Australian Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union, Queensland Branch, Union of Employees v Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Limited, Industrial Organisation of Employers [2001] QIRC 179 (2001) 168 QGIG 233

9 November, 2001 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 233 ########################################################################################################################### QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION Industrial Relations Act 1999 – s. 125 – application to repeal an award and to make a new award Australian Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union, Queensland Branch, Union of Employees AND Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Limited, Industrial Organisation of Employers (No. B1596 of 2000) MARGARINE MANUFACTURING AWARD – SOUTHERN DIVISION PRESIDENT HALL COMMISSIONER EDWARDS COMMISSIONER THOMPSON 31 October 2001 Application to repeal common rule award – Application to make new common rule award – award applying to one employer at one site – Award displaced by certified agreements – No prospect of reversion to the award – Proposed new award based on outdated certified agreement – Operation of ss. 125, 126 and 129 considered – Consideration of principles about deciding wages and conditions – Risk of flow-on discussed – Risk of barrier to entry of new competitors assessed – Application dismissed. DECISION The Margarine Manufacturing Award – Southern Division is a common rule award of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission. Its coverage appears from s. 2 – “This Award shall apply to all employers and employees engaged in the manufacturing and/or processing of margarine and/or the extraction and/or processing of vegetable oils in margarine factories in the Southern Division of the State of Queensland, that is, all that part of the State south of a line commencing at the junction of the sea-coast with 22 degrees of south latitude; thence by that parallel of latitude due west to 147 degrees of east longitude; thence by that meridian of longitude due south to 22 degrees 30 minutes of south latitude; thence by that parallel of latitude due west to the western border of the State: Provided always that, without limiting the generality of the term, ‘manufacturing and/or processing’ shall be deemed to mean and include all processes carried out in a margarine factory necessary to the production of a finished product suitable for marketing purposes.”. In fact the award applies to one employer and to one site. A company under the Corporations Law trading as Goodman Fielder Consumer Foods produces retail margarine, commercial oils and pastry products at a site at Murarrie. The factory is one of four Australian factories operated by Goodman Fielder Consumer Foods. The others are at Mascot (NSW), West Footscray (VIC) and Bunbury (WA). The factories have marginally different product mixes. The company has moved away from producing a full range of product at each site. Factories are now focussed at particular segments of the market. In volume terms the Murarrie site produces about one third of the company’s output. At the time of hearing there were 167 employees at Murarrie of whom 114 were production and laboratory employees covered by the Margarine Manufacturing Award – Southern Division. Although the Margarine Manufacturing Award – Southern Division applies to the 114 production and laboratory employees, it does not govern their employment. There is a long history of (not always amicable) enterprise bargaining between the applicant and the company. The first agreement, given effect by s. 124 of the Industrial Relations Act 1990, was entered into in August 1992. At the date of hearing, employment at Murarrie was governed by the Meadow Lea Foods Certified Agreement 1998-2001. We were told that the agreement, which reached its nominal expiry date on 31 March 2001 but which has not been terminated, is to be superseded by a new agreement and that the company is in fact paying a wage increase of 4% in anticipation of execution of the agreement. The agreements have become increasingly comprehensive and leave no room for the operation of the Margarine Manufacturing Award – Southern Division at Murarrie. The only role for the Award is as the “relevant award” for the purposes of the no disadvantage test (s. 160) to which this Commission must subject any new enterprise agreement before granting certification. Although one witness, an employee of the company and an official of the applicant, initially asserted that the company had threatened to abandon enterprise bargaining and retreat to the Margarine Manufacturing Award – Southern Division, she resiled from the assertion in cross-examination. There is uncontroverted evidence by the National Director – Human Resources (Mr Buxton) that the company has no intention of retreating to the Award. Indeed, it was Mr Buxton’s evidence that the company embraced enterprise bargaining and that it was the company’s opportunity to drive workplace change. Mr Martin for the applicant, concedes that reversion to the Award, which in some cases would reduce annual earings by $16,000, is industrially impractical. Termination of an existing agreement would, in any event, require consent of a majority of