms: "The section relates to moneys owing to the taxpayer when the notice is given, it imposes an obligation to pay forthwith moneys which are then payable; it imposes an obligation to pay moneys which become payable at a future time when that time arrives. It does not explicitly prescribe as a condition preliminary to the creation of the obligation to pay that the moneys owing to the taxpayer at the date of the notice shall continue to be owing to him when they become payable. It merely requires the recipient to pay to the Commissioner when they become payable moneys owing to the taxpayer at the date of the notice. The obligation attaches to the recipient on service of the notice, though it cannot be performed until a future date. The effect of imposing the obligation is to make it unlawful for the recipient to pay the moneys to anyone but the Commissioner after service of the notice." [25] Sub-section 72A(5) provides that if the Registrar gives notice under ss72A(1) the Registrar must provide a copy of the notice to the child support debtor. Sub-section 72A(6) provides that notice is taken to have been given under sub-section (5) if the Registrar sends notice to the last address of the person known to the Registrar. [26] The notice is signed by the Regional Child Support Registrar. On its face it refers to a delegation from the Child Support Registrar under s15 of the Act. There is no argument as to the validity of the notice in this regard. There is evidence that after the notice under s72A was faxed to the first defendant the public servant who sent the fax placed a copy of the notice in an envelope addressed to the fifth defendant at the address last known to the agency according to the records of the agency. In carrying out purely administrative tasks a public official like the Registrar may act through subordinates (Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works (1943) 2 All ER 560; Metropolitan Borough & Town Clerk of Lewisham v Roberts (1949) 2 KB 608; Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Cure and Deeley Ltd (1962) 1 QB 340; O'Reilly v Commissioner of State Bank of Victoria (1982) 153 CLR 1). [27] There is evidence of the system relating to posting mail from the agency and that, in the ordinary course of events, the particular letter would have left the agency in -- 7 of 11 -- 8 Australia Post's hands about 12.30pm on 14 December 2000. The public servant was not aware of the letter having been returned. [28] There is some evidence that he was not living at that address at the time. However, there is no explicit denial in his evidence that he did not receive it. The closest his evidence comes to this is that he said that he was not aware that the plaintiff was seeking to claim his share of his mother's estate and had not seen the notice prior to the disclaimer being executed. Although it is not in my view directly relevant to the question of compliance with ss72A(5), the evidence was that at some time between 13 and 17 December 2000 he found out a notice had been issued under s72A, he thought from his sister who had found out earlier. [29] A point was taken by both the first defendant and the fourth and fifth defendants that there was no evidence that the fifth defendant was provided with a copy of the notice as required by s72A(5). Whether failure to do so invalidates the process need not be explored. There is a clear circumstantial case based on the evidence of the public servant that the notice was sent to the address described in sub-section 72A(5). The inference that it was provided to him within the meaning of sub- section 72A(5) is not displaced when his evidence is also taken into account. There is in my view nothing in this point. [30] It was not disputed that a benefit under an intestacy could be disclaimed (as to which see the discussion in In the Estate of Simmons [1990] 56 SASR 1 (Legoe J)). Nor was it disputed that a disclaimer in the form adopted would ordinarily be adequate to achieve the purpose. The second to fifth defendants were administrators under a grant of letters of administration made on 14 August 2000. Distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the house was made in the week commencing 18 December 2000 to all but the fifth defendant. Except for the issue of the fifth defendant's share the evidence tends to suggest, although it is not entirely clear, that the administrators' duty to collect and get in the estate of the deceased and to administer it according to law was complete. What remained was the next phase of finalisation of the estate, distribution to those entitled. [31] The second, third and fifth defendants all wrote on 9 January 2000 advising the solicitors of their respective intentions to "revoke my right to be an executor under letters of administration in respect to (the) estate effective 9th January 2001". On 18 January 2001 the fourth defendant purported to give instructions as sole administrator of the estate and sole beneficiary to "strenuously defend any proceedings". [32] On 30 January 2001 the first defendant advised each other defendant that it was not permissible for an administrator to withdraw from that role without an order of the court. The second and third defendants who now are separately represented depose that they believed their role of administrator had ended after the distribution of the proceeds of sale of the house. (This accords with the tentative view expressed in para [30] above). They did not wish to become involved in the dispute with the Child Support Agency. It was in those circumstances that the disclaimer of any further interest in the estate was executed by them. They said they had given no instructions for further representation in the proceedings involving the dispute, nor to withhold payment from the Child Support Agency. -- 8 of 11 -- 9 [33] On the contrary, on 23 February 2001, each of the second and third defendants expressed an intention in a document described as "authority and direction" to the first defendant that moneys derived from any entitlement the fifth defendant might have be paid to the Child Support Registrar in accordance with s72A of the Act. [34] In my view it can be inferred from the evidence that the settlement of the sale of the house which formed the significant asset of the estate of Faustina Dossi was imminent at the time the fifth defendant executed the disclaimer. It is established by the evidence that the plaintiff, through his employees, was taking an interest in the transaction. It is safe to infer that by some means the fifth defendant became aware of the risk that, if what would be his entitlement under the Succession Act 1981 to share in the estate remained as such, the plaintiff would take steps to claim the money towards extinguishing his debt. However, the evidence does not enable me to determine the precise means by which he became aware of it, nor, in particular, that the first defendant was deliberately involved. [35] I am satisfied that the disclaimer was executed to reduce or defeat his obligation to meet an enforceable maintenance liability. The safety with which this conclusion may be drawn is reinforced