Dalagold Pty Ltd v Director-General, Department of Tourism, Small Business & Industry [1998] QSC 45 [1999] 2 Qd R 126

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND Brisbane No. 3298 of 1997 No. 4794 of 1997 Before the Hon. Mr Justice Lee [Dalagold Pty Ltd v. Chief Executive of the Department of Tourism, Small Business and Industry & Anor] BETWEEN: AND: AND: DALAGOLD PTY LTD THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM, SMALL BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY Applicant First Respondent MAROOCHYTAVERNPTYLTD,CRO~AD WELROWL PTY LTD AND COLD SPRING INVESTMENTS PTY LTD Second Respondents REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - LEE J. Judgment delivered 2 April 1998 CATCHWORDS: LIQUOR - Liquor Act 1992 s.59(1)(d) - Liquor Regulation 1992 s. 6C(1)(c)(i) - "approved premises" - "main licensed premises" - "5 kilometres by road from" - s.37 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 Counsel: Solicitors: Hearing date: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - Liquor Regulation 1992 s.6C(1)( c)(i) - "from" - s.14A, 14B Acts Interpretation Act 1954 - when applicable - purposive approach - absurdity or irrational result - s.37 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 - "applying an Act" - Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v. F C ofT (1981) 147 c.L.R. 297 - Kelsey v. Hill [1995] 1 Qd.R.182 - Newcastle City Council v. GIO Ltd (1997) 72 ALJR 97. WORDS AND PHRASES - "from", "by road" - Liquor Act 1992 s.59(1)(d) - Liquor Regulation 1992 s.6C(I)(c)(i) Mr Bain QC and Mr Rackemann for the applicant Mr McLeod for the first respondent Mr Gore QC and Mr Herbert for the second respondents Dunhill Madden Butler for the applicant Crown Law for the first respondent Hopgood and Ganim for the second respondent 24 February 1998. -- 1 of 18 -- IN THE SUPREl\1E COURT OF QUEENSLAND Brisbane Before the Hon. Mr Justice Lee No. 3298 of 1997 No. 4794 of 1997 [Dalagold Pty Ltd v. Chief Executive of the Department of Tourism, Small Business and Industry & Anor] BETWEEN: AND: AND: DALAGOLD PTY LTD THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEP ARTl\1ENT OF TOURISM, SMALL BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY (Applicant) (First Respondent) MAROOCHYTAVERNPTYLTD,CRO~AD WELROWL PTY LTD AND COLD SPRING INVESTl\1ENTS PTY LTD (Second Respondents) REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - LEE J. Judgment delivered 2 April 1998 This is an application by Dalagold Pty Ltd ("Dalagold") for a statutory order of review of two decisions, the first being a decision of the Liquor Appeal Tribunal on 17 March 1997 (the "LAT decision") and the sec,?nd a decision of the Chief Executive of the Department of Tourism, Small Business and Industry on 23 May 1997 (the "Chief Executive's decision"). The two decisions were originally the subject of two separate applications, No. 3298 of 1997 and No. 4794 of 1997 respectively. On 13 June 1997, Fryberg J made an order in chambers that the applications be heard together and that the evidence in one be the evidence in another. When the matter was argued before me the Chief Executive was the first respondent and -- 2 of 18 -- 2 Maroochy Tavern Pty Ltd., Crownhead Pty Ltd, Welrowl Pty Ltd and Cold SpringInvestments Pty Ltd (hereinafter referred to as·"Maroochy Tavern") was the second respondent. The overall effect of the LAT decision and the Chief Executive's decision was the granting of approval for a detached bottle shop to Maroochy Tavern. Dalagold seeks an order: 1. quashing or setting aside the LAT and Chief Executive's decisions. 2. that Maroochy Tavern's application contravenes section 6C(1)(c)(i) of the Liquor Regulation 1992 and may not be lawfully approved by the Chief Executive; and 3. that the Chief Executive decide Dalagold's application for a detached bottle shop according to raw or, alternatively an order declaring that Dalagold is entitled to have its application approved. In addition to the lengthy oral submissions, over 4 hours in Chambers, there are three helpful outlines. Those by Mr Bain QC and Mr Rackemann, who appeared for Dalagold are marked A. Those by Mr Gore QC and Mr Herbert, who appeared for Maroochy Tavern are marked B. Those by Mr McLeod, who appeared for the Chief Executive are marked C. These will be placed with the papers. Outline C is a helpful chronology and factual background referred to below. The Chief Executive merely abides the order of the Court and reserves the right to be heard on the question of costs: BACKGROUND By way of background to the applications: 1. On 2 January 1997, Maroochy Tavern applied to the Chief Executive for approval under s.59(1)(d) of the Liquor Act 1992 ("the Act") to operate a detached bottleshop at Shop 1, 716 David Low Way, Pacific Paradise. -- 3 of 18 -- 3 2. The proposed bottleshop was to be operated under the authority of the general licence held by Maroochy Tavern in respect of premises known as "Trader Dukes". 