Botha, Re [1998] QSC 59

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND O.S. No. 2827 of 1998 Before the Hon Mr Justice Lee [Re: N J Botha] CATCHWORDS: Counsel: Solicitors: Hearing Date: IN THE MATTER of· The Criminal Code - and- IN THE MATTER of the Bail Act 1980-1988 - and- IN THE MATTER of an application for bail by NICHOLAAS JOHANNES BOTRA REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - LEE J. Judgment delivered 3 April 1998 BAIL - Effect of 2 previous applications - Whether changed circumstances - threshold question - whether Crown entitled to adduce evidence - onus of proof - whether Court may look at past material - Bail not automatically granted - Considerations applicable - R. v. Edwards (1988) 35 A.Crim R. 465; R. v. Wakefield (1969) 89 W.N. (Pt 1) N.S.W. 325. Mr MacGroarty for the applicant Ms Weir for the respondent Robertson O'Gorman, Solicitors as town agents for WitheriffNyst Solicitors for the applicant The Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent 31 March 1998 -- 1 of 17 -- IN THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND Before the Hon Mr Justice Lee [Re: N J Botha] O.S. No. 2827 of 1998 IN THE MATTER of The Criminal Code - and- IN THE MATTER of the Bail Act 1980-1988 - and- IN THE MATTER of an application for bail by NICHOLAAS JOHANNES BOTHA REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - LEE J. Judgment delivered 3 April 1998 This is the third application for bail which was previously refused by Mr Justice Shepherdson on 9 December 1997 and again by Mr Justice Dowsett on 12 February 1998, the latter refusal being on the basis that there was no relevant change of circumstances and that many of the matters then sought to be raised again had in any event either been or ought to have been raised before Mr Justice Shepherdson. Each gave reasons which I have perused. Mr Mc Groarty, who appeared for the applicant, read the originating summons filed 26 March 1998 and by leave the affidavit of Christopher John Nyst sworn 30 March 1998. Ms D Weir who appeared for the Director of Prosecutions, read by leave the affidavit of Ken John -- 2 of 17 -- 2 Spinaze, sworn 31 March 1998 to which there were several exhibits, including a lengthy statement by one Daniel James Fitzgerald dated 1 March 1998. It was accepted by both counsel that in these circumstances the onus is on the applicant to show additional facts amounting to a change of circumstances as the threshold point before the application can be revisited. This is because it has been held that unless there are sufficient additional facts, any further application would be fruitless for that reason alone: R. v. Edwards (1988) 35 ACrim.R.465. It is abundantly clear, however, as Mr Groarty acknowledged, that even if there are some additional facts amounting to a change of circumstances, it does not follow that bail will automatically be granted. All that results from a relevant change of circumstances is that the question of bail may then be revisited. The provisions of the Bail Act must still be adhered to, as well as the considerations referred to by Mr MacGroarty in the decision of Cross J in R. v. Wakefield (1969) 89 W.N. (Part 1) N.S.W. 325, where His Honour set out the various factors to be taken into account in the balancing exercise which the Court must then undertake. I have carefully considered that decision. It should also be observed that whilst both counsel, and in particular Ms Weir, initially contended that the threshold question should be considered first without recourse to the past material, both subsequently accepted that the Court is entitled to look at any relevant past material. It is difficult to see how the Court can consider whether there are now changed circumstances, unless the Court is aware of what were the relevant circumstances at the time when bail was previously refused. I regard this as essential, as well as providing a better understanding generally of the matters relevant to this application. Both parties in fact read extensive past affidavits. I have considered the past material. -- 3 of 17 -- 3 Whilst the ultimate onus is on the applicant to show additional facts amounting to changed circumstances sufficient to justifY the revisiting of question of bail, it should also be observed that this does not mean that the Crown may not also show additional facts which can be taken into account in the ultimate decision of whether additional facts are sufficient for that purpose. For example, there is no bar on the Crown seeking, if it wishes, to adduce evidence which negates or neutralises the additional facts sought to be established by an applicant. This is merely an evidentiary matter. It does not throw the ultimate onus on the Crown, which Ms Weir seemed to have thought might be the consequence of the Court considering the additional material read by the Crown, on this threshold question. Mr MacGroarty submitted that there were changed circumstances such that the question of bail should be revisited, following the marks ofDowsett J on 12 February 1998. His Honour declined to then revisit the matter and refused bail. At pp.4-5 of His Honour's reasons, the following appears:- "I note, however, with some concern that since the matter was before Mr Justice Shepherdson, the Crown has not been able to proceed at the committal proceedings in accordance with the original arrangements. The material indicates that at the moment committal proceedings are to take place in March of this year . .tv1R FIELD: I can assist the Court, Your