Blyth v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources [1998] QLC 33

LAND COURT BRISBANE 13 March 1998 Re: Appeal against Annual Valuation - Valuation of Land Act 1944 - Valuation Roll No: 2996 (V96-463 and AV97-217). Haydon B and Glenys R Blyth v. Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources D E C I S I O N (Hearing at Stanthorpe) Background: This matter relates to a property at Sugarloaf Road, Stanthorpe, and described as Lot 108 (Camping Reserve) on Crown Plan B34363. The land has an area of 29.337 hectares, and is located approximately 15 kms east of the Stanthorpe Post Office. The subject is zoned as "Special Purposes" under the Town Planning Scheme of the Stanthorpe Shire Council of 11 June 1983, and effective at the dates of valuation of 1 January 1996 (V96-463) and 1 October 1996 (AV97-217). By agreement with the parties, both appeals were heard concurrently. The key issues are the nature of the land, the use of the land, the land use code, and comparison of sales. Access to the subject is via Sugarloaf Road which is a dual-lane bitumen sealed carriageway. Telephone, electricity, mail delivery and school bus services are available. The land is easy sloping granite forest, faces south, and is regularly shaped with the frontage to Sugarloaf Road tapering back towards the north. The Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources, issued valuations on 24 April 1996, at $19,400 (V96-463), and on 10 March 1997, at $19,400 (AV97-217). Following objections the Chief Executive disallowed the objections and confirmed the valuations at $19,400 (V96-463) on 17 July 1996, and $19,400 (AV97-217) on 2 July 1997. The appellants have appealed those figures claiming that in each matter the values should more properly be $5,700. Mrs GR Blyth appeared and gave evidence for the appellants. Mr DP Coe appeared for the respondent, calling evidence from Mr DB Redgen, the Departmental Registered Valuer, responsible for determining the valuation. [1998] QLC 33 -- 1 of 13 -- 2 The Evidence: (1)The nature of the land - There is agreement between the parties that the land was originally timbered with stringy bark, box, gum, some peppermint and apple, and the land slopes generally from south to north, with rural views to the north. It was also agreed that there were significant scars evident from former mining operations. About one-third of the subject (the northern part) is steep rocky country. There is a large dam in the centre of the land which was constructed by the appellants for mining purposes. The land on the western side between the dam and the road is basically in its virgin state, and the land to the eastern part is mainly rock outcrops. (2) The Tenure of the Land - In order to understand the current use of the land it is helpful to consider the history of the tenures affecting the land. A mining lease for 21 years was granted to the appellants in 1981, for the purpose of the extraction of tin and metal concentrates from alluvial deposits. Mining commenced in 1983, just three months prior to the collapse of the world price of tin. As a consequence of that loss of market, the mining operations have virtually been "mothballed" and maintained basically as a part-time homesite, and for the maintenance of the mining equipment. The subject has continued to be used for those purposes until 1994, when the appellants sought to take over the renewal of the Special Lease of the subject for grazing purposes, then held by the property managers of the neighbouring properties. The appellants saw that as a means of overcoming what they considered was overstocking of the subject. That renewal of the lease was refused, as was also an application for the issue of a new grazing lease by the appellants. A subsequent offer for a "Permit to Occupy" the land for grazing purposes was eventually negotiated. The appellants argue that prior to agreeing to the Permit to Occupy, they had been given an assurance that a single valuation of the property would issue (letter 20 August 1994). They were also of the understanding that, although the permit was revocable by the Department at short notice, such cancellation under normal circumstances, was highly unlikely. The appellants were also comforted by the possibility, at a later time, of being able to upgrade the permit to a more secure tenure. The "category" rating of the permit was for "grazing and agricultural" purposes. The matter of the likely categorisation for rating purposes had still to be confirmed. Subsequently, the Stanthorpe Shire Council issued two rate notices, one for the mining activity and the second for the rural activity. The appellants have objected to those rate requests, and sought clarification from the Chief Executive in respect of why a single valuation -- 2 of 13 -- 3 had not proceeded, as had been their understanding. As a method of overcoming the problems, following legal advice, the Department moved to