Cairns Shelfco No 16 Pty Ltd v State of Queensland [1996] QCA 38 [1998] 1 Qd R 228

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1996] QCA 038 SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND Appeal No. 130 of 1995 Brisbane Before Fitzgerald P. Pincus J.A. Dowsett J. [Cairns Shelfco No. 16 v. State of Queensland] BETWEEN: CAIRNS SHELFCO NO. 16 PTY LTD A.C.N. 010 327 312 Appellant AND: THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND Respondent REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - FITZGERALD P. Judgment delivered 05/03/1996 The circumstances giving rise to this appeal are set out in the reasons for judgment of Pincus J.A. Broadly speaking, the appellant is the lessee of harbour land at Cairns from the Cairns Port Authority and, as such, an “owner” of the land within the meaning of s. 7 of the Valuation of Land Act 1944, unless the contrary intention is indicated by that Act: Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s. 4. While the Trial Division Judge from whom this appeal is brought found such a contrary intention, his Honour’s reasoning was not explained in detail but was connected with his conclusion that the special valuations which s. 74 of the Valuation of Land Act authorises were not intended by the legislature to provide “a person in the position of the [appellant]” with “all of the rights of objection and appeal which otherwise, and -- 1 of 27 -- 2 quite properly, should flow from the more public type of valuation with which the Act is primarily concerned”. The critical issue for decision in this appeal concerns the correctness or otherwise of that view. The rental payable by the appellant under its lease can be increased by increases in “the unimproved valuation of the demised premises assessed by the Valuer-General in accordance with s. 741 of the Valuation of Land Act 1944-1987 ...”. Section 74 has been in two different forms at material times, but each has authorised the Valuer-General, or Chief Executive as he is now known, to value real or personal property on request. Both versions are contained in the reasons for judgment of Pincus J.A., and I will set the current section out in full later in these reasons. The Valuation of Land Act which by its long title is “An Act to make better provision for determining the valuation of land for rating and leasing purposes, and for matters incidental thereto or consequent thereon”, is divided into eight Parts. Part 1, “Preliminary”, is essentially concerned with definitions and meanings, some of which can usefully be recorded. By s. 2, “... ‘annual valuation’ means a valuation of all lands in an area made pursuant to part 4. ... 1 formerly s. 27 -- 2 of 27 -- 3 ‘area’ means the area of a local government ... . ‘general valuation’ means a valuation of all lands in an area made pursuant to sections 13 and 27(1). ... ‘roll’ means valuation roll. ... ‘valuation’ means valuation under this Act. ‘valuation for rental purposes’ means the valuation under s. 152 of land in a lease, licence or permit granted or issued under the Land Act 1994. ‘valuation roll’ means a valuation roll under section 47(1). ... . ...” Sections 3 to 5 give meanings to “unimproved value”, “improved value” and “value of improvements” as follows: “Meaning of ‘unimproved value’ 3.(1) For the purposes of this Act - ‘unimproved value’ of land means - (a) in relation to unimproved land - the capital sum which the fee simple of the land might be expected to realise if offered for sale on such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona fide seller would require; and (b) in relation to improved land - the capital sum which the fee simple of the land might be expected to realise if offered for sale on such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona fide seller would require, assuming that, at the time as at which the value is required to be ascertained for the purposes of this Act, the improvements did not exist. (2) However, the unimproved value shall in no case be less than the sum that would be obtained by deducting the value of improvements from the improved value at the time as at which the value is required to be ascertained for the purposes of this Act. ... 2 Section 15 provides: “Valuation for rental purposes 15. (1) The value to be used to determine the rent applying to a lease, licence or permit under the Land Act 1994 is the unimproved value under this Act. (2) However, sections 3(4) and 25 do not apply to the determination of a valuation of land for rental purposes for the financial year starting on 1 July 1993 and subsequent years. (3) For the purposes of a valuation for rental purposes, if the conditions of the lease, licence or permit are not restricted to farming or to a use as a single dwelling house as defined in section 17(2) - (a) section 17(1) does not apply; and (b) in the case of land other than land used for farming - the physical state and condition of the land at the start of the lease, licence or permit (other than improvements within the meaning of the Land Act 1994) is to be considered.” -- 3 of 27 -- 4 Meaning of ‘improved value’ 4. For the purposes of this Act - ‘improved value’ means, in relation to land, the capital sum which the fee simple of the land might be expected to realise if offered for sale on such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona fide seller would require. Meaning of ‘value of improvements’ 5. (1) The ‘value of improvements’ means, in relation to land, the added value which the improvements give to the land at the time as at which the value is required to be ascertained for the purposes of this Act, irrespective of the cost of the improvements, including in such added value the value of any hotel licence the value of which has been included in the improved value. (2) However, the added value shall in no case exceed the amount that should reasonably be involved in effecting, at the time as at which the value is required to be ascertained for the purposes of this Act, improvements of a nature and efficiency equivalent to the existing improvements.” Sections 6 and 7 give meanings to “improvements” and “owner”, which do not need to be noted at this point, except to point out that sub-s. 7(2)(e)(ii) includes as an “owner” (e) “a lessee of land held from ... - ... (ii) a port authority within the meaning of the Transport Infrastructure Act 1994; ...”