Honour. I have the conduct and carriage of the matter for the Crown, the substantive matter. I will be appearing for the Crown at the committal. It will commence, as Your Honour indicated, on 9 and 10 March. As a matter of caution my learned friend and I are considering approaching the Court for another three days to be allocated to it, but it will commence on 9 March, that's my understanding - sorry 19th and 20th, I beg Your Honour ... HIS HONOUR: Well, I think it should be recorded that the matter has been dealt with on this occasion upon the basis that the committal will commence at that time, and if the Crown again is unable to proceed, that may well be a change of circumstances which might justify the revisiting of the application for bail." -- 4 of 17 -- 4 It will immediately be observed that His Honour's comments simply raised the possibility that such a change of circumstances might justify the revisiting of the application. His Honour did not conclude that it would be so. Nor did His Honour indicate whether or not bail would be granted even ifthere were such a change of circumstances. If the Court now comes to the view that there is a relevant change of circumstances, this Court may then revisit the application and decide whether bail should be granted. Mr MacGroarty submitted that at the time when the matter came before His Honour, there were only three charges preferred against the applicant. These are the first three of 12 charges now appearing in ex.KJS 1 to the affidavit ofMr Spinaze. At that time, the committal was due to commence on 19 March 1998 and continue on 20 March 1998. Mr Field said that he and the applicant's legal advisers intended as a matter of caution to approach the Court for another three days. The material indicates that the prosecution had informed the defence prior to 19 March 1998 that more charges would be preferred Mr Nyst in his affidavit file on 12 February 1998 (which was before Dowsett J), stated that he received instructions from the applicant on 14 January 1998. The applicant told him of the three charges he was then facing. Mr Nyst then stated that the applicant was arrested on 3 December 1997 and charged with Charge No 1. The material shows that he was arrested at the Brisbane Airport when about to embark on a trip to Singapore. He had a return air ticket in his possession. On that day he appeared in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane and was remanded on bail without a surety to appear in the Magistrates Court on 4 December 1997 when he was remanded for committal mention on 2 February 1998. He applied to the Magistrates Court for an extension of bail which was refused. As indicated, his bail application to this Court had been refused by Shepherdson J on 9 December 1997. Mr Nyst stated that Shepherdson J was then told -- 5 of 17 -- 5 that the police anticipated laying 13 further charges involving millions of dollars (para 2(e)). Dowsett J was therefore aware of that possibility on 12 February 1998. Mr Nyst said that on 16 December 1997, the matter was transferred to the Magistrates Court at Southport. The applicant was remanded for mention on the charge in Count 1 on 22 December 1997. He made no application for bail and was remanded in custody. On 22 December 1997 he appeared in the Magistrates Court at Southport for mention on the one charge and on that date he was charged with charges 2 and 3. There was again no application for bail. All three charges were listed for urgent hearing of committal proceedings in the Magistrates Court at Southport on 22 January 1998. He was remanded in custody to appear in the Court at Southport on that date. According to Mr Nyst, the Director of Public Prosecutions on 23 December 1997 made application to the Magistrates Court to vacate the committal hearing on the ground that the prosecution would not be in a position to proceed on 22 January 1998. The prosecutor told the Court that there were approximately 30 witnesses in respect of charge number 1 alone. The application was granted and the matter was listed to proceed to hearing of committal proceedings on 19 March 1998 at which time the prosecution anticipated that it would be in a position to proceed. The matter was listed for two days hearing. There was no application for bail and the applicant was remanded in custody. On 28 January 1998, Mr Nyst said he telephoned Mr Field who had the conduct of the prosecution. He advised Mr Nyst that he had not received a brief of evidence from the police but now believed that the prosecution would be proceeding with only three charges. He did not know the number of witnesses. Mr Nyst in his affidavit then stated his instructions that the applicant intended to defend all charges and that it would be possible that the proceedings would not be completed in two days -- 6 of 17 -- 6 which had been allocated, particularly ifthere were to be called 30 witnesses in respect of charge 1 alone. He said from his experience that there was currently a two month delay in attaining a date for hearing at Southport and that he was of the opinion that the committal proceedings would take at least several days more than time currently allotted. He said that it was then unlikely that several more days would become available within three months of the adjourned date. Mr MacGroarty relies upon that affidavit which was then before His Honour, Dowsett J, as the basis on which His Honour made the above quoted comments. As indicated, His Honour was . aware of the possibility of additional charges and