Falconer v Chief Executive, Department of Lands [1995] QLC 27

LAND COURT BRISBANE 28 April 1995 Re: Appeal against a valuation. Caloundra Local Government Valuation of Land Act 1944 (AV93-238) Paul O and Enid J Falconer v. Chief Executive, Department of Lands (Hearing at Maroochydore) DECISION This is an appeal against the determination by the Chief Executive, Department of Lands of the unimproved value of Lot 26 on RP 96742 Parish of Bribie, in the sum of $49,500 for the purposes of the annual valuation of the area as at 31 March 1992. The appellants valued the lot at $43,685 on grounds going to relativity. The subject lot is a regular shaped lot of 582m2 and is situated at 7 Beausang Street, Caloundra, about 600 metres north of the Caloundra Post Office. The lot is an elevated lot rising from the road. It is zoned residential B but is used exclusively for single unit residential purposes. In these circumstances the Act requires that the land be valued for that purpose and without regard to any higher and better use as may be obtained under the zoning of the land as residential B. The valuation was thought to have issued in the sum of $50,000. The appellants objected to the valuation on one ground which reads as follows - "The adjoining property Lot 25/RP96742 <4429/0017> has an area of 584m2 - larger by 2m2 with a previous valuation of $38,000, identical to ours at Lot 26. It now has a lower valuation. " The appellants contended that the valuation should be "$49,000 or less". Lot 25 for the purposes of this annual valuation was valued at $49,500 (refer Annexure A). The objection was disallowed. Mr PO Falconer, who appeared on behalf of himself and Mrs Falconer, among other things was of the opinion that the decision on objection was deficient in that no reasons were given. It seems to me however, in view of the narrowness of the objection and the result, that reasons may [1995] QLC 27 -- 1 of 4 -- -- 2 of 4 -- 2 justifiably have been considered unnecessary by the decision-making officer. Annexure A sets out the values applied to lots in Beausang Street and where relevant identifies lots which have been developed under the zoning as residential B. Lots which have been considered by the appellants for the purposes of the exercise in relativity are - Lot 25 - adjoining - valued at $49,500 Lot 27 - adjoining - valued at $47,500 Lot 20 - opposite by one lot - valued at $43,500 The relativity between Lot 26 and the adjoining Lots 25 and 27 was not pressed by Mr Falconer. It is clear that a consideration of the applied values between these lots and the subject lot would not assist the appellants' case. I turn then to the evidence dealing with Lot 20. The evidence of Mr Falconer is as follows - "(A) Comparing LOT 26 with LOT 20 on an area basis the former is just 2.5m2 larger yet the comparative valuation per square metre is $85.095 versus $75.103. That is nearly $10.00 per m2 difference to our disadvantage. How can this be justified? (B) The building on LOT 20 is two storey with a garage and additional living area below. The building on our LOT 26 is smaller with a garage. Considering this the valuation increase on LOT 20 should be less than LOT 26 and if one takes into consideration the relative re-sale values the house with larger living and garage facilities should obtain a higher re-sale value. (C) On a $75.103/m2 LOT 26 would be more correctly valued at $43,687. NOT $49,500. (D) The house on LOT 26 was on the market for a period subsequent to 1992 and elicited no buyers at an asking price of $145,000. F.A.I. our insurers in 1993-94 valued the house at $127,200 and we did not dispute this in 1994. If the property which was constructed in 1988 were to sell at a hypothetical figure of $140,000 then the U/V of the land is 140,000-127,200 which is $12,800. Now that was in 1993-94 so how does the valuer justify his figure of $49,500 in 1992? Does the U/V have any relevance at all? " Mr RK Monteith who wrote the valuation on behalf of the Chief Executive sees the position differently. He says and it is not in dispute that Lot 26 rises from the road whereas Lot 20 falls from the road. It is agreed that both lots are used for single unit -- 3 of 4 -- 3 residential purposes. Mr Monteith however says that Lot 20 has unit development adjoining on Lot 21 and that this has a depreciatory effect on the value of Lot 20 for single unit residential purposes. In his opinion the subject lot is more elevated than Lot 20 (being on or near the crest of the rise running up from Lot 20) and topographically is better. The relativity in his opinion is correct. If I may put this evidence beside the test which must be applied in ascertaining unimproved value - that being to ascertain the sum which the subject lot and in this case Lot 20 would fetch in the marketplace at the relevant date assuming that the lots were unimproved and sold on such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona fide seller would require - I am led to the conclusion that a prudent buyer, given a choice between Lot 20 and the subject lot, would prefer the subject lot. Further, it is a well-established principle of valuation that comparisons of "like with like" if available are by far the better evidence. In terms of relativity this sort of evidence is found in the lots adjoining Lot 26. Lot 20 in my opinion is not a good basis for testing relativity in the subject case. In the comparisons made by Mr Falconer there are elements which do not conform with the test I have stated. These matters touch on the relevance of improvements or improved sales, comparisons on a per square metre basis when valuing single unit residential lots and generally in terms of relativity. Mr Monteith led evidence of sales situated in Maltman Street North and in Queen Street. He said that the sale of Lot 21 in Beausang Street which was raised by Mr Falconer could not be considered as the land was purchased for unit development. The lot in fact sold for $62,500 in 1990 or 1991. In the absence of sales of residential A land in the immediate vicinity of the subject lot, he applied the above sales which relatively speaking are within a valuer's reach of the subject lot. His evidence dealing with the sales and their worth as bases for valuing land in Beausang Street was in my opinion undisturbed by cross-examination. Under the Act it is provided that an appellant is limited to the grounds stated in the appeal and that the burden of proof is upon the appellant. On the evidence in the subject case I find that the appellants have failed to discharge the onus placed upon them under the Act of proving that the value is incorrect on the grounds relied upon. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed and the determination of the Chief Executive is affirmed. President of the Land Court -- 4 of 4 --