amalgamate the two assessments, and to issue a single valuation (letter 25 January 1996). Evidence was given that this is the first occasion in Queensland where this type of amalgamation has occurred. Since 1995 the Land Use Code has been re-assessed as "mining" purposes. (3)The Valuations - Between the period 1984 to 1995, the property was valued on the basis of its land use being classified for rural residential and mining purposes. This valuation classification is an internal administrative land use code which is used by the Department when valuing properties. By agreement with local governments those codes are often adopted to define local rating categories. However the land use codes have no formal standing other than as a valuation administrative designation. Following the granting of the permit to occupy in 1994, the following valuations for the subject issued from the Department: Date of Date of Date of Valuation Area Issue Valuation Effect 12.04.95 30.06.93 25.08.94 $ 4,400 29.337ha 12.04.95 01.01.95 30.06.95 $ 5,300 29.337ha 13.03.96 01.01.96 30.06.96 $22,000 58.677ha 24.04.96 01.01.96 30.06.96 $19,400 29.337ha 10.03.97 01.10.96 30.06.97 $19,400 29.337ha 02.07.97 01.10.96 30.06.97 $19,400 29.337ha As a consequence of three of those valuations, objections were lodged by the appellants against the valuations of 01.01.95 ($22,000), 01.01.96 ($19,400), and 01.10.96 ($19,400). The valuation which issued on 13 March 1996, for an area of 58.776 hectares was noted as a computer error precipitated by the two separate tenures over the subject for the mining lease and the grazing permit. Since that time the appellants have been charged twice annually for rates by the Stanthorpe Shire Council. The first charge is for the use as a mining operation, and the second for use for grazing purposes. In determining the valuation of the subject prior to 1994, the Chief Executive had valued the land under Section 24(1)(a) of the Valuation of Land Act, adopting a figure of 20 times the annual lease rental per hectare payable to the Department of Mineral Resources. The current rental of the mining lease is determined under Section 44(1) and Schedule 3 of the Mineral Resources Regulations 1990, updated in 1995, to $32.90 per hectare. Adopting this principle the land would be valued at $19,303.75, adopt $19,400. Because of confusion about the impact of the permit there are now substantial -- 3 of 13 -- 4 outstanding charges due to the Stanthorpe Shire Council, awaiting a decision on the valuation by this Court. It needs to be stated, however, that the quantum of rating of charges is not a matter for a decision of this Court, and is more properly to be decided by another court of competent jurisdiction under Section 634(1) of the Local Government Act 1993. (4)The Use of the Land - The appellants argue that since 1984 they have continued to use the land as a rural residential site, and for the storage and maintenance of mining equipment. They argue that there has been no mining upon the land since 1984. Since obtaining the permit in 1994 the appellants have commenced fencing the subject. Fencing has so far been completed along three-quarters of the western boundary, across the southern road frontage, and for approximately 100 metres along the eastern boundary. The appellants argue that, because of the eroded nature of the land from former mining activities, they presently have difficulties in its use for grazing purposes, although it was used for that purpose by the former lessees of the special lease over the land. In fact some cattle agisted upon an adjoining property still roam across the subject. Mrs Blyth confirmed that under the terms of their permit the agistment of cattle is not permitted. The current large dam upon the land was constructed by the appellants for mining purposes. There is also an access road to the building area. The current building improvements include five portable "container" buildings, about half of which are used for residential purposes, and which were designed for use as a residence during mining operations. Mrs Blyth argues that the portable nature of the buildings is to facilitate their removal should it be required under the mining lease at the completion of the lease. The mining equipment stored at the site includes earthmoving machines, a washing plant and other sundry equipment. Mr Redgen gave evidence that, in his opinion, following an inspection of the land, that the buildings are more properly defined as a "mining camp" rather than merely as a rural homesite. He based this view on the conclusion that the dominant use of the site was for mining purposes, and that the residential premises were ancillary to that purpose. In seeking to understand the dominant use of the land and its improvements, including some clearing and remedial actions of some old mining scars, Mr Redgen noted that clearing was permitted under the terms of the mining lease, while illegal