of the fact that the committal would take longer than the two dates allocated on 19 and 20 March 1998. In Mr Nyst's further affidavit sworn 30 March 1998, he stated that he appeared on 19 and 20 March 1998 on behalf of the applicant. The Magistrate was unable to commence until midday on 19 March due to other commitments, with another late start for similar reasons on 20 March 1998. This was no fault of either the prosecution or the defence. The principal police witness was examined in part only. After lunch on 20 March 1998, nine new charges were laid by the prosecution. Proceedings were adjourned early at 3. OOpm because the applicant had to be transported back to the prison. No other evidence was given. Mr Nyst reaffirmed that he had been told prior to the hearing on 19 March 1998 that further charges would be preferred. Mr Nyst has sworn that the issues are factually complex. The prosecution is also of the same view. The matter had been under investigation since August 1997. At the end of proceedings on 20 March 1998, the Magistrate requested a chart to facilitate his understanding of the charges. On 19 and 20 March 1998, during the evidence of Detective Cameron, he referred to several additional witnesses over and above the initial 27. He could not say how many additional witnesses would be called, but at least 20 more. -- 7 of 17 -- 7 Prior to the commencement of the committal on 19 March, Mr Nyst had tentatively arranged to have the continued proceedings pencilled in on 7, 8, 9, 28, 29 and 30 April 1998. The Magistrate subsequently said that he could not deal with the matter then and offered two weeks commencing 1 June 1998. An application for bail was declined by the Magistrate on the basis that two previous applications to this Court had been declined. Mr Nyst referred to cross-examination of Detective Cameron 19 and 20 March in which Detective Cameron said that in about August 1997 the Surfers Paradise Criminal Investigation Branch received two complaints against the applicant. They were investigated during the period August 1997 to March 1998. One of those complaints formed the basis of one of the new charges against the applicant. The other complaint has not formed the basis of any charge. On or about 7 November 1998, Detective Cameron executed a search warrant on Barwicks Wisewoulds Lawyers who had acted as stakeholder in relation to money lending transactions conducted by Mr Botha. A number of files were seized. The police reviewed the files and obtained the names of 50 people who dealt with Mr Botha in relation to money lending transactions. Allofthose transactions concerned borrowings in the multi-millions of dollars. Mr Nyst said that having received the names of approximately 50 persons who had thus transacted with Mr Botha, police sent letters to each of those persons advising that Mr Botha was being investigated for fraud. Detective Cameron agreed that the effect although not the purpose of each of those facsimile transactions was to invite the addressees to make a complaint of criminal fraud against Mr Botha. On 3 December 1997 the police executed a search warrant on Mr Botha's residence and a large number ofMr Botha's files were seized during that search. A total of 126 names were obtained in all by police as being corporate or other persons who had effected money lending -- 8 of 17 -- 8 transactions through Mr Botha. Each of those transactions concerned loans in the multi-million of dollars. Police subsequently sent to each of the 126 persons who had transacted with Mr Botha, a letter which did not name him, but Mr Cameron said that the letters effectively invited each of the addressees to make a complaint of criminal fraud. Of the total of 126 letters sent by police to various persons, false pretences or misappropriation charges were ultimately laid in respect of a total of 10 complaints. According to the evidence of Detective Cameron, each of the complainants was a person who had been unable or unwilling to provide any collatenil for the multi-million dollar loan sought. Mr Nyst states that from his experience, the committal proceedings are likely to take a further two to three weeks following which there will be significant argument on law in conclusion of the hearing on the first three charges at least. He states that preparation for the resumption of the hearing will require the applicant to have exhaustive contact with his legal advisers in dealing with the complex factual matters and will also require extensive perusal by him of a vast quantity of documents in conjunction with his legal advisers in order to be able to give detailed and adequate instructions. He states that the applicant's incarceration will undoubtedly hamper to a significant extent, adequate preparation. Mr Nyst also stated that on the first three charges, if the applicant is committed for trail, he will seeks to have the various charges against him tried separately and that there are grounds to expect that such an application might be successful. Given that the applicant's committal proceedings will not proceed until early June, it was his opinion based on his understanding of the present workload of the Southport District Court in its criminal jurisdiction, that the applicant's first trial is unlikely to commence before November 1998, and that any subsequent trial would not commence before early 1999. -- 9 of 17 -- 9 As Dowsett J pointed out, the application before him was dealt with on the basis that the matter would proceed to committal on 19 and 20 March 1998. At that time only three charges had been laid, but His Honour and the defence were aware that further charges would be laid and that the committal would in all probability take longer. Nothing appears from His Honour's reasons that he necessarily expected that the committal would be finished on those two days. The committal in fact commenced although not for the full time and there were an additional nine charges laid. