Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland v Queensland Cotton Corporation Limited [1995] QIRC 665 (1995) 150 QGIG 1687
1686 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETT E I 15 December, 1995
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15 December, 1995 J QUEENSLAND GOVE RNM ENT I ND USTRIAL GAZ E TTE 1687
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QUl.:LNSLA D l'IDl 'STRIA! Rt LA TIONS CO \i! MISSIO;,.
lndusma/ Relatto11s Act 1990
s. 118(2) appeal from dccision of indU',trial comm1s,1on
Australian \\'orkers' Ln1on ofl-mplo)ces. Queensland
A D
Queensland Cotton Corporation Limited
(Vo 8-166 of /995/
0 1 EE ~ I.A~ D COTTO~ CORPORA no~ I 1\111 t. D
ENTER PRI SE F LEXIBILI I\ AG R EEI\ IE:\T
(0\1MISSIONI RS BOUGOURE. Hl ·CIILY A D SWAN
30 \Jo\ em her 1995
\ppcal 10 full Bench of Commission Appeal hroughl in the
Public lntcrcs1 fnterpnse nc,ibil1t) Agreement tor Queensland
(. nuon Corporation Lumted Appro\ cd - WorJ,,.force Cons1,1ed of J
\mall Number of Pcnnancnt Fmplo)ees (24) and about 130 '.easonal
Workers "legotiauon\ for FFA onl} held \\Ith P.:nnanen1
\\orkforcc - Pennancnt Emplo)-ees Only Voted on Tenns and
Condiuons of Agreement Compliance "ith I egislJuon
I \CCptional Circumstances Established - Appeal Upheld - Refusal
10 ApprO\e implementation ofl· ntcrpmc Flex1b1lity Agreement.
Dl"CISIO\J
/\ decision ol this Commission 1S\ucd on 23 Februa11 1995, 111
mailer No EF15 of 1994. "hich approved the making of an
fntcrprisc Flex1bilit) Agreement (the Agreement/El A) bet\,cen the
Queensland Collon Corporation I imitcd and certain ol its employees
employed at couon ginncries and associated depotS at Dalb). Cecil
Plams. ~t George. bncrald and B1loela. I he Agreement was
appro\ed t,y the Queensland Industrial Relation, Conrnussion
pursuant to Di, 1s1on 3. Pan 11 of the lndusmal Relatums Act 1990
!the Act)
The respondent 111 this matter, the Australian Worker.,· Umon of
l::mployees, Queensland (A WU) (an Organisation of Employees with
constitutional CO\erage of the emplo)ec" in question) appealed this
decision to the Industrial Relatlons Coun.
In a decision of 8 AugusL 1995 (Cl6 and C l7 of 1995). the
President of the lndustrinl Re lations Court. Justice Mackenzie.
de1ennined 10 refer the mauer to a Full Bench of the Commission
pur..uan1 to s. 120 of the Act
It is rele\ ant to note that an appeal granted b} the President
under s. 120 of the Act "is not 10 be granted un less the Preside nt is of
the opinion that the matter b of such imponancc that an appeal
should be brought 111 the public interest'·.
The grounds upon "hich the appeal lies afl: those other than
error of law or excess of ju risdiction (sec s. 120(7) of the Act).
s 120(8) of the Act ,tales -
"On an appeal dul) instituted under this section the Industrial
Commission ma). b} its order -
(a) dismiss the appeal: or
(h) allo" the appeal and -
{i) set aside the decision appea led against and suhstilulc
the dec1s1on that. m us opmion. should ha,c been made.
(ii) vary as 1t considers appropriate the decis ion
appealed against;
(iii)suspend the operauon the decision appealed aga1ns1
if. being a decision ,uc h as is referred in subsection {I), it has
not alrcad) been sta}ed under secuon 121. and remit the cause.
wuh or wllhout directions. 10 the Industrial Commissioner, the
Industrial Magistrate or. as the case ma} be. the Industrial
Registrar
{A) for report 10 the Commission as constituted for the
purpoi.cs of the appeal. or
(B) lo proceed according Lt1 law;
as the Commission considers appropriate"
II is appropriate to cue some comments made b} 1he Prci.ident.