. Part 2, “Administration”, has a sufficiently self explanatory title. Part 3, “Valuations”, contains detailed provisions to establish “the unimproved value of the land to be valued under the Acts under which local authorities are established” (s. 13). All land in an area must be valued as at a date fixed by the Chief Executive “in respect of any and every general valuation” (s. 18) which must be a date “prior to the date of issue, pursuant to section 50, of the notices of valuation in respect of the general valuation concerned” (sub-s. 18(4)). Except as specified by regulation, general valuations must be made at fixed periods of between five and eight years (s. 27), and become effective from the date fixed by regulation “subject to objection or appeal under this Act” (s. 19). -- 4 of 27 -- 5 Section 20, which is also in Part 3, provides: “Chief executive to fix date of other valuations etc. 20. The chief executive shall fix the date on and after which any valuation or alteration of any valuation of any land made by the chief executive under this Act, save - (a) a general valuation; or (b) an annual valuation; or (c) a valuation or an alteration of a valuation the date of the coming into force whereof is fixed, or to be fixed, otherwise by or pursuant to this Act; shall, subject to objection or appeal under part 6, be the valuation of that land and the notice of valuation shall specify that date.” By s. 28, which is also in Part 3, except as provided in the Act no alteration may be made in a “general” or “annual” valuation relating to an area during the period such valuation is in force, but a wide range of circumstances in which alteration is permissible during such a period is contained in paragraphs (a) to (l) of sub-s. 28(1); see, for example, sub-s. 28(1)(g) to (i) which provide: “... (g) unless, in the opinion of the chief executive, circumstances affecting the valuation of the land are such as to render an alteration necessary or desirable for preserving or attaining uniformity in values between that valuation and subsisting valuations of other comparable parcels of lands; or (h) unless the valuation is affected by error or omission which the chief executive considers it necessary to correct; or (i) unless by reason of - (i) implementation of or alteration in zoning under or amendment of a planning scheme; (ii) the application of an ordinance or a by-law of the local government of the area in question affecting the use of development land; (iii) any other action or decision of the local government of the area in question affecting the use or development of land, the chief executive is of opinion that the valuation of such land has altered; or ...” When an alteration of valuation is made under s. 28 by the Chief Executive, that may be done at any time (sub-s. 29(1)), and sub-s. 29(3) provides: -- 5 of 27 -- 6 “(3) Every alteration of the valuation of any land made under this section must be taken to be a valuation and the provisions of part 6 respecting notice of valuation, objection and appeal shall apply and extend accordingly.” Various other provisions authorising alterations to valuation are contained in ss. 29A-32, and in ss. 34 and 35 provision is also made for the inclusion of several parcels of land in one valuation and separate valuations respectively. Whereas s. 11 (Part 2) dealt with secrecy, s. 36 (Part 3) permits information and access to be provided to certain persons in specified circumstances. Section 33, which is also in Part 3, provides: “Status of Valuation 33. Any and every valuation, or alterations of the valuation, of any lands made, or purporting to be made, under this Act by the chief executive shall be deemed to be correct until proved otherwise upon objection or appeal or until altered or further altered.” The annual valuations which find occasional reference elsewhere in the Act form the title, and the subject of Part 4. As at the date fixed by the Chief Executive in respect of the annual valuation (sub-s. 37(3)), the Chief Executive must, subject to some exceptions, “make annually a valuation of all land in an area in a period starting when a general valuation for the area first takes effect and ending when the next general valuation for the area has effect” (sub-s. 37(1)). Section 38 specifies the period for which each annual valuation is to have force and effect, and sub-s. 37(5) and s. 39 deal with the valuation which is to be effective if an annual valuation is not made. Sections 40 and 41 prescribe processes for notifications and publications of particulars of annual valuations (except valuations for rental purposes) and sections 42 and 46 make provision for objections to most annual valuations by dissatisfied owners, the consideration and decisions on objections by the -- 6 of 27 -- 7 Chief Executive, and appeals by owners who are dissatisfied with such decisions. Part 5, “Valuation Rolls”, requires valuation rolls for each area recording land descriptions, owners’ names, and general and annual unimproved values. Valuation rolls and copies furnished by the Chief Executive are evidence of the contents, and the valuations must be accepted as duly made unless and until the contrary is proved (s. 47). Section 48 provides: “Amendment of valuation roll 48. The valuation roll shall be amended whenever - (a) an alteration is made, under section 29, in the valuation of any parcel of land; or (b) there is a change in the