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the foregoing represents changed circumstances confronting the applicant as a result of the additional charges and the considerably longer time now needed for the committal (and ultimate trials if any), with respect to all ofthose 12 charges. There is also the offer by the applicant to give a security in the sum of $100,000 although Mr MacGroarty mentioned that there was an offer to give security in the sum of $50,000 to $100,000 previously. In these circumstances, there is a relevant change of circumstances such that the application can be revisited. This means that I am entitled to take into account all of the material on previous applications as well as the additional material advanced on this application, including the various factors submitted by Mr MacGroarty that had already been placed before the Court on previous occasions, viz. that his wife and their children would surrender their passports, that he would report seven days per week, that his health was not good such that service in custody would be detrimental to him, and various other factors in answer to allegations advanced against him by the prosecution. These were of course, as Ms Weir pointed out, taken into account on the earlier occasions, but for reasons already given, may now be taken into account by me on the current application. As Cross pointed out in R v. Wakefield, (as indeed did Shepherdson J in His Honour's reasons), a person is prima facie entitled to bail having regard to the public interest in the right -- 10 of 17 -- 10 of any person to have his case presented in the fairest possible circumstances. It is desirable that the preparation of the defence be allowed to take place in circumstances of approximate parity with those in which the prosecution is prepared and in this way it is desirable that the legal advisers of the applicant have ready access to him for interviews, consideration of documents, and the giving of instructions. Cross J's comments at 327 appear to have been referring to a case where an accused person has been committed for trial or for sentence. However, it was not submitted that similar considerations do not apply in the case of a preparation for a committal hearing. His Honour refers to other considerations viz that regrettably persons often fail without valid excuse to answer their bail and that it is in the public interest that persons alleged by the law enforcement representatives of Australia to be wrongdoers be arraigned before properly constituted courts; and further, that alleged wrong doers be not encouraged to flee or encouraged to the view that society does not greatly care whether they flee or not. On the other hand, it is in the public interest that proceedings take place promptly. It is therefore not in the public interest that the proceedings be delayed by the failure of the accused to answer his bail. A further consideration referred to at 327 is that it is not in the public interest that that the time of police officers be wasted and other moneys spent in pursuit of a fugitive. This may involve amongst other things, costly extradition proceedings interstate or overseas, assuming that the person involved can be traced and apprehended. It is of course not overlooked that Mr MacGroarty has submitted that the applicant has stated that he has no intention whatsoever of absconding and proposes to vigorously defend all of the charges. Cross J refers to the above considerations as the initial "issue" but rightly points out that this is not the sole issue. His Honour said that on the first "issue", it would seem that bail should be granted to enable the accused's case the more thoroughly to be prepared and thus presented -- 11 of 17 -- 11 unless the evidence indicates that there is a reasonable degree of risk that the accused will not answer to his bail. His Honour went on to say that on this issue there is a presumption in favour of granting bail, the onus being on the Crown to establish that there is a reasonable degree of risk that the accused if allowed bail would fail to answer it. This need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Court must be affirmatively satisfied that there is at least a degree of risk that the accused will fail to answer his bail and that the degree is such that the considerations which arise when an accused flees, outweigh the consideration that it is desirable that an accused's case be prepared in the best possible circumstances. Of importance is the fact that the applicant has no previous criminal history at all. He lives in a home on the Gold Coast with his wife and three children and has been living there for some three or four years. His children go to school and there are affidavits from the School Principal and Ministers of Religion which speak highly of him, and other affidavits referred to by Mr MacGroarty which explain and rebut, at least in part, some of the Crown's allegations against him. An important consideration is the gravity of the alleged offences and the probability or improbability of conviction. Ten of the twelve offences may be