clearing was an offence under the permit. Mr Redgen also noted that the erection of a building was also permitted under the mining lease, but not permitted under the permit. The conditions of a mining lease are covered in Section 276(1) of the Mineral Resources Act 1989. The conditions of the permit are covered in Section 177 to 180 of the Land Act 1994. The category of the permit is covered under Section 8(a) of the Land Regulation 1995. -- 4 of 13 -- 5 (5) The Use of the Land for Grazing The appellants argue that the current carrying capacity of the subject is approximately "seven head of dry cattle", based upon their experience of having owned and operated cattle properties, and noting the agistment of cattle upon adjoining properties. They also concede that effective grazing cannot proceed until the boundaries are fenced. The respondent agrees that the nature of the land is such as to preclude the subject from satisfying the requirements of "farming" under Section 17 of the Valuation of Land Act. The use of the land for grazing purposes under that Act is covered under Section 17(2)(a). The valuation of the land under the permit classification is exercised under Section 14(5)(b) of that Act. (6)The Use of the Land for Mining Mr Redgen argues that the evidence of the mining camp, the tailings dam, and the four mining vehicles all indicate that the dominant use of the land is for mining purposes. The appellants agree that between 1986 and 1993 they had used the subject as a holding and maintenance facility for their mining equipment, which was used for opal mining purposes in western Queensland for three months of each of those eight years. Income from opals in Quilpie during 1991-92 was only $1,100, and there was a nil income from tin from the Stanthorpe Area. However, since 1994, the appellants have received no income from either opal or tin mining, and have used the subject merely as a residence, with the storage of the mining equipment as an ancillary use. Mrs Blyth also argues that the Department of Mineral Resources recognises the "non-operational" nature of the land, and has advised the appellants that mining operations cannot proceed until the payment of a fee for an environmental impact statement under Section 261 of the Act is prepared, the quantum of which is currently being negotiated with the Department of Mineral Resources. This, she argues, supports the appellants' claim that the subject is used only as a rural residential site. However, Mr Coe argues that a mining lease, whether operational or not, is still a mining lease, and the property should be valued accordingly for that purpose under the Valuation of Land Act. (7) The Impact of Categorisation There is some confusion in respect of the impact of the different categorisations of the subject. The appellants argue that the land should be treated as a "grazing" category as defined under the permit to occupy the land under the Land Act. They note that the permit has been issued as Category 1 "Grazing and Agricultural" for rental purposes. The word "category" is also used by the Stanthorpe Shire Council in its rating procedures, which would appear to have some link to the internal administrative land use codes applied by the Chief Executive. How those different land use codes are then interpreted for rating purposes is really a matter for the Stanthorpe Shire Council. -- 5 of 13 -- 6 It is quite understandable how the appellants are confused about the use of the word "category", bearing in mind the different interpretations applied under the Land Act 1994, the Valuation of Land Act 1944, and the Local Government Act 1993 (Section 573). However it is clear that under Section 580 of the Local Government Act, the appellants, in first instance, have a right of objection against the type of category to either or both the Stanthorpe Shire Council (for the rates) or to the Chief Executive of the Department of Natural Resources (for land use coding). The appellants have so objected, and under Section 583 have now appealed to this Court for determination. (8)The Objection Procedure There was some disquiet on the part of the appellants, that they had not been afforded an opportunity to discuss the matter fully with the Department at an objection conference against the valuation at 1 October 1996. Mr Coe however pointed out that an objection conference had been set for 3 June 1997, the appellants failing to appear, and the valuation was determined in their absence. Mrs Blyth argues however, that she and her husband had planned to appear at the conference but, because of Mr Blyth's sudden hospitalisation on the evening of 2 June 1997, they had been forced to miss the appointment. She argues that she had advised the Department of her problems, and sought a deferment. She was apparently informed at that time that the decision had been made to reject the objection and, if necessary, to proceed to a decision of this Court on