ownership or an alteration in any other particular recorded therein in respect of the valuation of any parcel of land; or (c) any parcel of land is omitted from or erroneously described in that roll or other particulars of a parcel of land or of its value have been omitted from or erroneously entered in that roll; or (d) the chief executive considers it necessary to correct any other error or omission in respect of any valuation in or from that roll; or (e) an alteration is made in the valuation of any parcel of land pursuant to a decision upon objection or appeal under part 4 or, as the case may be, part 6.” Although it appears later in Part 7,”Use of Valuation”, s. 73 requires the Chief Executive to supply copies of, or extracts from, valuation rolls, or amended valuation rolls, to various officials. See also s. 96, “Evidence”, in Part 8, “Miscellaneous”. I will postpone consideration of Part 6, “Notice of Valuation, Objections, and Appeals”, and s. 74, which is in Part 7, “Use of Valuation”, for the moment. Apart from s. 73, to which reference has earlier been made, and s. 74, to which I will return, Part 7 consists only of s. 72, which deals with what -- 7 of 27 -- 8 valuations are to be used for what purposes under other legislation,3 and s. 75, which authorises the Chief Executive to identify for a local government the land in its area which is in each category according to criteria in the Valuation of Land Act. 3 By s. 79, which is in Part 8 - Miscellaneous the existence of a pending objection or appeal does not “interfere with or affect” these uses, but an adjustment is later to be made if the valuation is altered by the objection or appeal. Part 8, “Miscellaneous”, predictably relates to a variety of subjects, ranging (again) from the supply of information and extracts from valuation rolls, to power to obtain evidence, notifications of change of -- 8 of 27 -- 9 ownership, requirements, forms, returns, service, rights of appearance in certain proceedings, times for required activities, offences and penalties, evidence, the making of regulations etc. I will set out s. 78, after first setting out s. 74, with which it is associated. Sections 74 and 78 are respectively as follows: “Other valuations 74.(1) The chief executive may value real or personal properly for a person if the person asks. (2) The person must pay the prescribed fee for the valuation. (3) Any valuation under this section in respect of land may be in its unimproved state, the value of improvements, or the improved value, according to the nature of the request concerned. (4) The chief executive shall issue a certificate of valuation of any valuation made under this section. (5) The enabling of the chief executive to make any and every valuation authorised by this section to be made by the chief executive shall be a purpose of this Act and all of the provisions of this Act shall apply and extend accordingly. Certificate in lieu of valuation of land 78. Any trustee, solicitor, or agent may, despite the Trusts Act 1973, section 27(1) for the purposes of any investment obtain and use the certificate of valuation or any valuation made under section 74 of this Act and, unless directed by the conditions of the person’s trust, retainer, or employment to ascertain in any other specified manner the value of land offered as security, shall not be chargeable with negligence or other default for failing to obtain other evidence of such value.” Before leaving these provisions, it should be noted that there is no restriction on who may request a valuation of either real or personal property or the purpose for which a valuation may be requested, and, subject to any discretion which the Chief Executive might have to decline a request, a person requesting a valuation of any real or personal property, including that owned by a stranger, may obtain a certificate of valuation on payment of the prescribed fee. On the other hand, there is nothing expressly to indicate that an owner or other interested person who has not made a request or paid the fee is entitled to a -- 9 of 27 -- 10 certificate of valuation; however, contrary to the opinion of the primary judge, I do not find that in itself an indication that an owner is not entitled to notice of a valuation under s. 74 by virtue of Part 6, which is discussed below. Any rights which an owner has in respect of a valuation under s. 74 must be found in Part 6, “Notice of Valuation, Objections and Appeals”. Part 6 commences with s. 49 which provides: “Application of Part 49. Except to the extent otherwise indicated in this Act, this Part does not apply to or with respect to a valuation of land made pursuant to part 4.” It will be recalled that Part 4, “Annual Valuations”, contains its own provisions for objections and appeals in relation to such valuations. The more detailed and elaborate provisions in Part 6 are perfectly general in the valuations to which they refer, and, as noted at the outset, by s. 2, “ ‘valuation’ means valuation under this Act”. Before discussing Part 6 further, it is desirable to set out s. 7, which is as follows: “Meaning of ‘owner’ 7.(1) An ‘owner’ of land is the person who - (a) is entitled to receive the rent for the land; or (b) would be entitled to receive the rent for the land if it were leased at a rack- rent.1 (2) However, an owner does not include the State, but includes - (a) a registered proprietor of freehold land; and (b) a purchaser of land to be held as freehold land that is being purchased from the State under an Act; and (c) a lessee of land held from the State, and any manager, overseer or superintendent of the lessee who resides on the land; and (d) the londer or lawful occupier of a mining lease; and -- 10 of 27 -- 11 (e) a lessee of land held from, or the holder of a licence or permission to occupy from - (i) the Coorindator-General; or (ii) a port authority within the meaning of the Transport Infrastructure Act 1994; (iii) a local government; or (iv) the Minister administering the Industrial Development Act 1963; or (v) the Primary Industries Corporation; or (vi) Queensland Railways; and (f) the holder of - (i) an occupation permit or stock grazing permit under the Forestry Act 1959; or (ii) a permission to occupy under the Land Act 1994; and (g) a licensee under an occupation licence or road licence under the Land Act 1994. (3). A reference in subsection (2) to a lessee includes, if a person or entity representing the State is the lessee of State land, a sublessee from the person or entity.” 