broadly described as fraud charges, i.e. obtaining money by wilfully false promise or false pretences or by misappropriation. Two of the twelve charges are for alleged breach of provisions of the Financial Transactions Reports Act 1998, namely opening and operating an account in a false name. In general terms, the ten fraud charges allege that the applicant induced various persons or companies to pay up front either to him or to his nominee, various sums of money, which has been referred to in other jurisdictions as "advanced fee fraud". The several sums alleged to have been paid over to the applicant or to his nominee exceed US$1.5 million, which is considerably more in Australian dollars. The prosecution alleges that the appellant induced ten persons or -- 12 of 17 -- 12 companies to pay those fees as an up front brokerage fee in return for a promise to provide them with overseas loans from legitimate overseas banks, the allegation being that the alleged overseas banks were not in fact legitimate banks. The loans never materialised. It was said that this was because the persons involved did not provide collateral security. It cannot be said that these charges are other than very serious. If the evidence available at the prosecution substantiates the allegations referred to in the material, there is a probability of conviction, but this of course is subject to any questions the applicant might raise. There is reference to civil litigation in the material, and whether or not there is criminal liability will depend on what was the precise arrangements, if any, between the applicant and the various complainants. Whether the charges are sustained is an entirely different matter, which I do not have to resolve. Nor is it my role to decide any questions of credibility. The material also shows that the appellant has carried on a similar type of international money lending operation in several other countries. It has apparently been conducted on a large scale. He has sworn that he has never been convicted of any offence in any country, but the Crown alleges that from information available to it from Interpol and other sources from various countries, which appear in the material, the applicant frequently moved from country to country when trouble brewed so that prosecuting authorities could not proceed against him for jurisdictional or other reasons. The material also suggests that he has been under investigation for money laundering and investment fraud in various countries including the United States. As Shepherdson J pointed out, the applicant is a frequent user of international plane flights. His Honour also pointed out that the applicant and his wife and children had visas to travel to Mexico in January 1988 although as Mr MacGroarty pointed out, the appellant alleges that this was to be a family holiday because of the lack oftime to obtain visas into the United States, where they had proposed to have a holiday. Mr MacGroarty pointed to the affidavit of Julie Anna Lee -- 13 of 17 -- 13 Strutton, travel agent, filed 12 February 1998, which explained her extensive dealings with the applicant regarding holiday travel and other travel by the applicant and his family throughout Australia and overseas. There is also information available to the prosecution of statements attributed to the applicant's wife that the applicant and his family were to leave Australia in January 1998 to live in the United States. The statement by Daniel James Fitzgerald of 1 March 1998 indicates that he was introduced to the applicant by his younger brother towards the end of 1996 the beginning of 1997. His brother was friendly with the applicant's daughter at that time. In Mayor June 1997, he states that the applicant invited him to come to his house for a meeting. At that meeting the applicant suggested that Fitzgerald work for him. The appellant mentioned that he was involved in the procuring of off-shore loans and investment banking. The applicant gave Fitzgerald some loan application forms and told him to study them in about July 1997. In about July 1997 or early August 1997, the applicant told Fitzgerald that he wished to advertise to attract prospective customers. Fitzgerald did this on behalf of the applicant. The advertisement ran for eight weeks. It was published again in September to November 1997. Many expressions of interest from prospective purchasers were received and Fitzgerald faxed them loan application forms. After a completed loan application form was received, Fitzgerald gave them to the applicant's wife who by computer, drafted a letter of offer he said, before any credit check was made. Fitzgerald also stated that the applicant told him that a person named Hamlyn was looking after his bank accounts and was moving money through the accounts for him, as well as looking after other documentation. Fitzgerald said that the applicant told him that he had some US$200M in various overseas accounts, and that when he was at the applicant's house he saw 25 US$lM Treasury Notes in the top drawer of a desk in his office. The applicant told Fitzgerald that one -- 14 of 17 -- 14 Robert Chuah, Anthony Chin or one Imdad could bring him US$lM in cash at the drop of a hat. Even if those statements were made by the applicant to Foster it is another question whether they were in fact true. At most they might show that the applicant had at his ready command large sums of money. Fitzgerald also said that during meetings with the applicant, the applicant showed him numerous fake drivers' licenses. They