appeal. Mr Coe advised that he had no memory of such advice to Mrs Blyth, but noted that an appeal on the matter had already been lodged with the Court for the valuation at 1 January 1996. (2 September 1996). It was noted that the computer printout shows the decision on the objection was processed on 19 June 1997, and issued on 2 July 1997. Evidence was supplied by Mr Coe that the objection form (Form 58) was determined on 3 June 1997, and the accompanying note for file confirmed the decision on 4 June 1997. (Exhibit 6). Whatever the background to the objection conference, it is clear that the Chief Executive is within his powers to determine the objection, with or without a conference. That Mr Coe felt that the matter was best determined by this Court, would appear to have influenced his decision to not allow a further extension of time in view of Mr Blyth's ill health. In the end however, while conforming to the intentions of the Act, such a procedure does little to strengthen the public's perception that their concerns are being fully considered. It was also noted that the appellants had failed to request a conference as part of their objection to the valuation of 1 January 1996, presumably in view of their lack of understanding of the provisions of the Act. (9)Comparison of Sales - In seeking to compare the subject on the basis of a rural residential site, Mr -- 6 of 13 -- 7 Redgen provided the following comparable sales of land zoned as "Rural". (i)Valuation at 1 January 1996 - (V96-463) - Three sales at Hale Haven (Sale 1 - May 1995 - 23.56ha), Amosfield (Sale 2 - June 1995 - 15.02ha), and Sugarloaf (Sale 3 - August 1995 - 31.717ha) were analysed, all being seen as superior to the subject. After allowing for improvements the sales were analysed at $56,000 (Sale 1), $48,000 (Sale 2) and $53,150 (Sale 3). Mrs Blyth challenged the relevance of those sales, noting that they were better country and more in the Sugarloaf area which was a more attractive area. The sales were also less scarred from old mining activities than the subject. A fourth sale of 252.421 hectares (Sale 4) was also analysed and seen to be overall superior to the subject, but inferior on a per hectare basis due to its size. Sale 4 had an analysed unimproved value of $44,994, and was applied at $39,500. Sale 4 was only 2 kms west of the subject, and has been developed extensively for grazing subsequent to the sale in November 1995. Based upon these comparisons the subject was assessed as a house site at an unimproved value of $35,500, less an allowance for mining scars of $11,820, giving an unimproved capital value of $23,500. (ii)Valuation at 1 October 1996 - (AV97-217) - Four sales at Mt Tully (Sale 1 - January 1996 - 8.258 hectares), Mt Tully (Sale 2 - December 1995 - 19.12 ha), Sugarloaf (Sale 3 - August 1995 - 31.717 ha), and Cannon Creek (Sale 4 - June 1996 - 33.04 ha) were analysed. Sale 1 was seen as inferior, and sales 2, 3 and 4 all seen as superior to the subject. After allowing for improvements the sales were analysed at $11,400 (Sale 1), $37,140 (Sale 2), $53,150 (Sale 3), and $33,000 (Sale 4). A fifth sale (Sale 4 of the valuation of 1 January 1996), was also compared providing a superior comparison at $44,994, and applied at $39,500. Based upon those comparisons, the subject was assessed as a housesite at an unimproved value of $35,500, less an allowance for mining scars of $11,820, giving an unimproved capital value of $23,500. (10) Relativity - Mr Coe drew comparison with the unimproved values of the property to the west (Lot 1 on RP 21525) with an unimproved value of $27,000, and the property to the east (Lot 2 on RP 164703) at an unimproved value of $40,000. This, he felt, reflected a reasonable comparison to the value of the subject as a homesite at $23,500. Mrs Blyth challenged that comparison as she argues that the subject was to be adopted at the lesser value of 20 times the lease, or $19,400. Mrs Blyth also noted that those two adjoining parcels were in fact used for -- 7 of 13 -- 8 business purposes as a forestry (pine tree) plantation and as a sawmill. On that basis she believed the subject was being unfairly treated as a "Mining" business by comparison when in fact it is merely used as a rural homesite. In response to these claims Mr Coe advised that at the time of issue of the permit a review of relativities was undertaken of the Sugarloaf area. As a result of that review of valuation, the value of the subject as a site was seen to exceed, for the first time, the calculations of 20 times the annual rent of the mining lease. Because of the unique nature of the subject, where the permit and the lease were held by the one person, the matter has now come to this Court for resolution. Mr Coe disagreed that the adjoining properties satisfy Section 17 of the Act as a "farming" activity and therefore were able to be afforded a concessional valuation. In any case he argues, even if those