1 Rack-rent of land is a rent for the land that is the highest possible rent for the land. It implies that the land is leased commercially. Notice of valuation must be given to every owner, accompanied (except in presently irrelevant circumstances) by advice that objection is permissible. By s. 52, objection must be made within 60 days, and only a dissatisfied owner may object. Provision is made in s. 53 for the consideration of objections and, by mutual consent, mediation conferences. Notification of the outcome of the objection is usually called for (s. 54), and appeal is generally available within 60 days: see ss. 55-62. Once again, only a dissatisfied owner may appeal, and the appeal need only be filed in the Land Court and served on the Chief Executive. Provision is made for appeals to be heard by the Land Court (s. 63), with an appeal to the Land Appeal Court (s. 64) and a further appeal to this Court on error of law or excess of jurisdiction by either owner or Chief Executive (s. 65). Provisions are made concerning the orders permissible (s. 66), practice and procedure (s. 67) and costs (s. 70). Other provisions include a unilateral reduction in valuation by the Chief Executive while an appeal is pending (s. 68), and some, presently irrelevant restrictions on appeal (s. 69). Section 71 permits a local authority dissatisfied with -- 11 of 27 -- 12 the valuation of any land in its area to object, seeking a higher valuation, but it has no right of appeal against the Chief Executive’s decision. However, if the Chief Executive alters the valuation in such circumstances, the objection and appeal process provided for by Part 6 is reactivated for the benefit of owners. With minor exceptions like s. 71, the entire objection and appeal process for which the Valuation of Land Act provides is confined to disputes between owners and the Chief Executive. For example, there is no provision for the intervention in appeals of other parties which might be affected by valuations (as to which see, for example, ss. 13, 15 and 72), or for a person obtaining a certificate of valuation under s. 74 or a person affected thereby by virtue of s. 75 to appeal or participate in an appeal. However, whatever the limits, if any, on the valuations which must be recorded in the valuation rolls provided for by Part 5, at least unimproved values must be included, and s. 48 appears wide enough to require, or at least permit, alteration of a valuation roll consequent upon a s. 74 valuation; for example, to correct an error or omission which a s. 74 valuation had revealed. -- 12 of 27 -- 13 In these circumstances, in my opinion it cannot be said that an owner cannot be adversely affected by a s. 74 valuation (and indeed may be the very person who seeks such a valuation and is dissatisfied with the result, perhaps for significant commercial reasons). Owners therefore have a legitimate potential interest to challenge s. 74 valuations by objections and appeals. Further, the language of sub-s. 74(5) is in extremely wide terms, and cannot be read down to the extent contended for by the respondent by any orthodox process of construction. In summary, the respondent therefore failed to explain to my satisfaction why an owner should be excluded from the comprehensive objection and appeal scheme for which the Valuation of Land Act provides only in the single instance of a s. 74 valuation. A number of other matters raised by the respondent are rejected in the judgment of Pincus J.A., with whose reasons on those issues I am in substantial agreement. I agree with the orders which his Honour proposes. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - PINCUS J.A. Judgment delivered 05/03/1996 This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, refusing an application for determination of certain questions arising under the Valuation of Land Act 1944 ("the Act"). By a lease entered into in 1988 the Cairns Port Authority let to the appellant harbour land at Cairns, for a term of 75 years at an initial rental of $250,000 per annum, applicable for the first two years of the term. Clauses 1(b) and (c) of the lease make provision for increases in rental, at two year intervals. Clause -- 13 of 27 -- 3 1(b) provides that the rental for the first two years is increased by a percentage equal to the lesser of two percentage increases: the first is "the unimproved valuation of the demised premises assessed by the Valuer-General in accordance with s. 27 (now s. 74) of the Valuation of Land Act 1944-1987, over the unimproved valuation" of the premises so assessed in respect of the initial two year period; the second is the unimproved value so assessed, over the sum of $3M. In each ensuing two year period, the rental for the preceding two year period is increased by a percentage equal to the percentage increase in the unimproved value so assessed or, at the election of the lessor, "the general valuation or annual valuation of the demised premises as assessed by the Valuer-General in accordance with the Valuation of Land Act as at the commencement of each such two year period over the general annual valuation in force and effect as at the commencement of the immediately preceding two year period". The rental thus depends or may depend on valuations under s. 27 (now s. 