3. On 3 January 1997, Dalagold applied to the Chief Executive for approval under the same section of the Act to operate a bottleshop at Shop 2, 716-718 David Low Way, Pacific Paradise (presumably next door to the site proposed by Maroochy Tavern). This bottleshop was to be operated under the authority of its general licence held in respect of the Sunfair International Resort. 4. On or about 3 January 1997, the Chief Executive decided to postpone a consideration ofDalagold's application pending the determination ofMaroochy Tavern's application. 5. On 5 February 1997 the Chief Executive refused Maroochy Tavern's application. 6. On 6 February 1997 Maroochy Tavern filed a Notice of Appeal to the Liquor Appeals Tribunal in respect of the Chief Executive's decision. 7. On 17 March 1997, the Liquor Appeal Tribunal set aside the decision of the Chief Executive and remitted the matter to the Chief Executive to determine the application in accordance with the Tribunal's findings. 8. On or about 23 May 1997 the Chief Executive granted Maroochy Tavern's application. 9. On the same day the Chief Executive refused Dalagold's application. The nub of the matter revolves around regulation s.6C(1)(c)(i) of the Liquor Regulation 1992 as amended. It states that the Chief Executive may approve premises under s.59(1)(d) of the Liquor Act 1992 only if, inter alia; -- 4 of 18 -- 4 "(a) the applicant is the licensee of licensed premised (the "main licensed premises"); and (b) the applicant has no more than 2 approved premises for the main licensed premises; and (c) the proposed approved premises - (i) (ii) are no more than 5 km by road from the main licensed premises; and " It was not in dispute that regulation 6C(2) had no relevance to the current matter. The "main licensed premises" are, in this case, those ofMaroochy Tavern (known as "Trader Dukes"). Section 59(1)(d) of the Liquor Act authorises the licensee to sell liquor on premises for consumption off the premises (i.e. from a bottleshop) so long as the Chief Executive approves the premises. The grounds for approval are contained in s.6(C)(1) ofthe Liquor Regulation 1992, the 5 km stipulation mentioned above being one of the mandatory prerequisites for approval. The key issue in this application is whether Maroochy Tavern's proposed bottleshop at Shop 1, 716 David Low Way is no more than 5 km by roadjrom Maroochy Tavern's main licensed premises (Trader Dukes) at Denna Street, Maroochydore. The words "by road from" are italicised because their meaning is in dispute for the reason that the distance between the two sites measured along the most direct road route travelling from Trader Dukes north to the bottleshop is 5.5 km. Travelling south in the reverse direction the distance is some 4.4 km. The disparity is caused by a large clover leaf shaped on-ramp that must be negotiated when travelling from south to north. To gain entry onto the motorway to head north to the bottleshop site one must travel south for a short way before looping back onto the northbound lane and must also proceed left around a loop at the northern end, across the river. It must be mentioned that if a pedestrian walks the entire distance on a footway designed for pedestrians and along the footpath, the distance is also approximately 5.5km. -- 5 of 18 -- 5 Coming from the other direction, from the north, a vehicle simply moves to the left on to the motorway at the northern end and at the southern end, merely exits to the left on an offramp which curls around to a roundabout in the near vicinity of Trader Dukes entrance way. The on-ramp is the cause of the 1.1 km disparity depending on the direction of travel. There is an aerial photo attached to this judgment which illustrates the reason for the discrepancy in distances. The road was in that form well prior to the construction ofMaroochy Tavern premises, which was constructed on the excavated area, as the aerial photo shows. The motorway runs in a northerly direction from left to right in the aerial photograph across the Maroochy River. In light of the different distances, the need to precisely ascertain the meaning of "from" in s.6C(1)(c)(i) becomes obvious. Dalagold contends that "from" shows that Parliament's intention was that the distance between premises was to be measured starting from the practical access to the licensed premises moving to the proposed bottleshop. In other words, the use of "from" dictates a uni-directional approach to measurement; starting from a fixed measuring point at the licensed premises and moving away towards the proposed site. Maroochy Tavern, on the other hand, argues that an applicant meets the criteria of s.6C(1)(c)(i) if the proposed bottleshop is within the shortest direct route less than 5 km long, regardless of direction of travel. They do so on the basis of a submitted purposive interpretation of the legislation and certain anomalies they say are created by Dalagold's interpretation of the section. More will be said about this shortly. The meaning of the rest of the phrase "by road from", namely "by road" is also disputed. The reason for this is that Maroochy Tavern suggests that even if their contended interpretation for "from" is rejected, they still scrape in under the 5 km limit on the basis of two hypothetical