employees during the currency of an agreement (s. 172) or, after the nominal expiry date, require the consent of the Commission (s. 173). We proceed on the view that there will not be a retreat to the Award at Murarrie. We also proceed on the view that no actual or potential competitor of the company has a present intention to establish a Queensland production unit. There is no evidence to the contrary. Mr Buxton’s evidence supports an inference that off-shore production is the realistic threat. On 24 October 2000 the applicant, an industrial organisation of employees with coverage of the production and laboratory employees at Murarrie, applied for the repeal of the Margarine Manufacturing Award – Southern Division and the making of a new common rule award to be known as the Margarine Manufacturing Award – State to have effect throughout the State of Queensland. The application of 24 October 2000 was said to be based on s. 129 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999. We do not accept that proposition. On a perusal of Part 2 Chapter 5 we consider the power to make, amend or repeal an award arises under s. 125. Section 126 then states the objectives which the Commission must achieve in exercising the otherwise discretionary powers to make, amend or repeal awards. Sections 127 and 128 then deal with nominated subjects with some particularity. Section 127 deals with dispute resolution procedures to be contained in each award. It provides: “127.(1) The commission must ensure an award contains a dispute resolution procedure. -- 1 of 5 -- 234 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 9 November, 2001 (2) The form of the procedure is to be agreed on by the parties to the award. (3) However, if the parties can not agree, the commission must insert an appropriate procedure in the award. (4) Without limiting subsection (1), the procedure must include – (a) procedures for consultation at the workplace; and (b) procedures for the involvement of relevant organisations; and (c) any other procedure prescribed under a regulation.”. Section 128 deals with issues about gender equity and junior rates. It provides: “128.(1) In fixing wage rates payable to employees in a calling, the commission must fix the rates on the basis that a man and a woman employed by the same employer must receive equal remuneration for work of equal or comparable value without discrimination on the ground of sex. (2) Despite any other provision of this Act, wage rates fixed by the commission for persons under 21 years may be fixed on a progressive scale based on the wage rates payable to employees 21 years or over in the same calling. (3) In making an award that fixes the wage rates, the commission must consider the age and experience of the persons under 21 years.”. One then comes to s. 129 which by its heading (which is part of the Act, Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s. 35C(1)) is said to be a section about the “flow- on of certified agreements”. Section 129 provides: “129. The commission may include in an award provisions that are based on a certified agreement only if satisfied the provisions – (a) are consistent with principles established by the full bench that apply for deciding wages and employment conditions; and (b) are not contrary to the public interest.”. In the context, it seems to us that s. 129 confirms that in making, amending or repealing an award to provide fair and just employment conditions and to ensure that the award meets the benchmarks at s. 126, the Commission may not only have regard to the terms of certified agreements but may base the provisions of an award on a certified agreement (which in consequence of s. 32C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 – singular includes the plural – presumably extends to basing the provision on more that one certified agreement). However, having confirmed the scope of s. 125, s. 129 also imposes each of two limitations on the exercise of the power. The first limitation is that the Commission must be satisfied that the provisions are consistent with principles established by the Full Bench that apply for deciding wages and employment conditions. The second limitation is that the Commission must be satisfied that the provisions are not contrary to the public interest. Each of the Minister’s Second Reading Speech and the Report of the Industrial Relations Task Force chaired by Professor M. Gardner falls within the definition of “extrinsic material” at s. 14B(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954. Regard may be had to both to confirm an interpretation, s. 14B(1)(c). The Second Reading Speech is consistent with the construction contended for. After noting that – “The award system is becoming irrelevant and out dated as a consequence of the Commission being limited to awarding minimum safety net adjustments targeted at the low paid. This is unacceptable as a significant proportion of Queensland workers remain solely reliant on the award system to set their wages and conditions.”, the Minister went on to observe – “The Report also found that a growing inequality in wages has developed between employees who are reliant solely on wages and those who are involved in enterprise bargaining. For instance, workers who rely on award adjustments for wage increases