74) of the Act, and on general valuations as well as on annual valuations. The second and third types of valuation are clearly capable of being challenged under the Act and the question is whether the first type may also be so challenged. As will appear, there are provisions which on the face of it are perfectly general, allowing objection to and appeal against valuations under the Act; the respondent says in effect that they must be read down, so as to leave s. 27 (now s. 74) valuations not subject, so far as the Act is concerned, to attack. The evidence shows that the Authority requested of the Valuer-General s. 27 (now s. 74) -- 14 of 27 -- 4 valuations as at the commencement date of the term, 12 January 1988, as at 12 January 1990, as at 12 January 1992 and, by fax dated 29 November 1993, at an unspecified date. Each of these requests was responded to by the issue of a certificate of valuation; the last certificate which issued on 17 December 1993 was dated as at 14 December 1993 and the others as at the date in respect of which the valuation was requested. The appellant purported to object, under the Act, to all of these valuations. The notices of objection relating to the last of them described the valuation as being "as at a date believed to be 12 January 1994", and that has been assumed to refer to the valuation mentioned above, which is in fact dated 14 December 1993; no point is taken with respect to the discrepancy in dates. The relief sought in the application was, in substance, a determination of the question whether the appellant is competent to object to these valuations, under the Act. That was of course determined adversely to the appellant. There are two parts of the Act which provide for objection and appeal, Parts 4 and 6. Of these, Part 4 deals only with what are called "annual valuations". Part 6 begins with s. 49, which reads: "Except to the extent otherwise indicated in this Act, this Part does not apply to or with respect to a valuation of land made pursuant to Part 4." Section 50 says that: "Notice of valuation shall be issued to the owner in the approved form . . . " The section goes on to provide for certain details which it is not necessary to explain. It should be noted that the expression "notice of valuation" in s. 50 is unqualified; the operation of the section is not in -- 15 of 27 -- 5 terms confined to valuations of any particular kind. Reading s. 50 in isolation, one would take it to refer to any valuation made under the Act other than those specifically excepted by the immediately preceding section - i.e. excepting those made pursuant to Part 4. Section 52 reads as follows: "An owner who is dissatisfied with the valuation made by the chief executive under this Act may, within 60 days after the date of issue of the notice of valuation (which date of issue shall be stated in such notice), post to or lodge with the chief executive an objection in writing against the valuation." Again, the expression "the valuation" is unqualified, but the provision read as a whole implies that valuations the subject of s. 52 are those in respect of which notices of valuation must be issued under s. 50; that is so because the time for lodgement of the notice of objection runs from the date of issue of the notice of valuation. Not too much should be made of this, however, since the time limit is an ancillary procedural provision which is unlikely to have been intended to do away with what would otherwise have been substantive rights of objection and appeal. Section 53 provides for consideration of objections and s. 54 requires the "chief executive", being the person formerly called the Valuer-General, to issue to the objector written notice of the decision on the objection. Under s. 55, an owner who has duly objected against a valuation may appeal to the Land Court. All four valuations which are in question were done under s. 74 of the Act, 74 being the number now given to the former s. 27; the form of the section is presently as follows: "(1) The chief executive may value real or personal property for a person if the -- 16 of 27 -- 6 person asks. (2) The person must pay the prescribed fee for the valuation. (3) Any valuation under this section in respect of land may be in its unimproved state, the value of improvements, or the improved value, according to the nature of the request concerned. (4) The chief executive shall issue a certificate of valuation of any valuation made under this section. (5) The enabling of the chief executive to make any and every valuation authorised by this section to be made by the chief executive shall be a purpose of this Act and all of the provisions of this Act shall apply and extend accordingly." This is not the form which the section had at relevant times, a point to which neither side drew attention. To determine the effect it had when the valuations were done it is of course necessary to examine the section in its then form. Except for the last valuation, that of 14 December 1993, the section at the date of the valuations in issue was, as to the most relevant parts, in the following form: " (1) (i) The Valuer-General shall have power and authority to make, and shall, as and when required by any State Department or sub-Department or Crown instrumentality, make any valuation of real and/or personal property for such department, sub-department, or instrumentality. (ii) The Valuer-General may make any valuation of property as and when required by any other person. . . . (4) The Valuer-General shall issue a certificate of valuation of any valuation made under this section. (5) The enabling of the Valuer-General to make any and every valuation authorised by this section to be made by him shall be a purpose of this Act and all of the provisions of this Act shall apply and extend accordingly. " When the section was enacted, on 23 November 1944, subs. (1) was as set out above, except