scenarios. The first scenario involves a pedestrian walking from the main licensed premises up a pedestrian ramp and onto a decidedly undeveloped path through the grass and onto the -- 6 of 18 -- 6 motorway. A parked car waits for the pedestrian oli the motorway and the journey to the bottleshop is completed by car in a total distance of 4.79 km. The other scenario is by the use of a motor scooter that travels some way by road, then is wheeled up the pedestrian ramp referred to above and across the same grassy path and onto the motorway. At this point the traveller mounts the scooter and travels the remaining distance to the north along the motorway. The total distance travelled is 4.88 km. The purpose of both of these routes is to avoid the long clover leaf on-ramp. To meet the prerequisite imposed by s.6C(1)(c)(i), the route contended for by Maroochy Tavern in each of those scenarios must be capable of categorisation as "by road". Dalagold argued that - i) it does not and that the traveller trespasses when moving between the pedestrian ramp and the motorway ii) the traveller is in breach of the traffic rules in relation to the motorway as soon as he or she steps from the informal path onto the motorway (the relevant by-laws are addressed below); and iii) the term "road", where it involves the motorway, does not have the wider meaning ascribed to that term by the Traffic Act or other acts such as the Main Roads Act, nor does it include the pedestrian ramp and the undeveloped path leading up to the motorway. The term "road" in those Acts includes a road reserve, not just the actual carriageway, whereas the motorway established by special legislation, is simply built on Crown grants for that purpose and is elevated. The need to interpret the phrase "by road" is only necessary if the word "from" is given the uni-directional nature argued by Dalagold. The distance between the premises, if measured travelling "by road" southwards towards the main licensed premises, is less than 5 km. Thus the -- 7 of 18 -- 7 need to interpret "by road" will not arise if Maroochy Tavern's submission on the meaning of "from" is correct. For this reason this aspect of statutory interpretation will be dealt with first. Dalagold contends that no ambiguity exists as to the meaning of "from"; that it is perfectly plain language that suggests a distance measured in one direction departing from the place immediately following the word "from" to the bottleshop site. Maroochy Tavern, on the other hand, contends that the proper interpretation of s. 6( c)( 1)(c)(i) requires the distance between the two premises to be measured along the shortest road distance. For this to be correct it must be the case, and Maroochy Tavern contends, that "from" in the subsection means "apart relative to ... ". So it is argued that 'from' is concerned with the distance between points, and not the prescription of the method of measurement. It is said that the fact that the mode of travel "by road" is not prescribed supports the argument that the direction of travel is not a key consideration. Maroochy Tavern also argued that the direction the word "from" indicates depends on the location at which the word is used. For example, when a passenger in a car driving to home in Brisbane asks the driver "How far are we from home?", it is perfectly correct for the driver to answer in terms of the number of kilometres left to travel from the current position in the direction of home. The answer is different if the car is travelling in the other direction away from home. In this case, the answer is in terms of the number of kilometres travelled in a direction away from home, perhaps determined by the odometer. In most cases the answer will be approximately the same if the question is asked at the same point along the road, because most roads carry traffic in both directions side by side. This, unfortunately, is not the case here where there is a substantial difference in distance travelled depending on the direction of travel. In such a case the answer to the hypothetical question "how far are we from home", and thus the meaning of the word "from" in that phrase, depends on the direction of travel. -- 8 of 18 -- 8 The best place to start for the meaning of "from" is in the Oxford dictionary: The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "from" as: "1. Denoting departure or moving away: indicating a starting point ... 