have received wage increases of 10 per cent since January 1992, while workers covered by collective agreements have had wage increases of up to 15 to 20 per cent above the award rates of pay during the same period. In Queensland this has meant that workers who are employed by small business and in rural and regional areas who depend on awards have not fared well when compared with other workers employed in urban areas and, particularly, in the public sector who have been covered by enterprise agreements. These developments provide the context within which legislative support for a relevant and up-to-date award system and general standards of employment must occur. Such a move will provide enhanced social cohesion, a decent standard of living for all workers and community commitment to change where all can benefit. Without intervention in this system as proposed in the Bill, the wage gap will continue to widen. This has the potential to segment the labour market and lead to the development of a new working poor which may undermine social cohesion in the Queensland community. The Bill also removes the current legislative restrictions which establish agreements as the primary vehicle for wage movements, and creates a real choice between awards and a range of agreements to suit particular industries and workplaces, employers and employees.”. All of that may be achieved if s. 125 is used to achieve the benchmarks at s. 126. Relevantly, the Minister then concluded – “In terms of the interaction between awards and agreements, the Bill makes it clear that the Commission is empowered to include the terms of a certified agreement in an award where the Commission determines this is consistent with full bench wage principles and it is in the public interest to do so.”. The Minister was, with respect, entirely correct. Section 129 does clarify the Commission’s power to impose limitations about full bench principles and the public interest. (Though, with respect, the second limitation seems not to be satisfaction that it is in the public interest to do so, but satisfaction that it is not contrary to the public interest to do so. The distinction may not be of importance. It is not immediately obvious that ss. 125 to 126 would support insertion of a provision in an award where the Commission lacked satisfaction that its insertion was in the public interest.) -- 2 of 5 -- 9 November, 2001 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 235 The Task Force Report is more explicit. After observing – “In order to ensure that awards remain relevant for those dependent on them and as a benchmark for agreements there must be provision for varying them periodically.”, (thereby we think summarising the dual role of awards), the Task Force turned its mind to what in the heading to s. 129 is described as “Flow-on of Certified Agreements”. It observed (at 122 to 123) – “. . . While conditions won through agreements would be relevant to such variations, the restriction on automatic flow-on of terms in an agreement should prevail. The Taskforce believes that allowing for application to vary awards will ensure that they remain relevant for those who are solely reliant on them for setting wages and conditions of employment. Two members of the taskforce argued that awards and agreements should be on an equal footing and that enterprise bargaining increases should be able to be rolled into the relevant award. The majority believed that retaining restrictions on automatic flow-on will prevent difficulties that might arise from allowing agreements in certain enterprises to act as a ‘whipsaw’ for conditions across a common rule award. However, it should be noted that the Commission has discretion in relation to flow-on of conditions, subject to its Full Bench principles. It would not be expected that agreement conditions would be easily incorporated in awards in most circumstances. However, it is worth noting that in the public sector there are special cases where such incorporation might not cause inappropriate enterprise-related outcomes to be imposed across a larger sector. Thus the relationship of conditions in agreements and in awards remains a matter for Commission decision. These proposed changes impose significant responsibilities on the Commission and are discussed further in section 6.”. To the extent that those passages suggest that use should be made of certified agreements in an evidentiary way to provide fair minimum standards for employees (unable to bargain for themselves) in the context of living standards generally prevailing in the community, the passages take a view of the use which may be made of certified agreements which fall within the scheme ultimately enacted. To the extent that the passages confine the use of certified agreements to such cases, the passages take a narrower view than the scheme ultimately enacted. (The substantive provisions ultimately enacted must of course prevail.) But the passages do make it abundantly clear that “Flow-on of Certified Agreements” is not to be automatic. There is to be a testing against the Full Bench “principles” and the public interest. The fact that a provision appears in a certified agreement (or in a large number of certified agreements – within an industry) may be material to the question whether the provision or