Finlen's Contract Build Pty Ltd, Re [2000] QSC 174
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: In the matter of the CORPORATIONS LAW
In the matter of FINLEN'S CONTRACT BUILD PTY LTD
(Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) [2000] QSC 174
PARTIES: BARRY JOHN ARNISON
(first applicant)
and
IAN CHARLES TURNER
(second applicant)
and
GORDON WILLIAM LEPP
(third applicant)
and
DIANNE MAUREEN MOSES
(fourth applicant)
and
MARY JANE RUDKIN
(fifth applicant)
and
JOHN DAVID AITKENHEAD
(sixth applicant)
v
TREVOR JOHN SCHMIERER
(first respondent)
and
RAYMOND WILLIAM RICHARDS
(second respondent)
and
FINLEN'S CONTRACT BUILD PTY LTD
ACN 010 115 741
(SUBJECT TO DEED OF COMPANY
ARRANGEMENT)
FILE NO: S1142 of 2000
DIVISION: Trial Division
DELIVERED ON: 15 June 2000
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 4 April 2000
JUDGE: Mackenzie J
ORDER: 1. I order that the envelope containing documents sealed
in accordance with Rule 764 of the Corporations
(Queensland) Rules 1993 and marked not to be opened
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unless by order of the court be opened for inspection by a
judge only for the purpose of considering matters relevant
to the present application.
2. I dismiss the application.
3. I order that the documents referred to in order 1 be
resealed and marked so as to indicate that the envelope
was opened for the purposes of order 1 and that it not be
opened again unless by order of a judge.
4. I order the applicants to pay the respondents' costs of
and incidental to the application to be assessed.
CATCHWORDS: CORPORATIONS LAW – EXAMINATION OF AFFAIRS
– s596B – Application – affidavit – must give full and frank
disclosure – not be used to give administrators unfair
advantage – abuse of process.
COUNSEL: J Batch SC for the applicants
M Martin for the respondents
SOLICITORS: Gadens Lawyers for the applicants
McCullough Robertson Lawyers for the respondents
[1] MACKENZIE J: On 24 February 2000 an order was made by Senior Deputy
Registrar Kempin pursuant to s596B of the Corporations Law for the purpose of
conducting an examination of each of the applicants concerning examinable affairs
of the respondent company. With the exception of Mr Arnison who is headmaster
and CEO of Somerset College Limited and Mr Turner who is bursar, each of the
applicants is a director of the college which is a private school on the Gold Coast.
[2] The respondent company carried out works for the college on the swimming pool
and the administration building under separate contracts. A dispute concerning the
administration building contract is currently the subject of arbitration. A claim has
also been made in respect of the swimming pool. Without prejudice negotiations
ensued in that regard and it is asserted in correspondence by the applicant Mr Smith
(who is also the solicitor on the record) that Somerset College's position based on
expert reports is that no moneys remain payable to the respondent company under
that contract. It is asserted that a response to this from the first and second
respondents who are administrators of the Deed of Company Arrangement of the
corporate respondent remains outstanding.
[3] In the same correspondence the applicants' attitude to examination is expressed to
be that as litigation is under way in respect to the administration building an
examination in relation to that building would give the administrators an unfair
advantage in relation to the litigation. It is asserted that the applicants are not
obliged to disclose documents or answer questions in relation thereto. The legal
validity of this proposition is denied by the solicitors for the respondents.
[4] Section 596B permits a court to summon a person for examination about a
corporation's examinable affairs if:
(a) an eligible applicant applies for the summons; and
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(b) the court is satisfied that the person:
(i) has taken part or been concerned in examinable affairs of the
corporation and has been or may have been guilty of misconduct in
relation to the corporation; or
(ii) may be able to give information about examinable affairs of the
corporation.
[5] The "examinable affairs" of a Corporation are those defined in s9. Section 53
elaborates on what the affairs of a body corporate include in a non-exclusive way.
The scope of those definitions is extremely broad.
[6] The present application does not seek to set aside the order for summonses for
examination. However, presumably as a preliminary step towards such end, it asks
that the affidavit or affidavits relied on by the respondents in applying for the orders
to be open for inspection by the applicants and that copies of those documents and
the written outline of submissions or argument relied on by the respondents be
made available to the applicants. Section 596C requires a person who applies under
s596B to file an affidavit that supports the application and complies with the rules
and further provides that the affidavit is not available for inspection except so far as
the court orders. The Senior Deputy Registrar ordered that the affidavit be sealed
and marked not to be opened unless by order of the court.
[7] The administrators sought, in effect, all relevant documents pertaining to the
dealings between Somerset College and Finlen's Contract Build Pty Ltd from 1996
to the date of the summons. Section 596B authorises an eligible applicant to gather
information even though it may relate to legal proceedings involving those
examined and a company with whose examinable affairs an eligible applicant is
dealing, subject to the power of the court not to allow the power to be used for
improper purposes or as an abuse of process (Re: Hugh J Roberts Pty Ltd (in liq)
(1970) 2 NSWR 582, Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486, Grosvenor Hill
(Queensland) Pty Ltd v Barber (1994) 120 ALR 262).
