Bretts Ltd v Comar International Pty Ltd & Anor [1999] QSC 44
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CIVIL JURISDICTION
FRYBERG J
No 10081 of 1997
BRETTS LIMITED
ACN 009 658 315
and
i nEVISED COPIES ISSUED
· State Reporting Bureau
Date Q / J. /
Plaintiff
COMAR INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD (FORMERLY KNOWN AS
WEINIG AUSTRALIA PTY LTD)
ACN 001 809 703 First Defendant
and
MICHAEL WEINIG AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
ACN 071 413 593
BRISBANE
.. DATE 03/02/99
JUDGMENT
I, J."l,1,1•• 't'1,n I .,,u , ......... , .. t• ............. c, ...... , 1, ... : .. 1 •..•. . "" ..i,,,,,,
1
Second Defendant
[1999] QSC 44
-- 1 of 4 --
030299 T10/IRK13 M/T 3814/99 & 3890/99 (Fryberg J)
HIS HONOUR: This is an application by the first defendant for
an order that the statement of claim be struck out as against
it. The basis of the application is that the material in the
affidavits clearly shows that no case is maintainable against
the first defendant and that the continuation of the
proceedings amounts to an abuse of process.
The plaintiff's claim is against the defendants in the
alternative. It is essentially a contractual claim and is
brought in the alternative on the basis that an agreement was
originally made with the first defendant for which the first
defendant is said to be liable but, in the alternative, it is
said that there was a novation of the agreement such that the
second defendant became liable on it in place of the first
defendant.
The first defendant says that the material admitted by the
plaintiff clearly shows that the alternative claim is the only
one which is maintainable. The plaintiff denies this.
The question is one which could be easily resolved at the
trial when all matters are before the trial Judge. No
material has been put forward by the applicant, the first
defendant, to show that it would suffer any prejudice as a
result of that course being followed.
It is submitted that I ought to infer that the prejudice which
would be suffered would be the incurring of a liability for
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20
30
40
50
costs by the first defendant to its solicitors. There is, I
suppose, also a potential liability for costs to the plaintiff 60
2 JUDGMENT
-- 2 of 4 --
030299 T10/IRK13 M/T 3814/99 & 3890/99 (Fryberg J)
but it is difficult to see how that could arise unless
judgment were given against the first defendant.
The two defendants are, to some extent, associated companies.
The second defendant is a joint venture company and one of the
joint venturers is either the first defendant or persons
associated with the first defendant. The defendants are
represented by the one firm of solicitors and by the same
counsel.
No additional costs would, it seems, be incurred by having the
issue resolved at trial rather than in Chambers and no
evidence has been put before me as to the terms of the
retainer given to the solicitors by the defendants. That is a
matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendants.
In those circumstances, I am not prepared to infer that the
first defendant will, in any realistic sense, have to pay its
solicitors funds if this issue goes to trial and it
participates in the trial which could be avoided if the matter
were resolved today.
In my judgment the applicant has failed to demonstrate any
sufficient reason for a Judge in Chambers to decide, in
effect, a preliminary issue under the guise of an application
to strike out. It does not seem to me that an abuse of
process is clearly demonstrated on the evidence though I do
not think I need embark upon the merits of whether or not an
ironclad case is made out as the first defendant contends.
3 JUDGMENT
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60
-- 3 of 4 --
030299 T10/IRK13 M/T 3814/99 & 3890/99 (Fryberg J)
In my judgment this is not an appropriate case for the
intervention of the Chamber Judge and the application must be
dismissed.
HIS HONOUR: It seems to me that there is no reason
demonstrated why the ordinary order should not follow. The
application is dismissed with costs.
4 JUDGMENT
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/1999/044