Duncan v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd [1995] QIRC 357 (1995) 150 QGIG 65
64 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE [ I September, 1995 I September, 19951 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 65
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QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
Industrial Relations Act 1990
s. 295 - application for reinstatement
Dennis Allan Duncan
AND
ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd
(No. 8861 of 1995)
CHIEF INDUSTRJAL COMMISSIONER HALL
155224-5
18 August I 995
Application for Reinstatement - Transfer of Employee - Identity of
Employer - Dismissal or Separation by Agreement - No Valid
Reason - No Procedural Fairness - Long Serving Employee -
Compensation A warded.
DECISION
Dennis Allan Duncan is a 46 year old married man with
dependent children. lie commenced his career as a painter. On or
about 1975/76 Mr Duncan commenced employment with what he
seems to regard as the ICl!Dulux Group. He was initially employed
as a Shop Assistant at a Paint 'n ' Paper Store at Stones Comer, a
suburb of the City of Brisbane. Mr Duncan steadily rose through the
ranks. By 1988 he was the group 's heavy duty industrial coatings
representati ve in th e City of Townsville. At about t11at time the
Berger/British Paints Group was taken over by the ICJ/Dulux Group.
Some staff rationalisation followed shortly thereafter. In particular,
Mr Duncan was offered a redundancy payment. Mr Duncan tells me
that he had succeeded in soliciting an offer from another company
dealing in paint. He was not cross-examined on that answer and I
accept i t. In the event, Mr Duncan d id not receive a redundancy
payment and did not accept the offer from the other paint company.
His then immediate supervisor (Mr Millisan) drew his attention to a
vacancy within the !Cl/Dulux Group in Papua New Guinea. Mr
Duncan to ld Mr Miligan that he would "go to Papua New Guinea"
and "have a look''. He told Mr Miligan that if he liked what he saw
he would accept the position in Papua New Guinea. If he did not
like what he saw he would accept the offer from the other paint
company. Presumably, Mr Duncan did like what he saw. He did
take up the vacancy in Papua New Guinea.
I have hitherto utilised the expression ICJ/Dulux Group. I have
done so because it seems tolerably clear to me that Mr Duncan has
not come to grips with the doctrine of corporate personality.
However, he does allege that wh ilst based in Australia he was
employed by !Cl Australia Operations Ply Ltd. As is commonly the
case in this Commission, the Respondent has not exercised its right
to file a Response. I cannot avoid noticing that t11c Respondent has
not disputed that ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd was Mr Duncan 's
employer until he moved to Papua New Guinea. The Respondent
was plainly in a position to explain the corporate structure of t11e
group. It seems to me that in the circumstances I should proceed on
the basis that fCI Australia Operations Pty Ltd was the employer of
Mr Duncan until such time as he went to Papua New Guinea.
At the time when Mr Duncan went to Papua New Guinea two
corporations within the group were conducting operations in that
country, viz !Cl Dulux Papua New Guinea Pty Ltd and British Paints
(PNG) Pty Ltd. The latter corporation had of course come into the
group a5 part of the take over to which I have previously referred.
Shortly after Mr Duncan commenced working from the offices
of IC! Dulux Papua New Guinea Pty Ltd in the city of Lae he
received a letter purporting to set forth t11e tenns of his engagement.
It is a letter which, I musl confess, I find it more than a little difficult
to comprehend. The letter is on the letterhead of !Cl Dulux Papua
New Guinea Pty Ltd. It is addressed to Mr Dennis Duncan Cl- ICI
Dulux PNG Pty Ltd, PO Box I 105, Lae. If one stops there, the
natural conclusion would be that IC! Dulux Papua New Guinea Pty
Ltd was the em ployer. One cannot stop there. One must read the
entire letter. The first paragraph is in the following tem1s:
"This letter fonnal ly confinns your appointment as Sales
Manager, British Paints (PNG) Pty Ltd, based in Lae."