2. Indicating a place or object which is left at a distance, behind, or on one side, by an objectwhich withdraws or turns away." The Macquarie Dictionary (2nd ed.) defines "from" as a: "particle specifying a starting point, and hence used to express removal or separation in, ... , space etc." Both dictionary definitions show that "from" contemplates a starting point from which something moves away or is situated away from in space. In light of this there seems to be little ambiguity in the meaning of subsection 6C( 1)(c)(i). In that context, "from" indicates the starting point ofthe main licensed premises. On its face the legislation appears to prescribe an eminently simple method of approving a proposed bottleshop. An applicant for approved premises simply drives, or rides or walks (so long as the means of travel allows measurement of the distance travelled) away from the main licensed premises to the proposed site. If the distance travelled is less than 5 km then the prerequisite in subsection 6C( 1)(c)(i) is satisfied. This approach accords with both the first and second aspect of the meaning given to "from" in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary. It suggests a starting point which is left behind by an object that withdraws. The method of measurement outlined above has, in fact, been adopted by the Liquor Licensing Division as Guideline number 17 which states that in measuring the distance between the main licensed premises and the proposed site, the initial measurement should be undertaken at a point on the road which is directly in line with the edge of the main licensed premises which is closest to the proposed site. (see the Statement of Reasons of the Executive Director, Liquor Licensing, contained in the Appeal Book which is exhibit 1 to the affidavit of Darrell Frederick Jardine filed 2 December 1997). -- 9 of 18 -- 9 Mr Gore QC submitted on behalf ofMaroochy Tavern that "from" meant something akin to "between" - a prescription of distance with no indication as to the direction of measurement. This was based on the use of the word "from" indicated by the previous example of a car travelling towards or away from home, together with his submission on the purpose of the Liquor Act 1992. There is no doubt that the function of this court is to give effect to the will of Parliament as expressed in the law. The exercise of statutory interpretation can never be anything other than ascertaining the meaning of what Parliament intended and this is primarily derived from what Parliament said. The starting point must always be the assumption that the words used mean what they say, and also that the legislation said everything it wanted to say. The fundamental object, then, of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intention by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole. I adopt, with respect, the statement of Gibbs CJ in Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v. F C ofT(l981) 147 C.L.R. 297 at 304,305 where he said "if, when the section in question is read as part of the whole instrument, its meaning is clear and unambiguous, generally speaking nothing remains but to give effect to the unqualified words" His Honour also said: "There are cases where the result of giving words their ordinary meaning may be so irrational that the court is forced to the conclusion that the draftsman has made a mistake, and the canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution in such a cases." In the same case Wilson J and Mason J (as he then was) said: "but there are cases in which inconvenience of result or improbability of result assists the court in concluding that an alternative construction, which is reasonably open, is to be preferred to the literal meaning because the alternative interpretation more closely conforms to the legislative intent discernible from other provisions in the statute." -- 10 of 18 -- 10 Thus an absurdity or irrational result· must flow from the plain meaning of subsection 6C(1)(c)(i) before the court can examine extrinsic materials pursuant to sub-section 14B(I) of the Acts Interpretation Act to determine if Parliament intended another meaning in light of the purpose of the Liquor Act 1992. Dawson J's dissenting opinion in Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v. F C ofT (supra), whilst not binding in the present case, should be noted. His Honour was of the opinion that s.35 of the Interpretation oj Legislation Act (Vic), which is the equivalent of s.14A(I) of our Acts Interpretation Act, needed no ambiguity or inconsistency before a purposive approach is adopted. His Honour argued that the section allows the court to consider the purpose of an Act in determining whether there is more than one possible construction. However, that is not the approached endorsed by the Court of Appeal in this state. See Kelsey v. Hill [1995] 1 Qd.R. 182 at 185. McHugh J recently restated this position in Newcastle City Council v. GIO. General Ltd (1997) 72 ALJR 97 at 112 where he said: "Section 15AB permits a liberal use of many forms of extrinsic material. But the section has its limits. Recourse to extrinsic material under a s.15AB is legitimate only if s.40 of the Act is 'ambiguous or obscure', for it cannot be said that the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of that section is 'manifestly absurd or is unreasonable'. Moreover, under s.15AB the ambiguity must arise from the words themselves before recourse to the extrinsic material is permitted, ... " Even if it was permissible to look at Hansard in the present case, as I have done, it does not help to determine the question in the way contended for by Maroochy Tavern. I fail to see how it can be said that an absurdity or irrational result flows from the application of the correct English meaning of "from" in the subsection. Parliament is free to use whatever means it sees fit to place geographic limits on the placement of detached bottle shops. The means in the regulations is a 5 km distance by road measured from the main licensed . -- 11 of 18 -- 11 preIll1ses. