Burrows v Workers' Compensation Board of Queensland [1997] QCA 182
[1997] QCA 182
COURT OF APPEAL
FITZGERALD P
MACKENZIE J
HELMAN J
Appeal No 6694 of 1996
ARTHUR ALEXANDER BURROWS Respondent/Plaintiff
and
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD OF QUEENSLAND
Appellant/Defendant
BRISBANE
..DATE 12/6/97
JUDGMENT
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THE PRESIDENT: This is an appeal by the Workers'
Compensation Board of Queensland against a judgment of the
District Court in favour of the respondent on 18 July 1996.
There was only one point in issue.
It was common ground that, by virtue of what was
sub-section 10.1(2) of the Workers' Compensation Act 1990 at
the time when the respondent was injured, he was not
entitled to indemnity from the appellant if his employer was
at the time when he was injured "required by - a law enacted
by any other State ... to provide against the employer's
legal liability in respect thereof". It was also common
ground that the only law enacted by any other State which
might have imposed such a requirement was subsection 155(1)
of the Workers' Compensation Act 1987 New South Wales.
So far as presently material, that provision which is to be
found in Part 7 Insurance, Division 1 - Insurance policies,
provided at the material time compulsory insurance for
employers and employers "shall obtain from a licensed
insurer, and maintain in force, a policy of insurance that
complies with this Division for the full amount of the
employer's liability under this Act in respect of all
workers employed by the employer and for an unlimited amount
in respect of the employer's liability independently of this
Act (being a liability under a law of New South Wales) for
any injury to any such worker".
The District Court Judge who found in favour of the
respondent held that subsection 155(1) of the New South
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Wales Act did not impose upon the respondent's employer at
the time when he was injured any obligation to obtain a
policy of insurance. Hence, Her Honour found that there was
"no law enacted by any other State" requiring the
respondent's employer "to provide against the employer's
legal liability" for the respondent's injury.
It is not proposed to discuss Her Honour's reasons in
detail. It is sufficient to state briefly why I have
arrived at the opposite conclusion.
The terms "employer" and "worker" are defined in subsection
3(1) of the New South Wales Act in general terms and are
literally wide enough to extend to the respondent and his
employer at the time when he was injured. However, some
limitation must be imported into subsection 155(1) of that
Act. Each of the respondent and his employer at the time
when he was injured was a Queenslander, and subsection
155(1) plainly was not intended to apply if the respondent
had been injured while working in Queensland or, for that
matter, Victoria. That is not the case.
Although the respondent's employer at the time when he was
injured was a company incorporated in Queensland and not
registered elsewhere which had its only premises in
Queensland, its business as a transport operator regularly
involved it in business activities in New South Wales.
The respondent, the driver of one of his then employer's
vehicles, went to New South Wales on numerous occasions in
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the course of his employment and his injury occurred in New
South Wales while he was working there in the course of his
employment.
The long title describes the New South Wales Act as an Act
"to provide for the compensation and rehabilitation of
workers in respect of work related injuries", and as a
matter of policy seems plainly intended to have a wide and
beneficial operation.
I cannot identify any reason for reading subsection 155(1)
down so as to exclude from its ambit any work-related injury
which occurs in New South Wales. However, there might be
other provisions in the New South Wales Act to which the
attention of this Court has not been drawn which effect some
limitations in some circumstances, and it is possible that,
for example, subsection 155(1) of the New South Wales Act is
inapplicable if an employee's presence in New South Wales
when he or she is injured in the course of his or her
employment is fortuitous, fleeting or sufficiently unusual.
It is sufficient for present purposes to say that, in my
opinion, subsection 155(1) of the New South Wales Act is not
inapplicable merely because neither employer nor employee is
resident or domiciled, based or located, whichever be
thought most apposite, in New South Wales when an employee
is injured, and that the subsection was applicable to the
respondent's then employer in respect of the work-related
injury which the respondent suffered in New South Wales in
the course of his employment which was the subject of the
present action.
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That conclusion seems to me consistent with the material
part of the decision of Kirby A.C.J., with whom Priestley
and
Clark JJ agreed in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales v.
BillPat Holdings Pty Ltd (N.S.W.C.A. 40263 of 1994,
unreported 14 July 1995), and see also what was said by
Kirby P. in Commissioner for Railways for the State of
Queensland v. Peters (1991) 24 N.S.W.L.R. 407 at pp. 437 to
438.
Accordingly, I would allow the appeal and set aside the
judgment for the respondent against the appellant together
with the order that the appellant pay the respondent's costs
in the action to be taxed. Instead, the respondent's action
against the appellant should be dismissed with costs to be
taxed and this appeal should be allowed with costs to be
taxed. As requested, the respondent should have a
certificate under the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1973.
MACKENZIE J: I agree.
HELMAN J: I agree.
THE PRESIDENT: The orders will be as I have indicated.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCA/1997/182