Coomera Resort Pty Ltd v Bond [1995] QSC 339
. - 2tr11 Sc 9SfJs;
-AJ. State Reporting Bureau
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CIVIL JURISDICTION
DOWSETT J
No 1321 of 1994
COOMERA RESORT PTY LTD
ACN O5 0 911 1 5 6
and
PAUL LEVINSON BOND
BRISBANE
.. DATE 29/11/95
JUDGMENT
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1 State Re~crnnq Bureau
IDate :l~' I · l?lI
Plaintiff
Defendant
4th Floor, The Law Courts, George Street, Brisbane. Q. 4000 Te/e(Jhone: (07) 227 4360. Facsimile: (07) 227 5532
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HIS HONOUR: The applicant before me, Paul Levinson Bond, is
the third defendant in proceedings presently pending in the
Court in which the plaintiff is Coomera Resort Pty Ltd which
is one of the respondents to the present application, or at
least appears to oppose it. The proceedings in that action
involve, among other issues, a claim by the plaintiff that the
third defendant used the fourth defendant, Land Base Holdings
Limited, for the purpose of deriving a secret commission in
breach of a duty owed by the third defendant to the plaintiff.
I need not presently say anything more about those
proceedings.
There have been previous proceedings in the Federal Court, not
involving the transaction in issue in the current proceedings,
but involving some of the same parties. That was an action in
which a company called Sanwa Homes Inc and another company
called Sanwa Homes Australia Pty Ltd sued a number of parties,
including the present applicant/third defendant and a firm of
solicitors Primrose, Couper, Cronin, Rudkin for damages and
other relief. That action has been struck out as the result
of an order for security for costs which was not complied with
by the applicants.
The order for security was obtained by Primrose, Couper,
Cronin, Rudkin on whose behalf at that time the firm Clayton
Utz was acting. Clayton Utz are the solicitors for the
plaintiff in the present action in this Court. In the course
of acting for Primrose, Couper, Cronin, Rudkin in the Federal
Court proceedings, they received certain files - a quite
substantial number of files it would seem - which were
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presumably relevant or thought to be possibly relevant to the
proceedings in that Court. The evidence indicates that the
files were in the possession of Clayton Utz for an extended
period of time, but the evidence also indicates that
only minimal reference was had to those files and that no
reference to the contents of the files was had by anybody who
is presently concerned with the prosecution of the action in
this Court.
The present applicant/third defendant seeks to restrain
Clayton Utz from continuing to act in this action. He says
that they have had access to information which was
confidential information derived by Primrose, Couper, Cronin,
Rudkin in their capacity as his solicitor, for the purpose of
giving him advice. He says that since they have become privy
to that information, he has a fear that they will misuse that
information for the purpose of advancing the cause of the
plaintiff in the present proceedings at his expense. For
present purposes, I am willing to assume that such a claim
would be one which the Court might entertain and, as a matter
of discretion, use as a base for prohibiting a solicitor from
continuing to act in these proceedings.
However, there are two obstacles which stand in the way of the
applicant's success in this application. The first is his
allegation that Primrose, Couper, Cronin, Rudkin acted for
him. He certainly asserts as much, and he asserts that the
documents which were provided to Clayton Utz contained
documents which were his. It seems that Primrose, Couper,
Cronin, Rudkin challenge that assertion because they have
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refused to give him access to the documents but, in any event,
I was not persuaded by his evidence that such firm was acting
on his behalf. He seemed to have considerable difficulty in
distinguishing between retainers on behalf of his various
companies and himself, but, even if that is not a fair
criticism, the only conversations or dealings between them to
which I have been taken in the course of the argument were
when the applicant dealt with Mr Rudkin of Primrose, Couper,
Cronin, Rudkin in the latter's capacity as both a director and
solicitor for the Sanwa companies. He seemed, in evidence, to
be very enthusiastic about asserting the relationship of
solicitor and client, but I was by no means persuaded that the
relationship existed or, at least, that it existed in any way
relevant for present purposes.
The second difficulty with the claim is that the applicant has
been singularly unable to point to specific documents which
were in the file supplied to Clayton Utz and which he claims
relate to the relationship of solicitor and client which he
asserts. He says that he is unable to do this because the
file has been returned by Clayton Utz to Primrose, Couper,
Cronin, Rudkin and the latter firm refuses him access to it.
When pressed, counsel for the applicant has done as best he
could, I am sure, in saying that the only documents which
might be relevant for present purposes are memoranda by
Mr Rudkin of advice given by him to Mr Bond and perhaps also
instructions given for the purpose of obtaining that advice.
I am willing to infer that the solicitor would probably keep
such memoranda.
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However, it is necessary, in order to be successful in these
proceedings, that the applicant satisfy me on the balance of
probabilities that such memoranda were handed over by
Primrose, Couper, Cronin, Rudkin to Clayton Utz. The
applicant seeks to do this by asserting that Mr Rudkin appears
only to have maintained one filing system and that all of
these affairs were rolled up together. I simply see no basis
for such an inference in the evidence. The only justification
is said to be that there is such a memorandum which surfaced
in the Federal Court proceedings, apparently having been
produced by the solicitors then acting on behalf of Sanwa.
The memorandum concerns an approach by Mr Bond and another man
called Deane to Mr Rudkin, but its contents suggest that Mr
Rudkin was acting not in the capacity of solicitor to Mr Bond,
but in his capacity as a director or solicitor of Sanwa.
I can see no basis for inferring that Mr Rudkin disclosed to
Clayton Utz any memoranda of advices or memoranda of
instructions received by him or given by him in connection
with any solicitor and client relationship between him and
Mr Bond. I should say that there were other documents which
the applicant asserted were confidential. However, Mr Fraser,
who appears for Clayton Utz, prepared a comprehensive response
with respect to virtually all categories of documents which
could be identified from the material and, in argument before
me today, Mr Douglas QC, who appears for Mr Bond, has accepted
those explanations in respect of all categories of documents
other than the one to which I have made specific reference,
namely memoranda of instructions and advice prepared by Mr
Rudkin.
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In those circumstances, it seems clear that the application
must fail and the motion is dismissed.
HIS HONOUR: The affidavits held by the solicitors for Clayton
Utz can be retained by the solicitor subject to the
undertaking already given, and the ones on the Court file will
be placed in an envelope and sealed and ordered not to be
opened other than by order of a Judge.
HIS HONOUR: Application is made on behalf of the solicitors
Clayton Utz for an order for costs on an indemnity basis.
They say, and there may well be substance in this, that the
application does not seem to have been properly motivated.
Some of the circumstances surrounding the way it has been
conducted, it is suggested, would justify the inference that
it was being done in such a way as to cause maximum
inconvenience and embarrassment to the firm. That may or may
not be so, but I am not persuaded that the proceedings were
motivated other than by a genuine, if misplaced, perception by
Mr Bond that his position was likely to be unfairly
compromised by the continued involvement of Clayton Utz in the
matter.
The possibility of conflict is often a very real one, and the
issue has become much more significant in recent years as the
result of amalgamation of many of the firms. Conflict and the
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appearance of conflict must be avoided at all costs in
litigation and, where there is a reasonable basis for a
suspicion, the Court will not look too closely at its
motivation. However, in the present case, I have concluded
that there is no basis for such suspicion. Nonetheless, I am
not willing to penalise the applicant by making other than the
usual order for costs. In the circumstances, I will order
that the applicant/third defendant pay the costs of the
plaintiff and of Clayton Utz of and incidental to those
proceedings. The order is to include reserved costs.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/1995/339