Enders v McLennan [1996] QCA 312
[1996] QCA 312
COURT OF APPEAL
DERRINGTON J
MACKENZIE J
WHITE J
CA No 228 of 1996
NEIL MALCOLM ENDERS Respondent
and
PETER ROLAND McLENNAN Applicant
BRISBANE
..DATE 30/07/96
JUDGMENT
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DERRINGTON J: The applicant for leave to appeal was convicted
in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane on 21 December 1995 on two
counts: the first, a false and reckless mis-declaration of
dangerous goods for air transport in contravention of Civil
Aviation Act 1988; and the second, in respect of a consignment
other than in accordance with the Civil Aviation Regulations.
On the first count a fine of $2,000 was imposed and on the
second, a fine of $6,000 was imposed.
The applicant filed an appeal in the District Court but, on the
second hearing of the matter before the learned District Court
Judge, the prosecution took the point that the appeal there was
incompetent as the offences charged were indictable although
heard summarily and that, for that reason, the District Court
had no jurisdiction. That, as it turns out, was correct and the
appeal was dismissed.
The applicant claims that he then suffered from a heart
condition which required his confinement to hospital for a
period of about 15 days in May and that contributed to the
further delay in this matter. Unfortunately, he has provided no
evidence about that and the Court has been required to rely upon
statements from the Bar table which are not altogether matters
that might be comfortably accepted but, for the purpose of this
application, are sufficient.
The fact that he duly took steps to pursue his appeal, albeit in
the incorrect jurisdiction, affords this Court the opportunity
to be fairly liberal in its approach to the question of leave.
However, that is not an end to the matter. The prosecution
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contends that leave should be refused because the applicant has
no real prospects of success in respect of either count.
As to the first count, it is the view of the Court that the
matter deserves to be argued although I would make it clear that
this does not necessarily imply any confidence in the result.
It means only that the matter is such as to warrant
consideration by the Court. In respect of that, the question of
punishment would follow as well.
In respect of the second count, it is my view that the matter
was adequately disposed of by the Magistrate by his
determination of the facts in such a way as to render the appeal
of such little merit that the application should be refused in
that respect. That, however, does not apply to the issue of the
punishment that was imposed in respect of that count. The
decision to allow the applicant the opportunity of appealing the
first count makes it somewhat easier to grant him leave to argue
the question of the punishment in respect of the second count
and, in my view, he should be granted leave to appeal in that
respect also.
MACKENZIE J: I agree.
WHITE J: I agree also.
DERRINGTON J: The order of the Court is that the applicant is
granted leave to appeal in respect of his appeal concerning the
first count referred to including the question of the severity
of the punishment. His application should be refused in respect
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4 JUDGMENT
of the question of his conviction of the second count but that
he should be granted leave to appeal in respect of the
punishment imposed in respect of that count.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCA/1996/312