Barrett v Attorney-General of Queensland [1998] QCA 211
1
COURT OF APPEAL [1998] QCA 211
de JERSEY CJ
McPHERSON JA
CHESTERMAN J
CA No 187 of 1998
THE QUEEN
v.
PETER ROBERT BARRETT Respondent
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF QUEENSLAND Appellant
BRISBANE
..DATE 12/06/98
JUDGMENT
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE: On 21 May 1998 the respondent was arrested
for the attempted murder of the complainant. He applied for
bail. Bail was granted by a Judge in Chambers on 2 June 1998.
Because the respondent was charged with "an indictable offence
in the course of committing which he is alleged to have used a
firearm" the learned Judge was required to refuse bail unless
the respondent showed cause why his detention in custody was
not justified.
In the event of granting bail, the Judge was required to
include a statement of his reasons because of the provisions
of section 16 subsection 3 of the Bail Act. In the formal
order he expressed as his reason that the applicant's
continued detention was not justified and that cause had been
shown. In addition, the Judge gave substantial oral reasons
which have been transcribed.
Although when this appeal was launched the appellant relied
upon a suggested absence of a sufficient statement of reasons,
it is my view that the reasons given by the Judge were
adequate to ensure compliance with the statutory requirement.
The appeal now is brought by the Attorney-General under
section 254 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 which provides that
an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from every order made by
a Judge in Court or Chambers with certain presently irrelevant
exceptions. As confirmed in Maher, 1985, 19 Australian
Criminal Reports, 177, especially at 179, that is apt to
confirm the existence of a right of appeal such as is now
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being exercised before us.
It is convenient now to mention something of the facts of the
alleged offence. The allegations are that the complainant and
the respondent ran businesses from adjoining commercial
premises at Lawnton. On 21 May 1998, at about 11.15 a.m., the
complainant was working on a car in the rear yard of his
business premises when he felt a blow to the cheek. He
realised that he had been shot and fell to the ground. As he
crawled away he heard a second shot. He looked up to see the
respondent standing about five metres away holding a rifle.
The complainant got back into the building and called the
police. The first shot had penetrated his cheek and jaw and
lodged in his chest. He was taken to hospital and underwent
surgery for the removal of the bullet.
The investigating police officers found both the respondent
and a weapon, with an expended shell in the breech, at the
respondent's premises. Another expended shell was located in
the floor of the respondent's premises. A bullet was located
in the wall of the complainant's premises. The police spoke
to an alleged witness who said that he had seen the respondent
point the rifle at the complainant and fire. The respondent
declined to be interviewed.
It is said that the relationship between the respondent and
the complainant had been strained for about six months prior
to the shooting. There had been verbal confrontations. The
police had attended on four occasions. The basis for the
confrontations was the respondent's persistent accusations
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that the complainant was a multiple murderer and leader of a
paedophile organisation. The police had investigated those
allegations and, for their part, had dismissed them.
The applicant had been previously convicted, but many years
ago, in 1978 for assault occasioning bodily harm. He was, at
the time of this alleged offence, the subject of a consent
domestic violence order.
As to the respondent's own material, and I have noted that he
bore the onus of showing cause in this particular case, his
affidavit indicated that he had been living and working at the
Lawnton premises. He claimed that he had a need for liberty
to be able to prepare properly his defence. There was,
however, no expansion on that fairly obvious point. He
claimed, in addition, that he would suffer great financial
loss if he could not continue to work at the warehouse.
In her affidavit, one Elaine Gardner undertook to accompany
the respondent on all known visits to his factory and to
discourage him from contacting the complainant. The question
was whether through this, in the overall context, and with the
offer also of a $10,000 surety, the respondent had shown
cause.
The Crown opposed bail at the original hearing and, of course,
does now. In allowing bail, subject to that surety, the
learned Judge imposed particular conditions; that the
respondent refrain from contact or communication with the
complainant; that he live at a place other than the warehouse;
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that he live, indeed, with his brother or at any address
approved by the Director of Public Prosecutions; that he
report three days a week to the police; that he attend at his
business only when accompanied by Ms Gardner; that he limit
his contact with witnesses to contact by his legal advisers;
and finally that he not have any offensive weapon.
The learned Judge expressed the relevant considerations in his
comprehensive oral statement of reasons and their form of
expression discloses no factual error. The question, in the
end, which has concerned me is whether, in terms of section 16
of the Bail Act, the view was reasonably open; that there was
no unacceptable risk that the respondent, if released on bail,
would, while released on bail, commit an offence or endanger
the safety of the complainant. In my respectful view,
notwithstanding the Judge's, at least, implicit contrary view,
that finding was not reasonably open.
To my mind the aggregation of the following circumstances
leads to that result.
1.The alleged commission of a grave offence involving a
firearm, more specifically a shooting in the head in
broad daylight, with no provocation, in the presence of
other people.
2.One adds the circumstance that the offence was allegedly
inspired by an apparently irrational passion borne by the
respondent towards the complainant.
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3.The respondent intends to continue to visit premises next
door to the complainant's.
4.The offer of security, that is his being accompanied by Ms
Gardner, is of doubtful sufficiency to exclude the risk
otherwise arising.
5.The Crown case is apparently strong and, on the material
before the learned Judge and us, really unchallenged.
6.If convicted of this alleged offence the respondent could
well face a term of imprisonment.
In the aggregate those circumstances, to my mind, combine to
amount to a powerful case to the effect that there is a risk
of re-offending or, at least, of endangering the safety in the
future of the complainant if the respondent is on bail. For
those reasons I consider that the conclusion reached, as I say
at least implicitly by the learned Judge, was not one which
was open on the evidence put before him.
I would therefore allow the appeal; revoke the order for bail
which was made by the learned Chamber Judge; and order the
issue of a bench warrant for the apprehension of the
respondent.
McPHERSON JA: I agree.
CHESTERMAN J: I agree.
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The orders will therefore be as I have
indicated.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCA/1998/211