Crick, P D, Re [1999] QDC 244

IN THE DISTRICT COURT HELD AT BRISBANE QUEENSLAND [Before JUDGE FORDE DJC] [Crick and Steltman and Others] Application No D3231 of 1999 IN THE MATTER OF ‘THE CRIMINAL CODE” AND IN THE MATTER OF THE QUEEN v. ANNEBEIN STELTMAN (First Respondent) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE QUEEN v. SLADE CHRISTOPHER MORGAN (Second Respondent) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE QUEEN v. FRANK JAMES BUTLER (Third Respondent) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE QUEEN v. KERRY ANNE STELTMAN (Fourth Respondent) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE QUEEN v. IRENE THERESE HARGREAVES (Fifth Respondent) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE QUEEN v. GRAHAM RONALD HARGREAVES (Sixth Respondent) AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION BY THOMAS WILLIAM CRICK REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - FORDE D.C.J. -- 1 of 6 -- Judgment delivered: 17th day of September, 1999 Catchwords: Criminal Compensation - A663B Criminal Code (Qld) - Discounting factors. Counsel: S. Lewis for Applicant T. Hardin for Respondent G R Hargreaves Solicitors: Nicol Robinson Halletts for the Applicant MacFie Curlewis Spiro for the Respondent G R Hargreaves Hearing Date(s): 15 September 1999 -- 2 of 6 -- IN THE DISTRICT COURT HELD AT BRISBANE QUEENSLAND [Before JUDGE FORDE DJC] [Crick and Steltman and Others] Application No D3231 of 1999 BETWEEN: THOMAS WILLIAM CRICK Applicant AND: ANNEBEIN STELTMAN First Respondent AND: SLADE CHRISTOPHER MORGAN Second Respondent AND: FRANK JAMES BUTLER Third Respondent AND: KERRY ANNE STELTMAN Fourth Respondent AND: IRENE THERESE HARGREAVES Fifth Respondent AND: GRAHAM RONALD HARGREAVES Sixth Respondent REASONS FOR JUDGMENT -FORDE D.C.J. Delivered the 17th day of September 1999 1. Thomas William Crick applies for criminal compensation pursuant to s. 663B(1) of the Criminal Code. He is the father of Paula- Marie Dawn Crick. I refer to my reasons in her application for the factual material. The respondents are Slade Christopher Morgan, -- 3 of 6 -- Kerry Anne Steltman and Graham Ronald Hargreaves, who is represented by counsel. 2. It is clear that at the material time, the conduct of the appellant contributed substantially to the kidnapping suffered by his daughter. This is conceded by his counsel. He owed money to Irene Therese Hargraves. He was involved in the drug trafficking and according to evidence from his former wife, has continued to so do. He seemed to know who may have kidnapped his daughter as he rang Irene Hargreaves, one of the respondents, almost immediately. 3. In determining what orders are to be made under the provisions of the compensation for injury, s.663B(2) is relevant: “In determining whether or not to make an order under ss.(1) of this section, and in determining the amount of any order, the court shall have regard to any behaviour of the person aggrieved which directly or indirectly contributed to the injury suffered by him, and to such other circumstances as it considers relevant.” 4. It is conceded by the respondent’s counsel that the applicant is an “aggrieved person”. 5. The applicant negotiated with the kidnappers. He would have been concerned about his daughter’s welfare. Reports have been placed before the court from a Mr. MacDougall, a counsellor, Dr. Howse, and Ms. Krishnan, a psychologist. The applicant is 53 years of age. THE NATURE OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE 6. The reports which I have before me are dated in 1996. The applicant had been receiving treatment by Dr. House from June 1994, i.e., prior to the subject offence. The affidavit of the applicant is dated 21 November 1997. He deposes in his affidavit to relying upon the medical reports for the purposes of this application. In the affidavit of his former wife which was filed in Application D3232/99, she says that the applicant continued in the drug trade after the subject offence. 7. Mr. MacDougall started to see the applicant in May 1995. The offence occurred in August 1994. The applicant was “still deeply unhappy and his mind was still occupied in -- 4 of 6 -- 3 attempting to work out the factors in his life which led to the kidnapping”. He had high levels of anxiety. Mr MacDougall counselled the applicant. He stated that the applicant’s life had been disrupted as a result of the kidnapping of his daughter. In view of the objection to this report by counsel for the respondent, I rely on it only for the fact that the applicant received counselling. 8. Ms. Krishnan, in her report, states that although the applicant suffered a severe level of depression affecting his motivation, enthusiasm, and contributing to insomnia, it could be treated with anti-depressants. He felt guilty about his daughter’s condition. Ms. Krishnan says that the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms of the applicant were quite severe, but he stabilised over the last two years. She conceded the major trauma for the applicant had been in the recovery stage at that time (October 1996). Even though counsel for the respondent objected to the expertise of Ms. Krishnan, I accept that as a psychologist she is capable of diagnosing PTSD. It is conceded that PTSD amounts to a psychiatric condition and an injury within the meaning of s.663B. 9. Dr. Howse stated that the applicant was treated at his practice from June 1994 up until October 1996. He was depressed at that time and had “lost all remnants of social functioning”. Dr. Howse opined that the applicant was permanently disabled and incapable of work. He said he was unable to cope with the belief during the kidnapping that his daughter may be dead. This does not have the ring of truth as he spoke to her on a couple of occasions. He was reassured on each occasion by his daughter. Dr. Howse was aware that the applicant had undergone regular counselling and had received anti- anxiety drugs until the end of 1994 and at various times since that date. 10. The view that I take is that the applicant has contributed substantially to his own problems in this matter. He suffered a short term but severe PTSD as a result of his own guilt, loss of his business and difficulty in rehabilitating. The fact that he has continued to be involved in drug trafficking, according to his former wife, was more likely to be the cause of his symptoms. Even apart from the latter fact, any award should be a nominal one in all the circumstances of this case. I assess his claim at $2,000. -- 5 of 6 -- 4 ORDERS: 11. That the respondents do pay to the applicant the sum of $2,000 by way of compensation as a result of the kidnapping for ransom which occurred in August 1994. 12. It is further ordered that the respondents do pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to this application to be assessed. -- 6 of 6 --