That passage on il~ face indicates that the employer is British
Paints (PNG) Pty Ltd, unless one commences to muse why !Cl
Dulux Papua New Guinea Pty Ltd is formally confinning Mr
Duncan's appointment as the Sales Manager of British Paint (PNG)
Pty Ltd. The next paragraph takes the mailer further. It says:
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66 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE [ 1 September, 1995
"This is an initial appointment to get you into Papua New
Guinea by the quickest way which in this case is to use an
existing approved position in that company.".
The reference to "approved position" is given content by a
paragraph which appears subsequently on the first page of the letter.
It appears that the appointment of Australian citizens to positions in
Papua New Guinea required approval by the PNG Department of
Labour and Employment. A willingness to use corporate seals as
convenient hosts is plainly apparent. At the bottom of the page the
letters DULUX appear inside a box resembling a 1950 surfboard
with the ends sawn off. The words which appear next to the box are
"Reg. Trademark ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd". One's natural
inclination is to wonder whether the vehicle of convenience policy
extended so far that ICI Dulux Papua New Guinea Pty Ltd and
British Paints (PNG) Pty Ltd were both discharging functions in
relation to Mr Duncan on behalf of ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd
which at all times remained the actual employer. Such an
arrangement is by no means unusual. Compare Morgenstern,
International Conflicts of Labour Law, 1984 International Labour
Organisation Publications at 63, "a triangular relation, with one
undertaking normally responsible for the supervision of the work and
for carrying out the obligations of the employer at the workplace and
a second responsible for tenure of employment, for wages and for
Social Security, is now recognised in a number of countries as
typical of personnel leasing. Within groups of companies, also, a
division of the responsibilities of lhe employer between two or more
entities is not uncommon-··".
There are other factors which suggest that the true employer
remained ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd. At paragraph 3 of the
letter the expression "when we have completed integration of the two
companies" appears. The two companies referred to are plainly the
two New Guinea companies. The plural pronoun "we'' can only
refer (inaccurately) to ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd. The
purported terms of the arrangement refer to the ''company". That
reference appears to be to ICI Operations Australia Pty Ltd. The
relocation expenses clause encourage Mr Duncan to use ''the
company's current contractors" and advised him to obtain names of
same from the Personnel Officer in the Brisbane suburb of Rocklea.
Of the three entities, ICI Australia Operations Pty. Ltd. was most
likely to have Australian contractors. Further. the termination clause
contains, inter alia, the following passages:
"This is a term appointment to the position described with !Cl
Dulux PNG Pty Ltd. The parent company, ICI Australia Ltd has
no obligation to accept the employee into the company in
Australia.
After the original contract period is completed, the employee
may wish to put himself forward for a position with a parent
company. if such position was available he'll be considered in
the light of performance, experience and skills with other
candidates at that time:·.
If indeed the contracting patties were ICI Dulux Papua New
Guinea Pty Ltd and Mr Duncan, one might wonder at the inclusion
within the contract of terms going to a relationship between Mr
Duncan and ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd. By way of
explanation, the Respondent's sole witness, (Mr Lynch) gives
evidence that is the practice for ICI Dulux PNG Pty Ltd to disclose
to ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd the terms upon which local staff
of ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd have been ·'taken into Papua
New Guinea''. which I hope is a neutral phrase, and to take advice
upon the terms of those contracts from that company. It seems to me
that at least as to the matter of repatriation the inference is resistible
that ICI Dulux Papua New Guinea Pty Ltd was acting as an agent for
ICI Australia Operations Ply Ltd.
Extrinsic evidence is admissable to ascertain whether or not a
party to an agreement was acting as an agent for another, see
Gilberto v Kenny (1983) 48 ALR 620 and also 771e Swan (968] 1
Lloyds LR5. The subjective intentions and assertions of the parties
are, of course, irrelevant in determining their relationship, Connelly v
Wells (1994) 54 IR 73.
There are certain factual matters which indicate that at all times
ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd was the employer.
When Mr Duncan moved from Townsville to Lae he was not
paid any money in respect of accrued entitlements to Long Service
Leave. Given Mr Duncan's length of service (in excess of 10 years)
s. l 7(2)(b) of the then the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act
1961 operated to give him an entitlement to a proportionate sum. if
indeed his employment was terminated.
