Chilcott v Bowen Health District [2000] QSC 443

fe:-P'-v·,i -ffu to5l1 oo-tt 3 Reporting Bureau TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS Copyright in this transcript is vested in the Crown. Copies thereof must not be made or sold without the written authority of the Director, State Reporting Bureau. SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CIVIL JURISDICTION de JERSEY CJ No S65 of 2000 MARGARET ANN CHILCOTT and BOWEN HEALTH DISTRICT TOWNSVILLE .. DATE 28/02/2000 JUDGMENT 1 REVISED COPIES ISSUED State Reporting Bureau Date 29/02/2000 Applicant Respondent 4Th Floor, The Law Courts Complex, George Street, Brisbane Q. 4000. Telephone: (07)3247 4360. Facsimile: (07) 3247 5532 -- 1 of 4 -- 28022000 TS/SAL M/T TSVSC6924/6925 (de Jersey CJ) HIS HONOUR: The applicant was employed by Queensland Health with the Bowen District Health Service as a temporary part- time employee for six months from 21 October 1998. That period expired on 21 April 1999. She did not then leave the employment of the District Health Service, but remained on, it seems, until late May, perhaps early June. At that stage, she swears that she was told that the District Health Manager had terminated her employment. She is dissatisfied with that, because of two things: First, 10 she swears to having been assured at the commencement of her employment that she, "Would progress to a status of permanent part-time, subject to satisfactory work performance reports"; Second, she is concerned that the termination of her employment is explained by the District Health Manager's reaction to some letters written by her husband to a newspaper. She sought reasons for the termination of her employment. The reasons given by a Mr Newell are that her employment had 20 simply ceased, "On the basis of the expiry of the term of agreed employment". That is not, however, correct, because she did remain in employment beyond 21 April 1999. Whether the department likes it or not, that is the fact, and it does seem to me that her employment has therefore been terminated. It is not simply a matter of expiry with the affluxion of time on 21 April. It may be that that gave her certain further rights in light of the letter of appointment dated 2 November 1998, the fourth last paragraph of which refers to termination upon notice or pay in lieu of notice. 30 2 JUDGMENT -- 2 of 4 -- 28022000 TS/SAL M/T TSVSC6925 (de Jersey CJ) Now, I express no view on that. I simply raise it to explain why I am at least implicity suggesting that the approach taken by Mr Newell in the letter of 17 February 2000 maybe somewhat simplistic. It may be - I do not know - that the applicant has rights under the Industrial Relations Act. That point arose this morning in this way. In mentioning it, I am not to be seen, in any way, as encouraging an application to the Industrial Relations Commission, but I have to make that point to explain why this morning's application is misconceived. This morning's application is for further reasons to be given 10 under section 38 of the Judicial Review Act. The further reasons are sought, obviously enough because of the applicant's dissatisfaction with the letter of 17 February 2000, in light of the matters I referred to earlier. The application is, however, flawed, because as I see it, the decision to terminate the employment at the end of May is not a, "Decision to which this Act applies", referring to the Judicial Review Act as defined in section 4 of that Act. It is not, in short, "A decision of an administrative character 20 made ... under an enactment". This is a decision made under a contract of employment. A private matter, as I put it during argument, between the applicant and her employer, the department. Simply because a government department is involved, does not mean that the requisite decision is an administrative decision to which the Act applies. I have not been referred to any provision of any enactment which would dissuade me from the view which clearly emerges, and that is, that this is simply a decision made under a 3 JUDGMENT 30 -- 3 of 4 -- 28022000 T8/SAL M/T TSVSC6925 (de Jersey CJ) private contract of employment. The application is therefore misconceived. I hope, however, that the department may look at this matter again, to see whether the applicant has any rights, because if she has, I'm sure that the department acting responsibly will seek to come to some accommodation. For the moment, I will reserve costs. The application is otherwise dismissed. 4 JUDGMENT 10 -- 4 of 4 --