properties did qualify under Section 17, that would not reduce the valuation of the subject, but only those two adjoining properties. On the evidence available, he maintains that the current relativity is appropriate. Mrs Blyth agrees that she does not really have a problem with the current valuation, but rather with the category adopted by the Department. Decision: (1) The Land and its Tenures - In the matter of the nature of the land, I note that there are no real differences between the parties. In considering the nature of the tenures affecting the land it is agreed that there is currently a mining lease in existence, presumably in a "non-operational" sense, other than for the storage and maintenance of mining equipment. The land is also subject to a permit to occupy for Category 1 (grazing and agricultural) purposes. The Category 1 (grazing and agricultural) is one of 13 categories for rent assessment established in the Land Regulation 1995. This rationalisation of the types of rental leases followed a major review of the former proliferation of leases (the "Wolfe Report"), and established it under Section 9 of the Land Regulation as: "Category 1 leases 9.(1) A lease is a Category 1 lease if, under its conditions it may be used primarily for, and it is being used primarily for, grazing or broadhectare agriculture. (2) In addition, a lease for grazing purposes over a state forest or a reserve is a Category 1 lease. " The appellants concede that under the terms of the permit they do not have exclusive use of the camping reserve. I note that the Chief Executive may issue a permit over a reserve under Section 177(1) of the Land Act 1994, and in line with the object of the reserve for -- 8 of 13 -- 9 camping purposes, only the boundaries may be fenced under Section 177(4). I note also that the permit may be cancelled, subject to reasonable written notice under Section 180. Unless a reserve is revoked under Section 33, the camping reserve (Lot 108) remains as a reserve for community purposes under Section 30. Any improvements upon the reserve, should it be cancelled or surrendered, becomes the property of the State without any right for compensation under Section 180 (4), unless the Chief Executive allows recovery of the improvements under Section 180(5). I note also that a permit to clear timber over the land must be obtained under Section 255, but that the appellants have a right to apply for a tree clearing permit under Section 259(e). In the matter of the mining lease I note that the conditions of the lease are provided for in Section 276 of the Mineral Resources Act 1989, and that specifically the lessee shall not interfere with the lawful right of access by any person in respect of the land under Section 276(1)(f). I note also that the appellants have the right to seek renewal of the lease when it falls due under Section 281. In the matter of the rental payable under the lease, I note that regulations may be made to determine annual rents under Section 417(2)(b), and that the rental payable under the lease is established under the "Mineral Resources Regulation 1990" in Section 44(1), and Schedule 3, which determines that the yearly rental on a mining lease is set at $32.90 per hectare. In summary, the appellants have separate and distinctive rights under the two tenures held for the land. Both uses can be enjoyed separately and by different "owners". In the current matter the two different interests in the land are held concurrently by the one "owner", a matter the Court understands is currently unique in Queensland. (2) The Use of the Land - On the evidence provided I accept that the land is currently not used for the purpose of the mining of alluvial tin. I accept that the major use of the land is now as the full-time residence of the appellants, although there is also the storage of mining equipment on the site. While the dwellings do not match the usual understanding of what constitutes a residential dwelling, they do reflect the dwelling needs of the appellants. That they are also of a reasonable transportable nature, I believe does not preclude the building from satisfying the definition of a dwelling for the appellants. In seeking to understand whether the use of the land could be seen as a rural residential site, I note that the word "residence" is taken to refer to a place of permanent and not merely temporary abode. ("Words and Phrases Legally Defined" 3rd Edition, Volume 4, Page 75, Butterworths). However the word "reside" has a wide meaning and may be taken to mean to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, or to be one's settled or usual abode. See FC of T v. Miller (1946) 73 C.L.R. 93. There is no argument that the subject is currently the -- 9 of 13 -- 10 appellants' abode for most, if not all, of each year. In seeking to understand the meaning of the word "dwelling" I note that it was found that it was taken to refer to "a house in which people