1n granting lca\e to the A \\'U to appeal this dcc1s1on 10 a Full Bench
of the Commission. as those comments provide a succinct summary
ot the h1stol') of the maucr -
"II is common ground that the operation of the business of
Queensland Cotton C:orporallon is seasonal and 1s earned on m
several widespread locations. It was also common ground that
the \\Orkforcc con\1sted of a small number of pcnnanen1
emplo)ees (24 at the time of appro, al of the EFA) and about 130
seasonal workers \\ho worked from about March to Jui) each
)Car
Negotia1ions "ith respect to the EFA ,,ere held in October
'1.o\ember 199 -1 \\hen onl) the pennancnt \\Orkforce \\as
employed. As was necessary. the l: F/\ ex tends not only 10 them
but also to ,casonal \\0rkc~ \\ho ma) be emplo) ed 111 future
~eason~. The EFA was voted upon b) the 24 pennanenl
employees in December 1994 and oppro\cd by 1.5 ,otes 10 9. It
is alleged that comparative!) seasonal \\Orkcrs arc
disadvantaged by the tenns of the FFA. II is common ground
that the appellant llnion \\35 not 1mohed m the nego11a1ion,.
being unaware of the proposal. Ju~11fica11on for non-
invol\Cmcnt of it was said to be that enquiries amongst the
pennanent \\0rkforce had foiled to reveal 311) persons m the
pennanc111 workforce were members of it. ·1 here is some
C\ idcnce that al least one ma} ha\c been a member at rclc\ant
umes notwllhstandmg the negative enquiries. There was
matenJI before the ('omm1s\loner that the llnion had an historic
connectron "Ith the a,\ard g0\Cmmg seasonal cmplo)CC~ and
contact 111 previous) cars \\ ith the respondent in that connection.
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16 88 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE ( 15 December, 1995
The principles relating to the granting of leave to appear to a
Full Bench are set out in Re: Security Industry (Contractors)
Award ( 199 1) 136 QGIG 585 . It is submitted that the applicant
is entitled to leave because an important question of principle
arises as to the appropriateness o f approval of an EFA in a case
where the workforce is swelled on a seasonal basis but th e EFA
is approved only by a significantly s ma ller group of pennanent
employees especially where it is alleged that seasonal workers
are relatively disadvantaged by the tenns of the agreement. It
was sub mi tted , and the propos ition was nol dissented from by
the respondents, that other seasonal industries may encounter
simil ar situations.
It is my vie\\ the case involves a matter of such im portance
that an appeal ought lo be brought in the public interest. The
granting of leave. of course, does not indicate any preference fo r
one view over the other so far as the merits of the appeal are
concern ed .".
We find it necessary to address the question raised by the
Preside nt as it go es lo the fact that in voting to accept the terms and
condi ti ons of the Agreement, some 24 fu ll-time employees exercised
a vote. whilst seasonal employees. who comprise the majority of the
workforce during a certain period of each year and on whom the
Agreement impacts, were excluded from this process.
The Commissioner at first instance was sa ti s fied. upon receiving
submissions from the applicant, that "A majority of employees
employed by the employer on a da te not earlier than seven days
before the application was mad e voted to accept the proposed
En terprise Flexibility Agreement (s. 180(1)) ."
A plain reading of this section shows that no more or less
occurred than a strict adaptation of this provision by the
Commissioner. At the time of the negotiation and voti ng on the
Agreeme nt , the o nl y persons to be covered by the Agreement
employed by the applicant were the 24 aforementioned employees.
1-lo,~ever. it appears from the \\Titten decision of the Commissioner
that no further consideration "as given to the facts surrounding the
disparity in numbers between those who voted fo r the agreement and
those who were excluded from the agreement.
In considering the situation regarding those employees (the
seasonal workers) whose conditions of employment are 10 be
covered by the Agreemen t. we would make the fol lowing
observations:-
We ackno\,ledge that logistical problems arose for the
emplo}er in fo nnulaung this agreement in that, at the
t im e of negotiations, seasonal workers were not
employed at the various s it es.
The industry in question is different from many
industries. The difference lies in the fact that th e bulk of
the ,,ork force in the induslr) is season al by nature. The
" high season.. for this workforce occu rs generally
between the months of March to July each year.
Therefore, on a yearly basis. this represents a regular
pauem .
Proport1onally, 84% of the "high season.. \\Orkforce are
seasonal as against 16% of the .. high season'· total being
regular, pennancnt e mployees. Of that 16%, being 24
persons. 15 voted to approve the agreement.
s 181(2)oftheActstates:-
''The Commission may refuse 10 approve implementation if
satisfied thai approv ing implementation wou ld be against the
public interest because of exceptional circumstances''.
We appreciate that at the time the vote on the agreement was
taken the employer was required by the Act to limit the vote 10 the
24 emp loyees who voted. In thi s respect there has been no non -
compliance with the Act. Whilst it may have been less convenient,
the vote could also have been arranged for the "high season" when
most casual employees were engaged.
The question which arises under s.1 81 (2) of th e Act is whether
approval would be against public interest because of exceptional
circumstances.
