Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Union, Queensland Branch v Queensland Rail [2001] QIRC 171 (2001) 168 QGIG 190

190 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 26 October, 2001 ########################################################################################################################### QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION Industrial Relations Act 1999 – s. 230 – action on industrial dispute Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Union, Queensland Branch AND Queensland Rail (No. D224 of 2001) COMMISSIONER BECHLY 16 October 2001 DECISION The Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union, Queensland Branch notified a dispute under section 229 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 on 20 July 2001 concerning action taken by Queensland Rail in changing the employment conditions of a driver, Mr Raymond Edge-Williams following an incident on 1 June 2001 when Mr Edge-Williams failed to stop the train he was driving (6CN5) at a Block Limit Board in accordance with the requirements of a Direct Train Control authority which resulted in the train exceeding its authority to travel by 11.53 kilometres. The train was operated by two drivers. Each are equally responsible for the control of the train in accordance with the Queensland Rail Traincrew Subsidiary Agreement extension, Certified Agreement 1998. Mr Edge-Williams was the driver in control at the time of the incident. The other driver was in a passive capacity. Each driver has been reduced in employment conditions. Only Mr Edge-Williams has initiated this action. Train 6CN5 was authorised to travel only as far as Reid River on 1 June 2001. Mr Edge-Williams acknowledges that he forgot to obtain authorisation from the Near West Control Officer to travel beyond Reid River. As a consequence train 6CN5 overran Reid River by some eleven and a half kilometres before it was brought to a halt and some action taken by Mr Edge-Williams to contact the train controller to attempt to secure authorisation to proceed. Each driver was aware that they were authorised to drive the train only as far as Reid River through instructions given by the Near West Control Officer which were exhibited on the in-cabin screen of the Direct Traffic Control system. That screen provides clear and precise information as to the limits of authority to travel; the limit beyond which the train may not travel; advice when the locomotive comes within one kilometre of the limit of authority and advice when the limit of authority is exceeded. When the limit of authority is exceeded the screen also flashes as an additional visual warning. An audible warning is also given in such circumstances by some systems. Mr Edge-Williams states that that warning was not audible at the time. In the circumstances that Mr Edge-Williams has acknowledged that he forgot to take the necessary steps to obtain the necessary authorisation to enter the prohibited area it is only necessary to determine whether the action taken by Queensland Rail to reduce his classification was fair. That is the process which has been agreed by the parties that the Commission should follow on this occasion. In defence of his actions Mr Edge-Williams indicates that he was distracted on approaching Reid River by the automatic application of brakes of the train through the automatic train protection system (ATP). He states that he was discussing the different application of the ATP with the second driver and became distracted and failed to contact the Near West Control Officer to gain authority to proceed. He also states that he had an expectation that he would gain such authority to proceed to Antil Plains because a preceding train had arrived intact at Antil Plains. Unlike illuminated signals which indicate danger or safe to proceed, block limit boards are painted, fixed signs situated at the side of the permanent way at about loco cabin height and clearly identify the location where they are placed, in this case the entrance to the Reid River Woodstock section. On becoming aware that he had exceeded his authority Mr Edge-Williams brought the train to a halt and in breach of the procedures for dealing with a signal passed at danger (SPAD) as contained in the Direct Traffic Control Manual, he sought to gain approval to enter the Reid River Woodstock section after he had proceeded 11.53 kilometres into the section. Queensland Rail standards for dealing with a SPAD situation provide only two categories of SPAD; those where the limit has been exceeded by less than 50 metres and those where the limit has been exceeded by 50 metres or more. Exceeding the limit by 11.53 kilometres is, rightly, regarded as a very serious breach. The tape recording of communication between Mr Edge-Williams and the Near West Control Officer indicates that at 1653.46 hours Mr Edge-Williams advised control that the train was “Just at Reid River” and was given a new command code to enable the train to proceed beyond its original authority. He commenced to enter the code into the computer which then shut down because the train was beyond its authority. It was after that point that the Near West Control Officer was advised that the train was beyond its authority. Initially Mr Edge-Williams advised that it was five kilometres beyond its authority and later the correct kilometre mark was quoted which was 11.56 kilometres beyond Reid River. The two drivers were subsequently removed from further operation of the train which was taken on the remainder of its journey by another crew. The drivers were suspended on pay, an investigation conducted and following an opportunity to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken, were effectively demoted to a lower grade for six months. On the evidence before me the investigation conducted by Queensland Rail was proper in all respects. -- 1 of 2 -- 26 October, 2001 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 191 Mr Edge-Williams raised a number of matters in his defence which were dealt with in evidence as follows:– • “The failure of control to respond to his call at Woldston, an earlier checkpoint.” Control responded to the first call made but did not respond to a