live or which is physically capable of being used for human habitation". (See Lewin v. End (1906) A.C. 299 at 304). The matter was also referred to in Bakes v. Huckle (1948) VLR 159, where Barry J. said at page 160: "Whether particular premises are a dwelling-house is a question to be decided on the facts of each case. ----- In deciding that question the test is whether at the material time the premises possessed the characteristics ordinarily found in buildings used or let for human habitation as homes. " In understanding the meaning of "fit for habitation" I note that certain statutory conditions are taken to apply to a dwelling for such purposes, but the words have been found to mean to be "wide and elastic, because they are able to be applied to the needs and circumstances of poor people living in confined quarters" - See Summers v. Salford Corporation (1943) A.C. 283 at Pages 292 to 294, per Lord Wright. In the light of those references I believe that the appellants' use of the buildings as part of the "mining camp" demonstrates that they are their residential dwelling place. I find that the storage of the mining equipment is ancillary to that purpose. It may be noted that resident sites for many people are used for a variety of storage purposes, without negating the dominant use of the site as a place to reside. In the current circumstances of the appellants, I believe the dominant use of the site is as a rural residence. However, should those circumstances alter, in the context of annual valuations, that matter should be reviewed. (3)The Use for Grazing Purposes - There was no evidence to suggest that the use of the land could currently be considered as meeting the requirements of "farming" (grazing) under Section 17(2) of the Valuation of Land Act. The land is not used under Section 17(2)(a) for the business of grazing, the dominant use of the land under Section 17(2)(b) is not for such a business purpose; there is no significant and substantial commercial purpose or character to the use under Section 17(2)(c); and grazing is not engaged in on a continuous or repetitive basis under Section 17(2)(d). It is therefore not applicable to consider any concessional valuations for such purposes at this time. (4) Separate Valuations for the Subject - As the subject is impacted by two different tenure types it is noted that, in that situation, it would be appropriate for the Chief Executive to determine two separate valuations for rating purposes. It is noted that under Section 13 of the Valuation of Land Act, the Chief Executive is charged with providing a valuation for all land under acts which establish local authorities. -- 10 of 13 -- 11 In the event that the two tenures were separately held by two different "owners", it would be lawful for the Stanthorpe Shire Council to charge a separate rate notice to each person. That both of those interests in the land were held by the appellants, would not, in my opinion, remove the separate responsibilities for rates under the Local Government Act. That Act establishes in Section 553(1) that all land is rateable other than certain specific types of land, none of which cover the subject. Even State forest or timber reserves which are exempt under Section 553(1)(c), do not include land occupied under an occupational permit or stock grazing permit under the Forestry Act 1959 or under a lease under the Land Act. Liability to pay rates on those interests in land is provided for in Section 606(1) of the Local Government Act. An owner is defined under the Act in Section 5(1) to include: 5(1)(d)(i)a holder of a mining claim or lease; and (g)(ii)the holder of a permission to occupy under the Land Act. "Owner" is also defined under the Valuation of Land Act: "Section 7(2)(d) the holder or lawful occupier of a mining lease; and Section 7(2)(f)(ii) a permission to occupy under the Land Act 1994; " In the event that the appellants wish to avoid the double responsibility for rating, the remedy lies entirely within their own control. They could relinquish the lesser interest in the land (the permit). However it is also true that a similar permit to occupy may be approved by the Chief Executive, thus compounding the appellants' concerns that the subject has been over-grazed by others. In the event of such a relinquishment of the permit, and in the knowledge of the current state of the land by the Chief Executive, it could be construed that it may be inappropriate to issue a permit for grazing which is inconsistent with the purpose of the land under Section 177(2) of the Land Act. That may avoid further possible degradation of the subject by grazing, although it would not assist the appellants should they wish to continue their fencing operations and eventually graze the land themselves. The key to such a decision lies in the long-term aspirations of the appellants. In the current matter the Chief Executive has apparently, in some way, amalgamated the grazing rights (permit) with the mining lease, thus presenting the current unique problem in the valuation process. Details of exactly how this has been achieved, other than by the use of the word "amalgamation" were not provided. However the statement of Mr Redgen advised that he had Departmental legal opinion that the two interests in the land could be amalgamated for rating purposes, as the permit was granted on the basis that it was not -- 11 of 13 -- 12 inconsistent with the purpose of mining and as such was subservient to the mining lease. In seeking to understand this advice, I note that Section 606(3) of the Local Government Act directs: "606.