Cook v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] QCA 277

99.277 COURT OF APPEAL de JERSEY CJ McPHERSON JA DOUGLAS J Appeal No 283 of 1999 BEVERLEY ANN COOK Appellant/Plaintiff and FAI GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED Respondent/Defendant by Election BRISBANE ..DATE 22/07/99 JUDGMENT -- 1 of 4 -- 220799 D.1 T9/JJD24 M/T COA164/99 2 JUDGMENT THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The appellant recovered judgment for damages in respect of injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident on 31 January 1994. Quantum only was in issue before the learned trial Judge. He gave judgment for the sum of $27,608. The learned Judge found, on the basis of medical evidence which he was perfectly entitled to accept, that the appellant had suffered but minor physical injuries, comprising soft tissue injuries to her neck, lower back, right arm and leg. He accepted the evidence of Dr Boys that the physical aspect of her injuries would account for about three to six months of pain and suffering. The complication in the case arose from a very substantial psychological condition, which came on proximately with her injuries and led to a marked exacerbation in the symptoms for which, however, there was, as His Honour found, no organic explanation. The Judge accepted the evidence of Dr Reddan, the psychiatrist, to the effect that the appellant was at this stage of her life in an extremely vulnerable condition emotionally, because of various other influences which affected her, quite independently of this accident. We were referred by Mr Fleming, QC, who appeared for the appellant, to part of the evidence of Dr Reddan, for a contention that the award of $27,000 was unduly ungenerous to the appellant, such as to warrant the intervention of this Court and he specified -- 2 of 4 -- 220799 D.1 T9/JJD24 M/T COA164/99 3 JUDGMENT $15,000 as the amount which should reasonably, on appeal, be added to the amount of the judgment given in the District Court. The evidence to which he referred us was in these terms: "I think (the appellant's) problems were such and were significant enough that she would have developed some sort of problem, probably a psychiatric problem, in order to resolve the psychological conflicts and marital conflicts that she was in and she was facing...she was facing the developmental path of mid-life. She would have had to have found some way to resolve that, so I think in some respects, you might say the motor vehicle accident came along at a good time, or the timing of it was important, but I think she would have had to have developed something without this motor vehicle accident, to resolve these conflicts." The doctor had earlier said in her evidence: "I think it likely that she would have developed some sort of problem that would have been to resolve the difficulties she was in..." She was asked: "Would it have taken much to do that?" and she answered, "No, I don't think it would have, because I think that the vulnerabilities were quite significant and she was coming into the developmental time of mid- life." A little later she was asked: "At that stage of her life, would (you) have expected something to have happened sooner, rather than later?" and she answered, "Yes, because I think the developmental issues - I see the developmental issues as important." The Judge set the component of the award for pain and suffering allowing for a period of effect upon the appellant of about two years. In my opinion, that was a reasonable approach to the matter, in light of the evidence of Dr Reddan, to which I have just referred. I do not consider that the appeal could possibly succeed or that there would be any basis at all upon which this -- 3 of 4 -- 220799 D.1 T9/JJD24 M/T COA164/99 4 JUDGMENT Court could, consistently with authority, responsibly interfere with the amount of the judgment. I have not gone into greater detail about the process which led to His Honour's award, because it was accepted in essence, and quite rightly accepted by Mr Fleming, that the approach taken by the Judge was a perfectly orthodox one which was open to him, the only question in the end being whether on that approach the ultimate award in amount was unduly ungenerous. I think for the reasons I have expressed that that argument, with all respect to Mr Fleming's advocacy, was simply untenable. I would dismiss the appeal, with costs to be taxed. McPHERSON JA: I agree. DOUGLAS J: I agree. THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The appeal is dismissed, with costs to be taxed. ----- -- 4 of 4 --