a derivative should be included in an award, but is not determinative of whether it is “contrary to the public interest” to include the term. The presence of a provision in a certified agreement goes to the merit of an application to include the provision in an award. It is not the merit in including the provision in the Award. The limitations at s. 129 are not without their difficulties. As a matter of first impression, the reference to “principles established by the full bench that apply for deciding wages and employment conditions” is a reference to the Declaration of Policy – Statement of Principles which now appears at 167 QGIG 353 and which is reviewed from time to time by the Full Bench which processes the State Wage Case. If that construction be correct the outcome is passing strange. There would be no need to test a provision against, for example, the Declaration of Policy, Occupational Superannuation, 137 QGIG 1105 as amended. (Insertion in an award of a provision contrary to that Declaration of Policy might well be held contrary to the public interest.) More importantly, the Declaration of Policy – Statement of Principles does not set a standard against which proposed provisions may be tested. It guides single Commissioners sitting alone in processing applications to make, amend or repeal awards. We adopt the observations of the Full Bench in the State Wage Case of 1999, 162 QGIG 359 to 360: “Role of Principles The principles have always been Queensland principles set in the exercise of independent statutory discretion. But the lineage is Federal. In setting principles the AIRC (and the earlier Conciliation and Arbitration Commission was constrained by the proposition that it might neither prescribe a provision applying to industry generally, R v. The Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; ex parte Ozone Theatres (Australia) Limited (1949) 78 CLR 389 at 401, nor prescribe a system of industrial legislation, R v. Kelly; ex parte Australian Railways Union (1953) 89 CLR 461 at 475 per Dixon, CJ. Conformably with those principles the AIRC might formulate a principle and apply it consistently to cases falling within it, R v. Clarkson and Others; ex parte Australian Telephone and Phonogram Officers’ Association (1982) 32 ALR 1 at 9 per Gibbs CJ. In particular, a Full Bench of the AIRC has always been able to formulate principles which direct how the Commission constituted by a single member sitting alone is to deal with matters coming before it. The noun ‘matters’ is worthy of note. The existing principles are not confined to wage fixing. Neither is any of the drafts. We propose to set principles about making and amending awards. The Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (and the earlier Conciliation and Arbitration Commission) was not constrained to the prevention of settlement of industrial disputes on a case by case basis. It has (and always had) power to issue a declaration of policy (s. 288). In practice, in the interests of harmonisation, in developing wage fixing principles the QIRC has trodden the Federal route. The principles have taken the form of a Declaration of Policy. Such a declaration cannot establish a set of legally binding principles, see Local Government Association of Queensland Incorporated v. The Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland (1995) 150 QGIG 61, at 63 per Mackenzie President, though of course non-observance of the principles is appealable, by leave, to a Full Bench of the Commission and error in a bona fide attempt to apply the principles may constitute an error of law, see in re Clerks Employed in Sugar Mills Award – State (1990) 134 QGIG 141, at 142 per Moynihan, President. The principles are fundamentally guidelines. They are intended to guide a Commissioner sitting alone on the question whether that Commissioner may deal with the matter or should seek the consent of the President to refer the matter to a Full Bench. The principles do not bind a Full Bench, though, having regard to the elaborate procedural steps taken to ensure the widest participation in proceedings leading to the declaration of principles, we consider that a Full Bench which has heard submissions by a limited range of parties should be reluctant to depart from a Declaration of Policy. Indeed, to be precise, the guidelines do not (subject to the availability of appeal by leave) absolutely bind a Commissioner sitting alone. What they do is modify the general principle, that an administrative tribunal called upon to exercise a discretion does not perform its duty if it acts in blind obedience to a rule or policy previously adopted, compare R v. The Port of London Authority; ex parte Kynoch Limited (1919) 1 KB 176 at 184 per Bankes, LJ, and substitute for the obligation to hear an application for departure from the principles an obligation to seek to refer such a matter to a Full Bench, compare R. v. Clarkson and Others; ex parte Australian Telephone and Phonograph Officers’ Association (1982) 39 AKR 1 at 10 per Gibbs CJ.”