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the main licensed premises is the centre point of a number of detached bottle shops (up to a maximum of three) which radiate outwards up to a 5 kilometre limit. The notion of a centre point supports the concept of a starting point from which the distance is measured to each detached bottle shop for which approval may be given to a licensee of the "main licensed premises"; in this case Maroochy Tavem's premises (Trader Dukes). Mr Gore QC pointed to the hypothetical situation whereby, due to differences in distance depending on the direction travelled, licensed premises A might establish a bottleshop AA immediately adjacent to licensed premises B, but licensed premises B is not able to establish a bottleshop BB adjacent to licensed premises A. This is hypothetical in the extreme. Firstly, it assumes that suitable premises for the bottleshop BB exist immediately adjacent to A and secondly, it assumes that the bottleshop adjacent to licenced premises B (AA) is a permitted use under the relevant local govemment's planning scheme (subsection 6D(l)(a) Liquor Regulation 1992). It would also be most unlikely that an approval would be granted in any such situation. The next point that comes to mind is that, assuming this hypothetical situation eventuated, the result may be somewhat harsh but there is nothing absurd or irrational about it. The Parliament has made a distance by road a prerequisite for a bottleshop, rather than a radial distance. It was no doubt obvious to the draftsman that roads sometimes follow circuitous routes and that some licensed premises will in fact have less distance, and potentially less customers, between the main premises and the bottleshop as a result of particular road networks. Hence it was accepted that a small degree of discrimination was inevitable as a result of adopting the method of measurement by road in subsection 6C(1)(c)(i). Thus the anomaly raised by Mr Gore QC is not an absurdity or irrational, and in fact falls within a degree of discrimination likely to have been contemplated by Parliament. -- 12 of 18 -- 12 In summary, the subsection prescribes a particular method of measuring the distance from the main premises in the direction of the bottleshop. Unless there is some other basis for upholding Maroochy Tavern's submission, Maroochy Tavern is not entitled to rely on the shorter distance between the premises when the direction of travel is reversed to fulfill the requirement of a 5 km or less distance between sites. Maroochy Tavern's frontage to land on which the Sunshine Coast Motorway is built In argument Mr Gore QC also suggested that if the distance measurement commenced at a point on the Sunshine Coast Motorway near where the boundary ofMaroochy Tavern's premises meets the land on which the Sunshine Coast Motorway is situated, then the distance between the sites travelled in a northerly direction is 4.2 km. The attached aerial photograph shows that there is no access to Maroochy Tavern's licensed premises at that point. As indicated above, the motorway or "road" is elevated at some distance from the boundary. To extend the phrase "by road from the licensed premises" to include a departure from a point in no way connected to the main premises would defeat the intention of the legislature. The subsection contemplates a continuous passage by road from the licensed premises. The distance between the indicated point on the motorway and the entrance point to Maroochy Tavern's premises is in the vicinity of some 300 to 400 metres down the exit ramp. It is not sensible to suggest that the journey from the licensed premises might begin some considerable distance away from the only point at which access to the premises can be gained. On this basis there is no need to consider Dalagold's further submission that Maroochy Tavern's premises actually abut a Crown grant on which the elevated motorway is built some distance away, and not the motorway itself, which is the "road". Nor is it necessary to consider the submission that the motorway, the subject of special legislation, is not a "road" in the usual -- 13 of 18 -- 13 sense, where "road" may include the entire road reserve, and is not limited to the actual carriageway of the road. Combination of Modes of Travel Based on the above reasoning, for Maroochy Tavern's bottleshop to satisfy the requirements of the regulations, it must be placed within a distance of 5 kilometres from the practical access to the main licensed premises travelling by road. The distance along the motorway in a northerly direction is 5.5 krn. However, as indicated above, Maroochy Tavern has posed two other scenarios which it is said meet the distance requirement of subsection 6C(I)(c)(i). The first is a trip by a pedestrian who walks from the main premises, up a footpath, onto a rough track and onto the motorway where a car waits