Mr Lynch, who was Mr Duncan's immediate superior at the time
of the alleged dismissal, gave evidence that he was "the country
manager for ICI Dulux in Papua New Guinea" and that he had been
employed with ICI "for 15 years". As a matter of mathematics the
15 year period has to include Mr Lynch's service in Papua New
Guinea. He refers to ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd a<; "the
company" and refers to himself as having been "seconded" to Papua
New Guinea.
The materials supplied to Mr Duncan relating to his "notional
salary, for superannuation and for return homes purposes" was
generated within the Melbourne based business services group of ICI
Australia Operations Pty Ltd. It is accompanied by a memorandum
which refers to Mr Duncan as a "secondee·'. The actual figures
appear on a page headed "calculation to detern1ine secondment
remuneration".
It seems to me that in the circumstances of this case the
conclusion that ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd was the true
employer at all material times is inescapable. I accept that Mr
Duncan was carrying out activities in Papua New Guinea for ICI
Dulux Papua New Guinea Pty Ltd and was under the supervision and
control of persons who held various appointments within that
corporation. It may well be that if the question of vicarious liability
arose IC] Dulux Papua New Guinea Pty Ltd would (rightly) be held
to be the employer. It does not follow that ICI Dulux Papua New
Guinea Pty Ltd was the employer for the purposes of Division 5 of
Part 12 of the Industrial Relations Act 1990. In Denham v Mid/um
Employers Mutual Assistance Ltd [1955] 2QB437, at 443-444
Denning LJ (as he then was) said: "Much of the difficulty which
surrounds this subject arises out of the 19 century conception that a
servant of the general employer may be transferred to a temporary
employer so as to become for the time being the servant of the
temporary employer. That conception is a very useful device to put
liability on the shoulders of the one who should probably bear it, but
it does not affect the contract of service itself. No contract of service
can be transferred from one employer to another without the servants
consent: and this consent is not to be raised by operation of law but
only by the real consent in fact of the man, express or implied: see
Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Colliery Ltd. In none of the
transfer cases which have been cited to us has the consent of the man
been sought or obtained. The general employer has simply told him
to go and do some particular work for the temporary employer and
then he is gone. The supposed transfer, when it takes place, is
nothing more than the device a very convenient and just device,
mark you to put liability onto the temporary employer; ••• it is a
device designed to cast liability on the temporary employer. The
real basis of the liability is, however, simply this: if a temporary
employer has the right to control a manner in which a labourer does
his work, so as to be able to tell him the right way or and the wrong
way to do it, then he should be responsible when he does it the
wrong way as well as in the right way. The right of control carries
with the burden of responsibility.".
16223_1.DOC
1 September, 1995] QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 67
See also Savory v Holland and Hannen and Cubitts (Southern)
Limited [1964] I WLR 1158 at 1165, "The doctrine of master and
servant pro /we vice today seems to me to be relevant only to a
question of vicarious liability" per Dip!ock LJ.
Before proceeding to the circumstances in which Mr Duncan's
employment terminated, it is necessary that I say something further
about the terms of his engagement.
By the letter to which I have previously referred at some length,
Mr Duncan's initial period of appointment was fixed at 2 years
"subject to review and continued approval by the PNG Department
of Labour and Employment''. It is further asserted "subject to the
above and performance. the appointment may be renegotiated on an
annual basis thereafter". In fact, from time to time, the contract was
extended. It was most recently extended in September 1993. It was
extended to 3 August 1995. Clause 17 of a letter dated 10 September
1993 from ICI Dulux Papua New Guinea Pty Ltd, to which I have
nut referred on the question of identity of the employer because it
seems to me to add nothing, is in the following terms:
"On completion of your contract, there may be the opportunity
of placement with ICI Australia. However, this is dependent on
satisfactory performance during the contract period, and
employment opportunities available at the time of termination.
In the event of your terminating within the original contract
period or within the agreed period of extension the company
reserves the right to withhold the costs of return airfares and
return of personal effects to the place to which you are
returning., •.