[8] The real thrust of the present application is that it is a consequence of the
requirement in s596C that an affidavit supporting an application under s596B be
filed that a person applying for a summons to be issued under s596B must properly
justify the application in the affidavit. It was submitted that the only purpose of the
affidavit is to provide a public record of the justification for the application. It was
further submitted that by allowing the court to vary the general rule that the
affidavit is not available for inspection s596C(2) contemplates that a person for
whose examination an order has been made could apply for and, furthermore,
usually expect an order that the affidavit be made available. The last mentioned
proposition relies on obiter dictum by Derrington J in Sunkist Tile Merchants Pty
Ltd (in liq) v Ruiter (1987) 1QdR 477. However, it was concerned with a practice
under a predecessor of the present legislation and Derrington J's comment did not
form part of the majority in that McPherson J agreed with Connolly J's reasons.
[9] It was submitted that failure by the administrators to give information concerning
the basis of the application to the applicants when they requested it in
correspondence is of significance. It was submitted that since there was no reason
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to suppose that there had or may have been misconduct on the part of any of the
applicants the only basis for the application for summonses was that they may be
able to give information concerning the examinable affairs of the company. It was
further submitted that involvement in contractual disputes one of which was subject
to ongoing arbitration probably did not even support a basis for satisfaction that the
present applicants may be able to give information about examinable affairs of the
company.
[10] In my view it would not be unreasonable to think that the directors and executive
officers of a company which is in dispute with another company over very
significant sums of money allegedly owing under contracts entered into by the
company of which they are directors and the other company may have information
concerning examinable affairs of the other company. There is no evidence from
any of them deposing that they have none, if that be relevant. There is in my view a
prima facie basis for issuing the summonses.
[11] The authorities referred to above establish that it is the legislative intent that it is
legitimate for examination under compulsion to be used to obtain information
concerning proceedings or which may assist in deciding whether or not proceedings
may be brought on behalf of the company under administration. In my opinion to
the extent that the notion that an unfair advantage in the arbitration proceedings or
any subsequent litigation may accrue to the administrators underpins the
application, it cannot succeed without more. If it appears that the purpose of
obtaining the summons is to obtain a forensic advantage not otherwise available the
process may be open to challenge (Hong Kong Bank of Australia Ltd v Murphy
(1992) 28 NSWLR 512; Re: Moage (1997) 25 ACSR 53). However, this kind of
case needs to be distinguished from incidentally gaining a forensic advantage by
gaining information when pursuing the legitimate purposes of the process. As
Gleeson CJ said in Hong Kong Bank (519):
"Whilst the court will not permit a liquidator, or other eligible
person, to abuse its process by using an examination solely for the
purpose of obtaining a forensic advantage not available from
ordinary pre-trial procedures, such as discovery or inspection, on the
other hand, the possibility that a forensic advantage will be gained
does not mean that the making of an order will not advance a
purpose intended to be secured by the legislation."
[12] It was also argued that where an ex parte application is made for an order under
s596B full and frank disclosure in the affidavit is vital. So much is established by
Re: One Twenty Seven Corporation (1995) 13 ACLC 1601 and Re: Southern
Equities Corporation Ltd (1997) 25 ASCR 394, 422-3. It was argued that the
outline of the argument which was admittedly relied on before the Senior Deputy
Registrar would reveal whether additional material to that in the affidavit had been
relied on and should be made available as well so that any application to set aside
the summonses may be facilitated. Southern Equities does not support the
conclusion that failure to include material information in the affidavit inevitably
breaches the principle that full disclosure be made (424).
[13] Having explored the relevant principles for the purpose of exposing the appropriate
issues recourse has been had to a course encouraged by Mr Batch and consented to
by Mr Martin of examining both the affidavit and the outline of argument. I am
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satisfied after such examination that there has been full compliance with the
requirement of full and frank disclosure to the Senior Deputy Registrar and that the
application was made for permissible purposes. I am satisfied that the application
has not been made for improper purposes or in a way which amounts to abuse of
process.
[14] Accordingly I make the following orders:
1. I order that the envelope containing documents sealed in accordance with
Rule 764 of the Corporations (Queensland) Rules 1993 and marked not to
be opened unless by order of the court be opened for inspection by a judge
only for the purpose of considering matters relevant to the present
application.
2. I dismiss the application.
3. I order that the documents referred to in order 1 be resealed and marked so
as to indicate that the envelope was opened for the purposes of order 1 and
that it not be opened again unless by order of a judge.
4. I order the applicants to pay the respondents' costs of and incidental to the
application to be assessed.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2000/174