that "real" appeared before "property" in para. (1)(ii). The learned primary judge reached the conclusion that the appellant had no right under the Act to object to any of these four valuations. His Honour regarded it as an "important point in the -- 17 of 27 -- 7 respondent’s approach" that s. 74(4) of the Act provides for the issue of a "certificate of valuation" rather than for the issue of a notice of valuation. The judge pointed out that not all the provisions of the Act apply to a valuation under s. 74; his Honour instanced s. 42. With respect, the fact that the general provisions for objection and appeal do not apply to s. 42 does not seem to affect the appellant’s contentions; as has been mentioned above, s. 49 expressly excludes valuations made under Part 4 (which includes s. 42) from the application of Part 6. Each of Parts 4 and 6 deals with objections and appeals; the former deals with them only in relation to annual valuations. The judge then referred to the fact that s. 50 refers to a notice of valuation rather than a certificate of valuation and to the definition of "owner" in s. 7 of the Act. His Honour regarded that definition as inapplicable to valuations under s. 74. The definition of "owner" is in fact so expressed that it applies to the appellant, unless a contrary intention appears: see s. 4 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954. His Honour concluded that "the s. 74 regime is a quite special one which the legislature intended to deal with in a rather more self contained way than the other mechanisms more generally applicable to which the Act refers . . . ". His Honour thought that the legislature did not intend that after this "rather more private procedure was invoked", all the rights of objection and appeal would be available which "should flow from a more public type of valuation with which the Act is primarily concerned". One may assume that his Honour did not have placed before him s. 74 as it was at the time the first three valuations were done; in that form it does not appear to be primarily concerned with valuations of a private kind. Before returning to that topic, I shall deal with some other provisions of the Act. In discussing these, it is desirable to mention the frequency with which the Act has been amended in recent years, and the complication of the renumbering of the whole Act. I have noticed one amendment, to s. 74 itself, which requires discussion, but otherwise I have proceeded on the assumption that reprint no. 1, including amendments up to Act no. 70 of 1993, gives the form of the Act at relevant times accurately -- 18 of 27 -- 8 enough. My confidence that it does so, however, is subject to the possibility that changes which are in truth significant have been made under the Reprints Act 1992; under that statute, as I understand it, alterations to the text are to be ignored if they change the effect of what was previously said: s. 8. It has to be admitted that the history of the Act as a whole is rather complex and it is a daunting task to determine its state at relevant times; since 1 December 1990, for example, it has been amended 16 times. Working, with these qualifications, from reprint no. 1, I note that s. 13 requires the chief executive to "decide the unimproved value" of land for local government purposes; that "the unimproved value under this Act" is to be used to determine rents under the Land Act 1962 (s. 15); that under the present s. 27 "general valuations" are made at intervals of not less than five and no more than eight years; that there is a limitation under s. 28 on the power to alter a general valuation or annual valuation while it is in force, but subject to that valuations may be altered under s. 29 and under certain subsequent provisions; that under s. 33, valuations and alterations of valuations made under the Act are deemed correct until proved otherwise upon objection or appeal or until altered or further altered; that s. 37 requires the making of annual valuations; and that, as has been mentioned, Part 4, in which the provision for annual valuations appears, contains provisions for objection and appeal specific to that part. Subject to certain observations made below, these provisions do not as it seems to me throw any particular light on the question whether the rights of objection and appeal in part 6 should be held not to apply to s. 74 valuations. The argument for the respondent depended, as it seems to me, principally upon the content of a Parliamentary speech, rather than upon the proposition that to accord rights of objection and appeal to owners affected by s. 74 valuations would be inconsistent with the terms of -- 19 of 27 -- 9 other provisions in the Act. To come back to the provision in question, s. 27 (now s. 74), it will be noted that the first paragraph, as it stood when the first three valuations were made, placed an obligation on the Valuer General to make valuations required by, to put it briefly, government. Section 27 was amended so as to replace subs. (1) by the present provision, by schedule 1 of the Lands Legislation Amendment Act 1993 (Act No. 67 of 1993). The amendment to s. 27 came into force on 10 December 1993, between the date of the request for the last valuation here in question and the date of issue of the certificate of that valuation; it may not be thought perfectly clear to what extent the amendment applies to that valuation. But by reason of the provisions of s. 14C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954, it seems that one should not assume that the amendment was intended to have any substantive effect. Section 14C reads as follows: "If - (a) a provision of an Act expresses an idea in particular words; and (b) a provision enacted later appears to express the same idea in different words for the purpose of implementing a different legislative drafting practice, including, for example - (i) the use of a clearer or simpler style; or (ii) the use of gender-neutral language; the ideas must not be taken to be different merely because different words are used. " The amendment to s. 27 is contained in schedule 1 of Act No. 67 of 1993 which is headed "Consequential and Minor Amendments", but it seems clear that the amendment does not appear "to -- 20 of 27 -- 10 express the same idea in different words", within the meaning of s. 14C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954. A reader of the current version of s. 27, now s. 74, would have been inclined to think that the substantial purpose of the enactment of s. 27 was merely to enable the Valuer-General to conduct a private practice in addition to his governmental work; the history of the section, and in particular its terms until the 1993 amendment just discussed, do not support that proposition. It was submitted during the respondent’s argument that no provision of the Act attaches legal significance to a valuation made under s. 74; it was suggested that such a valuation would be likely to have practical relevance only pursuant to a contract. That view would, if accepted, tend to diminish the likelihood that Parliament could have intended a s. 74 valuation to be challengeable by objection and appeal. It is at least doubtful whether anything in the Act makes any substantive rights or obligations flow from a s. 74 valuation, but nevertheless the submission has some difficulties. First, it should be noted that the Act does not itself prescribe the legal consequences of valuations done under it, whether under s. 74 or otherwise. The effect of valuations under the Act depends, speaking generally, on the terms of other legislation to which the statute refers, for example in ss. 13, 15 and 26. Secondly, the impression created from a reading of s. 74(1) in the form it had from 1944 until 1993 is that the principal object of its enactment was to extend the scope of the Valuer-General’s duties beyond the making of valuations for the specific purposes indicated in other parts of the Act, to valuing in response to the requirements of other governmental bodies. Such a requirement could become necessary for the exercise of a specific statutory function of another governmental body or merely, as here, under a contract made by such a body. Without an exhaustive search of Queensland statute law, as well as a -- 21 of 27 -- 11 search of subordinate legislation, it would not be possible to determine in what circumstances - or indeed whether - any statutory provisions have at relevant times been so framed as expressly to attach consequences to a valuation made, as contemplated by s. 74 in the form it had at relevant times, at the behest of a governmental body. Further, there is no information on the question whether at relevant times any standard forms of contracts with governmental bodies required that valuations which might become necessary under them should be done under s. 74 of the Act. To put the point more simply, in the form it has had until very recently s. 74 provided for valuations for governmental purposes; the Valuer-General had a statutory duty to make such valuations, under s. 27, and it would not seem anomalous that citizens affected by such valuations should be able to challenge them. There was argument before us as to the intended effect of the insertion of subs. 5, in 1953, reading as follows: "The enabling of the Valuer-General to make any and every valuation authorised by this section to be made by him shall be a purpose of this Act and all of the provisions of this Act shall apply and extend accordingly." It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the true meaning of this subsection is that only those provisions which give the chief executive powers, e.g. to obtain information compulsorily and make investigations, are brought in by subs. 5. It appears to me that, as a matter of legal policy, we should not be quick to hold that a generally-expressed subsection has the effect of making the provisions of a statute applicable only insofar as they confer rights or powers on an official, while excluding any -- 22 of 27 -- 12 provisions which might inhibit the official, or give rights to the citizen; an example of the latter, mentioned during the hearing, is the obligation to preserve secrecy: s. 11. It must be said that if that was the intention, it has not been clearly expressed here. The natural reading of the sub-section, as it seems to me, is one which would make all the provisions of the Act prima facie applicable to a s. 74 valuation, except in so far as the purpose of the Act, the context or some other matter is inconsistent with that general proposition. To reach the result contended for by the respondent, one would have to treat subs. 5 as if it said: "Only such provisions of this Act apply to valuations under this section as give powers and authorities to the Valuer-General." On the face of it, such a reading bears little resemblance to the text. But Mr Gotterson QC, for the appellant, relied on terms of a speech made by the responsible Minister on the initiation in committee of the Valuation of Land Acts Amendment Bill on 3 December 1953. It was suggested by counsel for the respondent that the following passage in the Minister’s speech refers to s. 27(5): "It is also proposed . . . to extend the powers of inquiry and investigation of the Valuer- General so that his valuation for all purposes may be founded on all essential evidence necessary of the making of complete correct valuations." That explanation of the effect of s. 27(5) as enacted is so different from the text that there must be a suspicion that it referred to an earlier version of the provision. The use of extrinsic material, such as the speech to which reference has been made, is governed by s. 14B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954. The argument