second call. This has little if any effect upon the failure to secure later required authority to proceed beyond Reid River. • “The operation of the ATP which he believed was a malfunction.” Evidence was presented to demonstrate that the operation of the ATP was not a malfunction. Although the train was travelling within the speed limit for the track it was travelling beyond the speed which would have enabled it to stop safely at the block limit board at Reid River. • “The position of the DTC screen and the inaudible alarm.” The screen is at what is described as the eyebrow position in the cab. The driver looks up to it, just above the windscreen. The screen is not visible to the second driver. The positioning of the screen was established through a cab committee upon which the drivers are represented. On the locos in question the eyebrow position is the only feasible position to place the screen. On inspection I formed the conclusion that it was not difficult for a driver to lift his eyes to the screen from time to time to observe messages contained therein and to observe the screen flashing warning signs. It was said that the sound alarm was inaudible. I have taken this into account. It is only one of the alert systems used to inform drivers that authority has been exceeded. • “The possible inaccuracy on the Global Positioning System(GPS).” It was established that the GPS was not inaccurate. The GPS determines the position by way of straight line distance between two positions whereas the track measured distance takes into account the meandering of the track through the terrain. • “The cab layout and screen location does not assist the second driver who is well out of line of vision.” This is factual. However, it is obviously the responsibility of the command driver to maintain an awareness of the information and warnings provided on the screen. More importantly both drivers were made aware through control instruction that the limit of their authority was Reid River some 34 kilometres from the start of a journey of some 48 minutes. • “The operation of the ATP was a definite distraction.” The ATP is a safety feature. It never replaces Direct Traffic Control and does not supervise the limit of authority. There appears to be some confusion as to when the ATP operates. Mr Edge-Williams expressed the view that he was not exceeding the speed allowed on the line and some surprise that the ATP applied a “braking penalty” when he crossed the transponder which activates the ATP. Queensland Rail’s evidence is that although he may not have been exceeding the speed for the line he was exceeding the speed which would have enabled him to stop safely at the Block Limit Board. These are two quite different concepts. Further training should provide a better understanding of the ATP system. I do not see the operation of the ATP as being a significantly greater distraction than other aspects of driving a locomotive. I do recognise that there is a belief that it operates on occasion when it is unexpected or thought not to be appropriate. Queensland Rail alleged, in the required “show cause” letter, that Mr Edge-Williams endeavoured to conceal the error in proceeding beyond the authority and, improperly, sought to gain an extension of the authority. This allegation has been denied by Mr Edge-Williams. His evidence is that he had no intention of covering up the incident, in his mind. He did indicate in his evidence that there were ways to defeat the system, none of which were legitimate. Queensland Rail relies upon the transcript of the communication between Mr Edge-Williams and the Near West Control Officer after the train exceeded its limit and travelled a further 11.56 kilometres. That transcript reveals that on three occasions Mr Edge-Williams advised in the following terms – “We’re just at Reid River”; “I’m just outside the yard” and “I stopped it and it (the computer) shut down. It said I exceeded the authority and then shut down.”. What occurred during this time was that Near West Control issued another authority to Mr Edge-Williams in the belief that he was still at Reid River within the authority. When Mr Edge-Williams attempted to encode the new authority the computer shut down because the train was outside the limit of authority. In the circumstances I believe that Queensland Rail had reason to suspect that there had been an attempt to conceal the fact that authority had been exceeded. A clear statement by Mr Edge-Williams, when he first contacted the controller, that he had exceeded his authority would have removed any prospect that a suspension would arise as to concealment. On the information provided to me I accept that appropriate training has been given to both drivers. Evidence was tendered as to their attendance at the relevant training course. It was acknowledged that the drivers involved did not drive on the track each day but it was put, and I think within reason, that both drivers had adequate familiarity with the track to be competent to drive over it. As earlier indicated in this decision the only matter to be determined by me is whether the downgrading was excessive in the circumstances. I have been provided with information as to the action taken by Queensland Rail with respect to other SPADS. The action, downgrading, has been the same as that applied to Mr Edge-Williams or different depending on the circumstances and relevant culpability of the crew members involved. I have come to the conclusion that the action taken be Queensland Rail was not excessive in the circumstances. I take into account the advice given on the train Working Advice (form SW52) at the commencement of the journey. However that information does not constitute an authority to proceed and only reflects movements on or about the track at the time it is issued. While no accident occurred there is always the potential for one. The parties do not need to be reminded of the loss of life, injury and damage that has occurred on railways where signals have been passed at danger. R.E. BECHLY, Commissioner. Released: 16 October 2001 Appearances:– Mr W. Williams for the Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Union, Queensland Branch. Mr P. Lucas for Queensland Rail. -- 2 of 2 --