. There are no principles to guide a Full Bench in deciding wages and employment conditions. It arguably follows that s. 129(a) has no application where an issue about inclusion in an award of a provision based on a certified agreement arises before a Full Bench. Indeed, there are textual reasons for concluding that s. 129 has no application where reliance is placed upon the terms of a certified agreement in proceedings before a Full Bench about making an award. Sections 255 and 256 are in the following terms:– “Continuance 255.The Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (the “commission”), as formerly established as a court of record, is continued in existence. -- 3 of 5 -- 236 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 9 November, 2001 Composition 256.(1) The following persons are members of the commission (“members”) – (a) the president; (b) the vice president, commissioner administrator and at least 6 other industrial commissioners (“commissioners”). (2) The full bench of the commission (“full bench”) is constituted by – (a) for chapter 12, part 16 or for the hearing of an appeal – the president and 2 or more commissioners; or (b) otherwise – 3 or more members. (3) The commission is constituted by a commissioner sitting alone. (4) More than 1 full bench or commission may sit at the same time. (5) The commission’s jurisdiction or existence, is not affected by a vacancy in any office of the commission.”. Prina facie, “commission” would appear to mean “the commission constituted by a commissioner sitting alone”. Doubtless context may suggest another meaning, Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s. 32A. But given that the principles which apply for deciding wages and employment conditions expressly limit themselves to proceedings before a single commissioner, the context here suggests that the noun “commission” was used in its prima facie sense. On the facts all of that is of little moment. If the application is granted the award wage rates will very significantly increase. It is useful to go to a table prepared by Mr Pawlowski, an industrial relations officer employed by Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Limited, Industrial Organisation of Employers, and a witness called by the company. Margarine Manufacturing Industry Award – S.D. ALHMWU Claim – Margarine Manufacturing Industry Award – State Excess of Claim per week Award Relativity % Classification Wage Rate per Week (40 hr/wk) $ Classification Level Calculated Relativity % Wage Rate per week (37.333)hr/wk) $ $ % (a) Operational Stream 79 Operator Grade 1B 417.60 96.4. 490.60 73 17.5 82 Operator Grade 1A 430.10 Operator Level 1 (entry level) 96.4 490.60 60.50 14.1 118.8 583.50 77.90 17.2 87.4 Operator Grade 2 452.60 Operator Level 2 128.4 623.80 (s/o) 171.20* 37.8 125.1 610.00 136.50 28.8 92.4 Operator Grade 3 473.50 Operator Level 3 134.7 649.90 (s/o) 176.40 37.3 134.6 649.50 161.30 33.0 96 Operator Grade 4 488.20 Operator Level 4 144.2 689.50 (s/o) 201.30 41.2 100 Operator Grade 5 507.20 105 Operator Grate 6 528.10 (b) Laboratory Stream *Note: There are no senior operators at level 2 at Meadowlea Murarrie 82 Trainee/Lab Assistant 430.10 Operator Level D** (entry level - 1 st 3 mo) 133.4 644.70 214.10 49.9 92.4 Lab Assistant 473.50 Operator Level C 154 730.50 257.00 54.3 Operator Level B 161.2 762.70 255.50 50.4 100 Lab Tech Grade 1 507.20 Operator Level A 171.5 805.60 298.40 58.8 105 Lab Tech Grade 2 528.10 110 Lab Tech Grade 3 548.90 115 Lab Tech Grade 4 569.80 **Note: Levels A-D appear wrong (ie in reverse order) in appendix 1 to the proposed award. It must be conceded that wage rates may fairly be compared only where one is satisfied that the rates are payable in respect of the same classification. The assumption in the table is that the “grades” in the existing Award may be matched with the “levels” in the proposed Award. In terms, the “grades” do not match the “levels”. The grades are generically described and rely on time-based training modules. The “levels”, which are derived from the existing Certified Agreements, are specific to the Murarrie site and competency based. Mr Pawlowski has made the assumption that the “levels” may be fitted within the generically described “grades”. The assumption was freely disclosed in his witness statement. The applicant did not cross-examine about the assumption. In those circumstances we proceed on the basis the assumption is either correct or sufficiently close to being correct to make the table a reasonably accurate reflection of the scale of the increases in award rates which will be made if the existing Award were repealed and the new Award made. Our prima facie view is that the grant of wage increases of the magnitude proposed are not justifiable under the current principles relating to the fixation of wages and conditions of employment. Indeed, no attempt has been made to argue that the increases may be justified under those principles. What is contended is that no person at the Murarrie site will receive an increase and that there is no prospect of the increases “flowing on”. The first point is factually correct. Indeed, save for a matter relating to enterprise bargaining to which we shall shortly turn, the proposed Award (if made) would have no more relevance to day to day activities at the Murarrie site than the existing Award. Indeed, as to wages, it would from the outset be 4% behind the paid rates. The second point (about “flow-on”) seems to us not to be immediately obvious. There is already the risk that the wage rates in the Certified Agreements will “flow on” to