In relation lo public interest, it was said by Mason CJ, Wilson
and Dawson JJ in Queensland Electricity Commission and Others Ex
Pane Electrical Trades Union ofAustralia 72 ALR I at page 5:-
'·Ascenaining in any particular case of where the public interest
li es will often depend on a balancing of interests, includ in g
compelling public interests, and be very much a question of fact and
degree.''.
In relalion to the question of exceptional circumstances, in the
Enterprise Flex ibili1 y Agreement Test Case Decision at page 4 2, the
Au stralian Indus trial Relations Commission (AIRC) refers to the
submission by the ACTU in relation to situations where agreements
are made with a limited number of employees with th e intent of
subsequently applying the agreement to a much larger work fo rce. Al
page 43 of the decis ion the AIRC said :-
"The Commission will adopt a cautious approach to the use of its
power under subsection 170HC(3) having regard to the clear
legislative intent that such a power o nly be exercised in exceptional
circumstances. l loweve r. in our view it is ne ither appropriate nor
practical to defin e what would constitute exceptional circumstances.
The detennination of this issue will depend on the circumstances of
particu lar cases.".
Thus the ques ti on which we have to determine in relation to
s. 18 I(2) of the Act is a question o f fact and degree and depends on
the circumstances of the particular case. In this particular case the
\0te of the 24 fu ll-time employees "ill be binding upon about 130
seasonal workers. That in ou r view constitutes exceptional
circumstances in this particular case and furthennore we co nsider it
is against public interest that in the coniext in question such a large
number of seasonal workers should he bound by th e vole of such a
lim11cd number of full-time employees whose vote was split 15 - 9.
We are therefore satisfied that th e approval of the subject agreement
was aga inst the public interest because of exceptiona l circumstances.
Whil st a di scretion exists under s. 18 1(2) of the Act. we are c learly
satisfied, under the particular circumstances of this case. that the
decision to approve implementation of the agreement was erroneous.
It should be clearly understood that each case has to be
detennined on its 0\\11 circumstances. It must also be understood
and accepted that every agreement is, during the course of its
lifetime. li kely to cover some employees who did not take pan in the
vote.
The ci rcums tances of the instant case are more exception al th an
that. In the instant case it was well known th at a large number of
seasonal employees \\ OU!d be engaged each year in addition to the
full-lime emplo}ees. Wh ilst the make-up of the seasonal workforce
was not known, it is probable that a percentage wou ld work each
year.
In view of the decision we have made, \,e find it unnecessal'} to
consider the other submissions of the appellant. For reasons
aforementioned, pursuant to s .1 20(8) of the Act we allow the appeal.
We find some difficulty in detem1ining exactly what fonnal
order \\e should make.
The circumstances of this case are such that it is not appropriate
to accept any undertaking as to the agreemen t's terms under s. 18 3(2)
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15 December, 1995] QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE
nor to ~mend the agreement pursuant to s.183(5). It is also not
appropriate under the lastmentioned subsection for us to give the
perso~s who \\Ould be bound by the agreement an opportunity to do
what 1~ ne_cessary to enable approval since we have not made our
detcnn1? at1on on the basis of the contents of the agreement. We
cannot md1ca1e what changes to the agreement would be neccssarv
to enable approval, and a further vote by the employees at this t im~
"?uld apparently involve the same 24 employees in order to com ply
wi th the Act.
Bearing in mind the basis upon which we have detenn ined this
app~~I. our fonnal order is that we uphold the appeal. set aside the
dec1s1on appealed against and refuse to appro\ e implementalion of
the agreement.
Mr Low _ submi ts that in these circumstances we make a
rccommendauon tha1 the employer maintain wages and conditions
und~r the agreement for pennanent employees \,hilst negotiations
con11nu~ . W~ appreciate that our decision ma) cause some practical
d1f~cu_lues s mce the appellan t_ made no application to stay th e
operation of the agreemen t pending the hearing of this appeal.
Havi~g upheld the appeal, v.e consider it inappropriate to make
an) _spec ific recommendations of the nature sough t. We also
cons id er _that th ere is no practical course reasonably open to us under
the prov1s 1ons of th e Act to deal with any difficulties which arise
from the upholding of this appeal.
The Commission orders accordingly.
R.W. BOUGOURE. Commissioner.
R.E. BEC HL Y, Commissioner.
D.A. SWAN, Commissioner.
Appearances :-
Mr G. Low for The Australian Worke rs' Union of Employees,
Queensland.
Mr J Jones for Queensland Cotton Corporation L1m11ed
Operative Date: NIA
Decision - Enterpri~c Flexibilit} Agreement - Queensland Couon
Released. 30 November 1995
156666- 121
1689
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QIRC/1995/665