It is submitted by Mr Bedford who appears for the Respondent
that because the introductory paragraph of a letter of I O September
1993 asserts that the letter "confirms the current conditions of
employment", clause 17 does not modify the repatriation provisions
of the 19 July 1988. I am content to accept that where the parties to
a contractual arrangement summarise their understanding of that
upon which it is that they have agreed, regard should (must?) be had
to the summary in resolving uncertainty and ambiguity. I am not
content to accept that the terms of the letter accompanying a contract
control the subsequent clauses to the point of prevailing over express
words. I accept Mr Bedford's submission that clause 17 makes it
plain to Mr Duncan that he is not guaranteed placement with ICI
Australia Operations Pty Ltd upon return to Australia. However,
clause 17 is part of the contract and in my view is to be construed as
a contractual promise to grant Mr Duncan the opportunity of
placement with ICI Australia Operation Pty Ltd if an employment
opportunity 1s available al the time of termination of the New Guinea
engagement and Mr Duncan's performance has been satisfactory
during the period of that engagement. In the light of subsequent
events, the construction of clause 17 became significant.
Mr Lynch went to Papua New Guinea in 1993. Ile took with
him knowledge which Mr Duncan did not have and which Mr
Duncan did not acquire. Mr Lynch was aware that ICI Australia
Operations Pty I ,td had taken the policy decision that henceforth
staff seconded to Papua New Guinea would not be granted an
extension on the initial ( or current) engagement. While Mr Lynch
did not disclose that information to Mr Duncan, he did have
discussions with Mr Duncan about Mr Duncan's career prospects.
For reasons which it is not necessary here to explore, Mr I ,ynch
decided that Mr Duncan would best serve his (Mr Duncan's)
interests by "getting out of Papua I\ew Guinea". He told Mr Duncan
so. L'ltimately, at a meeting in Wewak on or about later
October/Early November 1994 Mr Lynch and Mr Duncan reached an
agreement about Mr Duncan's future. Mr Duncan's evidence. as I
understand it, is that he agreed to leave his New Guincan
employment and to return to Australia by the end of March 1995
subject to his being found a job with ICI Australia Operations Pty
Ltd or to his having found a suitable position with another Australian
employer. Lengthy cross-examination ultimately induced Mr Lynch
to say that his understanding was that Mr Duncan had agreed to
leave his New Guinea employment and to return to Australia if found
a job with ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd, or if he (Mr Duncan)
found himself a suitable position with another employer in Australia,
and that he (Mr Lynch) agreed that if Mr Duncan did find a suitable
position with another Australian employer he would be released
early from his employment in order to take up the position. Mr
Lynch says that the discussion did not touch upon what would
happen if ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd did not find a position for
Mr Duncan and Mr Duncan did not find one for himself. There was
of course no reason for the parties to enter into an agreement upon
that matter. There is no lacuna. If Mr Duncan failed to find
alternative employment and ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd was
unable to find Mr Duncan a position, the agreement entered into in
September 1993 would simply run its course and come to an end on
3 August I 995.
In fact ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd did not find a position
for Mr Duncan. In fact Mr Duncan did not find employment with an
alternative employer. In fact Mr Duncan's employment came to an
end on I O April 1995. What substantially occurred, or so it seems to
me, is that the Respondent wrongly asserted that the agreement was
that Mr Duncan would leave at the end of March in any event, and
insisted upon performance of that agreement. The Respondent
shored up its position, once again wrongly in my view, by asserting a
contractual agreement that Mr Duncan had no right to placement
with ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd in any circumstances. In the
end Mr Duncan's resistance was overcome. He left Papua New
Guinea. If the purpose of the Respondent's conduct was to lay a
basis for an argument that the engagement came to an end by mutual
agreement and that there was no dismissal within the meaning of
Division 5 of Part 12 of Industrial Relations Act 1990, the
Respondent did not achieve its object. No particular terms of art are
required to indicate notice of termination of employment Walnsley v
Ferguson Ltd [1989] IRLR 112 at 114. It was plain that Mr Duncan
did not wish to leave his employment and depart from New Guinea
and that the Respondent was insisting that he do so. In any event by
a letter from the Group General Manager (Mr Walker) dated 24
January 1995 - and I might add posted from Victoria - Mr Duncan
was informed that the Respondent ''after discussions with Mr Brian
Lynch, has agreed that you finish your employment with ICI Dulux
PNG Pty Ltd effective from 31 March 1995. Should you require any
assistance in tem1s of time off to job search, I am sure Brian will be
helpful"
There was no valid reason for dismissal. There is evidence of
some dissatisfaction by Mr Lynch and by previous supervisors with
Mr Duncan's ability to organise and to plan. Whether there was any
factual basis for the dissatisfaction the evidence has not enabled me
to say. But that dissatisfaction is irrelevant. The evidence was that
because of that dissatisfaction Mr Duncan was denied promotion.