other food processing awards. The risk arises from the operation of ss. 125, 126 and 129 previously discussed at some length. If this Commission were to endorse the rates by including the rates within an award, the risk of “flow on” to other awards -- 4 of 5 -- 9 November, 2001 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 237 would be exacerbated. The Margarine Manufacturing Industry Award – Southern Division, like the great bulk of Queensland awards, has been subjected to the minimum rates adjustment process. Each of the grades has a relativity to the tradesperson grade in the Engineering Award – State. If the proposed Award were made and the relativities of persons in the margarine industry were changed in the dramatic way disclosed at the table, other employees in the food processing sector (with perhaps not dissimilar generic classification descriptions) may very well seek a reassessment of their relativity to the tradesperson level. In our view we should be unwise to create risk of a new round of “change in work value” cases. Notwithstanding the absence of evidence of any potential Queensland based competitor, it is of concern to us that the proposed new Award is to be a common rule award operating throughout the whole of the state. Any market entrant would be required to pay the award rates or negotiate a certified agreement which would be tested for disadvantage (as previously described) against the Award. Additionally, there is the consideration that the description of classifications in the proposed Award is unintelligible. It is plainly arguable that to interpret the Award one may go back to the Certified Agreements, compare K and S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon and Gotch Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 309 at 315, Busby v Chief Manager, Human Resources Department, Australian Telecommunications Commission (1988) 20 FCR at 468 per Neaves, Birchett and Lee JJ and Short v FW Herchus Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 511 at 517-520. However, even that may not help. The classifications are based on the technology and methods of performing work in use at Murarrie in 1998. One really needs to understand that technology and systems in order for one to understand the classifications. There is the obvious point that there is no justification for forcing new entrants into use of the technology and systems of work embraced by the company in 1998. Certainly, the company itself had no high opinion of those working arrangements. The company’s National Director – Human Resources (Mr Buxton) variously described the arrangements crystallised in the 1998 2001 Certified Agreement as “complex”, “confusing”, “prescriptive and restrictive” “outdated” and as permitting flexibilities within work areas rather then permitting flexibilities across work areas. The National Director may of course have entertained an unduly critical view. However, we cannot entertain any measure of confidence that it is appropriate to force the arrangements upon anyone else. We must also notice that once the Certified Agreement now under negotiation is concluded, the work arrangements in the existing Certified Agreements will not be the work arrangements at Murarrie. It is contended for the applicant that the Margarine Manufacturing Award – Southern Division no longer serves as a safety net under enterprise bargaining. The discrepancy between the wage rates under the Award and under the Certified Agreement is such that abandoning negotiations in which the employer seeks too much and retreating to the Award, is not an option available to the workers. We think that that is so. However, unlike the repealed Workplace Relation Act 1997 (s. 122(b)) the Industrial Relations Act 1999 does not have as an object ensuring that “awards act as a safety net of fair minium wages and employment conditions”. We recognise that enlargement or narrowing of the gap between award rates and certified agreement rates may affect the bargaining power of employees and employers. It may well be that in an appropriate case, e.g. where an employer was making an oppressive use of a large gap, the Commission would intervene to strike a new Award at or about the Certified Agreement rates. We say “may” advisedly because it may well be the correct approach to such a case would be to exercise the power at s. 173 (previously discussed) to refuse consent to withdraw from an existing certified agreement or impose conditions upon the grant of that consent. None of that is relevant here. All the evidence is that whilst vigorous and productive of some measure of animosity, enterprise bargaining is alive and well at the Murarrie site. In all circumstances we dismiss the application. Dated this thirty-first day of October, 2001. D.R.HALL, President. K.L. EDWARDS, Commissioner. J.M. THOMPSON, Commissioner. Released: 31 October 2001 Appearances:– Mr J. Martin and Mr K. Krebbs for the Australian Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union, Queensland Branch, Union of Employees. Mr A. Herbert of Counsel instructed by Mr P. Ludeke of Goodman Fielder Consumer Foods and Mr S. Pawlowski for the Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry Limited, Industrial Organisation of Employers on behalf of Goodman Fielder Consumer Foods. -- 5 of 5 --