advanced for the respondent was to the effect that the provision is ambiguous within the meaning of s. 14B(1)(a) and therefore the extrinsic material may be used to provide an interpretation. But s. 14B(2) requires that, in determining whether -- 23 of 27 -- 13 consideration should be given to extrinsic material and in determining the weight to be given to such material, regard must be had to "the desirability of the provision being interpreted as having its ordinary meaning" - para. (a). Where the interpretation which is advanced, based on the extrinsic material, is one which would be unlikely to occur to a reader of the statute itself, it seems to me that it is prima facie undesirable to adopt as law, as we are in effect invited to do here, the language of the parliamentary speech; the tendency of the authorities is rather against that course. In re Boulton; ex parte Beane (1987) 162 C.L.R. 514 at 517 one finds, in the course of a discussion as to the relevance of a second reading speech: "The words of a Minister must not be substituted for the text of the law . . . it is always possible that through oversight or inadvertence the clear intention of the Parliament fails to be translated into the text of the law. However unfortunate it may be when that happens, the task of the Court remains clear. The function of the Court is to give effect to the rule of Parliament as expressed in the law." - per Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ. Courts have been reluctant to read a statute, on the basis of extrinsic material, in a substantially amended way, although the High Court’s decision in Coco (1994) 179 C.L.R. 427 is perhaps an example of that being done; see the discussion at pp. 444, 445. Turning away from the question of the interpretation of subs. 5, the most substantial argument in favour of the view that a s. 74 valuation cannot be challenged under the Act is that s. 74(4) wears the -- 24 of 27 -- 14 appearance of an exhaustive statement of the chief executive’s obligations with respect to notifying the result of a valuation under that section. If that construction is adopted, then s. 50 which requires notice of valuation to be given, without any qualification as to the type of valuation, should be read down so as not to apply to s. 74 valuations. But the argument is perhaps weakened by the fact that s. 74(4) is rather imprecise; it does not say to whom the certificate is to be issued, but leaves that to implication. There is of course nothing absurd, nor indeed particularly inconvenient, about applying to s. 74 valuations the notice requirement of s. 50, as an addition to the requirement of issue of a certificate in s. 74 itself. It does not seem to me that there is enough in s. 74 to justify reading into s. 50 a qualification making that section inapplicable to s. 74 valuations. -- 25 of 27 -- 15 There was some discussion before us as to the possible applicability of other sections of the Act to s. 74 valuations. It was suggested that s. 47, which requires the preparation of a valuation roll, might apply; that is unclear. Section 47(1) seems to contemplate that the roll shall set forth "each valuation" of particular pieces of land. But s. 47(2), setting out time limits for inclusion of the result of "any valuation . . . of all lands in an area" may imply that (subject to s. 48) only valuations of all lands in that area are to be included in the roll. It does not appear to me, however, to be necessary or even desirable to decide whether various provisions of the Act other than those with which the Court is directly concerned should be held to apply to s. 74 valuations. The essential point is and remains whether one should read down the generally-expressed objection and appeal provisions in Part 6 so as to exclude s. 74 valuations. Were it not for the fact that from its beginning (as s. 27) an explicit and primary function of s. 74 was to require the making of valuations for governmental purposes, I would have had more doubt about the matter. But in view of that circumstance, it appears to me that one should give sections 50 and 52 a literal reading, so as to encompass valuations under s. 74. I would therefore allow the appeal with costs, set aside the orders made below and in lieu make a declaration that the applicant was at material times entitled to be issued with a notice of each of the valuations mentioned in the originating summons, and a declaration that the applicant competently lodged each of the objections therein mentioned. I order that the respondent pay the costs of the proceedings below. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - DOWSETT J. Judgment delivered 05/03/96 -- 26 of 27 -- 16 I have read the reasons for judgment prepared by Pincus JA and am in general agreement with the orders proposed and the reasons given by his Honour. Unless a contrary intention can be found in the Act, the notice procedure prescribed by s.50 prima facie applies to a valuation under s.74. In the absence of express words, such a contrary intention will only be found if the two sections cannot operate jointly in a sensible way. I see no such conflict in the operation of the two sections. The respondent submits that s.74 compels us to read down the meaning of the word "owner" in s.50 to exclude the extended meaning given to that word by s.7, that limited effect being solely for the purposes of s.74. I cannot accept that submission. Section 7 extends the ordinary meaning to include lessees and others holding or occupying land under the Crown or some other government instrumentality. As Parliament has expressly included a lessee from a port authority in that definition, it would be necessary to find a clear contrary intention in order to hold that the present appellant is not an owner for any purpose under the Act. I can find nothing to justify that conclusion for the purposes of ss.50 and 74. -- 27 of 27 --