(3) If there is more than 1 owner or other person liable to pay a rate, all the owners or other persons are jointly and severally liable. " However, in determining the basis upon which a rate is levied, Section 621(1) of that Act goes on to state that: "A local government may levy a rate on rateable land on the basis of the relevant information of which it has been notified on or before the date it levies the rate. " Presumably now that the Chief Executive has "amalgamated" the valuation assessment advice to the Stanthorpe Shire Council, it is now within the power of the Council to amend the rate notice to a single assessment. However it is noted that the discretion lies with the Stanthorpe Shire Council in how it applies that advice from the Chief Executive. (5) The Codification of the Land Use - The potential confusion in the use of the term "category" was discussed earlier in this matter. The use of the term Category 1 "grazing and agricultural" is a statutory process of defining the rental liability of the permittee. As such it is just one factor for consideration by Mr Redgen in determining the highest and best use of the land when he determined the amended valuation of the amalgamated interest in the subject on 24 April 1996, at $19,400. The use of the term "category" for rating purposes by the Stanthorpe Shire Council is a matter for consideration by that body. In his adoption of the land use code of "mining", Mr Redgen would appear to have been influenced by the agreed dominant nature of the mining lease. However on the evidence supplied, the highest and best use of the land for mining purposes, in view of the stated depressed nature of the market for tin, would be difficult to substantiate in my opinion. I feel its highest and best use would in fact be as a residence for the appellants. I note also that discretion in respect of how a category may be determined is covered by Section 574(4) of the Local Government Act: "574(4). The category in which a parcel of rateable land is included may be identified in any way the valuation authority or local government considers appropriate. " In the event that the "owner" of the land is dissatisfied with the determined category, following an objection to the authorities, the "owner" has the right of appeal to this Court under Section 583: "583. If the owner of rateable land is aggrieved by - -- 12 of 13 -- 13 (a) the decision on an objection to the categorisation of the land; ....the owner may appeal to the Land Court against the decision or failure. " Should the use of the land for mining activities change over subsequent valuations, it would then be appropriate to review that land use code. (6)The Sales Evidence and Relativity - Mr Redgen's analysis of comparable sales was not effectively challenged by the appellants, who provided no alternative sales of their own. Based upon the respondent's comparison I note that the unimproved value of the subject as a rural residential site was determined at $23,500 for both valuations at 1 January 1996 and 1 October 1996. I have no reason to dispute those figures. The relativity of the subject with adjoining lands was agreed was not a matter of contention. Summary: In summarising the matter I find that the value of the subject as a rural homesite would be $23,500. The proper land use code classification for valuation purposes under the Valuation of Land Act at this time should be for rural residential purposes. However in determining the valuation of the land, direction is given in Section 24(1)(a)(ii) that the unimproved value shall be 20 times the yearly rent payable in respect of the lease. On that basis the appropriate valuation of the land should be $19,400. Conclusion: Having considered the whole of the evidence, I am persuaded that the appellants have proved their case in respect of the land use coding of the land which I determine to be for rural residential purposes. However, in respect of the valuations to be applied, I find that they have not demonstrated that the Chief Executive has made an error. I therefore dismiss that appeal and determine that the valuations of the Chief Executive for Lot 108 on Plan 34363 are confirmed at $19,400 (1 January 1996) and $19,400 (1 October 1996). (NG Divett) Member of the Land Court -- 13 of 13 --