to pick up the pedestrian and finish the voyage to the bottleshop. Mr Bain QC argued that such a convoluted trip was not within the contemplation of the Legislature in its prescription of 5 krn "by road". There is some doubt whether the rough track that connects the footpath to the motorway falls within the term "road" as it is defined in a number of Queensland statutes, for example the Main Roads Act and the Traffic Act. In the event, these matters do not require consideration. Travellers on the motorway are governed by by-laws proclaimed in the Queensland Government Gazette, No. 13, 27 January 1990. Section 11 of the Logan Motorway Agreement Act 1987, (No. 39 of 1987) which enabled the construction and operation of the motorway by a private company, authorised the Commissioner of Main Roads to make by-laws regulating the motorway. The Motorway Agreement Act 1987 was repealed by the Transport Infrastructure Amendment (No.2) Act 1994. However, the same amending Act inserted a new paragraph 89A in the Transport Infrastructure Amendment Act 1994, subsection 4 of which preserved the force of the by-laws made under the Logan Motorways Agreement Act 1987. -- 14 of 18 -- 14 By-law 12 states that: "a person shall not stop, park, or stand any vehicle, or cause or permit any vehicle to stop, park or stand within or upon any part of the Motorway except ... " None of the exceptions apply to the first hypothetical situation. Also a pedestrian, entering onto the "road" section of the motorway, and not remaining on the duly authorised pedestrian walkway, would be in breach of by-laws 8(2) and 7 referred to below. As a result I conclude that the combined pedestrian/motor vehicle trip is not within the contemplation of the phrase "by road" in the subsection of the Regulation because the journey includes the unlawful activity of stopping of a car on the motorway and a pedestrian unlawfully being thereon. In relation to the second possibility involving a motor scooter wheeled up the pedestrian ramp and onto the motorway via the undeveloped path, the same problem exists for Maroochy Tavern. Firstly, by wheeling the scooter onto the motorway the person doing so arguably breaches by-law 12, referred to above, by standing a vehicle on the motorway prior to setting off Furthermore, other by-laws also appear to render this scenario unlawful. By-law 8(2) states that: "Unless otherwise specifically approved by the Commissioner a person shall not be within or upon a Motorway unless he is ...... " None ofthe exceptions apply to this scenario. In a similar vein, by-law 7 states that: "Subject to by-law 8 and clause (2) hereof, a person shall not enter upon or be within or upon the Motorway unless he - (a) is a driver of or a passenger in a vehicle within or upon the Motorway and remains within the vehicle whilst within or upon the Motorway; or ... " -- 15 of 18 -- 15 As soon as the rider wheels the motor scooter onto the motorway he or she immediately breaches both by-law 7 and 8. Therefore I must also conclude that this method of travel can not be used in an attempt to satisfy the distance criterion in subsection 6C(1)( c)(i) of the Liquor Regulation. The foregoing conclusion is supported by s.37 of the Acts Interpretation Act, which provides: "Measurement of distance 37. In applying an Act, distance is to be measured along the shortest road ordinarily used for travelling unless there is a contrary intention that distance is to be measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane or in another way." Mr Bain QC initially submitted that as this section only operates "in applying an Act" and it was therefore not relevant. I conclude that it does have some relevance. I am concerned with "applying" s.59(1)(d) of the Liquor Act 1992. The words "ordinarily used for travelling" indicate that the convoluted route referred to in the two scenarios contended for by Maroochy Tavern cannot be said to be ordinarily used for travel by road. On the basis of the interpretation of the word "from" within the abovementioned subsection, namely that its plain meaning in the context of the subsection indicates a directional component in the measurement of the 5 km limit, and the unavailability of any other lawful route, vehicular or pedestrian, from the licensed premises to the detached bottleshop that is less than 5 km in length, I find in favour of the applicant. The Chief Executive's initial decision on 5 February 1997 was therefore correct. The court is unable to grant the alternative order sought in application No.4794 of 1997, namely that the applicant is entitled to have its application approved, because the Chief Executive's approval is dependent on various other factors. I therefore order that:- -- 16 of 18 -- 16 (i) the Chief Executive's decision on 23 May 1997 to approve Maroochy Tavern's application be quashed on the basis that the application contravenes regulation 6C(1)(c)(i) of the Liquor Regulation 1992; and (ii) the Chief Executive reconsider Dalagold's application for a detached bottleshop according to law. I will now hear arguments, if any, as to costs. -- 17 of 18 -- -- 18 of 18 --