by the absence of any plausible alternative explanation by the fifth defendant in his evidence. There is no onus on him in the legal sense, but his contribution to the sum of evidence available only adds to the weight of the obvious inference from the plaintiff's case. [36] It is essentially a question of fact at what point in time the personal representatives' duties in that capacity have concluded in a particular case. Once the administrator's duties, which include getting in the estate and paying the debts and expenses, are concluded there is a duty to distribute the estate as soon as may be (s52(1) Succession Act). In the present case there is no evidence which suggests compellingly that there was anything substantial to be done by the administrators by way of getting in the estate after settlement of the sale of the house on 15 December 2000. [37] Indeed, distribution of those proceeds but for the moneys concerned in the present dispute occurred the following week. The reason for enlarging on this is that the first defendant relied on the principle that it had never held any money on behalf of the fifth defendant because he had validly disclaimed. (Dr Barnardo's Homes National Incorporated Association v Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax Acts (1921) 2AC 1). It was also submitted that until a disclaimer is made the beneficiary has only a right to require administration of the estate. Until the function of the administrator in that capacity is complete the beneficiary is free to choose whether to avail himself or herself of the benefit or to disclaim it. If there is a disclaimer then the benefit is avoided. The effect of the disclaimer was to avoid any potential vesting of a person disclaiming as if the benefit had never existed. [38] Submissions as to whether, in such circumstances, an order could be made under s72C focused more on whether the disclaimer was a "disposition" within the meaning of s72C(6) than on whether the disclaimer was an "instrument". "Instrument" is not defined. In context it is, in my view, capable of comprehending a document which has legal consequences of the kind which a valid disclaimer would have and if it is executed to reduce or defeat the payer's ability to meet an enforceable maintenance liability it may be set aside. -- 9 of 11 -- 10 [39] In the present case the legal consequence of executing the disclaimer was that, if it was effective the fifth defendant placed himself outside the class of persons who would, but for the disclaimer, have an entitlement to share in the proceeds of the estate upon its administration being completed. [40] By executing the disclaimer to reduce or defeat his ability to meet the enforceable maintenance liability, he created an "instrument" that can and should be set aside pursuant to ss72C(2). Setting aside the disclaimer has the effect that it is to be treated as if it had never been entered into. It restores the situation that existed prior to its execution. The consequence is that his status as a person entitled to share in the estate pursuant to the Succession Act remains. In reaching this conclusion, I have had regard to the interest of interested persons as ss72C(4) requires. The interests of the second and third defendants are not affected since they want no benefit from the fifth defendant's share. While the fourth defendant would benefit form the disclaimer, I am satisfied that she has played a role in events which makes it appropriate not to subjugate the plaintiff's interest to hers. [41] There is evidence in the affidavits of DJ Kirchhubel, K Parry, G Dossi and R Dossi that moneys equivalent to the fifth defendant's share are held in the first defendant's trust account. The proceeds of the settlement of the sale of the house were, at the time of giving the s72A notice to be subsequently held (and since settlement, were held) on account of the administrators. The notice operates from the time it was given. All but the fifth defendant's share has now been paid to those entitled. The administrators could only deal with the remaining money on the basis that it is the fifth defendant's. They could, if they received it from the first defendant, only pay it to or at the direction of the fifth defendant. But the obligation to pay it to the Registrar supervenes by operation of the s72A notice from the time it was given. [42] The evidence of what subsequently happened in connection with the proceeds of the house sale supports the inference that the arrangement in existence prior to the notice being given was that the first defendant would receive the settlement moneys and pay each beneficiary's share to him or her, no doubt on instructions from the administrators. I am satisfied that, in light of events, there was a valid basis for notice under s72A to be given. [43] Since it is in my opinion not necessary to resolve the question whether the execution of the document is a "disposition" within the meaning of subsection 72C(6) I will not express a concluded view on the question. However, it may be that classifying such a transaction as a "disposition" is not without difficulty. The nature and effect of the disclaimer has been discussed above and attention would need to be given to whether a disclaimer is what is ordinarily understood to be a disposition, even in avoidance provisions. [44] I was not referred to any authority on this precise provision and there is, for example, a view expressed by a Full Court of the Family Court in Bassi & KD Sales Force Specialists Pty Ltd v Maas (1999) FLC 92-867 that a disposition must have a disponor and a disponee. However, in view of the conclusion reached that the disclaimer is an "instrument" it is unnecessary to finally resolve that question. [45] It follows from what has been said that the applicant plaintiff is entitled to relief and the first respondent, the first defendant, is not. While submissions on costs were -- 10 of 11 -- 11 included in written submissions by some parties, it is appropriate to allow 14 days for any further written submissions. If submissions are not received within that period, I will assume that the parties concerned do not intend to do so and proceed forthwith to make the order. [46] The orders are as follows: A. On the plaintiff's application: 1. That, pursuant to s72C of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 the disclaimer dated 13 December 2000 by the fifth defendant of an interest in the estate of Faustina Dossi be set aside. 2. That, subject to ss72A(1)(e) and (f) and in accordance with a notice dated 11 December 2000 pursuant to s72A of the said Act the first defendant pay to the plaintiff forthwith moneys which it holds or may subsequently hold, being moneys which the fifth defendant would, but for the said notice, be entitled to receive as a person to whom the Estate of Faustina Dossi is to be distributed according to law. 3. That the parties have liberty to make submissions in writing as to costs within 14 days. B. On the first defendant's application: 4. That the application be dismissed. 5. That the parties have liberty to make submissions in writing as to costs within 14 days. -- 11 of 11 --