Ainsworth v King [1995] QCA 178

1 COURT OF APPEAL [1995] QCA 178 FITZGERALD J de JERSEY J BYRNE J Appeal No 63 of 1995 MARK WILLIAM AINSWORTH v. JAMIE IAN KING Appellant BRISBANE ..DATE 05/04/95 JUDGMENT -- 1 of 5 -- 050495 JUDGMENT 2 BYRNE J: On 18 October 1994 the police executed a search warrant at the appellant's unit in Brisbane. The appellant was asked if he had anything to declare before the search was undertaken. He produced a bowl containing a small amount of cannabis sativa, telling the police that he had purchased three to four times that amount about three weeks earlier for personal use. He said that he regularly smoked cannabis. The drug was later analysed and it was found to be cannabis. A search was conducted. It revealed a burnt and bent spoon in a toiletry bag in an en-suite near the appellant's bathroom. He told the police that he owned the spoon and that the burn marks were caused when he had applied a cigarette lighter to it on the previous Saturday to "heat up speed". The appellant was convicted of the possession of the dangerous drug methylamphetamine and of the charge of being in possession of a related utensil exclusively in reliance on the remarks to which I have referred and an electronically recorded interview. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the things which he told the police were not a satisfactory basis for a conclusion that amphetamine had been used and that the spoon was a utensil which had been used in relation to the drug. In the interview the police asked the appellant how often he had used the spoon for heating up drugs in. This conversation then occurred: -- 2 of 5 -- 050495 JUDGMENT 3 "A: Well, that particular spoon probably just once on Saturday night. Q: What sort of drug did you heat up on the spoon? A: Speed. Q: How do you go about heating it up? A: I just got the ground speed and put it in the spoon and because it doesn't dissolve properly you have to heat it up a little bit to make it all dissolve." He said that he used a cigarette lighter as the source of the heat and that once he had heated the speed he injected the substance into his right arm. The interview proceeded: "Q: Are you a regular user of speed? A: Not over the last three or four months, no. Q: How do you know it was speed that you injected? A: Well, I don't, technically." The next inquiry was with respect to the effect of the substance which had been injected. The appellant described its effects in this way, "Speeding, rushing, speeding." "Q: Would you say it was speed that you injected yourself with? A: To the best of my knowledge, yeah." The probative force of these admissions must necessarily be determined by reference to the circumstances in which they were made. As Thomas J., with the concurrence of the Chief Justice and de Jersey J., said in R v. Corones, CA No 338 of 1986, 4 March 1987: "It now seems well established that an admission by an accused person that a substance is a particular drug may be acted on provided that it is shown that the accused has a sufficient basis for his expression of opinion." Speed is, of course, notoriously a synonym for amphetamine. -- 3 of 5 -- 050495 JUDGMENT 4 The admissions made to the police disclose that this was not the first occasion on which the applicant had injected himself with such a drug. Indeed the things which he said indicate that, except in the immediately preceding three to four months, he had at some time in the past regularly used "speed". In other words the things which he said indicate a familiarity in the preparation, administration and effect of amphetamine. The interview considered as a whole indicates in my opinion that the appellant himself entertained a considered belief, based upon personal experience, that the substance which he had used and injected was a form of amphetamine. The appellant, I should add, did not give evidence - something which, in the circumstances of the case, would in my view have more readily enabled the Magistrate to conclude as he did, beyond reasonable doubt, that the evidence of the admissions made during the course of the interviews was a satisfactory base for a conclusion that the guilt of the appellant had been established. The evidence, in my view, justifies that conclusion and I would dismiss the appeal. THE PRESIDENT: I agree. de JERSEY J: I agree. -- 4 of 5 -- 050495 JUDGMENT 5 ----- -- 5 of 5 --