There is no evidence that the short-comings (if there were any) were
thought by anyone to justify dismissal. Indeed, if they had been
thought to justify dismissal. one wonders why so much effort was
put into securing Mr Duncan's "agreement" to leave and to insisting
upon performance of the ·'agreement". Further. although the short-
comings were put to Mr Duncan, they were always put to him as a
reason for his failure to advance. At no time was it brought home to
Mr Duncan that the short-comings (if there were any) placed his
employment in peril. There is a dear denial of the opportunity to
defend vested by s.292( l) compare Johns v Gunns Ltd. unreported,
No. TI-J48R of 1994, 18.5.95, at 26 per Northrop J. It is
unnecessary for the purpose of this case to examine whether non-
compliance with s. 292(1) will always breach 291(2)(a). In this case
the Respondent drew the Applicant into an agreement by which he
gave much and received little, misrepresented the effect of the
agreement and earlier contractual arrangements and by force of will
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68 QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE [1 September, 1995
drove the Applicant from his place. The d ismissal was unjus t. No
reasons may be valid. s. 291 (2)(a).
The remedy of reinstatement here is quite impracticable. A
reinstatement order puts the employee in the same position as the
employee would have been in if a dismissal had not occurred. Here,
that cannot be done. Mr Duncan 's engagement would in any event
have expired with the efluxion of time on 3 August 1995. This
matter was not called for hearing until 2.15 p. m. on IOAugust 1995.
In those circumstances I consider it my duty to order the Respondent
to pay to the applicant an amount by way of compensation in order
that, so far as the payment of money may do it, the Applicant may be
placed in the position which he would have occupied if dismissal had
not occurred.
If a dismissal had not occurred Mr Duncan's employment would
have continued until 3 August 1995. The possibility that he might
have been found a job with ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd or have
found himself a position with another employer may be put aside.
The Responden t's evidence is that at no time over that period has a
position suited to Mr Duncan' s talents been available with IC(
Australia Operations Pty Ltd. Driven by unemployment and tlie
need to provide for his family, Mr Duncan has been unable to find
alternative employment. There is no reason to believe that he would
have been any more successful if he had made his enquiries from
Papua New Guinea. Further, even if Mr Duncan's employment had
continued unt il 3 August 1995 he wou ld, if not repatriated to a
pos ition witl1 ICJ Australia Operations Pty Ltd, had had the
opportunity to test !CJ Australia Operations Pty. Ltd's conclusion
that no su itable position was available in an action for breach of
contract. And I must say that on the evidence before me, I have
some reservations about the conclusion that no suitable position has
been available in the period since l OApril 1995. Mr Duncan. it
must be remembered, is a long serving employee. On balance. I
consider this to be a case which I am justified in awarding th e
Applicant a substantial sum. It is agreed between the parties that J
should proceed on the basis that Mr Duncan 's notional salary was
$A46,057 plus $525 leave loading. I order that the Respondent ICJ
Operations Australia Pty Ltd pay to the Applicant Dennis Alan
Duncan the sum of $20,250.
Dated this eighteenth day of August, 1995.
D.R. HALL. Chief Industrial Commissioner.
Appearances:-
Mr T. Bradley. of Minter Ellison for the Applicant.
Mr R. Bedford, for the Respondent.
Operative date: 21 August 1995
Decision - Compensation Awarded
Released: 18 August 1995
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I September, 1995] QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 69
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QIRC/1995/357