had his photograph on them but were in someone else's name. With each driver's license there was a credit card in the same name as the driver's license. He said that on one occasion at a restaurant the applicant showed him his wallet where he noted that all credit cards were either in the name of Nichola as Johannes Botha or John Carlos Barcley. There is some evidence in a similar vein on an earlier application regarding a false passport in the name of Nicola as Barclay which had a photograph of the applicant in it. This is contained in the affidavit of Randy Alan Kamps filed on 9 December 1997. He said it was stated as having been issued in Panama. The appellant has denied that he has ever had any false driver's licenses or false passports. Mr Fitzgerald also stated that during one of the meetings later in the year, 1997, the applicant told him that no client had ever received their loan funds. On inquiry, he said he was told that no client had offered sufficient collateral. Whether this involves criminal activity is, of course, a matter for trial. The applicant contends that any disputes he had with any persons with whom he dealt were civil disputes only. Fitzgerald also stated that on several occasions, most recently just prior to his arrest, the applicant requested him to erase his hard drive for him in his computer. He said that this was so the police would not see the information that was recorded in the computer. There was a change of mind and the applicant asked him to down load the information onto floppy discs for the applicant's wife to hide. -- 15 of 17 -- 15 On one occasion, Fitzgerald said he overheard the applicant speak to Robert Chuah with the phone on speaker. The applicant requested Thuah to organise letters of reference for him stating that clients were happy with his services. In paragraph 8 of his statement, Fitzgerald states that shortly before the applicant's arrest, the applicant told him that one Mario was going to meet him in Singapore with Mexican passports for the whole family to get into the United States. The new family name was going to be Grobe1aar and his wife's maiden name was going to be Rudaman. Fitzgerald said that he was informed by his brother, Richard that on 12 and 13 January 1998, the applicant's daughter had withdrawn AUS$135,000 in cash from the bank. He also states in paragraph 30 that he recalled that after the applicant was arrested, he overheard the applicant's wife discussing with Robert Chuah how to get the applicant out of Australia with a fake identification once bail was granted. Fitzgerald also said that on one occasion in the course of a search for a shirt, he observed a cheque book, credit cards and several items of identification belonging to Mr John Carlos Barcley. One of those items was a Panama passport that had the applicant's photograph on it. He said there was also a birth certificate for John Carlos Barcley. This of course does not coincide with Kamps's statement that he saw a passport in the name of Nicola as Barclay with the applicant's photograph in it. Fitzgerald said that he removed a cheque from the cheque book and handed that cheque to the investigating police officer, Detective Cameron. Fitzgerald identified the photocopy of a Panama passport, birth certificate and another document all bearing the name ofJohn Carlos Barcley as the same documents as he saw at the applicant's house. These are in the possession of the police. The foregoing statement by Fitzgerald is of course just that. Whether what he says is true or not is quite another matter. As indicated, it is not a matter for me on this application to attempt any resolution on questions of credit. Nevertheless, on an application ofthis kind, it is -- 16 of 17 -- 16 material available to the prosecution, in addition to the extensive material already available to it from overseas countries suggesting ready movement of the applicant from one country to another when his activities attracted attention. I am fully minded that the applicant has denied wrong doing of any kind in any country and in particular in Australia. He has made references to civil actions and asserts that he is not guilty of any criminal activity whatsoever. This will depend on the outcome of proceedings against him. I have concerns about the possible length oftime during which the applicant would remain in custody and before he is ultimately brought to trail, assuming he is committed for trial following the initial hearing in the Magistrates Court. Of considerable importance also is the obvious necessary preparation of his defence. I have given anxious consideration to all of the other factors advanced by Mr MacGroarty on the applicant's behalf and have considered all of the material and submissions. Likewise I have given serious consideration to the submissions by Ms Weir on behalf of the Crown. As indicated, matters of credit do not enter into the current application. Having carefully considered all of the material, the submissions and the competing considerations referred to in R v. Wakefield, and having balanced the various considerations therein referred to, I have concluded that there is a substantial degree of risk that the accused will not answer to his bail, notwithstanding his personal circumstances and notwithstanding the conditions to which it is said he would agree. In my opinion this risk outweighs the other considerations referred to. The prosecution should proceed as expeditiously as possible. In the result, the application is refused. -- 17 of 17 --